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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis reports the results of a case study conducted in a Portuguese 
manufacturing organisation, a part of a large group, which endured profound 
organisational changes. The initial objective of the research was to explore, in a 
processual way, the long-term interactions between an Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) system, the consultants that implemented it and management accounting and 
control, in this organisation. However, during the fieldwork, the researcher was 
confronted with an apparent puzzle: in the past, formally powerful ‘central’ actors had 
been confronted with important limitations – including in their relations with formally 
less powerful actors, particularly ‘local’ actors at the plant level. At the time of the 
fieldwork, however, the situation had substantially changed. The researcher was 
therefore confronted with a puzzle, which seemed to be about the distribution of power 
in the organisation, about who the powerful actors were and, more fundamentally, what 
caused (or limited) actors’ relational power. 
Three innovations introduced by central actors appeared to have played an 
important role in this fundamental change in the organisation and in the distribution of 
power within it. At stake were a technological innovation – the adoption of the financial 
module of an ERP system (SAP FI) – and two organisational innovations: the relocation 
of the Corporate Centre (CC); and the creation of a Shared Services Centre (SSC), in 
the same location of the group headquarters and of the Chairman and majority 
shareholder. 
Clegg’s (1989) framework of ‘Circuits of Power’, based on a Foucauldian and 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) approach, was drawn upon as interpretive lenses to 
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address the empirical puzzle about power. The researcher’s mobilisation of the 
framework facilitated the understanding of what caused (or limited) actors’ relational 
power, not only in the past but, particularly, at the time of the fieldwork, when the on-
going repercussions of the three innovations were taking place. Such in-depth 
understanding was constructed through a qualitative, interpretive and processual 
research, adopting the method of an explanatory case study combining both 
retrospective and longitudinal components. During the three-year’ fieldwork, 54 
interviews with 29 respondents, lasting more than 90 hours, were supplemented by 
other information generating techniques, such as documentation analysis and 
observation of meetings, presentations and artefacts in numerous socio-technical 
interactions. 
The researcher’s interpretation of the case study insights highlighted that the 
previous power limitations perceived by the formally powerful, ‘central’ actors could be 
traced to characteristics of the circuit of social integration (rules of meaning and 
membership across the organisation, as interpreted, accepted and enacted by actors) and 
of the circuit of system integration (techniques of discipline and production). The three 
technical and organisational innovations – SAP FI, the CC and the SSC - introduced by 
central actors in the circuit of system integration (conceptualised, in ANT terms, as non-
human and collective actors, respectively) had significant repercussions across the 
various circuits of power. These repercussions had a structural nature, since the 
innovations collectively succeeded in giving rise to a network of complementary, 
mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing Obligatory Passage Points. The emerging 
network of Obligatory Passage Points was essential in promoting the introduction, 
interpretation, acceptance and enactment of rules across the organisation as desired by 
central actors.  
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This thesis proposes several contributions concerning the repercussions of the 
collective of innovations across the circuits of power. Some examples are embedding 
rules in technology (Volkoff et al., 2007) and organisational processes, redefining the 
scope of agencies, creating non-zero sum outcomes, and the emergence of the 
perception of control inevitability and naturalness within organisational normalcy. 
Collectively, these innovations promoted rules enactment (by both human and non-
human actors) in ways that benefited the interests of central actors. 
In addition, this thesis proposes contributions related with the two theoretical 
frameworks and literatures framing the research. It proposes several refinements to 
Clegg’s (1989) framework, comprising changes in its graphical layout, linkages and 
even concepts. The second contribution is an ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-based 
action. This model draws on Burns and Scapens’ (2000) macro structure and concepts, 
but it proposes additional structures and substantially different perspectives, 
mechanisms and even concepts. It adopts a wide definition of rules, also viewing them 
as internal structures orienting actors. Thus defined, rules underlie routines and fill a 
gap in routines-focused frameworks – in particular, when there are no established 
routines as regards particular issues. The model acknowledges intra-organisational 
diversity and focuses on the processes of introduction, interpretation, acceptance and 
enactment of rules. It also relates rules with material conditions, in particular since rules 
may be technologically and organisationally embedded. Finally, the model highlights 
that rules may be enacted by both human actors (individual and collective) and non-
human actors. The model provides a novel way to conceptualise how actors’ interests 
may be achieved through the various intersections between rules and material 
conditions, and by the ultimate enactment of rules by both human and non-human 
actors. 
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1.1 Theoretical and empirical research options – setting the scene 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH OPTIONS – 
SETTING THE SCENE 
This thesis developed out of the goal to contribute to a research programme 
towards an in-depth understanding of organisational dynamics, by researching particular 
organisations. Organisational change has consistently remained as a central concern 
among both academics and practitioners, and a topic characterised by complex, 
opposing and paradoxical interplays. External and internal pressures towards change (or 
stability, or a combination of both) become enmeshed within particular organisational 
settings. Localised and idiosyncratic processes continuously unfold and entangle a wide 
range of actors, whose preferences, interests, actions and power - and indeed the very 
nature of those actors – remain controversial topics across numerous research streams.  
This research intends to provide a contribution to the very wide field of 
organisational change, by focusing on a particular topic: power – and, specifically, how 
the power of actors across a particular organisation had changed during the previous 
two decades. Such was not, however, the original research topic. This first section 
introduces this thesis, by providing a brief account of the research process and how the 
research topic and theoretical frameworks emerged, within a flexible research strategy. 
Then, the second section states the research objectives and the third section outlines the 
structure of the thesis. 
This research was initially designed to explore, in a processual way, the long-
term interactions between an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, the 
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consultants that implemented it and management accounting and control, in a particular 
organisation. Vast research has highlighted the complex repercussions of ERPs in 
organisations, including in the management accounting and control area (see Ribeiro 
and Oliveira, 2009 for a review, and Benders et al., 2006; Caglio, 2003; Chapman, 
2005; Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005; Dillard et al., 2005; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005; 
Rautiainen, 2009; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003 for examples of processual research 
drawing from various theoretical lenses). In addition, the potential long time lag of 
ERPs in producing effects (in organisations and in the management accounting and 
control area) had also been suggested (Granlund and Malmi, 2002), leading to the 
awareness that research on ERPs should consider of a long-term perspective.  
Consultancy has also been attracting increasing attention (e.g., Pellegrinelli, 
2002; see contributions in Buono, 2004a, in Clark and Finchan, 2002 and in the special 
issue introduced by Sturdy et al., 2009). The literature proposes very distinct 
perspectives on the impact of consultancy on organisations (e.g., the functionalist and 
critical strands, as identified in Hellgren et al., 2004). However, there is agreement that 
consultants are typically unavoidable, in various degrees and areas, to implement ERPs 
in organisations (Boonstra, 2006; Fahy, 2001; Ko et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2009).  
Consultancy and ERPs also share a characteristic that highlights the relevance of 
studying these topics: both are multi-billion euros industries (Buono, 2004b; 
Wickramasinghe, 2008).  
Therefore, an in-depth, processual, case-based research focusing on the 
intersection of the three areas, and with a particular concern on the long-term 
interactions, seemed relevant, innovative and timely (see subsection 4.1.3 for more 
details). 
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From a theoretical perspective, institutional theory, and Old-Institutional 
Economics (OIE) in particular, has been promisingly used to research change in 
management accounting and control and, in general, organisational change within 
particular organisational settings. The OIE perspective has also been used to explore 
how external factors can affect organisations, taking into consideration their particular 
contexts and characteristics. Therefore, initial research efforts were shaped by an OIE 
perspective, and in particular by the OIE-framework of Burns and Scapens (2000). 
According to such view, the introduction of an ERP system and the consultants’ 
intervention were conceptualised as “‘external’ changes” (Burns and Scapens, p. 10), 
i.e., external factors potentially promoting organisational change. However, no 
technological determinism (Markus and Robey, 1988) was implicit in this preliminary 
empirical conceptualisation and starting point, since organisational repercussions were 
anticipated to be highly influenced by the specific context and characteristics of the 
particular empirical setting to be researched. 
Consistently with the concern about considering specific characteristics of 
particular organisations and the need to develop an in-depth understanding and a 
processual view of organisational changes, this study adopted an interpretive 
methodology and, consistent with this, a qualitative approach and, in particular, opted 
for an explanatory case study (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009). In order to suit the research 
objective, the key criterion for selecting the case organisation was having had 
implemented an ERP system in the financial area with the assistance of consultants for a 
significant number of years. A large Portuguese manufacturing organisation, 
anonymised as ‘IndCo’, with an industrial presence in several countries and part of a 
wider group, was selected (see details of the selection process in chapter 4). In 1999, 
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this organisation had implemented accounting functionalities from the ERP market 
leader SAP (SAP FI), with the assistance of external consultants. When the fieldwork 
started in 2005, it was still on an on-going process of designing and implementing 
additional SAP modules. Therefore, the empirical setting seemed to be particularly 
adequate to investigate the research question. The fieldwork focused on the long-term 
interactions between the ERP, consultants and the management accounting and control 
area, exploring the (mostly intra-organisational and intra-group) context in which 
repercussions of the external factors unfolded. Given the ambition of constructing a 
holistic understanding of the case, a wide range of topics related with the research 
question were also approached during the fieldwork. 
However, an interview with a senior respondent triggered a profound reflection 
on what came to be considered an empirically fundamental, and also theoretically 
relevant, aspect of the long-term evolution in this organisation: how the power of actors 
across the organisation had changed over the previous two decades. The trigger to the 
research refocus was this respondent’s account about the motivations to ‘create’ a 
Corporate Centre (CC) in Portugal, approximately at the same time the SAP project 
started and a large international acquisition was carried out (see section 6.2). This 
respondent stressed that this change in the organisational structure was far more than a 
‘rational’ consequence of IndCo becoming significantly larger. The CC, more than 
being ‘created’, was relocated from Spain (where it had been for the previous five 
years) to Portugal - near the location of IndCo’s group headquarters and of IndCo’s 
chairman and majority shareholder (anonymously referred to as ‘Mr. A’). This 
organisational change, according to the interpretation of this senior respondent, was 
justified because…  
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“If IndCo’s Corporate Centre is in Madrid, [Mr. A’s] capacity to intervene 
is more limited (…) [The CC relocation is above all justified] from the 
shareholder point of view. ‘I am a Portuguese company, I don’t want to be a 
Spanish company, and therefore I don’t want my decision centre in Spain, I 
want my decision centre in Portugal.’ (…) The rest, the concept [underlying 
the Corporate Centre] was exactly the same.” 
Reflection upon this respondent’s account recalled insights from previous 
interviews, in a wide exercise to “reconnect the dots (…) looking backwards” (Jobs, 
2005) to previous empirical insights. This reflection highlighted how several 
technological and organisational innovations addressed particular limitations of key 
‘central’ organisational actors (see chapter 4, page 262 and following, for a discussion 
of the classification of ‘central’ and ‘local’ actors), such as Mr. A and other high-level 
actors. In fact, looking further back in time, many previous respondents highlighted 
that, by the end of the 1990’s, ‘central’, formally powerful actors were confronted with 
power limitations – including in their relations with ‘local’, less formally powerful 
actors, situated in subsidiaries and, in particular, at a plant level. This apparent paradox 
gave rise to the pertinent question “Who are the powerful?” (Seal, 2003, 95, emphasis 
in the original), which, as Seal (2003) and Clegg (1989) stressed, entails the additional 
question ‘What causes (or limits) power?’. 
The topic of power had already surfaced during previous fieldwork, but had not 
been given a major emphasis given the previous definition of a different research topic. 
The researcher was well aware of the existence of a large body of literature on the topic 
of power, particularly since some institutional literature establishes links with the 
literature on power and even includes such topic in its research (e.g., Burns, 2000; 
Ribeiro, 2003; see DiMaggio and Powell’s, 1991a, review). However, given the 
previously defined research topic, major attention had not been devoted to this area. 
Conceptualising the emerging topic of power therefore required an additional review of 
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the literature, on a long-standing, complex topic characterised by highly disparate 
positions (see chapter 3).  
Clegg’s (1989) framework of ‘Circuits of Power’, drawing mostly on Foucault 
(1975/1977, 1980 and 1988) and Actor-Network Theory (ANT), emerged of the new 
stage of literature review as particularly adequate theoretical lenses (see subsection 
4.1.4 for a discussion on the adoption of multiple research streams). Clegg’s (1989) 
framework had already been deployed in conjunction with an OIE framework (Ribeiro, 
2003) and it was perceived as having potential to explain change and fixity of power(s) 
across the heterogeneous organisation network – or, in ANT terms, across the actor-
network (see chapter 3). 
Clegg’s (1989) framework conceptualises rules of meaning and membership as 
shaping the power that flows through the circuit of social integration, influencing 
actors’ dispositions and behaviour (in line with an OIE perspective). In turn, 
technological and organisational innovations (such as SAP FI, the CC and the Shared 
Services Centre - SSC) are conceptualised as material conditions (or techniques of 
discipline and production) which influence the power flowing through the circuit of 
system integration. The two circuits are related and have a structural nature, i.e., they 
have the potential to structurally (yet always contingently and temporarily) fix powers 
across the organisational network and its participants. Together, these circuits 
structurally influence the episodic circuit of particular relations between actors (at the 
realm of action, in Burns and Scapens’, 2000 terminology). Clegg’s framework 
therefore provided an explanation of why power did not seem to reside intrinsically and 
independently in any particular actor, and why power was mostly relational. 
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A re-examination of previous fieldwork insights (and subsequent substantial 
fieldwork – see page 205 in subsection 4.1.4 for details), in particular by adopting 
Clegg’s framework, suggested that perceived limitations in central actors’ power until 
the late 1990’s had two main types of causes. First, limitations derived from 
shortcomings of extant techniques, in Clegg’s (1989) broad sense of techniques. 
Shortcomings in (or even absence of) information systems and organisational structures 
supporting visibility across the company limited central actors’ knowledge and reduced 
their capacity to effectively intervene. Second, limitations also derived from accepted 
and enacted rules, which sometimes (but in important ways) favoured the interests of 
local actors, rather than central actors’ interests (see chapter 5). 
In turn, the interpretation of fieldwork insights highlighted that several 
technological and organisational innovations, introduced between 1998 and 2002, 
addressed various causes of the limitations perceived by central actors. The introduction 
of SAP FI was an important technological innovation in the accounting area, promoting 
the adoption of similar accounting structures and rules. The relocation of the Corporate 
Centre was an organisational innovation with a main purpose to develop an 
organisation-wide view, with important benefits to central decision-making and control 
processes. Finally, the creation of a Shared Services Centre (SSC), in 2000-2001, also 
had various and important repercussions, such as promoting greater uniformity in rules 
and obtaining, at the organisational centre, more comparable, reliable and timely 
information from across the organisation (see chapters 6 and 7). 
Rules therefore seemed to be a relevant factor, both empirically (considering the 
interpretation of the empirical setting) and theoretically (considering Clegg’s 
framework). Importantly, rules are also an important component of OIE (Burns and 
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Scapens, 2000; Coad and Herbert, 2009; Hodgson, 2006). In addition, some literature 
suggests that “[p]ower and politics is (…) integral to any OIE-grounded explanation of 
life’s ongoing processes” (Burns, 2000a, p. 571) (although the political nature of OIE is 
insufficiently justified, as argued in subsection 2.4.3). Therefore, the continuing 
adoption of OIE as theoretical lenses to interpret and make sense of the study was not 
challenged by the new research concern with power, not least because rules are 
precisely the major connection between the two frameworks. 
In a nutshell, the PhD project substantially changed. First, it adopted a new 
research concern (power). Second, it adopted additional theoretical lenses, since 
Foucauldian and ANT approaches underlying Clegg’s model joined the previous OIE 
approach underlying Burns and Scapens’ model. Finally, and consequently, new 
research objectives and questions were adopted.  
It should be clearly acknowledged that, during the case study analysis (chapters 
5, 6 and 7), Clegg’s framework about power and its Foucauldian and ANT 
underpinnings were drawn upon incommensurably more often and more substantially 
than Burns and Scapens’ OIE framework. This was an inevitable consequence of 
making power the major research concern of this work. However, OIE concepts were 
preserved and in chapter 8 both perspectives were combined in an ANT-inspired OIE 
model. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has three explanatory objectives related with the empirical setting 
where the fieldwork took place. In spite of this close relation with the empirical setting, 
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1.2.1 Empirics-related research objectives 
the objectives have a strong theoretical component, as well. In addition, this thesis has 
two wider theoretical research objectives, related with the development of OIE and 
Clegg’s (1989) framework of power. Each type of research objective is briefly 
discussed next (they are also discussed within the context of the overall research design, 
in page 207 and following, in subsection 4.1.4) 
1.2.1 EMPIRICS-RELATED RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The three explanatory objectives related with the case study empirical setting 
intend to provide a holistic and in-depth explanation of why formally powerful, central 
actors were confronted with power limitations and how they overcame those limitations 
and increased their relational power within the organisational actor-network. Such 
overall explanation is intrinsically committed with a processual perspective, in 
particular because these shifts in power networks spanned across multiple, long-term 
processes, and involved a multitude of interrelated factors. Each research objective 
focuses on a particular stage of the change process – although these stages are largely 
overlapping. Each research objective corresponds to an element of the organisational 
narrative, which Czarniawska (1998, p. 2) suggested should comprise “at least three 
elements: an original state of affairs, an action or an event, and the consequent state of 
affairs”. In a very succinct way, the first research objective characterises the perceived 
limitations of central actors; the second objective explores why and how central actors 
introduced the three innovations (SAP FI, the CC and the SSC); and the third objective 
focuses on how the innovations in the circuit of system integration influenced rule 
acceptance and enactment and hence benefited central actors. Each objective is now 
discussed. 
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1.2.1 Empirics-related research objectives 
The first objective is tackled in the first part of the case study, in chapter 5. By 
explaining why some formally powerful, central actors at the case study organisation 
were confronted with power limitations, this chapter highlights that power issues were 
indeed relevant in the case study company and justifies the empirical relevance of the 
chosen research topic. In addition, it sets the background to contextualise the ensuing 
organisational changes, by describing the original state of affairs as the first element of 
the case study narrative (Czarniawska, 1998). From a theoretical perspective, chapter 5 
highlights the need to adopt an adequate theoretical framework to research power. In 
addition, by identifying that an important cause of those limitations concerned rules, 
this chapter also highlights the continuing relevance of the OIE framework, given its 
concern with rules (Hodgson, 2006). Therefore, the research objective addressed in 
chapter 5 is the following: 
1) Explain why formally powerful, central actors at the case study 
organisation were confronted with power limitations. 
 
 
The second objective, analysed in chapter 6, is to understand why and how some 
central actors introduced and mobilised technological and organisational innovations (in 
particular, SAP FI, the CC and the SSC). This corresponds to the action or event, as the 
second element of the case study narrative. These innovations are conceptualised as 
innovations introduced in the circuit of system integration of the case study 
organisation. Particular attention was devoted to understanding how the innovations 
were expected to address central actors’ limitations and objectives, in particular (but not 
exclusively) by influencing accepted and enacted rules. Therefore, the objective of 
chapter 6 is the following: 
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2) Explain why and how central actors introduced and mobilised 
technological and organisational innovations.  
 
 
Chapter 7 deals with the third empirics-related objective and analyses multiple, 
ex-post repercussions of the three innovations, extending the empirical timeframe until 
the time of the fieldwork.  This chapter addresses the consequent state of affairs as the 
third and final element of the case study narrative. There was a particular concern in 
exploring how influencing accepted and enacted rules was crucial to achieve central 
actors’ objectives. Therefore, the objective of chapter 7 is the following: 
3) Explain how technological and organisational innovations influenced 
rule acceptance and enactment and increased the power of central 
actors.  
 
1.2.2 THEORY DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In addition to the above objectives, which directly concern the specific empirical 
setting under investigation, the thesis also addressed two main objectives concerning 
theoretical developments contributing to a wider research programme (Scapens, 1990). 
In particular, this work aims to contribute to the two areas of the literature and the two 
frameworks underlying this work: literature on power - and Clegg (1989)’s framework 
in particular; and OIE literature - and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework in 
particular. 
Clegg’s (1989) framework was proposed over two decades ago. Although 
substantial empirical research has already deployed the framework (see references in 
subsection 3.5.1), no substantial developments have yet been proposed (see Schram, 
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1991 for a globally favourable critique of the book). The scarce adaptations of the 
framework found in the literature have been mostly simplifications or mere 
modifications, especially in graphical terms, without constituting actual theoretical 
developments (see subsection 8.1.1). No substantive suggestions for improvements or 
overcoming of eventual shortcomings have been provided and, in a recent publication, 
Clegg et al. (2006) proposed the original framework again.  
However, intensively and extensively deploying Clegg’s (1989) framework as 
theoretical lenses to interpret and make sense of the empirical material and to structure 
the case study write-up, contributed to highlighting that some concepts and relationships 
depicted in the framework could be clarified, completed and even changed. Therefore, a 
first research objective came to be to… 
 1) Contribute to the power literature by developing Clegg’s (1989) 
framework 
 
 
Second, right from the start, this thesis had the ambition to develop the starting 
theoretical framework of this study, proposed by Burns and Scapens (2000), and OIE in 
general. Burns and Scapens called for “longitudinal studies within individual 
organizations” to understand organisational change processes and potentially 
developing their own framework, proposed as a “starting point” (p. 13). Many 
researchers have responded to that call (see references in section 2.2) and this work 
intended to participate in such a research programme, by adopting the objective to… 
2) Contribute to the Old Institutional Economics literature by developing 
Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework 
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Over the last decade, much OIE research (inspired by seminal calls such as 
Scapens, 1994, and in particular by Burns and Scapens, 2000) focused on cases of 
resistance and continuity, or a mixture of resistance and change (most references above 
are representative of such trend; see also Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). Somewhat 
paradoxically, much research on change was actually research on lack of change, on 
stability and resistance to change, on small, gradual and slow changes. A focus on 
stability is understandable, considering that institutional theory is particularly suited to 
explain stability. However, this focus fuelled the general, long-standing criticism that 
institutional theory (including its OIE perspective) has had difficulties in explaining 
change and that it has overemphasised the influence of constraining structures over 
actors and agency (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; 
Droege and Johnson, 2007; Holm, 1995). While empirical settings of lack of change can 
facilitate an in-depth analysis based on OIE, they have less potential to contribute to the 
expansion of OIE as explanatory lenses. In addition, Johansson and Siverbo (2009) 
made a case that the evolutionary approach that underpins this research program can, 
and should be, “developed beyond the general belief that it describes only small and 
gradual, often slow, changes” (p. 147).  
Therefore, studies explaining ‘successful’ change are particularly necessary - 
even though they are unlikely to be (or, actually, especially if they are not) ‘linear’ and 
unproblematic change processes. ‘Successful’ change processes are the most favourable 
empirical setting to challenge the limits of OIE and hence expand the boundaries and 
explanatory reach of OIE. Indeed, recent papers have identified this gap and tried to 
address it (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns et al., 2003; Busco et al., 2006; 
Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; see also Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). The present work 
14 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
contributes to such a line of research by investigating a case of ‘successful’ change (i.e., 
in which change did occur).  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 focuses on institutional theory 
and, in particular, on Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and on the OIE model of Burns 
and Scapens (2000). This chapter briefly analyses major issues in OIE, including recent 
controversies about routines. It also argues for reconceptualising rules in a wider way, 
beyond formal rules and encompassing the notion of rules as internal structures 
orienting actors. It also notes that rules (thus defined) underlie routines and that 
considering rules fills a gap in routines-focused frameworks – in particular, when there 
are no established routines as regards particular issues. The chapter concludes by 
establishing links to the following chapter on the topic of power. 
Chapter 3 reviews literature on power. It starts by reviewing ‘conventional’ 
notions of power, typically viewing power as a cause of effects over others. Then, it 
discusses alternative notions of power, which subsequently support the discussion of 
Foucauldian and Actor-Network Theory approaches to power. The chapter then presents 
Clegg’s (1989) framework of ‘Circuits of Power’ in more detail, hence completing the 
theoretical foundations for the case study. 
Chapter 4 reflects on research design, providing a processual account of the 
conducted research design (and implementation) as a mix of deliberate and emergent 
strategies. The chapter starts by analysing the most fundamental aspects of research 
design, such as the researcher’s main assumptions and initial choices regarding the 
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research topic, theories, methodologies and method – as well as subsequent changes in 
topic and theories, as already outlined in the current chapter. Then, the chapter analyses 
more detailed aspects, such as the (dynamic) definition of the organisational and 
temporal scope and of the techniques to generate and analyse information. 
The case study analysis stretches through three chapters (5, 6 and 7), each 
addressing one research question and one element of the case study narrative. Chapter 5 
provides a general overview of the case study organisation and a broad historical 
perspective. Then, it characterises the organisation in more detail between the early 
1990’s and the late 1990’s (when the first analysed innovations – SAP FI and the CC - 
started emerging; see section 4.2.1 for details). Importantly, it depicts a scenario in 
which, by the end of the 1990’s, formally powerful central actors were confronted with 
several limitations and, on the contrary, local actors were perceived to have substantial 
power. Therefore, this chapter sets the empirical paradox, highlighting that answering 
‘Who are the powerful?’ requires answering ‘What causes (or limits) power?’ (Clegg, 
1989; Seal, 2003). 
Chapter 6 analyses ‘why’ and ‘how’ the three innovations (SAP FI, the CC and 
the SSC) were introduced by central actors between 1998 and 2001. It analyses each 
innovation separately, as related components of a single case study - although it 
becomes clear that the motivations (and expectations) and the processes involving the 
various innovations were indeed highly interrelated. 
Chapter 7 analyses the multiple repercussions which unfolded after the 
introduction of the innovations and until the time of the fieldwork. The analysis is 
mostly structured around the repercussions on the circuit of system integration and on 
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the circuit of social integration, but it becomes clear that the repercussions span across 
the various circuits in multiple and interrelated ways. Based on this analysis, this 
chapter proposes a number of contributions about how the innovations promoted 
repercussions across the organisation and its circuits of power, ultimately promoting 
favourable episodic outcomes for the central actors who had been involved in 
introducing those innovations. 
Chapter 8 proposes theoretical contributions to the literature on power and OIE. 
The first contribution concerns several refinements to Clegg’s framework, comprising 
changes in its graphical layout, linkages and even concepts; these developments add to 
the various contributions proposed in chapter 7. The second contribution is an ANT-
inspired, OIE model of rule-based action. This model is loosely inspired in Burns and 
Scapens’ (2000) macro structure and concepts, but it proposes additional structures and 
substantially different perspectives, mechanisms and even concepts. The proposed 
model acknowledges intra-organisational diversity and focuses on the processes of 
introduction, interpretation, acceptance and enactment of rules. It also relates rules with 
material conditions, in particular since rules may be technologically and 
organisationally embedded. Finally, the model highlights that rules may be enacted by 
both human actors (individual and collective) and non-human actors. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, reviewing the answers provided to the various 
research questions, acknowledging some limitations and suggesting avenues for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2 - INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides one of the theoretical foundations and interpretive lenses 
of this thesis, institutional theory, and in particular of its Old Institutional Economics 
(OIE) field. It also highlights key topical discussions within OIE, in particular as 
regards routines, it suggests that a reconceptualisation of rules may expand the 
explanatory potential of institutional theory and identifies linkages with other 
theoretical issues developed in the remainder of the thesis (in particular, power). 
Therefore, this chapter sets the institutional theory perspective which is the starting 
point for an additional theoretical review (chapter 3) and empirical work (chapters 5, 6 
and 7), and to which this thesis contributes (section 8.2). 
The first section briefly introduces institutional theory, starting by highlighting 
the difficulties in defining its fundamental nature and key concepts and its 
heterogeneity. It then briefly defines some fields of institutional theory. After a brief 
discussion of New Institutional Sociology (NIS), it explores OIE, the field most aligned 
with the researcher’s ontological and epistemological assumptions, with the research 
objectives and topics and with the adopted (micro) level of analysis (see chapter 4). The 
characterisation of OIE is completed with an analysis of its theoretical roots, with a 
particular attention to Anthony Giddens’ work. 
The second section sketches some contemporary developments within OIE. It 
starts by depicting the main features of the seminal framework of Burns and Scapens 
(2000) and ensuing research stream. Routines are the focus of the remainder of the 
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section, given their prominent place within OIE literature and the recent debates around 
their ontological nature (e.g., Becker, 2008b). In particular, the section reviews the 
various conceptions of routines typically identified in the literature (routines as 
behaviour, as rules or as dispositions) (e.g., Becker, 2004), identifies some proposals to 
reconcile the various alternatives (e.g., Feldman and Pentland, 2003) and adds a more 
recently identified dimension: the material dimension of routines (Volkoff et al., 2007). 
The third section argues for the need to dedicate greater attention to rules, a core 
(but somewhat neglected) component of OIE models. In particular, it suggests going 
beyond the usually adopted sense of formal rules (e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Lukka, 2007). Instead, it is argued that informal rules should also be considered, and 
rules can also be conceptualised as internal structures orienting actors’ behaviours, 
through processes of rules introduction, interpretation, acceptance and enactment 
(Becker, 1998; Busco, 2009; Clegg, 1975; Coad and Herbert, 2009; Ribeiro, 2003). This 
broader conceptualisation of rules is argued to underlie routines and to increase the 
explanatory power of institutional theory, in particular when there are no routines 
regarding particular empirical situations. The section concludes by noting that the 
proposed renewed emphasis on rules should not be considered as an alternative to 
routines; instead, future research should analyse how routines and rules (in particular, as 
actors’ internal structures) may evolve in a cumulative interaction. 
Finally, the fourth section identifies pertinent theoretical linkages to institutional 
theory which were elicited by the interpretation of the case study insights. In particular, 
this section discusses how institutional theory has investigated the topic of power, and 
therefore establishes a link to the next chapter. It notes that power has traditionally been 
absent from NIS. As regards OIE, an apparent paradox is noted: the prevalent claim that 
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power is at the heart of OIE is not immediately reconcilable with the overall OIE 
suggestion that institutions bring peace and truce to organisations. A final section 
concludes the chapter. 
2.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND SOME OF 
ITS FIELDS  
2.1.1 THE HETEROGENEOUS NATURE OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Within economics and organisational analysis, institutional theory has emerged 
mainly as a reaction to a traditional, mainstream view of the economy and 
organisations, rooted in a behaviouralist approach (Moll et al., 2006a). The need to 
affirm itself as an alternative to an existing approach had the consequence that 
institutional theory was largely defined by what it was not, rather than what it was 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Seal and Mattimoe, 2007)1. This characteristic of being 
defined by the negative also promoted the development of distinct alternative proposals, 
sharing some – though often limited – areas of commonality.  
In very broad terms, institutional theory claims that ‘institutions’ and the 
‘institutional context’ are important influences, limiting individual and organisational 
rationality as perceived by mainstream approaches. The very general consideration that 
“institutions matter” is a common assumption of the various institutional approaches 
(e.g., Moll et al., 2006a, p. 184). However, the definition of, e.g., institutions, 
                                                 
1 This definition of a new, emergent research approach by the negative, by stating what it is not, is not 
unique to institutional theory. The “polyphonic debate” in Ahrens et al. (2008, p. 840) discussed a similar 
situation in the broader field of interpretative research (where institutional theory may be loosely 
included). The fifteen contributors to this paper colourfully illustrated the efforts - and difficulties (see 
also Dillard, 2008)- in transcending such definition by the negative, which limits the clarification of an 
“independent intellectual identity” (Ahrens et al., 2008, p. 841). 
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institutional contexts and influenced entities differs across different institutional 
approaches (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Hodgson, 2000; Moll et al., 2006a; Nelson, 
2007). Such diversity derived from the level of analysis focused by each research 
stream, as well as from the disciplinary background of each stream (e.g., economics, 
political science, psychology, sociology, social history and organisational theory – 
disciplines with different levels of analysis themselves). Nelson (2007) argued that “the 
conglomerate of things” that have been identified with ‘institutions’ “largely reflects the 
fact that many different kinds of structures and forces mould the way individuals and 
organizations interact to get things done. Many different institutions are needed, and the 
institutions that are effective are very context dependent” (p. 313). However, he noted 
that “[t]his diversity of meanings, and analytic foci, makes coherent discussion about 
the nature and role of institutions difficult” (p. 314). 
Some authors (e.g., Dugger, 1990; Hodgson, 2000 and 2006; Nelson, 2007) 
aimed at defining concepts (an ‘institution’ or ‘institutional economics’) in a ‘positive’ 
way, what those concepts are (rather than what they are not), by enumerating a number 
of defining properties. However, they were all invariably led into comparing and 
confronting alternative perspectives or schools of thought.  
An example is Hodgson (2000), who set out to define the “essence”, the “‘hard 
core’ of the institutionalist tradition” (p. 317, 318), but actually confronted a particular 
branch of institutional theory (Old Institutional Economics – OIE, see below) against 
others. Hodgson rephrased Hamilton’s (1919) long-standing description of 
institutionalism into propositions. Among others, he proposed: institutionalism’s 
interdisciplinary character; an emphasis on ‘institutions’ as key elements of economy 
(Hodgson, 2006 later explored how differently theorists may use the word ‘institution’; 
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see also Nelson, 2007); the view of an open and evolving system, situated in a natural 
and social context, affected by technological and other changes. All these 
characteristics, Hodgson (2000) concluded, are not sufficient to define old 
institutionalism. Hodgson added another proposition, that “[i]nstitutionalism does not 
take the individual as a given. Individuals are affected by their institutional and cultural 
situations” (p. 318). And he claimed that this proposition was the one which could 
clearly distinguish old institutionalism from other schools and from other institutionalist 
fields. 
Reviewing Hodgson’s (2006) analysis, it is clear that in spite of the initially 
stated aims of defining ‘institutionalism’ (it could be thought, ‘institutionalism’ as a 
whole), Hodgson could not avoid placing himself in a certain ‘field’ of institutional 
theory (OIE). He could not avoid establishing comparisons against other schools of 
thought and other ‘fields’ of institutional theory. Finally, Hodgson was focused in the 
domain of economics, and did not try to encompass the insights from the sociological 
field of institutional theory (New Institutional Sociology – NIS, see below). 
As a reflection of these difficulties to sketch what institutional theory is, as a 
whole, most reviews of institutional theory opt to identify, describe and compare three 
main approaches of institutional theory: New Institutional Sociology (NIS), Old 
Institutional Economics (OIE) and New Institutional Economics (NIE) (e.g., Major and 
Ribeiro, 2009; Moll et al., 2006a; Robalo, 2007; see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a for 
some nuances within this classification). Notwithstanding, as noted below, various 
researchers have been addressing long standing calls to build bridges between branches 
of institutional theory (as proposed, e.g., by DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Hirsch and 
Lounsbury, 1997). 
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A detailed analysis of each institutional approach can be found in the above 
referenced reviews, and is not repeated here. As discussed in chapter 4, in this thesis, 
OIE was adopted as the main interpretative lens within institutional theory, and only 
occasional references to NIS are made. Therefore, New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
is not further discussed (see the reviews above, Dugger, 1990 and Hodgson, 1993). NIS 
is only briefly introduced next. Then, more attention is devoted to OIE. In particular, it 
is important to clarify the levels and units of analysis of NIS and OIE, and the 
corresponding (tentative) definitions of what an ‘institution’ may be considered to be. 
2.1.2 NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY (NIS) 
New Institutional Sociology (henceforth, NIS) tends to focus a high, macro level 
of analysis – typically, at the level of society or societal sectors such as organisational 
fields (many chapters in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991 are key references; also, Scott, 
1995 and 2001). It emphasises how organisations are influenced by their external 
environment, in the line of the Open Systems theory approach. Indeed, a key issue for 
the seminal work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991b) was understanding why 
organisations exhibited relatively little variation among themselves, and in particular 
within their organisational fields – i.e. understanding isomorphism. Interestingly, 
Hambrick et al. (2004) adopted the same open systems rationale and even DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) rationale underlying isomorphism to conclude, on the contrary, that 
subsequent macro-social trends actually promoted intra-industry diversity. Regardless 
of the diagnosis about the actual directions of macro-social trends, the important insight 
for this discussion about NIS is highlighting its focus on macro environmental pressures 
on organisations, and how organisations adapt to those external pressures. 
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DiMaggio and Powell described an organisational field as the “organizations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products”, hence including “the totality of relevant actors” 
(1991b, p. 64-5). Correspondingly, NIS defines institution at the macro levels defined 
above. Institutions are identified with macro level “external rules, procedures, myths 
and/or norms” (Moll et al., 2006a, p. 187), “organized, established procedure[s]”, “the 
‘rules of the game’”, constituting “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain 
state or property” (Jepperson, 1991, pp. 143, 145). Consequently, “institutionalization 
denotes the process of such attainment” (Jepperson, 1991, p. 145) and is 
“interorganizational in locus” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 14).  
NIS theorists argued that, within a given organisational field, particular ways of 
organising may become perceived as adequate and legitimate by participant 
organisations, which therefore tend to adopt them. This preference for, and adoption of, 
configurations prevalent in the institutional field is a result, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
argued, of organisations’ search for legitimacy, in order to secure scarce resources and 
hence increase their survival prospects. Since the criterion for adoption is the search for 
legitimacy associated with each (socially legitimated) configuration, configurations 
which are not technically adequate may be actually selected, provided they are seen as 
rational within the institutional field and, in particular, by the actors upon which the 
attribution of resources depend on.  
NIS traditionally depicted individual organisations as “loosely coupled arrays of 
standardised elements” within the institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 
14). Given NIS’s macro level focus, organisations tended to be treated as if they were 
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unitary entities and players (see, e.g., North’s position in his correspondence with 
Hodgson, in Hodgson, 2006). Organisations are considered social actors – collective 
social actors, alongside individual social actors (Scott, 2002). However, little attention 
was given to what exists and happens inside organisations, including institutionalisation 
processes within organisations. Organisations and institutionalisation processes at the 
organisational level tended to be treated as black-boxes, neglecting potential 
organisational and institutional diversity (e.g., Dillard et al., 2004; Ribeiro, 2003; 
Zucker, 1991)2.  
The NIS claim that institutions, as configurations already established and 
perceived as rational within an institutional field, tend to be emulated by organisations 
from that field, has prompted generalised criticism. NIS theorists typically complement 
the emphasis that “[i]nstitutions by definition connote stability” by adding that 
institutions are also “subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous” 
(Scott, 2001, p. 48). Nevertheless, there is a repeated accusation that NIS great emphasis 
on the macro influence of institutions has promoted an excessive emphasis on structural 
constraint and neglected the possibility of institutional change. Gorges (2001) was 
particularly critical: “The new institutionalism fails to provide an adequate explanation 
of institutional change because, by relying on variables such as critical junctures, path 
dependency, leadership or the role of ideas, it leaves institutions behind and employs a 
grab-bag of explanations that proponents of almost any theoretical perspective could 
use. The conditions under which these variables matter are unspecified and the causal 
                                                 
2 This NIS conception of organizations as collective social actors is markedly different from the collective 
agency proposed by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and postmodern theorists, discussed in the next 
chapter. Without anticipating the discussion, it suffices to say that ANT, while emphasising the effects of 
collective agency, is particularly focused on the micro level and on the diversity, relations and events 
within organizations – i.e., in a strike contrast with NIS macro level perspective and with the unitary way 
in which NIS tends to take organizations. 
25 
 2.1 An introduction to institutional theory and some of its fields 
 2.1.3 Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
relevance of institutions themselves is unclear” (p. 137). In addition, the macro level 
focus of NIS also prompted criticisms of neglecting important micro-level dynamics 
and, in particular, the role of individual agency (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; 
Lounsbury, 2008; Moll et al., 2006a; Ribeiro, 2003). 
These two major criticisms about the NIS emphasis on the macro level 
(neglecting the micro level) and on stability (neglecting change) have given rise to 
substantial research focused on change and encompassing intra-organisational issues, 
typically adopting a multi-level perspective (see Dillard et al., 2004; Major and Hopper, 
2005; Modell et al., 2007; Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2006) as 
examples from the accounting literature; see also Greenwood and Hinings, 1996 and 
Seo and Creed, 2002). Indeed, it can be observed that NIS researchers, to develop a 
more encompassing level of analysis and even to identify potential mechanisms of 
change, gradually incorporated concerns and concepts of the field of institutional theory 
which privileges micro-level issues - Old Institutional Economics (OIE). OIE is now 
discussed. 
2.1.3 OLD INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (OIE) 
2.1.3.1 An introduction to OIE 
Contemporary Old Institutional Economics (OIE) is a stream of institutional 
theory which privileges a lower level of analysis, when compared to NIS. The locus of 
institutionalisation tends to be individual, particular, concrete organisations, seen as 
“organic wholes” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 14). Therefore, the units of analysis 
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of OIE (Hodgson, 2002) are the prevalent institutions in a given setting (typically, an 
organisation), alongside the individuals3 populating that organisation.  
The prevalent OIE conception, drawing from the overall institutional theory 
assumption that ‘institutions matter’ (see above) and in line with Macintosh and 
Scapens’ (1990) interpretation of Giddens’ structuration theory (see below), is that 
organisational actors are “social and encultured individuals”, influenced by 
circumstances and, in particular, by prevalent organisational institutions (Hodgson, 
2002, p. xxii). OIE places a particular (but far from exclusive, as analysed below) 
emphasis on the notion of ‘downward causation’. Hodgson proposed (2000) the notion 
of ‘reconstitutive downward causation’, through which individuals’ learning “takes 
place through and within social structures” (p. 327), in developmental processes leading 
to the individuals’ reconstitution. In a nutshell, OIE endorses the view of “[t]he 
Institutionalised Individual” (Hodgson, 2000, p. 323), as a distinctive trait of OIE4.  
Therefore, OIE is particularly appropriate to research intra-organisational 
phenomena, at the micro level of local communities – clearly at a lower level than the 
inter-organisational and macro level approach of NIS. Indeed, these different levels of 
analyses can be seen as a useful complementarity. E.g., Johansson and Siverbo (2009) 
                                                 
3 A brief comparison between OIE and ANT is needed, similarly to the comparison with NIS in the 
previous footnote. OIE attributes agency (although a typically limited agency) solely to individuals, as the 
sole actors (or agents). However, ANT grants potential agency to both individual and collective human 
entities (e.g., organizations) and even non-human actors (see section 3.4, and Volkoff et al., 2007 for a 
brief comparison). Therefore, OIE has a narrower conception of agency than ANT. Since this chapter is 
about OIE, and to avoid confusions when quoting OIE-related literature, the ensuing text often mentions 
the term ‘individual’. However, when appropriate and when it does not cause confusion, the text also 
adopts the terms ‘agent’ or ‘actor’, which are accepted by both theoretical strands – although, in an OIE 
context, the term tends to have the narrower scope of ‘individual’. Adopting terms (‘agent’ or ‘actor’) 
shared by both theories facilitates future links between them. 
4 However, this ‘downward causation’ neither entails a deterministic relationship (in which individuals 
are ‘dopes’) nor invalidates opposite ‘upward causation’ mechanisms, as discussed below. 
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recently commented that “NIS explains how management accounting innovations come 
to organisations and OIE explains what happens to the innovations thereafter” (p. 148). 
OIE is also evolutionary, given its concern on processes – on processes of 
change and, often, on processes of stability. Although Hodgson (2000) was critic about 
the vagueness of the term ‘evolutionary’, Johansson and Siverbo (2009) have recently 
called that OIE adopts a more explicit emphasis on evolutionary theory (see also 
Pelikan, 2010 for a related approach). These authors argued that an evolutionary 
perspective has the potential to research not only slow and gradual changes (the most 
frequent field of application of this perspective), but also rapid and radical changes. 
Indeed, like NIS, OIE has tended to dedicate particular attention to stability, 
rather than change. As discussed next, OIE concepts (e.g., its main concept of 
‘institution’) tend to be particularly better adequate to explain stability. Taking for now 
a very simple approach, an overarching message of OIE is that, typically at an 
organisation level, existing institutions influence actors’ behaviours, beliefs and 
interests and, in time, this may ultimately lead to the reinforcement of the original 
institutions. In this regard, OIE actually shares common traits with NIS, since the 
central mechanisms of both fields of institutional theory are essentially about 
reproduction and therefore promote stability. As Droege and Johnson (2007, p. 83) 
simply, but expressively, put it: “Institutional theory has had a tough time dealing with 
institutional change”. 
OIE experienced a clear renaissance during the first decade of the millennium. In 
the specific area of accounting, a large number of studies emerged since the start of the 
new millennium, such as Abrahamsson and Gerdin (2006), Burns (2000a), Burns and 
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Scapens (2000), Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005), Busco et al. (2006), Coad and 
Herbert (2009), Granlund (2001), Lukka (2007), Quinn (2010), Ribeiro (2003), Ribeiro 
and Scapens (2006), Robalo (2007), Soin et al. (2002) and Van der Steen (2007). 
Before analysing in more detail OIE’s recent developments, it is useful to briefly review 
some of its antecedents.  
2.1.3.2 Key theoretical antecedents of OIE-inspired research 
A number of researchers drew on the late nineteenth / early twentieth century 
insights from Thorstein Veblen, the founder of OIE, and explored and developed them 
to explain the influences of institutions on organisational life (see Moll et al., 2006a for 
various Veblen’s references). As Burns (2000b) and Moll et al. (2006a) noted, early 
OIE work, such as Veblen’s, focused the macro level of society and economy. Only 
much more recently, in particular after Nelson and Winter (1982) and Hodgson (1988), 
OIE started being applied to the firm-level - in a revival characterised by Ribeiro (2003) 
and Ribeiro and Scapens (2006) as ‘neo-OIE’. 
A key, contemporary theorist behind this renewed stream of OIE research is 
Anthony Giddens (e.g., Giddens, 1979, 1984, 1987, 1990 and 1991), whose work has 
been addressed in a vast secondary literature5. Giddens laid down the basis of 
structuralism, addressing the controversial relationship between structures and agents, 
i.e., the controversy around structural determination and human agency – the wider 
                                                 
5 Examples of such secondary literature are Burns and Scapens (2000), Boland (1996), Busco (2009), 
Clegg (1989), Macintosh (1994), Macintosh and Scapens (1990), Moilanen (2008), Moore (2007), Quinn 
(2010), Ribeiro (2003), Scapens (1994), Scapens and Macintosh (1996), Seal (2003), Seal and Herbert 
(2009) and Whittington (1992). Given that the core theoretical approach of this thesis does not concern 
Giddens’ original work, but rather the applications and developments within OIE based on Giddens’ 
work, the ensuing analysis mostly draws upon this secondary literature (cf. the cautionary note of 
Mizruchi and Fein, 1999 about the usage of secondary literature). The resort to secondary literature also 
lessens the cumulative challenges of Giddens’ vast and highly abstract work being expressed in a 
“strangle[d] prose” which makes “meaning opaque” (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 200) and not being easy to 
summarise (Whittington, 1992). 
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social theory topic in which the relationship between institutions and individuals’ 
actions can be situated. There is no attempt here to describe structuration theory in 
detail, and only its main traits are sketched (the mentioned secondary literature 
constitutes a good interpretive guide through Giddens’ vast and complex work).  
As depicted in table 2.1 (below), Giddens identified three modalities of 
structuration, based on three dimensions of structures: structures of signification, of 
legitimation and of domination. In turn, structures are conceptualised as rules and 
resources, which are linked with the three modalities of structuration. There are two 
types of rules: interpretive and normative. Interpretive rules form structures of 
signification, by creating meaning; in turn, normative rules form structures of 
legitimation, producing a morality involving values. Finally, resources – which are 
facilitative - can be allocative or authoritative, forming structures of domination which 
produce power. The following systematisation of Giddens’ three dimensions of 
structures is a recurrent presence in analyses of Giddens’ work (Table 2.1). 
INTERACTION Communication Power Sanction 
(MODALITY) Interpretive scheme Facility Norm 
STRUCTURE Signification Domination Legitimation 
Table 2.1: Structures and modalities of structuration (Source: Giddens, 1979) 
Giddens proposed that structures are drawn upon by individuals, as 
knowledgeable agents, in their social practices and interactions. As such, structures both 
enable and constrain human agency and hence constitute social practices. This view is 
the ‘downward causation’ alluded above which, should it be taken in isolation, would 
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correspond to the deterministic view of the overwhelming influence of structures 
(including institutions) on social practices.  
In spite of this ‘downward causation’, Giddens still attributes a prime 
importance to self-conscious individuals, socially interacting in a purposeful way. 
Indeed, Giddens proposed the notion of ‘duality of structure’, considering that 
structures themselves depend on agents’ repeated drawing upon of those very same 
rules and resources. This latter influence corresponds to the voluntaristic view of 
knowledgeable human agencies recurrently producing social practices. This 
‘production’ of social practices by human agencies is constitutive of reality. Indeed, 
human agencies produce systems, defined as regular practices reproduced by human 
action across time and space. Structures therefore become dependent of agency and its 
recurrent drawing upon of rules and resources. In Giddens’ view, this ‘upward 
causation’ should be conceived neither as independent nor as opposite to the ‘downward 
causation’; instead, both influences should be viewed as interpenetrating and indeed as a 
unity. Rather than a dualism, these two influences are the basis of the concept of 
‘duality of structure’. Giddens’ proposal therefore attempts to “imbricate[] both aspects 
of production and reproduction” (Clegg, 1989, p. 139). 
However, authors such as Clegg (1989) and Ribeiro (2003) noted that Giddens’ 
approach attributes an unstable ontological status to structures. The very existence of 
structures depends on knowledgeable agencies drawing upon those structures, orienting 
their conduct. As noted by Volkoff et al. (2007, p. 834) in Giddens’ view “structure 
only exists in the moment of instantiation [of agencies’ practices] as traces in the mind. 
Without an actor, there is no structure”.  
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Giddens’ work has fuelled highly varied criticisms – indeed, even opposed 
criticisms. Archer (1995), Ribeiro (2003) and Volkoff et al. (2007) considered that 
Giddens conflated structure and agency. Clegg (1989) argued that Giddens was 
excessively subjectivist, privileging the voluntaristic or agentic perspective that agents 
are capable to define the actions to be carried out, in detriment to the constraining 
influence of structures (Volkoff et al., 2007 also made this criticism, while also 
accusing Giddens of conflating structure and agency, as mentioned above). However, 
such accusations are not universal. Other authors consider that indeed “both agency and 
structure are essential elements” (Scapens and Macintosh, 1996, p. 689, emphasis in the 
original) and that therefore “the duality of structure enables researchers to avoid 
excessive determinism and voluntarism” (Seal and Herbert, 2009, p. 17). Interestingly, 
Whittington (1992, p. 702) noted even the opposite accusation of a neglect of agency, 
through a “too easy surrender of human actors to the ontological security of routine”, 
has been formulated by Willmott (1986a) – an author who tended to structuralism but 
otherwise kept “loyal to the Giddensian ambition of accommodating both the subjective 
and the structural”.  
Giddens’ theory of structuration was a meta-theory and some authors (Coad and 
Herbert, 2009; see several authors referenced in their paper) argued that its high levels 
of abstraction made its deployment in empirical research difficult, even doubtful. 
However, Giddens’ theory influenced an important stream of OIE-inspired accounting 
research, largely via the seminal work of Macintosh and Scapens (1990) (see an 
acknowledgement in Busco, 2009) and subsequent works of both authors (e.g., 
Macintosh, 1994 and Scapens and Macintosh, 1996). In this interpretation of Giddens 
(cf. Boland, 1996), structures are abstract templates guiding agents’ behaviour. A strong 
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emphasis has been attributed, in particular within the subsequent research stream, to the 
role of structures in developing shared meanings and understandings (within the 
structure of signification) and shared beliefs and moral codes (within the structure of 
legitimation). Additionally, and in broader terms, this research stream also tended to 
emphasise the constraining effects of structures over agents, as discussed below – 
although, as noted above, Scapens and Macintosh (1996) argued for the importance of 
both elements. 
Structures, within the OIE approach, are above all represented in the concept of 
‘institutions’. Within accounting research, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) model became a 
landmark reference for this approach. This work was retrieved in its main features in 
Burns and Scapens (2008), but the ensuing discussion references the original 
publication year, 2000, to preserve its historical contextualisation. Burns and Scapens 
(2000) is the starting point of the next section, which reviews some key OIE 
contemporary developments in accounting.  
2.2 SOME CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN OIE RESEARCH 
2.2.1 BURNS AND SCAPENS’ (2000) SEMINAL MODEL AND ENSUING 
RESEARCH STREAM 
Burns and Scapens (2000) became widely cited as a seminal and typical OIE 
model, within the accounting literature, as recognised by Coad and Herbert (2009), 
Johansson and Siverbo (2009) and Quinn (2010). This model, in figure 2.1 below, 
comprised four main components: institutions, located within the ‘institutional realm’; 
actions, located within the ‘realm of action’; and rules and routines, which interact 
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between the institutional realm and the realm of action. Each component of the model is 
analysed next. 
 
Figure 2.1: The process of institutionalisation (Source: Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 9) 
In Burns and Scapens’ approach, institutions are “‘taken-for-granted’ ways of 
thinking and doing in a particular organization. (…) Members of the group simply take-
for-granted that ‘this is the way things are’” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, pp 5, 8). Burns 
(2000a, p. 583) cited Hardy (1996, p. S8) to relate an institution with the “unconscious 
acceptance of the values, traditions, cultures and structures”, which “captures all 
organizational members in its web”6. Institutions are the mental background which 
                                                 
6 As already noted, OIE research has tended to locate the concept of institution at an organizational level. 
This is questioned and discussed below in section 2.4. 
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permeates the various activities of organisational members. In line with the above 
characterisation of this research stream, this model placed an overall emphasis on the 
influence of institutions over agencies (‘downward causation’). The first area of 
influence concerns structures of signification and legitimation, associated with shared 
meanings and beliefs, respectively. In the model, this influence is represented in the 
framework by arrow ‘a’, through which broader institutions are encoded into (formal) 
rules, the model second component analysed next. Nevertheless, it should be 
emphasised that the authors systematically recalled the non-deterministic nature of such 
influence and the interrelated ‘upward causation’ (see below). 
Rules, the second core component of the framework, were conceptualised by 
Burns and Scapens as the “formalized statement of procedures”, “the formally 
recognised way in which ‘things should be done’” (p. 7 and 6, emphasis added). Beyond 
this particular model, the literature agrees that rules are a key feature of institutional 
theory. Institutional theory (not only OIE) has “stressed the ubiquity of rules that guide 
behavior” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 28). Indeed, it can be argued that rules are 
an underlying core component of institutions (although, as discussed below, this 
requires conceptualising rules in a wider way, beyond formal rules). The various 
institutional branches converge in considering that institutions have a rule-like character 
and are the rules of the game (Covaleski et al., 2003; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; 
Hodgson, 2006; North, 1990). E.g., when Hodgson (2006) argued that demographic 
structures were not institutions, his argument was that their influence was not 
necessarily done “through the operation of rules”; demographic structures were not 
“institutional, rule-based structures” (p. 3, 21, emphasis added). At a micro level, OIE 
also conceives of institutions as the “rules of the game” at lower levels - such as, e.g., 
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the organisational level-, prescribing appropriate conducts for individuals. At stake here 
is the legitimation structure, in Giddens’ terms. 
However, in OIE literature, the concept of ‘rules’ has not been a main concern 
among the various components of institutional models, for several reasons. First, the 
macro, pervading influence of institutions required – and still requires – researchers’ 
attention. Second, and more particularly, the cognitive revolution half a century ago 
(e.g., Cyert and March, 1963; see the next subsection) stressed that behaviours do not 
rely exclusively on deliberative, conscious and intentional enactment of rules. In turn, 
this cognitive revolution highlighted the importance of more taken-for-granted 
mechanisms such as routines (the third component of institutional models, analysed 
next). While the importance of such findings should not be underestimated, the lower 
importance attributed to rules may have also derived from a tendency to associate 
‘rules’ with the restricted sense of formal rules (e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Lukka, 2007; Quinn, 2010; Van der Steen, 2007). As 
discussed in the next section, researchers tended to exclude informal rules from the 
concept of ‘rules’. In addition, should rules be considered only as formal rules, as mere 
artefacts, external to the individuals, then (formal) rules are placed in the background 
when explaining individuals’ actions. However, as argued in the next section, this 
restrictive conceptualisation of rules as formal rules can be questioned and the attention 
devoted to routines should not obscure the influence of rules – among other reasons, 
because rules remain a key component underlying those same routines.  
Routines are the next core component of Burns and Scapens’ model – a model 
which is completed with the final level of practices, in the realm of action. Burns and 
Scapens conceived that routines, like rules, also encode (or, more appropriately, embed) 
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institutional principles (in figure 2.1, arrow ‘a’, again). As rules are repeatedly enacted, 
the prescribed actions may become routinised. These rules are enacted by organisational 
actors, as they make decisions in everyday life, initially due to the existence of the rules 
themselves, but later “only because the rules involved are embedded in shared habits of 
thought and behavior” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 6) – i.e., routines7 (arrow ‘b’). In other 
words, the repeated enactment (of rules and/or routines) creates and reproduces those 
routines (arrows ‘c’), which then, by themselves, sustain the reproduction of the same 
practices (leading to a new enactment, depicted in another arrow ‘b’). It should be noted 
that routines may be “‘reproduced’ either in the same or in a changed form” (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000, p. 10). These two alternatives correspond either to the ‘more vertical’ ‘c’ 
arrows which feed back on the same original routine or to the other (oblique) ‘c’ arrow 
heading towards a new rule/routine set, conveying a shift in the routine (and eventually 
in the underlying rule). 
This cascading influence: 1) of institutions over rules (arrow ‘a’); and 2) of rules 
over actions (which, when repeated, create routines) and of the emerging routines over 
actions (arrows ‘b’), is what Hodgson (2000, pp. 326, 323) called “downward 
causation”. This overall process creates, as mentioned above, “[t]he Institutionalised 
Individual”. 
In time, rules and routines, continuously enacted and reproduced by the actors of 
that particular organisation, end up by becoming (further) institutionalised (arrow ‘d’). 
As the institutionalisation process continues, actors of that organisation further regard 
                                                 
7 Along the clarification made by Burns and Scapens, there is large consensus in institutional theory that 
habits exist at an individual, personal level, while routines refer to groups of individuals. See Becker 
(2004) for a similar position and more supporting literature. Hodgson (2008) added a particular insight: 
“routines do not simply refer to habits that are shared by many individuals in an organization or group. 
(…) Routines (…) are organizational meta-habits” and “are one ontological layer above habits 
themselves” (p.18). 
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those patterns of behaviour as ‘the way things are’ in that field, in a relatively 
unquestioned, taken for granted way and increasingly disassociated from their particular 
historical context.  
This perspective is strongly influenced by a Parsonian view (Parsons, 1937), 
which stresses the importance of the internalisation of shared values among agents to 
generate commitment and ‘appropriate’ dispositions, in a stable and sustainable way. 
Parsons emphasises individuals’ evaluative judgment based on wider values, norms and 
attitudes, largely a result from the commitment derived from socialisation (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991a, characterising OIE; Ribeiro, 2003). Internalised values are therefore 
at the core of this evaluative dimension of orientations towards action8, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of wider social norms and expectations creating a normative order 
(this Parsonian view is further discussed in page 57). “Insofar as institutions lead to 
regularities of behavior, concordant habits are laid down among the population, leading 
to congruent purposes and beliefs. In this way the institutional structure is further 
sustained. (…) [T]hrough this positive feedback [institutions] have strong self-
reinforcing and self-perpetuating characteristics. Institutions are perpetuated not simply 
through the convenient coordination rules that they offer. They are perpetuated because 
they confine and mold individual aspirations and create a foundation for their existence 
upon the many individual minds that they taint with their conventions” (Hodgson 2006, 
p. 7).  
Self-reinforcement and self-perpetuation mechanisms of institutions promote 
stability of the status quo, and little or no change. Therefore, there were accusations of 
                                                 
8 See DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) for a discussion of the prevalence of the evaluative dimension in 
Parsons’ theoretical development, when compared to the other two dimensions he also initially proposed: 
the cognitive dimension (related with ideas and beliefs) and the cathetic (affective) dimension. 
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an institutional determinism eliminating any substantive agency, independent and free 
from institutions - as argued by Boland (1996) and as acknowledged, at least partially, 
by many contemporary OIE researchers (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Hodgson, 
2000) as regards some theorists of past decades.  
It should be acknowledged that Burns and Scapens’ grounding in Giddens’ 
structuration theory and its notion of duality of structure led to a systematic recall of the 
non-deterministic nature of ‘downward causation’ and the interrelated ‘upward 
causation’. So, they argued that while institutions produce and reproduce “settled habits 
of thought and action, (…) [i]nstitutions themselves evolve through a process of 
routinization of human activity”. Therefore, institutions are the outcome of individual 
behaviour and habituation within social interactions – i.e., institutions are socially 
constructed. Hodgson (2006) quoted Commons (1965-1899, p. 6-8) to argue that 
“common beliefs and desires are the vitalising active force within the institution”. So, 
“actor and institutional structure (…) are connected in a circle of mutual interaction and 
interdependence” (Hodgson 2006, p. 8), in line with Giddens’ notion of duality of 
structure. 
As noted above, Burns and Scapens (2000) became a key reference within OIE-
inspired accounting research. Abrahamsson and Gerdin (2006), Burns (2000a and 
2008), Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005), Busco et al. (2006), Coad and Herbert (2009), 
Dillard et al. (2004), Englund and Gerdin (2008), Granlund (2001 and 2003), Hyvönen 
and Järvinen (2006), Johansson and Siverbo (2009), Lukka (2007), Modell et al. (2007), 
Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007), Ribeiro (2003), Ribeiro and Scapens (2006), Robalo 
(2007), Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005), Soin et al. (2002), Van der Steen (2007) and 
Yazdifar et al. (2008) are mere examples of an impressive list of research (by and large 
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within OIE, but occasionally also within NIS) which draw heavily on Burns and 
Scapens (2000) (more than making a mere passing mention). Indeed, this list could 
easily be even further extended. 
2.2.2 AN EMPHASIS ON ROUTINES 
About half a century ago, cognitive theory (in particular from key organisational 
theorists as Cyert and March, 1963, March and Simon, 1958 and other researchers from 
the Carnegie School; see Hodgson, 1988 for a review of seminal contributions) showed 
that behaviour cannot be assumed to be entirely deliberative, conscious and intentional. 
This finding was hugely influential among institutional theorists, and promoted a 
particular emphasis on behaviour of a routinised nature – rather than on behaviour 
resulting from choices based on the rational following of rules. Routines became, next 
to institutions, a main research topic (see, e.g., Becker, 2004 for a review), which has 
recently gained further momentum (see below). However, as argued in the next section, 
such findings have not eliminated the importance and presence of rules, which should 
therefore be retained within an institutional account of organisational behaviour. 
Hodgson (1988) highlighted that “mind and consciousness” are “multiple-
levelled and hierarchical” and that “[h]uman agents are both rational and sub-rational at 
the same time” (p. 110). Such insights replaced decision-making models of mere choice 
by models of taken-for-granted expectations (see, e.g., March, 1987 for a classic 
example in accounting), fuelling the emergent concern on routines, habits and scripts9.  
                                                 
9 Interestingly, although DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) related these developments to NIS and argued that 
they contrasted against OIE’s concern with values and commitment towards a particular entity, many OIE 
works already cited highlight that such developments have been enthusiastically incorporated into this 
branch of institutional theory, as well. 
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The findings that behaviour is not entirely deliberative, conscious and 
intentional, and in particular that individuals adopt satisficing (rather than maximising) 
strategies (March and Simon, 1958), downgraded the emphasis in the precise 
calculation of consequences. Alternatively, they placed rule following in centre stage - 
even if mere ‘rules of thumb’ are involved, rather than maximising ones (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991a; Hodgson, 2008; Scapens, 1994). But, as noted in the next section, this 
still leads to the issue of knowing what the followed rules are and highlights that there 
are still rules involved.  
The new emphasis on rule following is typically associated with routinised rule 
following, and with how rule-following behaviour can be sustained (Hodgson, 2008; 
Scapens, 1994). Routinised behaviour has been discussed above, when Burns and 
Scapens (2000) was presented. Giddens (1984), one of Burns and Scapens’ main 
influences, emphasised how routines contributed to control anxiety. Therefore, routines 
address a major problem of the mind, as highlighted by cognitive theory (see Becker, 
2004 for an extensive reference list). “Cognitive theory shows that the mind responds to 
the vast amount of sense data it receives by working to reduce uncertainty at the 
conceptual level and by giving the ‘chaotic jumble’ of stimuli some sense and meaning. 
In general we simultaneously face the problem of having (…) too much data for the 
mind to process (…) and too little information (…) too little knowledge. It would not be 
possible to process all the given sensory data in a rational, conscious calculation. (…) 
The crucially relevant step is that we form concepts, based on our past experience, to 
categorize the sense data and to endow it with meaning” (Hodgson, 1988, p. 108-9). 
Therefore, “although individual actors (...) often try to act intelligently by 
calculating the expected consequences of possible actions, such a basis for action is 
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typically supplemented by, or subordinated to, the following of rules that encode 
historical lessons learned within a complex ecology of nested organizations” (March, 
1987, p. 157) – even if these rules are merely satisficing ‘rules of thumb’. 
In a conceptualisation closely related with the above perspective, Clegg (1989) 
discussed how “contextual ‘rules of the game’ (…) both enable and constrain action 
(…). These rules may be taken to be the underlying rationale of those calculations 
which agencies routinely make in organizational contexts. Action can only ever be 
designated as such-and-such an action by reference to rules which identify it as such” 
(Clegg, 1989, p. 200). E.g., producing a report from a subsidiary to headquarters cannot 
be made sense of without a reference to a large number of rules, both explicit and 
implicit, as regards the content and degree of detail, format, timing and relative priority 
to other actions, to name just a few. These rules constitute a ‘rationale’ underlying the 
behaviours. 
Much contemporary, mostly OIE-inspired research elected routines as a research 
focus (Becker, 1998 and 2004 and the fourteen contributions in Becker, 2008b; Burns, 
2000a and 2008; Coad and Cullen, 2006; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Lukka, 2007; 
Pentland and Feldman, 2005; Quinn, 2010; Robalo, 2007; Volkoff et al., 2007). The 
large number of works in this list, together with the analysis in this subsection, highlight 
the relevance of routines within institutional theory, and in other contemporary research. 
However, the concept and nature of routines have been recently under controversy. This 
controversy and emerging proposals are analysed next. 
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2.2.3 THE CONTENTIOUS NATURE OF ROUTINES 
2.2.3.1 Identifying the definitional ambiguity of routines 
What are routines? The definition of routines has recently been through an 
important debate around a definitional ambiguity of the term ‘routine’ in previous work 
(e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens and Macintosh, 1996), as noted by Becker 
(2004, 2008a), Englund and Gerdin (2008), Johansson and Siverbo (2009) and Quinn 
(2010) and acknowledged by Burns (2008).10 Hodgson (2003 and 2008) and Lawson 
(2003) also spotted a similar confusion in the earlier and seminal works of Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and Hamilton (1953), respectively. The recent publication dates of the 
above works highlight the current momentum of this discussion, although early 
warnings of ambiguity could already be found in Becker (1998). 
The definitional ambiguity concerned three alternative conceptions of the term 
‘routine’: 1) recurrent action patterns, or recurrent behavioural patterns; 2) rules; and 
3) dispositions or propensities (Becker, 2008a). These alternative conceptions have 
been used, not only in the literature, but sometimes even within the same works (e.g., 
Burns and Scapens, 2000; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The simultaneous usage of the 
term routine as located in both the institutional realm and in the realm of action risked 
conflating structure and action (Englund and Gerdin, 2008; Hogson, 2008; Quinn, 
2010). And, as Hodgson noted, “the one term ‘routine’ cannot usefully denote 
potentiality and actuality. It has to denote one or the other, but not both” (Hodgson, 
2008, p. 19).  
                                                 
10 Ambiguity is frequent when defining related terms. The above discussion on institutions is 
representative; for another example, see Carter et al. (2008a) for a discussion on the definitional 
ambiguity surrounding the term ‘practice’ - whose one of the various attributed meanings is, actually, 
routine. 
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Each alternative definition is analysed next. Then, this subsection concludes by 
discussing various proposals to reconcile the different alternatives and by adding some 
notes regarding the transversal presence, across the various alternatives, of rules (the 
focus of the next section). 
2.2.3.2 Routines as behaviour 
The first alternative, defining routines as recurrent behavioural patterns, 
represented a behaviouralist notion of routines as “‘the way in which things are actually 
done’”, as “programmatic rule-based behaviours” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 6). 
Indeed, this emphasis on behaviour and practices can be traced back to earlier writings 
about institutions and Giddens, such as Cohen’s (1989) approach, cited in Scapens and 
Macintosh (1996, p. 681): “‘The concept of social institutions in structuration theory 
specifically refers to routinized practices that are carried out or recognised by the 
majority of members of a collectivity’ ([Cohen] 1989, p. 38-39)”. Routinised 
behaviours emerge from repeated rule following, mostly based on tacit knowledge. This 
approach placed routines closer to, or even within, the realm of action. Becker (1998) 
defined the concrete, specific aspects of routines, at the level of action, as “recurrent 
action patterns” (p. 4, emphasis added). As later noted by Becker (2004), this approach 
was understandingly prevalent among empirical (rather than conceptual) research. 
2.2.3.3 Routines as rules 
The second alternative, of considering routines as equivalent to rules, was the 
option taken by Becker (1998) to deal with the prevalent definitional ambiguity. 
Contrasting to the above conceptualisation of routines at the level of action, Becker 
defined the cognitive representation of the routine (the routine in abstract) as ‘rule’. 
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This definition of rule is developed in the next section but, as it can be anticipated, it 
goes beyond a restricted conceptualisation of rules as formal rules. 
The parallels between routines and rules (in particular conceptions of the terms) 
are noticeable. For example, Becker (2004) indicated that routines have cognitive and 
governance dimensions – which are analogous to Giddens’ two types of rules, 
interpretive and normative.11 
It should be noted that Burns and Scapens (2000) argued against a hypothetical 
equivalence or conflation between the two central components of their model, routines 
and rules (central, in as much as they are placed at the ‘centre’ of the model, linking the 
institutional realm and the realm of action). These authors alerted that the two 
categories, in spite of both interacting between the institutional realm and the realm of 
action, should be analytically separated: “it is important not to confuse the two” (p. 7). 
However, this opposition derived from Burns and Scapens’ (overall) tendency (Quinn, 
2010) to conceptualise rules as formal rules. Under such definition, it is clear that rules 
should not be confused with routines, as these authors exemplified: “practices in use 
may not actually replicate the systems set out in the procedure manuals” (p. 7) (as it is 
noticeable, in this instance the authors adopted a behavioural notion of routines). 
2.2.3.4 Routines as dispositions 
The third alternative, of routines as dispositions, located routines at a more 
abstract level, within the institutional realm. In this alternative, routines are 
characterised as propensities to act, as generative dispositions (Burns, 2008; Hodgson, 
                                                 
11 In addition, Clegg’s (1989) framework, adopted in the next chapter, also considers rules of meaning 
and membership – concepts whose essence is not distant from Giddens’ interpretive and normative rules 
and, therefore, from Becker’s (2004) cognitive and governance routines. 
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2003). Routines are “a disposition to act and behave in certain ways” (Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009, p. 151, emphasis in the original), although in a non-deterministic way - 
as Van der Steen (2007) put it, it only makes “some behaviours and thought more likely 
than others” (p. 6). Routines are essential in sustaining rule-like behaviour, but they are 
not behaviour. According to this view, routines are located within the institutional 
realm, rather than within the realm of action. Indeed, according to (Johansson and 
Siverbo, 2009, p. 151) “‘the way in which things are actually done’ requires no real 
conceptualisation, but can be termed behaviour or practice even when directed by a 
routine”. 
2.2.3.5 Reconciling alternative conceptions of routines – and adding the material 
dimension of routines 
Reflecting this diversity of alternative conceptions, Feldman and Pentland 
(2003) reconciled both levels of routines (the institutional realm and the realm of action) 
by defining two dimensions of routines: the ostensive and the performative dimensions. 
They view “routines as Dualities (…) [b]oth (…) necessary for an organisational routine 
to exist” (p. 101). This suggestion, developed in Pentland and Feldman (2005 and 
2008), has been considered as promising and even adopted by several researchers 
(Becker, 2004; Quinn, 2010; Van der Steen, 2007; Volkoff et al., 2007).  
The ostensive or structural dimension of a routine is the “abstract, generalized 
idea of the routine, or the routine in principle” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, p. 101). In 
its ostensive dimension, a routine “takes on a rule-like structural quality in that it may 
have guiding, referring and accounting properties” (Quinn, 2010, p. 288). Therefore, the 
ostensive dimension corresponds mostly to the above sense of routines as rules. In turn, 
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the performative or agentic dimension of a routine is “the routine in practice” and 
“consists of specific actions, by specific people, in specific places and times” (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003, p. 101). It is constituted by observable and recurrent actions, 
performed when people act out their ostensive routine (Quinn, 2010). The performative 
dimension corresponds to the first, behaviouralist perspective of programmatic rule-
based behaviours. 
In addition, Volkoff et al. (2007) extended Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) work 
by adding a third aspect of routines: the material aspect, which is embedded in 
information technology (IT) such as ERPs12. Volkoff et al. argued that IT differs from 
other physical artefacts associated with routines, “because it is an integral part of those 
routines, not just part of the context within which routines are executed” (p. 833). Based 
on their case study, they provided a detailed description of their concept of 
technological embeddedness: “Organizational routines are embedded in the ES 
[Enterprise System] in the form of system-executed transactions - sets of explicitly 
defined steps that require specific data inputs to automatically generate specific 
outcomes” (p. 839). They argued that the material aspect differs from the ostensive (the 
routine in abstract), since it is concrete, “transactions hard-coded into the system, (…) 
the same for everyone, and individual interpretations do not affect how transactions are 
performed. At the same time, the material aspect is not the same as the performative 
                                                 
12 Volkoff et al.’s (2007) critical realist position emphasises the structural constraints created by 
technology. Volkoff et al. criticised structuration theory (and ANT, see next chapter) for conflating 
structure and agency criticised. In addition, they criticised institutional theory as tending to ignore agency 
(presumably, Volkoff et al. were targeting NIS, considering that the institutional literature they referenced 
- Avgerou 2000 and Gosain 2004 – are NIS works). As an alternative, they claimed that their critical 
realist theory emphasised the structural technological constraints and simultaneously incorporated the 
effects of agency. The different emphases of the various theoretical approaches are not unimportant. 
However, these different emphases do not prevent from including Volkoff et al.’s technological emphasis 
in this OIE analysis. On the contrary, the technological emphasis is a particularly useful complement, in 
particular since the case study focuses on the same major technological innovation that Volkoff et al. 
analysed: an ERP system. 
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aspect because the transaction is not performed but is executed by the technology. 
Whereas the performative aspect depends on the choices of the actor, the material aspect 
is predefined, and there are no choices to be made” (p. 840). 
Two notes should be made regarding these alternative conceptualisations of 
routines. Although some authors rejected accepting more than one alternative definition 
(e.g., Hodgson, 2008, as cited above), other authors were more accommodative. 
Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) suggestion of the two dimensions of ostensive and 
performative routines accommodates two conceptualisations. Volkoff et al. (2007) 
extends this accommodation to three conceptualisations. Becker (2005) could be 
interpreted as even going further, by relating the different dimensions of routines to 
different levels of analysis. “For purposes of empirical research, the implication is that 
the appropriate level of analysis has to be chosen according to the research question at 
hand” (p. 22). This thesis does not further discuss whether it is possible to accept 
multiple conceptualisations of routines or not, since the ensuing focus is not on routines, 
but rather on another component of OIE models: rules. Nonetheless, the above 
examination of multiple conceptualisations of routines is relevant as regards their 
linkages with rules. 
The second note is that rules are implicated in all recent conceptions of routines, 
as discussed in the next section. This argument that rules underlie routines – and indeed 
institutions, as also discussed next - raises the issue of how rules may be conceptualised. 
Conceptualising rules merely as a set of formal rules does not support such association. 
However, an expanded conception of rules is possible. This expanded conception of 
rules encompasses the notion of formal rules but places a distinctive emphasis on rules 
as an internal structure of agents. The conception emphasises the cognitive dimension 
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of rule - rules as interpreted, accepted and enacted by agents in their activities. Such 
conception makes rules regain a centre stage in institutional research. Indeed, rules are 
one of research avenues in OIE and are discussed in the next section.  
Finally, and importantly, it should be noted that the previous paragraph avoided 
using the term ‘individuals’, and used ‘agents’ instead. The objective is to encompass 
both individual and collective entities capable of acting (agents). In fact, this cognitive 
dimension of rules is relevant as regards both individual people (related with 
“individual cognitive processes”) and collective entities (related with “organizational 
cognitive processes”) (Seal, 2003, p. 97). Collective cognitive, sense-making processes 
have been profoundly researched in the literature. And although OIE typically considers 
agents as individuals (people), it is argued that an expanded conception of agents may 
be beneficial. Several theoretical strands support such expansion. In line with the above 
discussion in this chapter, Seal (2003) argued that Giddens’ structuration theory allowed 
combining both types of cognitive processes through the concept of ‘duality of 
structure’ (see also a quote from Scapens and Macintosh, 1996 in page 51).  
Furthermore, in the next chapter, alternative conceptualisations of agency are discussed 
which also accommodate the notion of collective agents – one of the distinctive traits of 
Actor-Network Theory. This important issue is here only introduced, and its 
development is left for the next section, which proposes a renewed emphasis on rules as 
a major research avenue in OIE. 
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2.3 A RESEARCH AVENUE IN OIE: A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON 
RULES 
Quinn (2010) noted that the “literature has not as yet provided any detailed 
discussion on the nature of rules in management accounting” (p. 292) and that, just like 
there was a definitional ambiguity surrounding routines, a similar situation could also be 
found as regards rules. The first subsection takes Quinn’s lead about the need to discuss 
the nature of rules. It is not intended to produce an in-depth discussion towards the 
ontology of rules, but merely to clarify (and justify) some considerations and proposals 
about the ontology of rules. It discusses the formal and informal nature of rules, arguing 
(unlike Quinn, 2010) that informal rules should also be included in the concept of rules. 
Then, it argues that rules have a dimension internal to actors which is crucial to explore 
the role of rules in behaviour. Finally, various arguments are presented to adopt the 
usage of the term ‘rule’. The second subsection argues that rules can be seen to underlie, 
in varying ways, all conceptions of routines. The third subsection discusses situations 
where routines do not exist and where rules, therefore, take a particular relevance. The 
fourth subsection discusses the individual and collective levels of rules, relating them 
with the notion of collective agency, typically absent from OIE. The final subsection 
concludes by reinforcing the call for researchers to devote greater importance to rules, 
as an important research avenue in OIE.  
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2.3.1 BEYOND FORMAL AND EXTERNAL RULES – CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT 
THE ONTOLOGY OF RULES 
2.3.1.1 Formal vs. informal rules 
OIE literature tends to associate ‘rules’ with the restricted sense of formal rules 
(e.g.: Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Lukka, 2007; Quinn, 2010; Van der Steen, 2007; 
Burns and Scapens, 2000 also tended to make a similar association, as discussed 
below). Such narrow definition of rules as ‘formal’ rules has the benefit of avoiding the 
potential inclusion of (arguably) inadequate concepts and potentially increasing 
conceptual clarity (Quinn, 2010). However, as suggested above, this subsection will 
argue that a more encompassing definition of rules beyond formal rules is not only also 
possible, but it may indeed be more adequate and fruitful.  
As an introductory line of reasoning, it may be argued that the notion that only 
formal statements qualify as rules sits uncomfortably with quite consensual 
conceptualisations in institutional theory. As a first example, the generalised 
acknowledgement that institutions are the “rules of the game” (cf. Nelson, 2007) is 
hardly compatible with a conception of rules restricted to formal rules. As a second 
example, recalling Giddens’ taxonomy of rules (interpretive or normative), interpretive 
rules (producing signification structures) are clearly unlikely to be restricted to formal 
rules: extant meanings about the social world would indeed be limited, and the scope of 
influence of structures would indeed be reduced, if only formal interpretive rules were 
at stake. As regards normative rules, defining legitimation structures, they can be (also) 
found in codified (hence formal) rules present at the level of states or organizations; 
however, it is clear that the definition of legitimate or illegitimate social conduct is 
influenced by a range of orientations beyond those set forward by formal rules. Englund 
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and Gerdin’s (2008) definition of normative rules makes that clear: “connected sets of 
precepts about what is regarded virtue and what ought to happen in social settings (…) 
that agents, consciously or not, draw upon when they act” (p. 1129). 
Frequently, structuralists’ descriptions of rules not only allow, but also require, 
the conception of rules both in a formal and informal sense – formal rules could not be 
expected to have all the described effects. The following passage from Scapens and 
Macintosh (1996, p. 682), in turn drawing from Cohen (1989), is representative: “Cohen 
argues that ‘Giddens’ most significant contribution in the duality of structure is to treat 
rules regarding aspects of institutionalized conduct as structural properties of social 
collectivities’; where ‘rules ... appear as generalizable aspects of procedures that are 
drawn upon in the reproduction of regularities of social praxis’ (1989, p. 42). Such rules 
are reproduced many times over during routine activities undertaken by members of a 
collectivity and recognized for a considerable period in the history of their collectivity 
(Cohen, p. 43). Thus, rules may be conceived as trans-situational properties of a 
collectivity which are inextricably entailed in the reproduction of institutionalized social 
action and interaction. It is this conception of ‘rules’ which makes structuration theory 
particularly valuable in understanding the role of management accounting systems in 
the reproduction of organizational practice”. This passage suggests that it is unlikely 
that an institutional theorist drawing from Giddens would argue that institutions could 
be reflected in, or be the reflection of, merely a set of formal rules13.  
In addition, Hodgson (2006) highlighted the problematic definition of ‘formal’ 
(“Does the term formal mean legal, written, explicit, codifiable, or something else?”) 
                                                 
13 The dual causality direction of the statement intends to focus exclusively on the issue of formality, 
rather than on the direction of causality between the two elements. 
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and, in particular, the illusory distinction between formal and informal rules (and 
institutions). Referring to institutions (but being equally applicable to rules), he stated 
that “the idea that there is a dividing line between institutions that are entirely ‘formal’ 
on one hand and entirely ‘informal’ institutions on the other is false, because ‘formal’ 
institutions (…) always depend on nonlegal rules and inexplicit norms in order to 
operate” (p. 18, emphases in the original). 
Even though Burns and Scapens (2000) mostly endorsed the notion of rules as 
formal rules (e.g., in procedure manuals), they also acknowledged that “not all rules will 
be specified in this way” (p. 14). In this vein, Hodgson (2006, p. 3) defined rule as “a 
socially transmitted and customary normative injunction or immanently normative 
disposition, that in circumstances X, do Y”. He further explicitly added that rules 
“include norms of behavior and social conventions as well as legal rules” (ibidem), and 
he concluded by defining rules as “socially or culturally transmitted dispositions, with 
actual or potential normative content” (p. 5, emphasis added). In Hodgson (2008), he 
grouped together “rules and norms of behaviour, of both the explicit and informal kind” 
as part of the “structured social and physical environment for each individual” (p. 22) 
(as noted above, OIE tends to focus on individual people, rather than collective entities). 
In a nutshell, a wide range of social rules are at stake - a different perspective from the 
narrow characterisation of rules as formal rules in some OIE research. 
Contributing to blurring the differences between formal and informal rules as 
regards their influence over behaviours, Hodgson (2006, p. 5) rejected the distinction 
between rules and norms based on “the different ways they enforce tasks”. According to 
such rejected distinction, norms would involve “a network of mutual beliefs”; in 
contrast, rules would be “the product of explicit agreement brought about by some 
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authority, and (…) imply sanctions”. Rejecting such distinction, Hodgson rightfully 
noted that “[t]he difference between such enforced sanctions and the perceived threat of 
disapproval by others is eroded when one considers that both involve some discomfort”. 
“[N]either external sanctions nor social disapproval is devoid of questions of value” and 
both will affect preferences as regards the course of actions to be followed. This 
supports that, as regards the influence upon behaviours, the concept of rules can be 
expanded beyond its formal sense.  
As a conclusion, there is support in the literature to go beyond formal rules, and 
devote greater attention to informal rules – while bearing in mind the problematic 
distinction between both. Lukka (2007) concluded by stating that “we need to probe far 
beyond the limits of the formal rule systems (…) and pay increasing serious attention to 
the informal domain of organisations” (p. 98). Lukka suggested focusing on routines, 
associating them with the informal dimension. Without debating again the 
classifications of routines, now as regards their informal nature (the alternatives 
discussed in the previous section may point to different classifications), it is clear that 
routines are, at best, only one particular component of the informal dimension.. This 
work therefore takes a different perspective, arguably with some advantages, to address 
Lukka’s (2007) important call for research on more than merely formal rules, by 
expanding the conceptualisation of rules. 
2.3.1.2 Rules as external to agents vs. rules as internal structures 
The next key issue is whether rules should only be conceived as external to 
agents, or whether there is also an internal perspective to be considered. The discussion 
above has already hinted at the need of going beyond a conception of rules merely as 
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external agents, as a part of the environment. It is now suggested to also consider rules 
as ‘taken in’ by agents, i.e., an internal perspective. Considering the similarities (and 
even unclear separation) between formal and informal rules (see Hodgson’s, 2006 
analysis just above), this need of adopting an internal perspective applies to both types 
of rules. Therefore, the ensuing discussion only distinguishes between formal and 
informal rules as regards ontological considerations and empirical examples, to 
facilitate discussion. 
Let us consider that a rule ‘exists’ externally to a particular agent (although this 
independent external ‘existence’ is questioned below). That rule may be a formal rule, a 
physical artefact with a material existence, e.g., imprinted in a manual or saved in a 
virtual, electronic database; or it may be an informal rule, informally prevalent in a 
social setting. However, the process through which these ‘external rules’ become 
actually enacted by a particular agent must be addressed. This ‘external existence’ could 
be considered to correspond to a ‘starting point’; however, there is clearly a need to 
focus on the ‘internal existence’ of the rule within the agent’s realm. 
A rule thus conceived is included in what Coad and Herbert (2009), drawing on 
Stones’ (2005) development of Giddens’ duality of structure, described as “internal 
structures, within the agent” (p. 179, emphasis added) (also, Busco, 2009). These 
internal structures are cognitive representations, internal to the agent, providing 
orientations for action and decisive in influencing the way the external structures 
constrain the agent and the agent’s perceptions. Indeed, Englund and Gerdin’s (2008) 
quote above already indicated that: rules are “connected sets of precepts” (p. 1129). 
Becker (1998) also adopted this concept of rule as a cognitive representation to replace 
the abstract (rather than action) level of routines. This corresponds to what Burns (2008) 
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described, as regards “habits, routines and other rule-like structures”, as “embed[ding] 
themselves within people’s minds and cognitive armoury” (Burns, 2008, p. 18), i.e., 
becoming a rule to that particular agent. 
Such conceptualisation of rules “makes reference to the interpretive work that 
people engage in, when they make sense of the world” (Clegg, 1975, p. 59, emphasis 
added). A rule can thus be seen as “a perceived order, rather than an external ‘thing’ to 
which the actor reacts” (Clegg, 1975, p. 60). Ontologically, it is internal to the 
individual, it “is located in the party’s belief that they are subject to an ‘order’, a 
‘structure of dominancy’ which is ‘regarded by the actor as in some way obligatory or 
exemplary for him’” (p. 60, citing Weber, 1968, p. 31) and “towards which one ‘orients’ 
one’s behaviour” (p. 62). 
Both types of Giddens’ rules (normative and interpretive) can be framed as 
cognitive representations of agents, orienting agents’ behaviour and their interpretation 
of the world – and including their interpretation of other rules. Indeed, as Becker (1998, 
p. 5) noted, “a rule does not ‘exist’ on its own. It only and always ‘exists’ in conjunction 
with its interpretation (…). If a rule and its interpretation always and necessarily ‘exist’ 
in conjunction, then the implication is that it is impossible to attribute effects to either 
one of those because there is no criterion for distinguishing their ‘influence’”. 
In addition, as Becker (1998, p. 5) also argued, “rules are linked with their use” 
(see also Clegg et al., 2006). This linkage between rules and their usage (i.e., their 
enactment) is particularly relevant considering the intermediating role of the 
interpretation of rules and its inherent indexicality. Rules “can never provide for their 
own interpretation” (Clegg, 1989, p. 201). Indexicality occurs regarding the context of 
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interpreters, i.e., the agents; and indexicality occurs regarding the context of 
interpretation, i.e., the actual situation in which the rule is interpreted and potentially 
enacted.14 In a nutshell, rules are indexical, i.e., rules are dependent on the context in 
which they are drawn upon by agents. This conceptualisation of rules underlies Clegg’s 
framework, explored in the next chapter. 
In addition to the processes of rules interpretation and enactment (analysed 
above), two other stages should be mentioned: how the rules are introduced to the 
agent’s internal realm; and how the rules are accepted by the agent. These two stages 
may be considered to be interpolated with interpretation and enactment, constituting a 
(potentially flexible) four stages sequence: introduction, interpretation, acceptance and 
enactment. Some brief words on these stages now follow. 
‘Introduction’ of rules to the agent’s internal realm should be broadly conceived 
as ‘exposure’ of the agent to rules – with varying levels of deliberativeness and 
coerciveness. Such introduction may result from deliberate processes or from more 
emergent processes (this distinction resembles the wider process of institutionalisation, 
as discussed, e.g., by Holm, 1995). In deliberate processes, other agencies draw on 
particular resources to ‘present’ the proposed rule to the agent for his/her examination, 
adoption and enactment. Such deliberate processes are typical of (but not exclusive of) 
the introduction of formal rules in a given setting by agents with the formal authority to 
legislate. In the case of formal rules, they involve codification and, as discussed in 
Burns and Scapens (2000), they may derive from institutionalised beliefs or may 
                                                 
14 Recalling that in Giddens’ approach rules are structures, a link can be made with a different strand of 
the literature which also defends that (a different sense of) structure depends on agents’ practice. By 
discussing organizational structure (rather than ‘structures’ in Giddens’ sense) and drawing from the 
‘practice perspective’ of Whittington (2002), Seal and Herbert (2009) argued that “structure is no longer 
seen as a static, discrete phenomenon that can be captured by organization charts. Structure has to be 
enacted or even performed by organizational members (…). Structure has to be practiced.” (p. 16). 
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constitute the codification of extant routines. As it should be clear, in spite of the above 
expression “proposed rule”, the coerciveness involved in these processes may be 
significant. On the other hand, emergent processes are more likely to characterise the 
introduction of informal rules – in line with the notion of “‘(…) accretion, a passive 
process not under anyone’s control, just happening’ (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 192, 
original author’s emphasis)” (cited by Seal and Herbert, 2005, p. 30, referring to the 
institutionalisation process). The processes regarding the processes of introduction (or 
emergence) of informal rules still requires substantial additional research. Some leads 
can be obtained from work on agents’ exposure to alternative institutional features, such 
as Clemens and Cook (1999), Seo and Creed (2002) and Granovetter (1973 and 1983), 
but further research is needed. 
As regards the acceptance of the rules by agents as valid orientations for their 
behaviour, alternative explanations can be found based on either a Parsonian view 
(Parsons, 1937) or in a more calculative view (Ribeiro, 2003). A Parsonian view 
emphasises the processes of internalisation and characterises much OIE research, as 
suggested by Ribeiro, 2003 and DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a (cf. Hirsch and 
Lounsbury’s, 1997 criticisms that DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a “overly caricatures the 
old institutionalism by (…) overemphasising the connections to Parsonian 
functionalism” (p. 49)). In a Parsonian perspective, rules are, above all, morally 
accepted.  The individual’s “moral frame of reference” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, 
p. 15) is crucial in the internalisation of rules, with the potential to make them largely 
institutionalised and taken-for-granted. Should a rule become valued by individuals, 
according to their evaluative judgments, it generates commitment and the appropriate 
dispositions towards its enactment; it becomes a rule within that individual’s internal 
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structure (Parsons, 1937; see reviews in Clegg, 1989; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; 
Ribeiro, 2003). This Parsonian view has been included within the interpretation that an 
important stream of authors has made of Giddens’ work (Busco, 2009; Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1990; Scapens and Macintosh, 1996) (however, this association has been 
contested, as discussed in section 2.3.4). 
An alternative view of rules acceptance could rely on a more calculative 
conception of individuals (Ribeiro, 2003): based on (whatever) calculative motivations 
(rather than espoused values), should a rule promote the attainment of (whatever) 
objectives of the individual, appropriate dispositions emerge towards the enactment of 
the rule. However, although these alternative views (a Parsonian and a more calculative, 
utilitarian view) seem very different, it has been suggested that the differences between 
them are not truly significant. As DiMaggio and Powell (1991a, p. 18) noted, in a 
Parsonian view “[a]ction remains rational in the sense that it comprises the quasi-
intentional pursuit of gratification by reasoning humans who balance complex and 
multifaceted evaluative criteria”, under “‘(…) rules governing actions in pursuit of 
immediate ends in terms of their conformity with the ultimate common value-system of 
the community’ (Parsons 1990: 324)” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 18). 
Summarising the above argument, a holistic understanding of the role of rules 
should pay close attention to the perspective of rules as agents’ cognitive 
representations, as internal structures. Abstract rules must be introduced to the potential 
agent. Then, the (potential) agent has to interpret those abstract rules, creating a first 
instance of indexicality in rules. The stages of acceptance and enactment may follow 
(involving, again, the agent’s interpretative efforts, as noted above). In particular, 
Becker (1998, p. 8) stressed that “‘rules’ (cognitive representations, general, abstract) 
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are necessarily coupled with interpretation or use when put into action”. Following 
Hodgson (2006, p. 18), “[i]f laws or declarations are neither customary nor embodied in 
individual dispositions, then - ‘formal’ or not - they have insignificant effects. They are 
mere declarations or proclamations, rather than effective social rules”. And these 
processes of introduction, interpretation, acceptance and enactment of rules are a 
fundamental part of the ‘downward causation’ that distinctively characterises 
institutional theory (see pp. 26 and 36), ultimately influencing the realm of action. 
2.3.1.3 Keeping the term ‘rule’ 
Considering it is, at least, plausible to label as ‘rules’ the cognitive 
representations, as orientations received, interpreted, accepted and enacted by an 
individual, then the issue becomes whether it could be advisable to adopt alternative 
terms. Sewell (1992), with Coad and Herbert’s (2009) agreement, argued that the term 
‘rule’ is too rigid and misleadingly suggests a sense of homogeneity; therefore, these 
authors recommended the replacement of the term ‘rule’ with the term ‘schemas’ which 
individuals draw upon in the structuration process (Giddens, 1984). While 
acknowledging the problems involved in the term ‘rule’ and the plausibility of Sewell’s 
(1992) and Coad and Herbert’s (2009) proposal, the term ‘rule’ (regardless of the 
formality degree of the rule) is retained in this thesis, for three reasons.  
First, the proposed term ‘schema’ is not, in itself, a fully adequate replacement 
for ‘rules’. While Coad and Herbert (2009) adequately deploy the term ‘schema’ 
meaning ‘outline’ or ‘model’ (“cultural”, “ideological” and “hermeneutic schema”, pp. 
180, 184 and 189), it can be argued that ‘schema’ does not encompass the notion of a 
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rule in the normative sense of “in circumstances X, do Y” (drawing from Hodgson’s 
definition above).  
Second, a focus on rules from an institutional theory perspective is particularly 
useful to establish linkages with another theoretical approach, in the next chapter: 
Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power, based on Actor-Network Theory. Clegg further 
develops, and builds on, this individual, internal perspective, and conceptualises rules as 
fixing relations of meaning and membership. In Clegg’s (1989) view, “rules will not be 
as static and idealized as in chess or some other game but will instead be far more 
fragile, ambiguous, unclear, dependent upon interpretation and subject to reproduction 
or transformation depending on the outcome of struggles to keep them the same or to 
change them this way or that” (p. 209). Ribeiro argued that “there may be different, 
possible conflicting sets of rules, available in a social system for individuals to establish 
meaning and membership” (p. 51) and, in addition, “in many social situations (for 
instance, in organisational life), clear-cut ‘rules of meaning and membership’ may be 
unavailable” (p. 73). Even when it is argued that “[r]ules can never provide for their 
own interpretation” (Clegg, 1989, p. 201), the possibility of encapsulating both formal 
and informal rules remains. The adoption of Clegg’s approach, in the next chapter, 
supports keeping the term ‘rule’, with a reach beyond the narrow concept of formal and 
‘external’ rules. 
The third and final reason for keeping the term ‘rule’ is grounded on its intuitive, 
common language, general dictionary-based meaning. The first entry in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary for ‘rule’ is “a regulation or principle governing conduct or 
procedure within a particular sphere”. The ‘principle’ mentioned in the definition 
encompasses non-formal rules and the internal dimension of rules, as discussed above. 
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Although general-purpose dictionaries are not necessarily the best reference for 
scientific usage, the fact that the common man can easily relate to the proposed 
meanings is a positive indication. 
Therefore, the term ‘rule’ will be used in the remainder of the thesis, 
encompassing both formal and informal rules, and encompassing both external rules 
and the internal dimension of agents’ cognitive structures. 
2.3.1.4 Beyond formal and external rules - a summary 
Summarising this reflection on the ontology of rules, conceptualising rules (also) 
as internal structures, as cognitive representations by agents, definitely challenges the 
restricted concept of rules as (only) formal rules, like suggested at the start of this 
subsection. The consideration that the concept of ‘rules’ should go beyond formal rules 
and should also encompass informal rules, along with the acknowledgement that rules 
should also be considered in a perspective internal to the individual, places interesting 
challenges to researchers and justifies a greater interest on the topic.  
Two final acknowledgements are required. First, a narrower conceptualisation of 
rules as formal rules, in line with some OIE research referenced at the start of this 
subsection, is not incorrect and has its own benefits. However, what this section argues 
is that a different and broader definition may be preferable. Second, the seminal 
findings about routines (another central component of OIE models, as overviewed in the 
previous section) should not be underestimated. The concept of ‘routine’ has had an 
overwhelming importance in understanding organisations and organisational life, 
fuelling an impressive amount of research about routines and routinised behaviours, as 
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this chapter has already evidenced (see also the various contributions in Becker, 2008b). 
However, on the other hand, it is argued next that the focus on routines may have been 
overemphasised, at the cost of neglecting other concepts – such as rules.  
The two following subsections develop two lines of arguments. The first line of 
argument argues that rules can be seen to underlie routines, hence pressing for a greater 
attention to the concept of ‘rules’. The second line of argument argues that rules are not 
only an underlying component of routines, but indeed an essential – though neglected – 
component of an institutional explanation of organisational life. In particular, rules may 
explain human behaviour in particular situations which the concept of routine is unable 
to address – in particular, for the simple and plain reason that rules may be in place for 
actors to draw on, in situations of absence of routines. 
2.3.2 RULES UNDERLYING ROUTINES 
The previous section analysed the insights from the cognitive revolution, 
highlighting the importance of routines and replacing decision-making models of mere 
choice by models of taken-for-granted expectations. 
However, these alternative decision-making models of taken-for-granted 
expectations still incorporate rules. In fact, these alternative models still assume that 
“‘actors associate certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropriateness” 
(March and Olsen 1984: 741) (…). Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing so 
they seek guidance from the experiences of others in comparable situations and by 
reference to standards of obligation” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 10, emphases 
added). Such search for “guidance” is, in fact, a search for rules to be enacted and 
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applied in the particular circumstances of the actor, even if those rules are inspired and 
based in the experiences of other actors. In addition, the mentioned “standards of 
obligation” are particular rules, either formal or informal, as internalised by the actor. 
The first section, after reviewing the various conceptions of routines in the 
literature, concluded by arguing that rules are implicated in all those conceptions of 
routines (dispositional, ostensive, performative and material). Such argument is now 
justified in more detail. In the alternative of restricting the concept of routines to 
generative dispositions, orienting agents, Johansson and Siverbo (2009) highlighted that 
“routines can be expressed as rules” (p. 148). As discussed in this section, (accepted) 
rules, as part of agents’ ‘internal structures’, also influence agents’ dispositions towards 
actions.  
Rules also underlie both dimensions of ostensive and performative routines. As 
regards the ostensive dimension of routines, it also has underlying rules, given its 
guiding properties. Indeed, the characteristic of guiding behaviour is shared by both 
rules and the ostensive dimension of routines, leading Quinn (2010, p. 295) to concede 
that “[i]t could be argued that the ostensive aspect of a routine is similar to an informal 
(undocumented) rule”15. As regards the performative dimension of routines (i.e., of 
routines as behaviour), the underlying rule being enacted (albeit in a routinised way) 
should not be ignored; as mentioned above, this perspective concerns programmatic 
rule-based behaviours. Finally, Volkoff et al.’s (2007) discussion on the material aspect 
of routines actually concerns the multiple rules underlying routines being hard-coded in 
information technology. Although they do not mention ‘rules’ in their paper, their 
                                                 
15 Quinn then differentiated both based on his assumption that rules had to take a formal, documented 
nature. However, the discussion below identifies a key criterion to distinguish between rules and the 
ostensive dimension of routines: the repetition of behaviours. 
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definition that “[o]rganizational routines are embedded in the ES [Enterprise System] in 
the form of system-executed transactions - sets of explicitly defined steps that require 
specific data inputs to automatically generate specific outcomes” (p. 839) reveals that 
they are referring to rules intended to define transactions and their sequence. 
It therefore seems to be impossible to expunge rules out of the new emphasis on 
routines, routinised rule following, and routinised action. Routinely producing a 
monthly variance statement (an example of a routine in Burns and Scapens, 2000) is the 
enactment of a rule stating that such statement should be produced every month – even 
if potentially mostly unconscious, with no other justification than emulating past 
behaviour (a mimicry assumption which, as already noted, has been criticised). 
Underlying rules still take a centre stage, both in the context of routines and 
even institutions. E.g., Burns and Scapens (2000) depicted the institutionalisation of 
routines as a process of disassociation with their particular historical circumstances (see 
also Seal, 2003). Since the abstract (or ostensive) aspect of a routine is a rule prevalent 
at a collective level, then an institution may also emerge from a similar process of 
disassociation between a prevalent rule and its historical circumstances. But even in that 
scenario, there is a still a rule being enacted, albeit in a taken-for-granted way, and 
indeed operating as an important internal structure as regards the agents’ behaviour. 
Similarly, Hodgson (2006), despite his emphasis on routines and habits, proposed a 
broad definition of institutions as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions” and claimed that the importance of institutions “involves 
the recognition that much of human interaction and activity is structured in terms of 
overt or implicit rules” (p. 2, emphases added). 
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In a nutshell, even if a rule becomes taken-for-granted (a frequently noted 
characteristic of institutions), it still remains a rule. Understanding the underlying rule 
shaping abstract routines and dispositions and the series of concrete actions (as 
routinised behaviours) should therefore be a key issue for institutional theory 
researchers. 
A concern on the rules underlying routines is still relevant even if actors do not 
fully recognise those rules or draw upon them without complete consciousness. Rules, 
as interpretive schemes or value norms (i.e., as structures of signification and 
legitimation, in Giddens’ theory) can potentially become unrecognised by agents. As 
Scapens and Macintosh (1996, p. 680) recalled, when particular “systems become 
institutionalized organizational practice and a taken-for-granted part of the 
organization’s lifeworld, the signification, legitimation and domination dimensions may 
not be explicitly recognized by organizational participants, even though they are drawn 
upon in day-to-day activity, through the duality of structure”. Clearly, rules being 
unrecognised by agents (albeit influencing and being reflected in individuals’ actions) 
do not make them a less relevant research focus – on the contrary. 
It should be acknowledged that institutionalists are usually cautious to recall that 
actors engaging in routinised behaviours are not “institutional ‘dopes’” “neither 
mindless nor senseless; rather, actors reflect on rules, ostensive routines, and context 
etc. to make sense of what they are doing or what they intend to do” (Quinn, 2010, p. 
234; cf. Lounsbury, 2008). As Busco (2009) recalled, Giddens emphasised that agents 
are both purposive and knowledgeably reflexive (cf. Clegg, 1989). Moreover, as already 
noted, there are multiple levels of consciousness (Hodgson, 1988) and Giddens’ 
distinction between practical consciousness and discursive consciousness is useful. 
66 
 2.3 A research avenue in OIE: a renewed emphasis on rules 
 2.3.3 Rules when there are no routines – filling a gap of routine-based frameworks 
Practical consciousness is related to an agent’s knowledge, potentially taken for granted 
and unnoticed – yet existent, nonetheless. On the other hand, discursive consciousness 
is related to an agent’s ability to verbally express their knowledge – an ability which 
may not exist as regards tacit aspects of practical consciousness (Coad and Herbert, 
2009).  
Therefore, as regards the impacts upon behaviour, the most decisive aspect is 
practical consciousness, which the agent deploys in everyday social interactions, 
drawing in the agent’s internal, cognitive structures, i.e., the agent’s rules. As Coad and 
Herbert (2009) argued, there is a need to supplement Giddens’ work, by emphasising 
“the content of what people might know”, “the theories of action” (p. 181) upon which 
they draw. 
The above analysis highlighted the importance of rules, in as much as they 
underlie routines and even institutions. The next subsection discusses another potential 
effect of rules which warrants rule crucial importance: rules influence behaviour even 
when, and particularly when, there are no routines. 
2.3.3 RULES WHEN THERE ARE NO ROUTINES – FILLING A GAP OF 
ROUTINE-BASED FRAMEWORKS 
2.3.3.1 Recurrence: necessary for the existence of routines… 
This section has highlighted some close links and even similarities between 
routines and rules. Several researchers defined routines as cognitive regularities or 
cognitive patterns, in a sense which approaches the concept of rule endorsed in this 
section. Other researchers opted to define routines as propensities to act in a certain 
67 
 2.3 A research avenue in OIE: a renewed emphasis on rules 
 2.3.3 Rules when there are no routines – filling a gap of routine-based frameworks 
way, by generating favourable dispositions towards carrying out certain actions – i.e., 
similar effects to those produced by the rules operating as internal structures of 
individuals, which also orient individuals in their actions and social interactions. Indeed, 
as this section argued above, rules underlie routines.  
However, the concepts of routines and rules are not synonymous. Indeed, one of 
the crucial differences to be now explored is derived precisely from a key characteristic 
of routines: recurrence. As Becker (2004) noted, based on a wide literature review (see 
also Quinn, 2010), “[t]he only commonality amongst [the various definitions of 
routines] is that they have to do something with repetition or regularity” (p. 664, 
emphasis in the original).  
Indeed, recurrence of behaviours is required both to create a routine and to 
maintain it. Previous recurrence of behaviours is required so that one can evoke the 
concept of routine in the first place – indeed, any of the alternative concepts, even those 
which are not within the realm of action. Realistically, “one would be hard pressed to 
call something happening only once a routine” (Becker, 2004, p. 646). In addition, even 
after having been constituted (in whatever ontological form, according to the various 
alternative concepts), a routine needs recurrent performance to be sustained. As 
Feldman and Pentland (2003) argued, “without on-going performance” of a routine, the 
performative dimension disappears and even the ostensive definition, though it may still 
exist, “becomes meaningless” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, 108). Therefore, without 
recurrent performance, even the ostensive dimension of a routine “may diminish over 
time, or even disappear” (Quinn, 2010, p. 296). 
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It should be noted that the differences between rules and routines, as regards the 
issue of recurrence, do not derive from different levels of analysis (individual or 
collective). In fact, the requirement of recurrence is equally applicable to the concept of 
habit - the individual-level equivalent of a routine (Becker, 2004; Burns and Scapens, 
2000). “[R]outines relate roughly to organisations as habits relate to individuals. (…) 
Habits are formed through repetition of action or thought. They are influenced by prior 
activity” (Hodgson, 2003, pp. 356 and 372)16. Adapting Becker’s (2004, p. 646) 
expression above, it is unreasonable to call a habit to “something happening only once”. 
The requirement of recurrence, or repeated occurrence, clearly restricts the field 
of application of the concept of routine. If a particular issue has never occurred, actors 
have never performed any actions related to that particular issue. In the absence of 
previous repetition of behaviours regarding a particular issue, no routine exists. 
Likewise, if a routine ceases to be performed, even its ostensive dimension may 
diminish or disappear (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Quinn, 2010).  
If we exclude routines, what concepts are there left in OIE models to explain 
behaviour? Rules may be an answer. But then, if rules are conceived as merely codified, 
formal rules, external to the individuals, then there is a glaring gap between those 
‘external’ artefacts and human behaviour (as discussed above, the gap concerns the 
internal mechanisms orienting human behaviour).  
In the absence of a routine addressing that particular issue and given the limits of 
formal rules, we are left with institutions, the macro component of OIE models. At first 
                                                 
16 This parallel between the concepts of routine and habit is valid in all alternative definitions presented in 
this chapter. Hodgson’s adoption of the specific alternative of defining routine – and hence habit – as a 
propensity does not affect the generalisation of the parallelism between both concepts. 
69 
 2.3 A research avenue in OIE: a renewed emphasis on rules 
 2.3.3 Rules when there are no routines – filling a gap of routine-based frameworks 
sight, it might be considered that institutions could provide a solution, since institutions 
also comprise rules (though, it should be noted, not in a formal, codified way, given the 
very nature of institutions). In addition, given the deeply settled and taken-for-granted 
nature of institutions, they are most likely to be enacted by actors. However, that very 
same requirement of being deeply settled and taken-for-granted severely restricts the 
sheer ‘number’ of institutions that may exist (assuming they could be ‘counted’) and 
restricts the scope and detail of existing institutions. Recognising such limitations, 
Burns and Scapens (2000) did not directly link institutions and actions; instead, they 
argued that “rules and routines act as the modalities which link the institutional realm 
and the realm of action” (p. 10). Indeed, since institutions are the most abstract 
component of the model, it seems reasonable resorting to other concepts to relate that 
abstract level with the level of action. 
Therefore, the explanatory power of routines in institutional theory is – quite 
obviously - limited to those situations in which previous instances of human behaviour 
in similar situations have recurrently occurred and whose repetition led to their 
routinisation.  
Recurrence, or repeated occurrence, is not only the only common characteristic 
among the various definitions of routines. It is also a striking - and crucial - difference 
as regards rules, as analysed next. 
2.3.3.2 Recurrence: … but not necessary for the existence of rules 
Rules, as internal structures of individuals, do not necessarily derive from 
repeated occurrence of behaviours. It is acknowledged that it is plausible, as Burns and 
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Scapens (2000) suggested, that repeated behaviours may create (ostensive) routines - 
which may be conceptualised as rules – and then eventually even be codified as (formal) 
rules. However, they did not claim explanatory exclusivity, and did not claim that all 
rules which individuals draw upon in their social life derive from previous behaviours.  
In fact, actors may draw on specific rules for a number of other reasons, other 
than due to routines. One approach draws on a Parsonian account of human behaviour, 
which deeply shaped OIE, as already argued in page 57. This approach emphasises the 
individuals’ evaluative judgment based on wider values, norms and attitudes, largely a 
result from the commitment derived from socialisation. Rules are, above all, morally 
accepted. 
Ribeiro (2003), on the other hand, drew attention to a more calculative 
perspective of human behaviour, in which individuals may enact certain rules according 
to strategic purposes, rather than genuine internalisation and moral acceptance of those 
rules (also: Boland, 1996). This possibility of calculative order, nonetheless, challenges 
a ‘downward causation’ from institutions (putatively embedding shared values) upon 
individuals.  
This discussion is continued later in the thesis. For the moment, the crucial 
conclusion is that, unlike routines, rules do not derive necessarily from past behaviour. 
Past, recurrent behaviour may not constitute rules, and rules may be constituted by 
factors other than recurrent, past behaviour. A rule may be a part of an individual’s 
internal structure without the underlying prescribed action having ever been performed, 
as briefly discussed above.  
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The argument that rules do not derive necessarily from past behaviour does not 
mean, of course, that past behaviour (any past behaviour, and particularly past and 
recurrent behaviour) may not leave its mark on actors and their rules. The importance of 
past actions is, e.g., reflected in the related notion of path-dependency, a notion shared 
by both OIE and NIS streams of institutional theory (see, e.g., Becker, 2004; Burns, 
2000b; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Coad and Cullen, 2006; Coad and Herbert, 2009; 
Modell et al., 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Powell, 1991 for various positions and 
perspectives on path dependency). Indeed, a potential research avenue is exploring how 
routines and rules (as agents’ internal structures) may evolve in a cumulative 
interaction. This perspective is not explored in depth in this thesis. However, in 
discussing and acknowledging the limitations of a framework proposed in section 8.2 
(Figure 8.2: An ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-based action), in page 625, some lines 
of development are suggested.  
2.3.3.3 Rules when recurrent actions do not develop into routines 
Finally, it should be noted that past behaviour does not necessarily translate into 
the development of rules. This applies to all conceptions of routines. In a conception of 
routine as a ‘recurrent behavioural pattern’, past behaviour may not be as ‘sufficiently’ 
recurrent as to qualify as a pattern (the ‘degree’ of empirical recurrence required for 
such qualification is, clearly, not amenable to an easy quantification). In the conceptions 
of routine as a ‘cognitive representation’ or a ‘disposition’, the emergence of such 
cognitive representations or dispositions is also not guaranteed to occur after (any given 
number of) reiterations of past behaviour.  
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Although the ‘cognitive revolution’ highlighted that much behaviour is 
routinised (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; see DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991a; Hodgson, 1988), some authors are cautious about not exaggerating their claims 
about the extent of routinisation. “Routines (…) comprise ‘programmatic’, rules-based 
behaviour (…) grounded in repeatedly following such rules. (…) The above is not to 
say, however, that all accounting becomes routinised (…), but that there is potential for 
routinisation (…) to occur” (Burns, 2000a, also cited by Yazdifar et al., 2008).  
Therefore, routines may not emerge at all (as noted in the above paragraphs) and 
surely do not emerge immediately (due their sine qua non requirement of recurrence, as 
discussed further up in this subsection). Consequently, devoting greater attention to 
rules may be useful to account for empirical situations in which routines have not 
emerged, or not yet emerged. 
2.3.4 ROUTINES AND RULES, THE COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
This section argued that a rule has differences – despite significant similarities - 
as regards an ostensive routine, or the “cognitive regularity” associated by Becker 
(2004) to the concept of routine. Becker is indeed right in highlighting that a routine can 
be seen as a rule – because there is indeed a rule underlying routines. The ensuing 
analysis considers how routines and rules are related with collective and individual 
cognitive processes, and how the possibility of collectively shared meanings and values 
has been taken by researchers drawing on Giddens. Seal (2003) noted that both types of 
cognitive processes (individual and collective) “may (…) be combined through the 
duality of structure as agents interact with a wider realm of institutions” (p. 97, 
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emphasis in the original), but recognised that institutional theory privileged collective 
level influences and processes, rather than individual level ones. 
As already noted, routines should be associated with the collective level (in turn, 
habits are the equivalent concept for an individual level). This association was 
particularly useful for much OIE-inspired research, because it resonated with the notion 
that certain structures at an organisational level (foremost, institutions, but also stable 
routines) influence the collective of organisational members, capturing them in their 
‘web’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Hardy, 1996) of shared meanings and beliefs. This is 
in line with Seal’s (2003) remark about the focus of institutional theory on 
organisational, collective cognitive processes promoting isomorphism. Shared meanings 
and interpretations are a cornerstone of many institutional approaches, in particular 
those relying on Macintosh and Scapens (1990) and Scapens and Macintosh (1996). 
When it comes to rules, there is an intrinsic individual dimension (although, as 
argued below, a collective dimension should also be considered). Rules are known, 
interpreted, accepted and enacted by actors – or, similarly but in the opposite 
perspective, rules are unknown, interpreted in various ways (‘misinterpreted’, other 
actors might argue), not accepted and not enacted by actors. Becker (2004) implicitly 
noted this point, when he expressed his concern that much research neglected “agency 
in the executing of behavior patterns, or in the process of expressing rules in action” (p. 
663). The interpretation of rules by agents is a crucial and indexical process – as argued 
above in this section, in page 55, rules are indexical regarding the interpreters and 
regarding the context of interpretation. Individual cognitive processes (Seal, 2003) and 
the actual enactment of rules by agents are at stake, but institutional theory has tended 
not to focus on these more ad hoc processes.  
74 
 2.3 A research avenue in OIE: a renewed emphasis on rules 
 2.3.4 Routines and rules, the collective and the individual 
Returning to Seal’s (2003) quote above, in Giddens’ structuration theory, 
“macro-institutional influences (…) interact with the more micro practices of reflexive 
actors in the duality of structure” (p. 97), promising to combine both levels (individual 
and collective) of cognitive processes. However, strong disagreements have developed 
about the potential existence of shared meanings, interpretations and beliefs in 
structuration theory – a Parsons-inspired interpretation endorsed by Macintosh and 
Scapens and researchers who drew on their work, but contested by Boland (1993 and 
1996). Boland emphasised that the Parsonian emphasis on internalised shared values 
and beliefs (see above in this section) was actually contested in Giddens’ work. Boland 
quoted Giddens (1984, p. xxxvi) himself: “‘a radical break has to be made with 
Parsonian theorems’”, since “Parsons leaves no real room for the agency of the actor” 
(Boland, 1996, p. 694). As an alternative interpretation, Boland stressed the ongoing 
and contingent nature of human interpretation and enactment of rules, hence granting 
greater prominence to agencies.   
These conflicting views are yet another episode of the perennial discussion about 
action and structure. It is hardly a novelty that two sides exchange accusations that the 
other part overrates and underrates the voluntaristic side of human behaviour (in this 
case, Scapens and Macintosh, 1996 and Boland, 1996, respectively). However, the OIE 
research stream distinctively emphasises the ‘institutionalised individual’, and this 
indeed suggests a greater emphasis on the constraining effects of structures – in spite of 
the claim of Scapens and Macintosh (1996) that both elements are essential, as noted in 
the first section. 
In this work, it will not be contended that there is no possibility to exist 
convergence of meanings and cognitive structures across organisational members. 
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Instead, the point to be made is related with the imagery associated with the notion of 
shared meanings and beliefs creating a truce in organisational conflict, in a Parsonian 
vein (Becker, 1998 and 2004; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Scapens, 1994). Such a 
convergence may be possible – but tends to require efforts from actors to ensure such 
convergence among and across individual actors, a convergence which remains fragile 
and potentially contestable. As further discussed during the analysis of Clegg’s (1989) 
framework in the next chapter, this stabilisation of rules of meanings and membership 
(closely resembling Giddens’ interpretive and normative rules) is indeed permanently 
fragile and contestable. This stabilisation of rules (in the sense of agents’ cognitive 
structures) is dependent on the actual securing of the centrality and unavoidability of a 
network of reinforcing structuring devices – among which, in a quite recursive way, the 
network of the extant rules. 
In addition, rules can also be identified beyond the merely individual level. This 
section has tended to privilege the use of the nouns ‘agent’ or ‘actor’, rather than 
‘individual’. The nouns ‘agent’ and ‘actor’ are recurrently found in OIE, so no violence 
is made against prevalent terminology. However, these two terms also accommodate the 
adoption of a collective level perspective. This collective perspective does not represent 
a mere sum of individuals. Instead, it allows conceptualising how rules are interpreted, 
interpreted, accepted and enacted by a collective of actors, as a collective. Importantly, 
it allows considering a collective conception of agency.  
A collective concept of agency is relatively scarce in institutional theory. Section 
2.1.2 noted that NIS views organisations as collective social actors (Scott, 2002), but it 
also noted that NIS tended to view organisations in a unitary, black-boxed way – 
neglecting individuals’ agency. Section 2.1.3 analysed how OIE focuses on processes 
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involving individuals, including the ways in which common traits may emerge within a 
collective of individuals populating a certain local community (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991a). However, OIE authors typically refrain from granting agency to collective 
entities such as organisations (see, e.g., Hodgson’s position in his correspondence with 
North, in Hodgson, 2006). 
However, collective processes of sense-making, of the construction of shared, 
collective objectives, beliefs, meanings, learning and knowledge have been topical 
research areas (some examples are Boyce, 1995; Busco et al., 2006; Callon, 1986; 
Hansen and Rennecker, 2010; Nonaka, 1994; Okamoto, forthcoming; Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006; Shrivastava, 1983). A particular theoretical approach has fuelled a 
significant stream of research granting agency not only to individuals, but also to 
collective entities (and also to non-human entities, as analysed later): Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT). This important theoretical perspective is developed in the next chapter, 
in section 3.4, and is instrumental to widen the scope of entities capable of agency in 
OIE. 
In addition, and as argued later, convergence across actors, as members of an 
organisation, as regards their objectives, beliefs, meaning, etc., impinges directly on 
issues of power in organisations. Power can also be seen to underlie important debates 
in institutional theory (e.g., the power of institutions and structures vs. the power of 
agents). Power is a controversial topic which has been very differently dealt with within 
the literature, including institutional theory. The topic of power is indeed considered as 
a main research avenue in OIE, and is introduced in the next section.  
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2.3.5 THE PROPOSED EMPHASIS ON RULES: SUMMARY, 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND NEXT STEPS 
The concept of routines has had (justified) central presence in institutional 
theory, which has not been contested in this section. However, there have been 
criticisms that institutional theory has tended to overemphasise the taken-for-granted, 
relatively automatic and unconscious nature of routine behaviour. Moreover, the 
emphasis on routines, although not exclusive, has relegated alternative (and potentially 
more aligned with mainstream approaches) perspectives and factors into the background 
(and typically away from the abstracts of the papers). Such a relegated factor was 
‘rules’.  
Without questioning the relevance of routines, the above argument attempted to 
restore the centrality of the concept of ‘rule’ for institutional theory. It suggested that 
rules, if (re)defined as internal cognitive structures, gain a greater explanatory power. 
Rules, as internal cognitive structures, are ubiquitous, not only underlying other 
components of the models, but also in empirical instances not addressed by the other 
components – in particular, when there are no routines. Indeed, a potential research 
avenue was suggested to explore how routines and rules (as agents’ internal structures) 
may evolve in a cumulative interaction. 
Indeed, an acknowledgment should be made. There is no claim in this work to 
produce a meta-theory, intending to encompass all the influences upon behaviour. In 
particular, this chapter has emphasised the influence of rules and therefore was, 
assumedly, unbalanced as regards the relative attention given to the various components 
of OIE models, such as Burns and Scapens (2000). This greater attention devoted to 
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rules is a consequence of the perceived need to redefine the concept of rules and tease 
out their importance, when compared to prevalent approaches. However, it should be 
acknowledged that as this section granted a greater focus to a particular component, it 
risked creating the very same unbalance it initially contested. It is not intended to lessen 
the role of the other components, such as routines, let alone institutions. Although 
focusing on agents’ need to perform ‘interpretive work’, the social and institutional 
dimensions of that interpretive work should not be ignored (Scapens and Macintosh, 
1996). But there is always the risk of such perceived outcome. After all, this permanent 
tension may well be a transversal feature of the perennial debates about action and 
structure, which may not go away anytime soon, if ever. 
Action and structure are, indeed, a recurrent topic in institutional theory. Other, 
not unrelated topics, recurrently attract institutional theorists’ attention. Stability and 
change is certainly one of them. On the other hand, power, a concept occasionally 
mentioned in this chapter, has been often ignored by some streams of institutional 
theory – although it can be considered to underlie the previous two popular coupled-
topics of ‘action and structure’ and ‘stability and change’. The next section introduces 
this controversial topic, locating it within institutional theory, and the next chapter then 
develops a wider analysis of power. 
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2.4 A RESEARCH AVENUE IN OIE: A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON 
POWER 
2.4.1 POWER IN DEBATES OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Fundamental notions and debates in institutional theory can be stated in explicit 
power terms. In a very simplistic way, the debate in institutional theory as regards 
structures and actions can be phrased as the power of ‘structures’ vs. the power of 
‘agents’. Another perennial debate, both within NIS and OIE, concerns the opposition 
(or intertwinement) of stability and change (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Droege and Johnson, 2007; Lukka, 2007; Modell et al., 2007; Seo and Creed, 2002; 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). This stability and change debate can be phrased as the 
power of factors stabilising institutions vs. the power of factors (and, in particular, 
actors) inducing institutional change, and how those powers can become interrelated.  
For example (and without getting into details about concepts of power), an 
important stream of OIE would argue that prevailing institutions have the power to 
shape the behaviour and beliefs of institutional participants and have the power to 
stabilise the institutional context. The popular paradox regarding institutional change 
triggered by institutionally embedded actors (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002) could be stated as 
whether or not internal actors have the power to change their institutional context - 
considering that they (supposedly) share the beliefs, world views and interests which 
make up the prevailing institutions. But how can institutional inhabitants free 
themselves from the prevailing embedding structures, i.e., institutions? Finally, agents’ 
interpretive work concerning rules and the inherent indexicality of the latter is also a 
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facet of the power of those agents to determine their actions and is another contribution 
to the stability vs. change debates. 
The (admittedly telegraphic) analysis of Giddens’ theory of structuration 
developed above in this chapter only briefly alluded to power, which is conceptualised 
to derive from structures of domination. Considering that domination is one of three 
structures in Giddens’ framework, he did attribute a relevant place to power in his meta-
theory, and not merely in trivial ways. As an example of the sophistication of Giddens’ 
analysis of power, the identification of the powerful actors is not straightforwardly 
related with formally powerful actors – in fact, the notion of duality of control suggests 
that subordinates are always capable of influencing their superiors, in all forms of 
dependence. 
However, in institutional theory discussions, power has often not been 
mentioned, mentioned somewhat tangentially or lost a central stage. E.g., following 
Clegg et al. (2006), an early institutional theorist (Silverman, 1970) influenced 
contingency theory through Child’s (1972) focus on ‘strategic choice’, depicting 
organisations as a result of choices made by a dominant coalition. However, after the 
revival of NIS through Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) 
(first published in 1983), the NIS branch of institutional theory lost the focus on power. 
Therefore, the way NIS and OIE have dealt with power are analysed separately, next.  
2.4.2 POWER IN NEW INSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY (NIS) 
NIS has tended to simplistically downplay power, politics and conflicts of 
interests as peripheral, both within and across organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
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1991b; Hopper and Major, 2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Some researchers 
argued that “institutional theory has focused on institutionalisation as an outcome rather 
than a process and as a result has neglected the role of power (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996; DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker, 1987) and group interests (Perrow, 1985, 1986). 
Institutionalization, as an outcome, places organizational practices and characteristics 
beyond the reach of interests and politics” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 510); see also Burns 
(2000a). In a related, but slightly different perspective, Hensmans (2003) interestingly 
suggested that NIS’s traditional focus was actually a response to the OIE focus on intra-
organisational change and power. This led to NIS’s purpose of showing that dominant 
organisational arrangements were reproduced through collective interactions among 
organisations, rather than examining how new arrangements were constructed through 
strategic agents. Ultimately, this focus on isomorphic pressures and homogenisation led 
NIS to neglect how strategic agency could thrive.  
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between the three mechanisms of 
institutional isomorphism (mimetic, coercive and normative isomorphism, as suggested 
by DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, republished in 1991b). Mizruchi and Fein (1999) (also 
cited by Clegg et al., 2006) suggested that researchers drawing on DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) seminal work tended to focus on mimetic isomorphism, at the expense 
of neglecting the coercive and normative concepts also present in the original 
framework. In fact, the seminal (1983) framework of NIS proposed by DiMaggio and 
Powell encompassed theoretical concepts clearly dealing with power issues. 
Nevertheless, the NIS field evolved into a different direction. Recognising such 
limitation, DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) clearly stressed the need to “place interests 
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and power on the institutional agenda” (p. 27). Such calls have been finally met, more 
recently. 
Indeed, several studies (re)introduced power concerns in NIS, such as Carruthers 
(1995), Dugger (1990), Hensmans (2003), Hopper and Major (2007), Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens (2005), and studies included in the special issue of the Academy of 
Management Journal (45(1), 2002). In particular, Hensmans (2003) identified the early 
nineties as the approximate time when NIS started expanding its scope, trying to 
produce “strategic insights”, by extending its “‘limited theory of action’ (Fligstein, 
1997: 397), and emphasising the role of diversity (Kondra and Hinings 1998), power, 
and agency (Beckert 1999; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). (…) [Therefore, NIS focus 
shifted to the] study of fields as arenas of power dependencies and strategic 
interactions” (Hensmans, 2003, p. 356). 
As a conclusion, NIS evolution is related with the paradox of institutional 
change triggered by embedded agents (see above) and, in general, with the wider debate 
about structures and agency. In particular, the neglect of power may have contributed to 
this paradox and to the neglect of agency, while the recent uptake of the topic may 
contribute to overcome some of NIS limitations. 
2.4.3 POWER IN OLD-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (OIE) – A PARADOX 
TO BE ADDRESSED? 
The relationship between OIE and power is a complex one. On one hand, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991a) considered that OIE “was straightforwardly political in 
its analysis of group conflict” and emphasised “the vesting of interests within 
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organizations as a result of political tradeoffs and alliances” and the subversions caused 
by “parochial interests” (pp. 12-13). Similarly, Clegg et al. (2006) restricted to NIS 
(rather than OIE) the distancing as regards the concept of power. Burns (2000a, p. 571) 
stated that “[p]ower and politics is (…) integral to any OIE-grounded explanation of 
life’s ongoing processes - i.e. part of OIE’s core methodological underpinnings”. 
Several OIE works explored internal power struggles, conflicts and resistance (e.g., 
Burns, 2000a; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Robalo, 2007; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 
2005; Yazdifar et al., 2008). Robalo (2007) argued that Burns and Scapens’ (2000) OIE 
framework “has been particularly effective in studies where power, politics and vested 
interests are central” (p. 106).  
However, on the other hand, this claimed close relationship between OIE and 
intra-organisational power, politics, conflicts and vested interests needs to be further 
discussed and justified. There appears to be a gap, a paradox, in the way much literature 
has claimed, in a quite taken-for-granted way, that there is an almost ‘umbilical’ 
relationship between OIE and intra-organisational conflicts17. This paradox emerges 
because the typical OIE definition of an institution, with its Parsonian emphasis on 
shared values and beliefs (Macintosh and Scapens, 1990; Scapens and Macintosh, 
1996), does not seem “straightforwardly political” and it does not suggest the existence 
of intra-organisational conflicts - on the contrary.  
In addition, although Burns (2000a) made clear that the organisation was merely 
one of the communities or groups the concept of institution could be applied to (see also 
Parkhe, 2003), much subsequent literature retained the parts of Burns’ (2000a) and 
                                                 
17 To simplify the discussion, ‘intra-organizational conflict’ will be used instead of ‘intra-organizational 
power, politics, conflicts and vested interests’. 
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Burns and Scapens’ (2000) definition of an ‘institution’ which mentioned the 
organisational level. The association of the concept of an ‘institution’ with an 
organisation became very common (Abrahamson and Gerdin, 2006; Hardy, 1996; 
Yazdifar et al., 2008). Therefore, much research focusing on the organisational level 
suggested that global acceptance of institutions is an expected characteristic of a given 
organisation, promoting intra-organisational homogeneity. 
Based on such descriptions, if any hypothesis is to be made regarding intra-
organisational conflicts, such hypothesis would be that such conflicts would be more 
unlikely, given the generalised acceptance of institutions by organisational members. 
Becker (1998, 2004) identified truce as a key function of routines. Scapens (1994) 
argued that the organisational actors’ “‘content’ to play their individual roles in the 
organizational routine [due to institutionalisation] (…) involves overcoming intra-
organizational conflict. According to Nelson and Winter: ‘(…) routine operation 
involves a comprehensive truce in intra-organizational conflict’ (1982, p. 110). (…) 
Truce ‘tends to give rise to a particular symbolic culture shared by the parties (…) [and] 
the fear of breaking the truce is, in general, a powerful force tending to hold 
organisations on the path of relatively inflexible routine’ (1982, p. 110-112). Thus, 
routines provide for both the reproduction of behaviour and the cohesion of the 
organization” (Scapens 1994, p. 311) (emphases added). 
It is acknowledged that, if institutions promote “a comprehensive truce” and 
“cohesion” in the organisation through the sharing of certain beliefs among all 
organisational members, then in some way institutions are involved in conflicts. 
However, institutions have an influence by overcoming those conflicts, bringing truce 
and ‘peace’ to the organisation. The paradox emerges because the literature suggestion 
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that OIE’s approach is “straightforwardly political” (as mentioned above) does not 
evoke an imagery of ‘peace’. On the contrary, it suggests an imagery of open conflicts 
and power struggles, in which institutions are at the core or are even devices used by 
actors in those disputes. Indeed, going back to the seminal work of Nelson and Winter 
(1982), these authors did not endorse the view of an absence of divergent interests 
across organisational participants preventing intraorganisational conflicts: “Conflict, 
both manifest and latent, persists, but manifest conflict follows largely predictable paths 
and stays within predictable bounds” (p. 110). 
This paradox regarding the relationship between OIE and intra-organisational 
conflicts seems to require more research: on one side, into institutional theory; and, on 
the other, into theory about power (and related topics of conflicts and interests). There 
seems to be potential to improve our understanding of institutional theory by a more 
adequate grounding on power theories. For example, the next chapter discusses several 
‘faces’ and ‘dimensions’ of power which conceptualise power and conflict as having 
different levels of visibility. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the main features of institutional theory, the starting 
theoretical framework for this study, providing fundamental theoretical lenses for 
interpreting the case study, and to whose development this thesis attempts to contribute. 
After noticing the heterogeneous nature of the field of institutional theory, this chapter 
briefly depicted, in broad traits, the field of New Institutional Theory (NIS), typically 
focused at macro levels of analysis. Then, this chapter proceeded to analyse Old-
Institutional Economics (OIE), whose more micro level of analysis, typically at 
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organisational level and below, provides more adequate sensitising lenses for the 
adopted research questions and empirical study.  
The second section started by depicting the seminal OIE framework of Burns 
and Scapens (2000). Then, particular attention was devoted to routines, a component of 
their model highly emphasised in the literature and undergoing substantial debate as 
regards its ontological definition. The literature has considered routines as either (and 
sometimes as both): behaviours; rules; dispositions (Becker, 2004). In addition, Volkoff 
et al. (2007) added that routines may have also a material dimension. This heterogeneity 
has created substantial theoretical and empirical ambiguities and difficulties, but a 
common trait was detected: rules can be seen to underlie, in different ways, all 
conceptions of routines. However, it was noted that the often, narrow conceptualisation 
of ‘rules’ as formal rules was not well suited to provide the basis for such association 
between rules and routines. Therefore, further conceptualisation work on rules was 
required. 
The third section made the case for dedicating closer attention to rules, an often 
neglected component of OIE models. This neglect was partly traced to a narrow 
definition of rules as formal rules. Therefore, the section started with a discussion on the 
ontology of rules, arguing for the need to encompass also informal rules and, above all, 
to also conceptualise rules as internal structures of actors. Rules were conceptualised as 
a cognitive representation, internal to the actors, providing orientations for action to 
each agent. This placed actors’ ‘interpretive work’ of rules at a centre stage. While 
accepting that actors’ interpretation is influenced by the wider social and organisational 
context (including prevalent institutions), it was argued that rules are inherently 
indexical. There is indexicality regarding the interpreters, i.e., the agents; and there is 
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indexicality regarding the context of interpretation, i.e., the actual situation in which the 
rule is interpreted and potentially enacted. Furthermore, it was considered that the rules 
should also be linked with their usage, at the realm of action, in particular as a result of 
the developed interpretive work. Therefore, it was concluded that a holistic 
understanding of the role of rules should pay close attention to the perspective of actors’ 
internal cognitive representations and enactment of rules. 
This section also noted that, while rules can be identified underlying routines, 
rules may be at work in particular situations even when there are no routines. In 
particular, previous recurrent behaviour is a sine qua non requirement for the existence 
of routines, but not rules. Therefore, it was argued that a renewed emphasis on rules has 
the potential to increase the explanatory power of institutional theory, by providing it 
with tools capable to explain empirical situations not possible to address solely drawing 
on the concepts of routines, institutions and formal rules. Finally, it was noted that while 
routines are intrinsically related with a collective level, rules should be conceived at 
both an individual and a collective level. The inherent indexicality of rules can bring 
diversity to a micro level, based on varying interpretations. In addition, it was argued 
that the acceptance of collective entities as actors (as proposed by Actor-Network 
Theory) has great potential in understanding the operation of rules within organisations. 
The fourth section introduced the topic of power. It was argued that power has 
not been a major and explicit concern in much institutional theory, although 
fundamental debates in institutional theory (e.g., between structure and action, stability 
and change, etc.) can be stated and explored drawing on the topic of power. This section 
was conceived merely as an introduction to the topic of power, as well as to establish its 
importance for institutional theory. Discussing power in some detail is a lengthy task, 
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and the next chapter is entirely devoted to it. With this discussion on power, and the 
subsequent deployment of institutional and power frameworks as theoretical lenses for 
the case study, the intention is to provide contributions for the development of both 
institutional and power theories, in particular by strengthening and developing the 
linkages between both areas.  
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CHAPTER 3 - POWER 
 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The overall objective of this chapter is to critically analyse the main conceptions 
and frameworks of power1, concluding with the adoption of Clegg’s (1989) framework 
of ‘Circuits of Power’ as theoretical lenses for this study. The analysis of power 
developed in this chapter, along with the institutional insights developed in the previous 
chapter, are the bases for the interpretation and discussion of the case study carried out 
(chapters 5, 6 and 7) and the starting point of several proposals to develop institutional 
and power literature (chapter 8). 
The importance of power is acknowledged by theorists from different strands. 
E.g., within the functionalist, mainstream literature, Pfeffer (1992) noted the centrality 
of power for organisational and individual success. On the other hand, within a non-
functionalist, more critically-oriented strand of the literature, Clegg et al. (2006) thus 
argued for the importance of power in organisations. “What is organization but the 
collective bending of individual wills to a common purpose? (…) Power is inscribed in 
the core of organizational achievement. If it were not, (…) the social relations that 
constitute organization, the collecting together and coordinating of individual wills, 
endeavours, and energies, would not occur” (p. 2-3).  
                                                 
1 Developing an in-depth review of literature about power is beyond the ambitions of this work. Works 
exploring in great detail the lineage of the different schools and concepts are Clegg (1989) and Lukes 
(2005). Ribeiro (2003) developed a very interesting discussion at an intermediate level of detail, similar to 
the level of detail pursued here; Wickramasinghe (2006) offered a short summary. Ribeiro’s (2003) 
deeper, more creative and thought provoking analysis is followed more closely. 
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However, power is frequently restrictively associated with constraints and 
domination. The creative and positive facets of power are often ignored, and “people 
tend to shy away” from understanding power (Pfeffer, 1992, p. 8). Clegg et al. (2006), 
Pfeffer (1992) and Mintzberg (1983) converged in considering that investigating power 
has traditionally been a less considered research area. In particular, business research 
tends to ignore organisational power or to relegate and associate organisational power 
and politics to illegitimate behaviours (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006).  
Within institutional theory, the topic of power has been emerging, although with 
an uneven importance, as discussed at the end of the previous chapter. This emergence 
can be traced both within NIS and OIE. In NIS, since the initial focus on power was 
very low, the rise can be said to be more noticeable. In OIE, power can be said to have a 
greater tradition; not always considered, but increasingly focused. The uneven 
importance – let alone treatment – given to power by institutional theory further justifies 
giving it close attention.  
A reflection on the topic of power is particularly needed because, as this chapter 
demonstrates, the area of power is a complex and polyphonic one. Multiple, often 
contradictory approaches have been developed throughout the years – actually, 
throughout the centuries. A researcher approaching the field may be mesmerised by 
such diversity and Lukes (1974) described the concept of power as “essentially 
contested” (p. 14) (cf. Benton, 1981). This chapter intends to provide a needed overview 
of the topic and to adopt a theoretical framework to orient the ensuing empirical 
analysis. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 overviews some conventional 
notions of power, which typically share the perspective of power as a cause of effects 
over others. These notions tend to underlie most research on power and even more 
‘radical’ approaches, such as Lukes’ (1974, 2005). Section 3.2 then introduces 
alternative notions of power: power as a capacity (deterministic or not), as positive, as a 
variable to be explained (power and its cause) and dispersed and based on relational 
networks. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 build on the alternative notions of power introduced in 
section 3.2 to propose postmodern conceptions of power: Foucauldian and Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) approaches, respectively. Section 3.5 presents – and adopts – 
Clegg’s (1989) framework, strongly inspired on Foucault and ANT and depicting a 
fluid, dynamic and multiform conception of power. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
Throughout the chapter, and particularly at the end of the sections, links are established 
with the analysis of institutional theory carried out in chapter 2. 
3.1 CONVENTIONAL NOTIONS OF POWER AND LUKES (1974): 
POWER AS CAUSE, AS A CREATOR OF EFFECTS OVER OTHERS 
3.1.1 THE ONE DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK - RESEARCHING THE VISIBLE 
The classic concept of power derives from the intuitive and visual metaphor of 
clashing billiard balls, with one ball causing effects on others. As Ribeiro (2003) 
synthesised, for Hobbes (1839), in the XVII century, what was at stake was the power 
of an entity (an ‘agent’) to produce effects in another entity (the ‘patient’). Relations of 
power were causal, atomistic and mechanical, and relied on the action of a prime mover, 
the ultimate source of action, the ruling agent. Hobbes viewed the world as an ordered 
place, where legislation consolidated power and order, resting on science (as the 
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modernist justification) and monarchy (as the unambiguous personalised source of 
power). Ultimately, this would secure sovereignty to a powerful ruler. Hobbes 
emphasised that “the power of the agent and the efficient cause are the same thing 
(Hobbes, 1839, p. 127, emphasis added)” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 59). 
This empiricist view of power was further stretched by Hume (1969), who 
emphasised the need that the effects are caused by the exercise of power. A cause (i.e., 
power), in order to exist, requires its actual exercise, by producing actual effects. In 
other words, if there is no power exercise, there is no power.  
Behaviourists as Robert Dahl followed the same empiricist line. Dahl (1957) 
proposed that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that 
B would not otherwise do” and, in another expression, proposed that power involved “a 
successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do” (pp. 202-
203, 204). Dahl’s studies focused in particular on concrete, observable behaviour and 
events, on the actual exercise of power producing those empirical effects - i.e., 
observable episodes of actors exercising power over other actors. As regards the 
opposite situation, when there is no possibility of observing hypothetical episodes of 
power, then those non-observable events should not be considered as causes.2 Dahl and 
his supporters privileged methodological precision in measuring the produced effects, in 
a way to measure the power which caused them. Ultimately, the power of the causing 
agent A could be measured through the response of, or impact on, the influenced agent 
B.  
                                                 
2 This is the usual interpretation about Dahl’s position. However, a notable exception is McLachlan 
(1981), who argued against the idea that Dahl’s conception of power required visibility. These alternative 
interpretations are analysed in the next subsection, during the discussion of the second dimension of 
power. 
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Dahl’s conception might have been appropriately coined the ‘visible-face’ of 
power. Dahl’s studies focused exclusively on visible behaviour, especially in explicit, 
concrete decision-making situations, over key important issues (e.g., Dahl’s, 1957 
empirical setting was the actions taken by the US Senators in their decision-making 
process). Such behaviour occurred within the context of observable and overt conflict 
between actors, according to their subjectively perceived interests3. Such (subjective) 
interests translated into policy preferences, which were publicly expressed through 
political participation. Because of Dahl’s single focus, his conception was called as the 
‘single-face’ of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1975). 
Lukes’ (1974) framework is a major reference to conceptualise and compare 
various alternative conceptions of power. This framework, graphically expressed by 
Clegg (1989) in the following figure 3.1, proposed three dimensions of power. Dahl’s 
‘single-face’ of power, analysed in this subsection, is the first building block, or 
dimension, of Lukes’ framework (the second and third dimensions are presented in the 
following subsections). 
 
                                                 
3 This notion of ‘subjective’ interests is clarified below in this section, when the opposite notion of ‘real’ 
interests is discussed within Lukes’ (1974) three dimensional concept of power. 
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 The three-dimensional view incorporates 
the first, the second and a third dimension
 The two-dimensional view incorporates  
the first and a second dimension 
 One-dimensional 
view 
 
Key elements First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
Representatives and 
‘school’ 
Dahl  
‘pluralists’ 
Bachrach and Baratz 
‘elitists’ 
Lukes’ ‘radical view’ 
Methodologies of 
analysis 
Objective observation Interpretative 
understanding 
Evaluative 
theorisation  
Objects of analysis Visible behaviour 
 
Concrete decisions 
 
Actual issues 
Intentional action 
 
Non-decisions 
 
Potential issues 
Interests in action 
 
Political agenda 
 
Both actual and 
potential issues 
Indicators Overt conflict Covert conflict Latent conflict 
Field of analysis Express policy 
preferences revealed 
in political 
participation 
Express policy 
preferences embodied 
in sub-political 
grievances 
Relation between 
express policy 
preferences and ‘real 
interests’ 
Figure 3.1: Lukes’ (1974, 2005) three dimensional framework (Source: adapted and 
expanded from Clegg, 1989, p. 90). 
Dahl’s field of analysis was at the level of express policy preferences revealed in 
political participation, which was considered to be free from constraints. Dahl’s view 
was crucial in a political debate in the United States of America in the sixties, known as 
‘the community power’ debate4. Dahl’s defence of an equalitarian access to political 
participation supported the side of this debate which came to be known as pluralists. As 
                                                 
4 Lukes’ (2005) introductory section provides an elucidating and brief account of this political conflict. 
See Clegg’s (1989) chapters 3 and 4 for a lengthier discussion, and Merelman (1968) for a shorter 
account. This ‘community power’ debate is now dated and is not further developed here; only the main 
underlying arguments are used to support the construction of a wider theoretical framework on power.  
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synthesised by Lukes (2005), pluralists considered that different interest groups 
prevailed in different areas, and therefore power was distributed pluralistically across 
actors and interest groups. 
Hobbes’ and Dahl’s mechanical and empiricist conceptions became building 
blocks for the mainstream view of power. It adopts a realist ontology (in the sense that 
“[i]t takes the empirical world, the world of experienced occurrences, to be the object of 
scientific investigation” (Isaac, 1987, p. 6), and a positivistic research approach 
(Cortese, 2006). “There is nothing but a flux of events whose only relationship is one of 
contingent conjunction. (…) [B]ecause the only meaning that can thus be given to 
causality is as empirical regularity, the task of scientific explanation becomes (…) the 
formulation of generalizations about empirical regularities which enable us to predict 
that ‘Whenever A, then B.’” (Isaac, 1987, p. 6-7). The methodological assumptions and 
research methods, especially the emphasis on the measurement of visible events and 
other operational variables, “seemed to produce reliable” evidence and “conclusions 
which met the canons of science” (Merelman, 1968, p. 451; also Isaac, 1987). 
3.1.2 THE TWO DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK – EXTENDING BEYOND THE 
VISIBLE 
Authors like Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz argued that the situations where 
Dahl researched power were too restricted (only visible exercises of power and only 
within decision-making situations). Without denying the existence of visible conflicts, 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963 and 1975) proposed an additional, less visible face of 
power: the one which keeps some actors (and their preferences) excluded from decision-
making processes. This ‘hidden’ face of power is about ‘non-decision making’ – a 
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concept which had a great impact in the literature. This type of power, based on the 
control of the political agenda, would exist when an actor A contributes5 to the creation 
or reinforcement of barriers which prevent an actor B from making public any policy 
conflicts which would be detrimental to A’s interests. Therefore, power may involve 
more than simply interaction; it can also involve limitations on interaction. 
As a result, actual decision-making processes would be biased: they would only 
deal with issues which are in A’s best interests, since B’s grievances would have been 
prevented to be expressed. Schattschneider (1960) inspired this view, when he wrote the 
widely cited quote that “some issues are organized into politics while others are 
organized out” (p. 71), therefore creating a ‘mobilisation of bias’ of the political agenda. 
Heightening the subject to an ontological level, Schattschneider (1960, p. 71) argued 
that “organization [itself] is the mobilization of bias”, in the sense that certain kinds of 
conflict are accepted and explored (i.e., “organized into politics”) while others are not 
accepted as valid and therefore suppressed (i.e., “organized out”). As Longaker (1961, 
p. 146) noted, Schattschneider emphasised the importance of controlling the “scope of 
conflict”, when “leaders of an organization (…) attempt to expand or restrict the scope 
of conflict in order to best serve their cause”. 
Bachrach and Baratz therefore sustained that a more fundamental power could 
be under the control of a minority of actors: an elite, which would typically not be 
visible to the remaining actors. Theorists who shared this concern about the 
concentration of power among a ‘ruling elite’ become known as elitists. This movement 
                                                 
5 Only in later writings (Bachrach and Baratz, 1975) these authors came to accept that a mere contribution 
of A (to the creation or reinforcement of barriers) was sufficient to consider that A was exercising power. 
They acknowledged that their previous causal view of power, in Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and 
previous works, was “excessively stringent in implying that A exercises power only when it is a necessary 
and sufficient condition of gaining B’s compliance” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1975, p. 904). 
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of elitists was in strike contrast with the pluralists (who, as analysed above, claimed for 
the existence of an even distribution of power across interest groups)6. The differences 
between pluralists’ one-dimensional view of power and elitists’ two-dimensional view 
are visible by comparing the first two columns of Lukes’ framework (figure 3.1, above), 
which contrast and synthesise the main characteristics of the two perspectives analysed 
so far. 
A third perspective of power, proposed by Lukes (1974) and which encompasses 
the two dimensions analysed so far, are now discussed.  
3.1.3 THE THREE DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK - QUESTIONING ‘REAL’ 
INTERESTS 
Let us briefly take stock. The one-dimensional framework relied on observing 
visible behaviour, in concrete decision-making situations which involved overt conflict. 
The two-dimensional framework drew attention to less visible situations, through which 
powerful actors might prevent other actors to publicly air issues which might be 
detrimental to their interests. Therefore, those issues would never achieve public 
visibility and would not get to a decision-making stage. In this situation, conflict would 
actually exist, yet covert. 
                                                 
6 Classifying these theorists as ‘elitists’ may sound as a paradox, it may suggest that they defend the 
existence of an elite (given the common language meaning of the word ‘elitism’), whereas in fact they are 
concerned about, and oppose, such situation. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) commented that sociologically 
oriented researchers tended to find that power was concentrated in an elite and labelled themselves as 
‘elitists’; on the other hand, political science researchers tended to find that power was widely diffused, 
and therefore labelled themselves as ‘pluralists’. The ‘elitists’ label was, therefore, established in the 
literature - in spite of Merelman’s (1968) plausible proposal to distinguish between ‘elitists’ (those who 
first proposed the existence of a ‘ruling elite’, such as Hunter, 1953 and Mills, 1956) and ‘neo-elitists’ 
(who emerged later in a reaction to pluralists, such as Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) (cf. Lukes, 1974). 
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The main thrust of Lukes’ (1974, 2005) third dimension of power is its challenge 
to the notion that actors can subjectively know and express their ‘real interests’. From a 
sociological perspective, Lukes claimed that broad social forces and institutional 
practices may constrain actors’ minds so completely that they will not be able to 
identify (let alone express and fight over) what their interests ‘really’ are – i.e., actors 
develop a ‘false consciousness’. As such, those broader forces have the power to make 
actors believe they have certain interests – which in turn favours the interests of other 
actors, the ones controlling those broader forces. “The supreme and most insidious 
exercise of power is to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no 
alternative to it, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial” (Lukes, 
1974, p. 28 7). In a similar vein, but without any connotations with a divine order, 
Tismaneanu (2001) (cited in Droege and Johnson, 2007, p. 86) labelled the infusion of 
most facets of Chinese society during Mao Zedong’s rule as “the colonization of the 
mind” (p. 987-8). 
This view has important consequences about how to conceptualise conflict. Both 
the first and second dimensions considered that there is actual conflict, be it either overt 
(within the first dimension) or covert (within the second). However, the third dimension 
suggests that actors may fail to gain awareness of their ‘real interests’ due to their ‘false 
consciousness’, therefore being ‘alienated’. Then, the political agenda becomes even 
more controlled by the dominant actors. “The most effective and insidious use of power 
                                                 
7 Since Lukes (2005) includes Lukes (1974) as a first chapter, all henceforward page references to Lukes 
(1974) are based on the numbering of the second, 2005 edition. 
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is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (Lukes, 2005, p. 27). In this 
situation, actual conflict (either overt or covert) will not emerge8.  
In Lukes’ framework, the absence of actual conflict should not be considered as 
equivalent of a genuine consensus – something which later works of elitists accepted as 
a possibility, as Lukes (2005) noted on Bachrach and Baratz (1970). On the contrary, 
the shaping of dominated actors’ “perceptions, cognitions and preferences”, the hiding 
of their “real interests” and the creation a “false consciousness” would suppress conflict 
against the dominating actors, which would be exercising power through broad social 
forces. However, as stated, the resulting absence of actual conflict would not correspond 
to a genuine consensus. 
In Lukes’ third dimension, conflict would still exist, yet in a merely latent state. 
In fact, Lukes argued that there would be a contradiction between the ‘real’ interests of 
the dominated actors (who nevertheless were alienated about those ‘real’ interests of 
them) and the interests of those exercising power. The existence of such a contradiction 
implies that if dominated actors somehow discover their ‘real’ interests, they may 
realise that their ‘real’ interests are unmet by the existing order. Therefore those now 
‘enlightened’ actors would change their policy preferences and publicly express them. 
At this stage, the (until then) latent conflict would become an actual conflict. 
Lukes’ complete, three dimensional framework (figure 3.1, above) can now be 
fully analysed. The comparison of the three columns provides a clear summary of the 
                                                 
8 Concepts as ‘real interests’, ‘false consciousness’ and ‘enlightenment’, as well as a focus on domination 
at a social level and on class struggles, are inspired by Marxism – although Lukes agreed that he had 
deployed them in a non-Marxist way. In his 2005 work, Lukes clarified (or rather, to be more precise, 
acknowledged) that the underlying concept in this third dimension was actually “the securing of 
compliance to domination”, rather than the broader concept of “power” (p. 109). This clarification is 
developed when an alternative, positive view of power is discussed in the next section 
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different concerns of each of the three dimensions discussed in this section. However, 
there are also important commonalities between the three dimensions. These 
commonalities are analysed next. 
3.1.4 VIEWS ON POWER SO FAR: POWER BASED ON THE EFFECTS IT 
CAUSED, NEGATIVE AND LOCATED 
Ribeiro (2003) pointed out that all three dimensions share some common traits. 
They all portrait power: 1) based on the effects caused by power, not based on its 
nature; 2) as negative, in the sense of being exercised over other actors; 3) as located, in 
the sense that the origin of the power can clearly be located. In fact, Isaac (1987, p. 13) 
noted that Lukes’ “similarities with his predecessors outweigh his differences”. Each of 
these common traits is now analysed. 
The first common trait of the three dimensions resides on the fact that they tend 
to privilege the effects that power produces, rather than the nature of power per se. They 
are focused on effects that derive from the exercise of that power, that power causes or 
has caused. As highlighted by Isaac (1987), Lukes (1974, p. 30) himself recognised that 
they “can be seen as alternative interpretations and applications of one and the same 
underlying concept of power, according to which A exercises power over B when A 
affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. Clegg (1989) emphasised that the figure 
he constructed to represent Lukes’ framework (figure 3.1) was “designed to demonstrate 
visually how Lukes regards the second and third dimension of power as developing out 
of the underlying causal and episodic notion of one-dimensional power” (p. 91). 
Certainly, there are differences across the dimensions, as regards the ways of power is 
exercised (more visible, for pluralists; or less visible, for elitists and Lukes); and 
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whether the power is attributed more to the intervention of an agent (for pluralists and 
elitists) or to a broader system (for Lukes). However, the focus on the effects caused by 
the exercise of power is common to all of them. In brief, the underlying notion was 
considering ‘power as cause’, as an exogenous variable, in the line of Hobbes’ notion of 
‘prime mover’. 
The second common trait is the emphasis on the negative side of power. Power 
is conceived as being exercised over other actors, and it is therefore denying or 
diminishing the others’ power. The last part of Lukes’ quote just above is elucidative: 
“… in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. The result of such exercise is a zero-sum 
game, whereby gains of one actor are compensated by losses of another actor9. This 
win-lose situation is clear across all dimensions: for pluralists, a plurality of actors wins 
across different areas, with another plurality of actors correspondingly losing. For 
elitists, an elite wins by preventing the majority from airing opposing views and thereby 
remaining without any chance of winning. For Lukes (1974), the ruling class shapes the 
minds and interests of the other classes, hence dominating them. In all these 
dimensions, the ‘power over’ notion is central. 
The third common trait of the three dimensions is that they all consider power as 
being located in some entity (or entities). It was always possible to identify the entity 
with power, the ‘sovereign’, the locus of will, the originating source of power. The 
pluralists identified the diversified interest groups which prevailed in different areas and 
moments. The elitists pointed out to the elite that rules, even though it might not be 
visible. Lukes proposed the society’s ruling class, controlling the broad social forces 
                                                 
9 Lukes (2005) later abandoned his initial position and also accepted non-zero sum games, as discussed in 
the next section. 
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which shaped the other classes. The three views can all be traced back to Hobbes’s 
original concerns with the ruling agent, on the sovereignty of a powerful ruler.  
These three common traits (viewing power as: based on the effects it caused, a 
consequence of its exercise; negative; and located), and particularly the characteristics 
of the first dimension of power, came to characterise the mainstream literature on power 
(Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al.,, 2006; Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998). The most 
noticeable trait is probably the negative connotations attributed to power (e.g., Clegg, 
1989; Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1992). Cendon and 
Jarvenpaa (2001) argued, in a critical tone, that much literature “portrays the exercise of 
possessive power and negative, manipulative tactics” (p. 122, emphases added)10 and 
assumes “conflict to be a necessary condition for the exercise of power” (Hardy and 
Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998, p. 454). E.g., politics was particularly criticised by Mintzberg 
(1983), describing it as “informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive and, above all, 
illegitimate” (p. 172). Politics is seen as a problem, a problem that needs to be solved. 
Nevertheless, Clegg (1989) argued that politics is a pervading feature of all 
organisational systems, rather than a particular system which should be contained.11 
 
However, these common traits of Lukes’ three dimensions were contested on 
several grounds. Lukes’ corrections, in his 2005 work, of some of his previous 
                                                 
10 The title of the paper Cendon and Jarvenpaa (2001) referenced to exemplify this claim contains all 
three traits: “Power over users: its exercise by systems professionals” (Markus and Bjorn-Andersen, 1987, 
emphases added). However, and somewhat paradoxically, almost the same can be said about the title of 
their own paper: “The development and exercise of power by leaders of support units (…)” (emphases 
added). 
11 In a critical perspective, Clegg et al. (2006) argued that the neglect of the study about power, as 
discussed at the start of this chapter, is actually a result intended by those actors who have the power, so 
that (in line with Lukes’ third dimension) the other, non-powerful actors do not become aware of it – and 
hence do not even consider changing the extant situation. 
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positions, are the starting point for the next section, where alternative views are 
considered. 
3.2 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF POWER: CAPACITY-BASED, 
CAUSED, POSITIVE AND DISPERSED 
Lukes (2005, p. 64) acknowledged that his previous conception of power (in 
Lukes, 1974) was “a very partial and one-sided account”, and offered three new 
perspectives – which are presented and further developed through the contributions of 
other authors. 
3.2.1 ALTERNATIVE VIEW #1: POWER AS A CAPACITY – A DETERMINISTIC 
SENSE OF ‘POWER TO’ 
The first limitation Lukes (2005, p. 109) acknowledged was that in Lukes 
(1974), “following others in the ‘power debate’”, he had committed the “exercise 
fallacy” – i.e., requiring that power only exists in so far as it is exercised. For pluralists, 
this meant the requirement that power had to actually cause an observable sequence of 
events. For elitists, this meant the requirement of causing ‘mobilisation of bias’ and 
‘non-decision making’ situations. For Lukes (1974), this meant the requirement of 
causing the actual shaping and control of the minds of the dominated classes.  
On the contrary, Lukes (2005, p. 109) came to recognise that power identifies 
“an ability or capacity, which may or may not even be exercised”. Etymological 
analyses of the term ‘power’ are useful. Isaac (1987, p. 21) noted that “‘Power’ derives 
from the Latin potere, meaning ‘to be able’. It is generally used to denote a property, 
ability, or capacity to effect things”. Drawing from the French (hence Latin) roots of the 
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English term ‘power’, Clegg (1975) added that a potential source for confusion derives 
from ‘power’ presently encompassing both meanings at stake: ‘capacity’ (associated 
with ‘puissance’) and ‘exercise of that capacity’ (associated with ‘pouvoir’). 
Therefore, Lukes (2005) revised his previous position and accepted the notion of 
‘power to’ (achieve some effects), based on the actor’s capacity, even if such effects are 
not actualised should the power never be exercised (Clegg, 1989 and Ribeiro, 2003). 
Isaac (1987), who harshly criticised Lukes’ initial position, went further, claiming that 
the conception of “‘power over’ (…) is parasitic upon a ‘power to’ conception”, 
meaning that “the power one agent exercises over another agent in interaction is 
parasitic upon the powers to act which the agents possess” (p. 5, 15).  
The perspective of ‘power as a capacity’ focuses on the essence of power in 
itself, in a realist perspective - rather than its manifestations, the effects. It is this 
fundamental and groundbreaking difference that justifies considering that ‘power as a 
capacity’ is the widest sense of the notion of ‘power to’ (this section proposes other 
senses of the ‘power to’ notion). This realist approach, originated in the natural sciences 
and then taken to the social sciences, is now explored. 
A realist conception of the natural sciences (Harré and Madden, 1975) argues 
that an entity has some intrinsic characteristics which explain the phenomenon. E.g., “to 
say that conductivity is a power of copper is to claim that copper possesses an enduring 
capacity to conduct electricity that is intrinsic in its nature, in this case its atomic 
structure” (Isaac, 1987, p. 21) (see Clegg, 1989 and Ribeiro, 2003 for similar examples). 
In other words, within this realist conception of the natural sciences, universal laws 
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describe what power effects will occur, according to the intrinsic nature or constitutions 
of the elements, under the appropriate standing conditions.  
A realist view was also taken to the social sciences in general (e.g., Archer 1995 
and 1998b), to specific fields, such as economics (e.g., Foss, 1994), marketing (e.g., 
Easton, 2002), information systems (e.g., Volkoff et al., 2007) and to the debates about 
power (Benton, 1981; Bhaskar, 1975; Isaac, 1987). It should be noted that Harré and 
Madden’s definition of power already intended to be applied beyond natural sciences, 
and to man in particular: “‘X has the power to A’ means ‘X will or can do A, in the 
appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic nature’ (Harré and Madden, 1975, p. 86, 
emphasis added). In this definition, “the can-option is reserved for ascribing powers to 
people” and “this reservation is a tip of the hat to freedom of the will” – but only as 
what concerns the powerful actor, as noted by Woller (1982, p. 627).  
However, the determinism of the realist view, considering that ‘causal powers’ 
ensure a predetermined outcome given certain standing conditions, has been criticised 
both in the natural sciences and especially in its application to the social sciences. These 
criticisms are addressed in the next subsection, which proposes a non-deterministic, 
more contingent view of the notion of ‘power to’. 
A brief terminological remark is now proposed. Key authors on power reviewed 
in this thesis (Clegg, 1989; Lukes, 2005; Ribeiro, 2003) considered that viewing power 
as a capacity means that power is a ‘dispositional concept’. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2 when conceptualising routines and rules, ‘disposition’ often refers to 
psychological aspects, such as propensities to act. Also, describing power as 
‘dispositional’ may suggest that the actor has “the power to deal with something as one 
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pleases” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, emphasis added), i.e., it may suggest that the 
actor has to have some intentionality. However, power can also include situations 
generating ‘unintended consequences’, as the above authors agreed (see also Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962, 1970 and 1975). This is particularly relevant in ANT (section 3.4), 
since ANT does not require intentionality to define agency (such characteristic is 
particularly clear as regards non-human actors, but it is not limited to them). Therefore, 
equating the notion of ‘power to’ with power as a ‘dispositional’ concept risks being too 
restrictive, since it may place an undue focus on mental aspects and it may suggest 
requiring intentionality. Therefore, this thesis adopts the concept of ‘power as a 
capacity’ to express the ‘power to’ notion.12 
3.2.2 ALTERNATIVE VIEW #2: POWER AS A CONTINGENT CAPACITY – A 
NON-DETERMINISTIC SENSE OF ‘POWER TO’ 
This subsection explores critiques to the determinism underlying the realist 
notion of ‘power as a capacity’ and proposes a non-deterministic sense of ‘power to’: 
power as a contingent capacity. 
Harré and Madden’s realist conception about ‘causal powers’ sparkled 
controversy both within and beyond natural sciences. As regards natural sciences, 
Woller (1982, p. 616) claimed that their realist conception “runs counter to the humean-
positivistic tradition, which denies the existence of any distinctively ‘natural’ or causal 
necessity” (see other criticisms from McCullagh, 1998 and Wilson, 1985). The 
application of realism beyond natural sciences was subjected to even more criticism. In 
                                                 
12 In addition, section 3.5, discussing Clegg’s  framework of circuits of power, adopts the term 
‘dispositional’ to refer to the dispositions (i.e., inclinations and orientations to act) of social actors to act 
in certain ways, as a consequence of prevailing rules, as discussed in chapter 2. 
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fact, there are crucial differences as regards natural sciences, where realism was 
originated. The implicit determinism was a key objection. Although, as noted, Harré 
and Madden’s tried to accommodate free will by recognising that “X (…) can do” 
whatever is in his power (or, alternatively, X can decide not to do it), this was only a 
partial response. In fact, they were only dealing with one side of the question: the 
powerful side. The other side, which was missing, are those who are subject to that 
power. 
Ribeiro (2003) includes the consideration of the behaviour of the ‘other’ side(s) 
of the power relation, of those who are subject to power. In the social world, “[t]hese 
powers are not covered by [universal, physical] laws, but rather are fixed in and through 
rules that are enacted by individuals who participate in social relations. But individuals, 
unlike inert materials, may always choose to respond otherwise – that is, by reference to 
different sets of rules” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 63, emphasis in the original), as suggested in 
chapter 2 and further developed in section 3.5.  
More generally, Hindess (1982) denied that, in the social world, power has 
“capacity to secure. (…) [C]apacity vanishes on closer inspection” (pp. 502, 504, 
emphases in the original). “Actors may have intentions concerning outcomes, and may 
mobilize resources or engage in the management of meaning with the idea of achieving 
them, but pulling these ‘strings’ of power does not necessarily produce these desired 
outcomes” (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998, p. 458). Hindess (1982) further 
explained: “First, the means of action of agents are dependent on conditions that are not 
in their hands. Second, the deployment of these means of action invariably confront 
obstacles, which often include the opposing practices of others. Success in overcoming 
these obstacles, and in fixing the appropriate standing conditions that would a priori 
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ensure attaining the desired outcomes, cannot in general be guaranteed. (…) 
[Therefore], outcomes are not ‘predictable and unvarying’” in a way that would allow 
power actually having “capacity to secure” (pp. 501-502). ANT, discussed below in 
section 3.4, particularly emphasises this perspective, highlighting the need to orchestrate 
powers and actions of others to produce outcomes. 
What emerges from the previous arguments is that a more appropriate notion of 
‘power to’ should emphasise the limited and contingent nature of the capacity of any 
actor’s power to actually secure outcomes. Such is the underlying perspective of many 
researchers conceptualising power as the capacity to get things done (e.g., Macintosh 
and Scapens, 1990). Power(s) may facilitate or contribute towards certain outcomes and 
effects, although within a contingent perspective. Powers operate in a context in which 
outcomes are typically dependent on the actions and reactions of other people and, more 
generally, on appropriate standing conditions, both of which typically cannot be 
guaranteed. As such, power should be seen as a contingent capacity.  
Much mainstream literature balances between the views of power as a 
contingent capacity and power as a capacity. The view of power as a contingent 
capacity is actually reflected in the frameworks of mainstream authors, when they 
describe the multiple factors which may affect outcomes. However, their synthetic 
definitions tend to explicitly adopt the view of power as a capacity, tout court. E.g., 
Mintzberg (1983, p. 4, emphasis removed) defined power as “the capacity to effect (or 
affect) organizational outcomes”. Mainstream literature with a functionalist perspective 
suggests that, by adequately studying and using power, it is possible to achieve success. 
E.g., Pfeffer (1992, p. 8) drew on Nixon (1982, p. 5) to state that “[t]he great leader 
needs (…) the capacity to achieve” and argued that “[t]oday more than ever, it is 
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necessary to study power and to learn to use it skilfully, since we cannot otherwise hope 
to gain individual success in organizations or the success of the organizations 
themselves” (p. 8). Overall, going beyond the more attention-grabbing excerpts, 
mainstream literature approaches the view of power mostly as a capacity - although a 
difficult to secure one.  
Viewing power as a capacity (deterministic or not) does not entail any judgment 
about its effects. Traditional approaches to power tended to depict power as negative 
and prohibitive (the ‘power over’ view). The next subsection explores the alternative 
approach of viewing power as having the capacity (deterministic or not) to achieve 
positive outcomes - i.e., in an evaluation of the outcomes of power. 
3.2.3 ALTERNATIVE VIEW #3: POWER AS POSITIVE – THE EVALUATIVE 
SENSE OF ‘POWER TO’ 
Strictly speaking, the notion of ‘power to’ merely invokes the capacity 
(deterministic or not) to produce certain effects – whatever those effects are. However, 
the literature has often associated ‘power to’ with a particular alternative notion of 
power, one that evaluates that power can also be positive (rather than negative), by 
potentially producing positive effects (e.g., Moilanen, 2008; Ribeiro, 2003). 
Lukes (2005) acknowledged that dealing only with the negative view of power 
was a second limitation13 of the first edition of his book. Lukes (1974) had dealt only 
“with asymmetric power – the power of some over others – and, moreover, with only a 
sub-type of this, namely, the securing of compliance to domination” (Lukes 2005, p. 64, 
                                                 
13 As analysed above, Lukes (2005) had also acknowledged the ‘exercise fallacy’ in Lukes (1974) by 
ignoring the notion of ‘power to’. 
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emphasis in the original), in a zero-sum situation. Indeed, this acknowledgement 
suggests that the expression ‘domination over’ should be used to express such 
situations, while ‘power over’ should be used as a general expression of the fact that 
power may affect others. 
In the second edition of the book, Lukes (2005) came to concede that “power 
(…) may sometimes favour, or at least not disfavour, the interests of those who are 
subject to it” (p. 84), therefore creating a positive, non-zero sum game, or even a ‘win-
win’ situation. Drawing from Wartenberg (1990), Lukes provided examples such as: 
paternalist legislation enforcing wearing seat belts; apprenticeship, teaching, parenting 
and therapy relations; and absolute obedience relations indispensable to coordination, as 
in armies or orchestra conducting. Lukes (2005) admitted that it is possible “to be 
powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ interests; power over others can be 
productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity” (Lukes, 2005, p. 
109). In turn, Clegg et al. (2005, p. 184) argued that “Positive uses of power make 
things happen that wouldn’t otherwise have happened – not by stopping some things 
from occurring, but by bringing new things into creation, involving less force and more 
listening, working with, rather than against, others”. 
Therefore, power may also lead to or facilitate the achievement of results which 
are desirable by both the ones with power and the ones subjected to it (as further 
discussed in this chapter). This favourable evaluation about the benefits resulting from 
power has often been associated with the ‘power to’ notion (Clegg et al., 2006; Ribeiro, 
2003). However, it is clear that the positive perspective is merely one of the possible 
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senses of ‘power to’ – what was labelled in this subsection as the ‘evaluative sense of 
‘power to’’14. 
However, the notions of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ may in practice overlap. 
As the previous subsections established, the notion of ‘power to’ views power as a 
capacity (deterministic or not). And although “there is no [longer an] assumption that 
power is necessarily negative or repressive, a ‘power over’” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 63), it 
does not necessarily imply a positive outcome to all actors involved, either. Indeed, 
Clegg et al. (2006) pointed out that everyday situations usually encompass the two 
opposite notions of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. E.g., a power exercise overthrowing 
tyrants may be evaluated as positive by the liberated people, but it is most certainly 
evaluated as negative by the former tyrants and their entourage and loyal troops (see 
quotation in page 133). 
Therefore, the conception and evaluation of the power of each person “is 
dependent on the point of view taken. One person’s ‘power to’ may involve asserting 
‘power over’ many other people (…) [Therefore,] the effects of power as productive 
[i.e., positive] or negative are strictly contingent, so for some people the effect may be 
positive while for others it will be negative. Power itself isn’t ‘over’ or ‘to’ in a 
                                                 
14 The literature offers several classifications of power-related concepts involving this negative-positive 
perspective. E.g., Bachrach and Baratz (1963) distinguished between the power-related concepts of 
influence, authority, force and manipulation, and Lukes (1974) clarified this classification by adding the 
concept of coercion. Clegg et al. (2006) proposed the following modalities of exercises of power: 
domination, authority, seduction, coercion and manipulation. Some of these distinctions are defined as a 
function of power being perceived as positive or negative. However, this discussion and associated 
taxonomies is not further explored here. 
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transcendent way; it is ‘over’ or ‘to’ depending on the specific situation and the 
contingent position of the agents” (Clegg et al., 2006, pp. 190-1).15  
Summarising this alternative view of power, power does not necessarily have to 
be negative, and particularly should not be equated to domination (as traditional 
approaches tended to assume). Power can be positive and facilitative of the achievement 
of interests of various parties – although in practice the two notions ‘power to’ and 
‘power over’ may overlap and classifying power as positive or negative may be 
contingent on the specific agents’ situation. 
The previous discussion about viewing power as a capacity (deterministic or not) 
brings the logical question of what this ‘capacity’ of the actors is about, so that they 
have power. What causes that power? This issue is analysed in the next subsection. 
3.2.4 ALTERNATIVE VIEW #4: POWER AS A VARIABLE TO BE EXPLAINED – 
‘POWER AND ITS CAUSE’ 
Since in traditional approaches the origin of power was located in some ‘prime 
mover’ (‘the sovereign’), the notion of ‘power as a cause’ prevailed. The ‘cause’ was 
power itself, and it was power that caused effects.  
However, the focus on the capacity to produce certain effects (rather than on the 
effects themselves and on visible exercises of power) and, even more, the 
                                                 
15 Pfeffer (1992) initially concurred that a particular actor may perceive power to be positive or negative 
depending on whether the actor is exercising, or being submitted to, power. However, Pfeffer then 
diverged from Clegg et al.’s perspective by suggesting that such biased perceptions should be considered 
somehow primitive and erroneous and should therefore be avoided. Alternatively, in a functionalist 
approach, he proposed a ‘better’ perspective: “[a] more sophisticated and realistic view would see it for 
what it is – an important social process that is often required to get things accomplished in interdependent 
systems” (p. 16). 
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acknowledgement of a mere contingent capacity, challenges the notion of ‘power as 
cause’, of ‘power as the cause’. In other words, it requires abandoning the notion of 
power as an exogenous variable (Ribeiro, 2003). Instead, it requires adopting a view of 
‘power and its cause’, a view of power as something whose origin has to be explained, 
as an endogenous variable. It implies looking ‘upstream’ of power (analysing its 
causes), rather than ‘downstream’ (analysing its effects). It implies explaining the 
nature of power. 
Viewing power as a contingent capacity to produce certain results highlights, 
even more, the need to research what causes power. A realist perspective may be useful 
at this point, since the notion of a contingent capacity highlights that in certain 
conditions (what realists referred to as ‘appropriate standing conditions’) the outcomes 
will be produced; however, failing such conditions, those outcomes may not eventuate. 
The issue would then become to determine the necessary and / or sufficient causes for a 
certain actor to have the power to actually secure outcomes.  
It should be clarified that considering power as a contingent capacity intends to 
stress that this capacity is not absolute. It highlights the need to identify factors acting 
as causes of power of agents, and whose presence or absence influences their capacity 
to secure outcomes. In addition, the view about the contingency of power does not 
reflect the adoption of a research approach known as ‘contingency theory’ (e.g., 
Chenhall, 2003; Oliveira et al., 2009; Otley, 1980 and 1995; Ryan et al., 2002). 
Contingency theory, when applied to organisations, tries to identify factors which 
explain certain organisational characteristics, and then tries to make statistical 
generalisations, using quantitative methodologies. Contingency theory assumptions, 
objectives and methodologies are not adequate to many of the issues tackled in this 
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thesis – e.g., the less visible aspects in the second and third dimensions of power, and 
the unpredictability and indeterminacy implicit in Clegg’s framework, adopted at the 
core of this thesis.  
As a summary, this subsection has developed the notion of ‘power as a 
capacity’, by inquiring what factors can be regarded as causing power (‘power and its 
cause’, rather than considering ‘power as cause’), and hence causing the (typically non-
deterministic capacity) of some actors to produce outcomes. But, who are those various 
actors? A powerful A and a powerless B? A plurality of powerful As and powerless Bs? 
Can these As and Bs be located and identified? This is discussion developed in the next 
subsection. 
3.2.5 ALTERNATIVE VIEW #5: DISPERSED AND RELATIONAL POWER 
Traditional views on power tend to consider that power can be identified in 
particular locations, in particular agents, in As which have power (vs. Bs who do not). 
Lukes (2005) made only some way in detaching himself from the traditional view on 
power as something located in a given actor or actors. In his third rectification to his 
previous work, Lukes (2005, p. 64) only went so far as to admit that in Lukes (1974) he 
had only treated “binary relations between actors who are assumed to have unitary 
interests”, and that such simplifying assumptions should be relaxed. The corresponding 
corrective should allow for considering multiple actors with multiple interests, some in 
conflict and some not.  
However, even though Lukes focused on effects of a broad system, rather than 
interventions of particular agents (Clegg, 1989), he still viewed power in one single, 
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particular location: in society’s ruling class. A similar criticism has been raised to 
related streams of research. E.g., Whittington (1992, p. 702) noted that even when 
Willmott (1986b) “acknowledges the multiple social identities of organizational actors, 
and recognises the scope of managerial interpretation”, Willmott’s “conception of the 
firm is still too monolithic”, dominated by “capitalist principles” and an emphasis on 
class struggles (a criticism extended to other Willmott’s works and to the Bravermanian 
and labour process perspective). Therefore, even though acknowledging multiple actors, 
the location of power is still considered to be determinable - at a collective level. The 
issue about the location of power was still not fundamentally challenged.  
Alternatively, Hayward (1998, pp. 1-2) suggestively argued “[a]gainst the 
prevailing conceptualization of power as a social phenomenon that necessarily wears a 
‘face’”, the face of As and Bs, of powerful and powerless agents. Developing this 
alternative perspective, Ribeiro (2003, p. 64) endorsed the view that power could be 
seen as a “capacity for collective action”, conferred to a given actor “within a collective 
capable of acting in concert”. Social powers “are not his own but [are] rather 
relationally attributed or available to him” (emphases in the original), and which the 
actor has to continuously seek and retain within the surrounding network.  
This new perspective reinforces the notion, already introduced in subsection 
3.2.2 (p. 106), that any given, or desired, ‘standing conditions’ may not be (and 
generally are not) under the full control of any agent. Therefore, any agent has to 
continuously struggle to promote suitable ‘standing positions’, managing the relations 
which favour the creation and sustainability of his social powers within the network.  
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This section introduced a shift in the conceptualisation of the entities that 
researchers should consider in order to investigate power. The focus should turn away 
from individual As and Bs (no matter how many these As and Bs might be) and the 
power they might (individually) possess. Alternatively, the focus should be on the 
collective. In particular, the focus should be on the relations established within this 
collective, the powers of this collective and the powers relationally attributed or 
available to the various actors. This focus on the collective and on relations highlights 
the non-determinism of any capacity that might be arguably attributed to any actor. This 
important ontological shift is further developed over the next two sections, as Foucault’s 
and Actor-Network Theory perspectives are explored. 
3.2.6 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT CONCEPTIONS OF POWER – AND 
REFLECTING BACK ON OIE 
This section discussed conceptions of power which are alternatives to the 
conventional conceptions presented in the previous section. Instead of merely focusing 
on the effects of power, the focus can be placed on power as a capacity, as capable of 
producing effects – although in the social world this capacity is likely to be contingent 
on a plurality of factors, many of which may not be under the control of any particular 
actor. Instead of viewing power as solely negative and prohibitive, it was suggested that 
power can also be positive and creative, including for those who are submitted to power. 
In addition, typically each actor may evaluate power as positive or negative depending 
on the relative position of that actor within the power relation. Instead of considering 
power as a prime mover which causes effects, the need to research what causes power 
was highlighted. Finally, instead of considering a simple framework of perfectly 
identified actors, of As and Bs, who exercise power or have power exercised on them, it 
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was suggested that a more dispersed and relational notion of power is required to deal 
with the complexity, interdependency and unpredictability of social relations. 
The notions of power analysed so far are pertinent to an Old-Institutional 
Economics approach (see chapter 2). The emphasis of much OIE literature on the 
constraining power of structures (in particular, institutions) over individuals 
corresponds to a structural capacity (though a typically non-deterministic capacity) of 
those structures to produce effects, mostly in a power over perspective. However, OIE 
theorists also argue that institutions may be decisive towards organisational 
accomplishments (through, e.g., organisational coordination and truce - Nelson   and 
Winter, 1982; Scapens, 1994) which, in turn, may benefit the individual. Therefore, the 
assumed lack of (or limited) power of individuals (due to the lack of, or limited, agency) 
does not necessarily entail negative and detrimental consequences over them. Here, the 
notion of power at stake is ‘power to’ and, indeed, ‘power as positive’. Finally, the 
unsettled OIE issue about whether institutions can be manipulated by particular actors 
or whether accretion is a more accurate depiction of institutional formation (Seal and 
Herbert, 2005, drawing on Czarniawska, 1997) impinges on various discussions in this 
chapter. E.g., this issue concerns whether there are ‘ruling agents’ (one, a few or 
multiple; more identifiable or less identifiable) actively attempting to shape institutions; 
on whether institutions are influenced by a ‘ruler’ (or rulers) possessing particular (i.e., 
absolute) powers or by actors developing their relational position in each particular 
instance, struggling to orchestrate collective power; and on the alternative of there being 
no rulers behind the structures (in line with the notion of ‘accretion’). 
The previous discussion on power – and its contributions to OIE – can be 
enriched by exploring the ideas of French philosopher Michel Foucault. Foucault has 
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attracted a great deal of attention across many areas, including power. The following 
section 3.3 explores Foucault’s ideas about power. Then, section 3.4 introduces key 
related concepts from Actor-Network Theory and section 3.5 presents Clegg’s 
framework, which synthesises many ideas on structures, agency and power previously 
discussed. 
3.3 POWER ACCORDING TO FOUCAULT 
Michel Foucault (e.g., 1975/1977, 1988) is a key author associated with the 
broad postmodern and post-structuralism movement. Burchell et al. (1991) labelled 
Michael Foucault’s enormous influence in contemporary social sciences and, 
specifically, on power, as ‘the Foucault effect’ (see also Clegg et al., 2006). However, 
the use of metaphors and a rhetorical style, by Foucault and many of his followers, 
create difficulties as regards how literally the texts should be interpreted (a comment 
equally applicable to much post-structuralism), as even some of his followers have 
acknowledged (e.g., Clegg, 1989). The ensuing discussion tries to avoid reproducing 
such problems. 
This section first sketches Foucault’s main ideas about power. The following 
subsections analyse how Foucault’s ideas fit in the various conceptions of power 
presented so far in this chapter. The section concludes by establishing some 
intersections and distinctions between OIE and Foucauldian perspectives. 
3.3.1 AN OVERVIEW ON FOUCAULT’S IDEAS ON POWER 
Foucault emphasised the concept of disciplinary power and traced its historical 
origins. Specifically, he suggested that the institution of the monarchy, the notion of the 
119 
 3.3 Power according to Foucault 
3.3.1 An overview on Foucault’s ideas on power 
power of a sovereign, influenced the way authors like Hobbes and Dahl conceived 
power. In these traditional approaches, the power was located in the sovereign. 
Moreover, since sovereigns typically only exercised authority on certain occasions (or 
episodes)16, an episodic view corresponded to the conceptualisation that power was 
“mostly absent except when exercised, (…) only intermittently in discrete episodes” 
(Clegg 1989, p. 156).  
However, Foucault suggested that such intermittent, mechanical and located 
view of power was no longer adequate to today’s world. Alternatively, he also 
conceived a shift of power from episodic events and exercises of power between As and 
Bs, to an all-pervasive capillary form of power, continuously affecting all individuals, 
at all times. 
Foucault also defended this shift - from an episodic to a continuous form of 
power - on an economic basis, as Legrand (2005) noted. In particular, Foucault 
(1975/1977) analysed the cost-benefit relation of various forms of power, and he 
concluded that an episodic exercise of power had a high cost, when compared to a more 
continuous type of power. Through Foucault’s historical analyses, Legrand argued that 
the episodic exercise of the sovereign power until the eighteenth century relied on 
excess usage of the means of punishment, since the punishment was also a ritual to re-
establish power, including through the spectacle of the punishment, of its excess. 
“Therefore, such system has, as a very condition to function, to be un-economical” 
(Legrand, 2005 17). Interestingly, Foucault argued that, during the eighteenth century, 
                                                 
16 Within feudal relations, the exercise of such sovereign power was restricted to the periodical (i.e., 
episodic) appropriation by the feudal monarch from the producer of its product (Clegg, 1989, based on 
Bauman’s (1982) historical account). 
17 Translated from the French. Since the source is a recording from an oral presentation by Legrand, no 
page numbering can be indicated. 
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“[t]he criticism of the reformers was directed not so much at the weakness or cruelty of 
those in authority, as at a bad economy of power” (Foucault 1975/1977, p. 79). “If we 
intervene in a too discontinuous way, we risk allowing the development, in the 
meantime, of phenomena of resistance and disobedience, with a high political cost” 
(Legrand, 2005). So, there was, at the same time, too much power (in the way it was 
exercised by the several agents, in the instances when it was indeed exercised) and “not 
enough power, because such power was discontinuous, erratic, concentrated on certain 
privileged points, instead of being extensive” (Legrand, 2005).  
Therefore, the objective of the reformers became to “set up a new ‘economy’ of 
the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither too 
concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities; 
so that it should be distributed in homogeneous circuits capable of operating 
everywhere, in a continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body. (…) 
[M]ore regular, effective, more constant and more detailed in its effects; in short, (…) 
increase its effects while diminishing its economic costs (…) and its political costs” 
(Foucault 1975/1977, p. 80).  
But without relying on a sovereign from whom power directly emanated and in 
whose name that power was exercised in (very) visible episodes, how could this all-
pervasive, capillary, continuous power be achieved? In other words, without the 
traditional source of power (the sovereign), what could cause power?  
To support a pervasive disciplinary power, in space and time, Foucault proposed 
the adoption of technologies of administration, surveillance and assessment. One 
particularly illustrative and classical example was Bentham’s (1995/1843) ‘Panopticon’ 
121 
 3.3 Power according to Foucault 
3.3.1 An overview on Foucault’s ideas on power 
(see Foucault 1975/1977, pp. 195-228). This “ideal form” (Foucault 1975/1977, p. 205) 
of a prison (designed by Bentham, but never actually built) would consist of a central 
watch-tower, around which cells would be distributed. Therefore, from the tower it 
would be possible to observe (‘gaze’) all prisoners; however, because light was only 
shed on the prisoners’ cells, but not on the central observation point, prisoners would 
not be able to know if they were actually being watched, at any given time. Hence, even 
if the observer were not there at all (let alone looking at a particular prisoner), the 
prisoner’s knowledge of the possibility of being monitored at any time and the 
impossibility of avoiding it would promote each prisoner to permanently self-survey 
and self-discipline himself, according to the established norms. It was the possibility of 
the ‘gaze’ (or, more precisely, the prisoner’s knowledge of the possibility of being 
‘gazed’), rather than its actual exercise, that created disciplinary power. Hence 
Bentham’s principle that “power should be visible” (the inmate would constantly see 
the tower from where he may be observed) “and unverifiable” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 
201).  
Therefore, Foucault considered that power has to be supported, or caused, by 
particular devices (the technologies of administration, surveillance and assessment), and 
that the production of effects is not dependent on the actual and visible exercise of 
power. Updating Foucault’s example to current-day situations, CCTV (closed-circuit 
television) systems, personnel’s remote time control systems, or information systems 
registering every action and transaction within a company, are examples of systems 
whose mere existence creates the awareness that individuals’ actions can be monitored 
and controlled at a distance – even if they, or most of them, are not permanently or even 
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never actually monitored or controlled. As Foucault described, “the perfection of power 
should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary” (Foucault 1975/1977, p. 201). 
Indeed, Foucault went beyond the scenario of Boss et al.’s (2009) conclusion, in 
an IT and managerial context, that “if individuals believe that management watches, 
they will comply” (p. 151, emphases added). While both highlighted the importance of 
the subjects’ perceptions, Foucault stressed that the perception of the mere possibility of 
being monitored (rather than the perception that management actually watches, as in 
Boss et al.’s, 2009 conclusion) produces self-disciplinary effects. 
Summarising this introduction, Foucault emphasised the goal of an economy of 
continuity and permanence of power (rather than episodic excess), based on 
technological devices. To “reduce its economic and politic cost by increasing its 
effectiveness and by multiplying its circuits. In short, constitute a new economy and a 
new technology of the power to punish” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 89). Furthermore, 
these power mechanisms should be designed in a way to dispense actual punishment, 
coercion, action and the sheer actual presence of any controller. Yet, they should 
operate in a capillary way, unconstrained and across contexts of time and space, 
allowing potentially permanent surveillance and, more decisively, inducing permanent 
self-surveillance and self-discipline. The Panopticon imagery corresponds to Foucault’s 
most ‘radical’ and extreme position as regards the total reach and unavoidability of 
power (cf. the only partial visibility and control of the ‘oligopticon’ proposed by Latour, 
2005, as explored by Hyvönen et al., 2008), which is debated and revised below in 
subsection 3.3.7 . Before that, the next subsections analyse how Foucault’s ideas fit in 
the various conceptions of power presented: power and its cause; relational power; 
power as a (contingent) capacity; and power as positive. 
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3.3.2 MECHANISMS OF POWER – POWER AND ITS CAUSE 
The previous overview on Foucault’s ideas highlighted that identifying the 
source(s) of power is not straightforward. Foucault clearly rejected the simple 
identification of the origin of power to a sovereign, or to some prime mover. Viewing 
power as cause was inadequate to Foucault. On the contrary, the sources, the 
mechanisms allowing a certain actor to have power, need to be identified. In other 
words, Foucault was interested in researching power and its cause. In particular, these 
mechanisms of power can continuously and pervasively operate upon individuals and 
may create individuals’ self-discipline, potentially dispensing with the need for an A to 
control and exercise power over a B. This reference – and rejection – of the traditional 
setting of an A and a B raises the issue of the ontological status that Foucault attributed 
to actors – or, using Foucault’s privileged terminology, subjects. This is explored in the 
next subsection.  
3.3.3 RELATIONAL POWER AND RELATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SUBJECTS 
AS A PRODUCT OF POWER 
Rather than conceiving identifiable, locatable As and Bs and their power, 
Foucault was interested on dispersed masses of identities. In addition, for Foucault, 
“identity is never regarded as being given by nature; individuality is never seen as being 
fixed. (…) Identity is seen as contingent, provisional, achieved, not given. Identity is 
seen as always in process, (…), not absolute but (…) always relational: one can only 
ever (…) be something in relation to some other thing. Identity is always defined in 
terms of difference, rather than as something intrinsic to a particular person or category” 
(Clegg 1989, p. 151). As Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) described, “the individual 
is a socially constituted, socially recognized, category of analysis who has multiple 
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fragmented identities, identities which are salient only insofar as they are socially 
recognized (…). Thus the subject is not a ‘given’” (p. 459) 
In addition, the dominating side is also not as clearly identified as the 
‘sovereign’ of the previous approaches. Foucault’s defended “a machine for creating 
and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it” (Foucault, 
1975/1977, p. 201). Foucault does not consider an A (or As) acting as a sovereign whose 
will is enacted through these mechanisms. Foucault eschewed that traditional setting of 
As and Bs. Foucault’s focus is on the field of relations established among the actors and 
the forces which emerge within such field of relations. Retrieving a notion introduced in 
3.2.5, the power of an actor is relationally attributed or made available to him, based on 
the position he occupies and the alliances he holds at each moment in an ever shifting 
network. As such, points of resistance across the network may emerge, breaking 
alliances, regrouping actors and reshaping strategies (Clegg, 1989). 
The idea of power being determined by ever shifting relations within an ever 
shifting network is, clearly, on the antipode of the idea of power emanating from one 
single source, either in the view of the classic sovereign, or Lukes’ (1974) ‘third 
dimension’, based on the power of society ‘ruling class’. No wonder that, in a typically 
metaphorical and expressive way, Foucault asserted the widely-quoted call for the “need 
to cut off the King’s head” (Foucault, 1980, p. 121). 
In addition, Foucault considered that power had a more fundamental role than 
merely dominating, or subjugating, an actor (or, in Foucault’s terminology, a subject). 
For Foucault, power produces the subject. Recalling previous notions of power, the 
episodical power of the sovereign only subjected, i.e., dominated the subject. Here, 
125 
 3.3 Power according to Foucault 
3.3.3 Relational power and relational identities and subjects as a product of power 
“[t]he subject is socially produced by the system of power which surrounds it” (Hardy 
and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1988, p. 459, emphasis added). This production of the subject 
operates through a “process of ‘correction and normalisation’. Subjects are ‘gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, 
forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc’, a process or series of processes which 
add up to ‘on-going subjugation’” (Wickham, 1983, p. 475, quoting Foucault, 1980, p. 
97). 
Therefore, in Foucault’s view, the ubiquitous presence of “power (everywhere 
and every when) as field of force relations” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 67) becomes constitutive 
of the subjects. In other words, the subject is ‘constituted’ through subjection to power; 
power ‘subjectifies’ the subjects, turning them into docile bodies.  
So, in Foucault’s writings representing his vision throughout most of his life, no 
one can escape such power relations, and there is no place outside power. And this view 
is related to one of Foucault’s conceptions of power as ‘productive’: power is 
‘productive’ because it constitutes, ‘produces’ the subject18.  
Another fundamental question requires a clarification: what entities can be 
considered as actors, or agents? What entities can be involved in power relations, can be 
considered to have power or have power to be exerted upon them? As patent in the 
discussion so far, Foucault considered that not only human beings can be agents, and in 
particular powerful agents. The Panopticon device, a CCTV camera, a personnel’s 
remote time control system, an all encompassing information system recording all 
                                                 
18 At the end of this section, a second conception of the productive nature of power is discussed, also in 
line with Foucault’s approach. 
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transactions, have the potential to recurrently obtain outcomes by their mere existence, 
and could be described as powerful agents. Only they are not human agents: they are 
non-human agents (a distinctive notion of Actor-Network Theory, discussed in the next 
section). 
The argument that power actually constitutes, produces the subject suggests a 
wide and deep reach of power, suggesting that power may actually secure effects and 
outcomes. This suggestion is discussed over the next subsections. The next subsection 
analyses a proposal to combine this notion of an overwhelming power with the various 
views of power discussed so far – based on a ‘Fourth dimension’ of power (Hardy and 
Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998), adding to Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions. 
3.3.4 NO ESCAPE FROM POWER: A FOURTH DIMENSION OF POWER? 
In a Foucauldian perspective, how effective can power be? What is the balance 
between, on one hand, the weakness caused by an instable terrain and the lack of a fixed 
source of sovereign power, and, on the other hand, the strength of capillary mechanisms 
of surveillance? Bauman (1982, p. 41), cited in Clegg (1989, p. 168), provided an 
answer drawing from an historical analysis: “No one of these many powers [of the 
many broad groups subjecting the individual(s)] is now total, as that of the absolute 
monarch claimed to be. But together they reach a kind of totality which no power 
dreamed of reaching before”.  
Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) argued that, more than operating through 
mobilising scarce resources, controlling decision-making or managing the meanings, 
power can be seen as “embedded in the very fabric of the system; it constrains how we 
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see, what we see, and how we think, in ways that limit our capacity for resistance” (p. 
460). And in line with views already expressed, they argued that “while some actors 
may derive certain advantages from the power relations embedded in the system, they 
can neither control them nor escape them.” (p. 461). 
In other words, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) drew on the Foucauldian 
insight that there is no escape to power relations - including all actors alike, regardless 
of the relative power that each may relationally possess, regardless of being 
(relationally) ‘more’ or ‘less’ powerful. As such, they suggested that the all-pervasive, 
capillary power, encompassing all actors alike, could be described as a ‘fourth 
dimension’, adding to the three dimensions proposed by Lukes (1974). This fourth 
dimension represented ‘systemic power’, which shaped the subjects at the deepest 
possible level (see figure 3.2, a schematic representation by Clegg et al., 2006).19  
                                                 
19 Clegg et al. (pp. 218-219) were critical of the concept of a fourth dimension, encompassing the other 
three dimensions proposed by Lukes. They argued that “Foucault does not come from the essentially 
Hobbesian conception of causal power that shapes Lukes’ account” and that there were “contradictory 
political, ontological, epistemological and moral presuppositions” across the various dimensions. They 
therefore concluded that blending and synthesising the four views on power “may result in a mixture that 
is somewhat indiscriminate”. However, they also conceded that other authors (e.g., Digesser, 1992 and 
Hardy, 1996) had also pursued the same objective of synthesising contradictory views. As a whole, the 
graphic representation is not eschewed here, as it is believed that the advantages of an intuitive and 
encompassing visualisation outweigh eventual issues deriving from inconsistencies across the four 
dimensions. 
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 Getting others to do what they wouldn’t otherwise do 
Liberal one-dimensional power 
 
  
Agenda setting and issue shaping of preferences 
Reformist two-dimensional power 
 
  
Hegemony occluding appreciation of real interests 
Radical three-dimensional power 
 
 Subject shaping 
Systemic four-dimensional power 
 
Figure 3.2: The four dimensions of power, according to Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan 
(1998) (Source: Clegg et al., 2006, p. 219) 
This fourth dimension represents superstructuralism in an extreme form, 
constraining indeed all actors in a way that resistance and the possibility to escape from 
those very constraints would indeed be very limited, or inexistent. As Lukes (2005, p. 
88) argued, this Foucauldian conception of power would indeed represent an “Ultra-
radical view” – presumably, even “more radical” than Lukes’ own ‘Radical view’. In 
short, as already stated, there would be no place outside power, and no escape from 
power.20 
The Foucauldian description of the subjection of the individual, or the 
‘production of the subject’, as well as the description of how all actors are constrained 
by power relations and that there is no escape from power, raises two issues. First, this 
description may suggest that power may have a total capacity to secure outcomes. As 
                                                 
20 Lukes (2005) argued, however, that Foucault changed his mind, closer to his death, and that his ‘final’ 
position was not truly radical. This discussion is developed later in this section. 
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argued in the previous section, this is questionable in the social sciences, and the next 
subsection (3.3.5) focuses on Foucault’s views about power as a capacity. Second, this 
description of subjugating the subjects risks presenting power as something negative – 
an idea that Foucault clearly opposed, by emphasising that power can be positive. This 
controversial issue is the focus of the ensuing subsection 3.3.6.. 
3.3.5 REJECTING ‘POWER AS A CAPACITY’ – FOUCAULT’S FOCUS ON THE 
LOCAL, ON THE RELATIONAL AND ON CONTINGENT EFFECTS 
The proposed ‘Fourth dimension’ of power would have an extensive and 
overwhelming influence. It would encompass all actors, and not even requiring either an 
observer / controller or visible exercises to produce effects, since subjects would self-
monitor and self-discipline. This might suggest that Foucault mainly considered power 
as a capacity – and indeed with a high level of determinacy and capacity to secure. 
However, such suggestion would not be correct. 
As analysed in the previous section, the notion of ‘power as a capacity’ was 
endorsed by the realist perspective, emphasising that, in the appropriate standing 
conditions, certain characteristics of an actor or an object have the capacity to secure 
outcomes, regardless of whether they are exercised or not. These characteristics are 
‘causal powers’, which under those appropriate standard conditions cause certain 
effects. However, “Foucault teaches us that, rather than being a resource that can be 
held or exercised – a capacity inanimate but potential – power is inseparable from its 
effects. (…) The focus for analysis is (…) the mundane practices that shape everyday 
life (…). [T]echniques of power [are only so] in so far as they induce appropriate forms 
of conduct. Hence, power is only visible in its effects” (Clegg et al., 2006, pp. 230-231). 
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The combination of this apparent certainty of the capacity of power to produce 
and secure certain outcomes, on one side, with the consideration that power is 
inseparable from its effects, on the other side, may strike as a paradox. However, 
Foucault did not return to the classical focus on effects as the way to conclude for the 
existence of power. The mechanical metaphors about the effects caused by powers of 
some prime movers are, indeed, totally eschewed by Foucault.  
As a first step towards explaining this apparent paradox, a clarification is 
needed. The view of power as a capacity is opposed to a view of power based on its 
exercise – an exercise which, traditionally, has been associated with episodes (in 
particular, visible episodes) of exercise of power. As discussed above, what Foucault 
criticised was the episodic exercise of power, much in line with the mechanical 
metaphors about the effects caused by powers of some prime movers. Instead, Foucault 
proposed a continuous and capillary type of power. And this continuous power would 
indeed be exercised – in fact, permanently exercised (although perhaps dispensing 
specific actions, or even a controlling actor). Therefore, in a nutshell, Foucault endorses 
the focus on exercises of power (in particular, in a continuous, rather than only episodic, 
way) and their effects. This clarification that Foucault focuses exercises of power is the 
first step towards explaining the suggested paradox.  
The second, and decisive, step to solve this apparent paradox lies in Foucault’s 
local and relational focus, on “how power is constituted locally in specific organization 
settings” (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 231, emphasis added), amid interrelated strategies of 
actors whose very identities are relationally defined (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 
1998). 
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These local arenas are fields of force, constituted by actors mutually interrelated 
and dependent; indeed, the very identities of these actors are relationally defined. In 
these fields of force, those multiple actors attempt to deploy their strategies involving 
the other actors, possibly at the same time that the other actors are doing the same, 
leading to contingent, highly unstable outcomes. Actors may find it impossible to secure 
the appropriate standing conditions which would benefit their strategies. This scenario 
“does not rely on a model of possession or access to resources with which to leverage 
others. (…) [W]e are moving towards an immanent view of power, one in which, as 
Allen says, ‘Power does not show itself because it is implicated in all that we are and all 
that we inhabit’ (2003: 65). The immanent idea of power is not dependent on an 
analytical claim to omnipotence” (Clegg et al., 2006, p. 232). Resistance by actors is 
expected and may be successful, and the notion of power as having capacity to secure 
outcomes becomes inadequate. “To say that power is constitutive does not mean that it 
should be seen as constitutive of nearly anything and everything, as being ubiquitous” 
(Clegg et al., 2006, p. 261).  
Additionally, institutional and structuralist authors recalled the 
interconnectedness of alternative institutional arrangements and the “participation of 
actors within a diversity of organizations” (Whittington, 1992, p. 695, drawing on 
Giddens, 1985; Seo and Creed, 2002). The concept of totality (Benson, 1977; Seo and 
Creed, 2002) is at stake, and it is further discussed in section 8.2. Therefore, in an 
institutional perspective, such diversified exposure of actors “precludes any total 
Foucauldian disciplinary power” (Whittington, 1992, p. 695).  
Therefore, it is possible to justify the combination of Foucault’s focus on the 
sources of power (power and its cause, which the previous section had related with the 
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realist notion of capacity) and Foucault’s rejection of power as a capacity and his 
proposal of the link between power and its effects. The combination is justified by the 
indeterminacy associated with Foucault’s view of multiple, relationally defined actors, 
whose powers are also only relationally attributed to them, who develop their strategies 
in specific, local settings and drawing in a wide variety of personal experiences, 
resulting in largely unpredictable outcomes. 
Summarising this subsection, Foucault’s focus was on local arenas, on the 
multiple practices of the multiple, relationally defined actors. Because all actors are 
involved in power relations, at all times, no individual has the power to ‘pull all the 
strings’ in order to secure outcomes (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998). Although 
power is immanent and omnipresent, no individual power is omnipotent. Hence, the 
rejection of power as a universal capacity, in a transcendent way. Hence, the focus on 
local practices, in specific settings, by relationally defined actors. Hence, the focus on 
the contingent, mostly unpredictable effects resulting from the confluence of those 
related, and potentially  conflicting,  practices.  In  a  world  so strongly characterised by 
contingent relations, it makes little  sense  to  consider power as a capacity, and certainly 
not as an absolute, universal capacity. 
As mentioned above, another issue remains to be tackled. The previous section 
argued that power can also be considered as positive, rather than negative. Therefore, 
the next subsection discusses the various meanings that ‘power as positive’ may have, 
in Foucault’s thought. 
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3.3.6 HOW POSITIVE IS ‘PRODUCTIVE’ POWER? PRODUCING OUTCOMES 
AND PRODUCING SUBJECTS 
‘Positive’ power was discussed in the context of the evaluative sense of ‘power 
of’, in subsection 3.2.3. This subsection highlights that power can be positive in two 
senses: a more ‘mainstream’ sense of producing outcomes and a distinctively 
Foucauldian sense of ‘producing subjects’. In a mainstream perspective, power can be 
‘productive’ along the more common language sense of obtaining, or ‘producing 
desired outcomes’. E.g., Pfeffer (1992), in a functionalist approach, highlighted the role 
of power as “an important social process that is often required to get things 
accomplished in interdependent systems” (p. 16). Clegg et al. (2006) argued that power 
may be creative, empowering and facilitate the achievement of collectively desired 
objectives, and that “it is not necessarily constraining, negative or antagonistic” (p. 2). 
They exemplified the “positive, wonderful things [that] may be achieved with power: 
tyrannies defeated, democracies created21, relationships forged, and freedoms 
established” (p. 2), and how the Live8 Make Poverty History events had the power to 
positively contribute to improve the conditions in Africa. As Bentham (1995-1843) 
proclaimed in the Preface of a text which significantly influenced Foucault (1977-1975, 
p. 207), “Morals reformed - health preserved - industry invigorated - instruction 
diffused – public burthens lightened - Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock”.  
On the other hand, this section has already discussed an alternative, Foucauldian 
sense of power as ‘productive’: the sense of ‘producing’ or ‘constituting’ a subject. As 
power ‘subjectifies’ the subjects, through on-going subjection by an all-encompassing, 
                                                 
21 As discussed in the previous section, evaluating a given power exercise as positive or negative is 
contingent on the specific agents’ situation, rather than reflecting any transcendental, universal 
classification. Clearly, “wonderful things” such as “defeating tyrannies” can be simultaneously classified 
as positive (by the liberated people) and negative (by the tyrants and their entourage and loyal troops). 
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ubiquitous power, it turns them into ‘docile bodies’, which will take the desired 
conduct22. 
These two senses of power as ‘productive’ (producing collective objectives or 
producing subjects) are related, but different. They are related, as in Bentham’s 
argument above, encompassing the two senses: collective objectives were obtained by 
transforming individuals into subjects, by creating ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 
1975/1977), something which Ribeiro (2003) argued that emphasised “the positive, 
productive and facilitative aspects of power” (p. 68). However, these two senses of 
power as ‘productive’ are also clearly different, and it is doubtful whether the process of 
subjectification of individuals can still unambiguously receive the qualification of 
‘positive’ (Wickham, 1983). In fact, Wickham noted that “in suggesting as he 
[Foucault] does (…) that subjects are produced in subjugation, produced as subjects of 
the essence of power, Foucault is promoting one of the major misconceptions of power 
which he urges people to avoid - negative power” (p. 475).  
Finally, it should be emphasised that both acceptations of ‘productive’ and 
‘positive’ power are not deterministic, but merely facilitative. They are merely 
facilitative, because neither follow the original notions of power, when rolling billiard 
balls produced movement in other balls, in the causal and mechanical way of the one-
dimensional framework of power, depicted at the start of the chapter.  
As a summary, this subsection explored two senses of ‘productive power’. In a 
more mainstream sense, ‘productive power’ refers to the achievement of results and 
                                                 
22 As discussed above, this extreme, deterministic description must be interpreted in line with Foucault’s 
contingent, non-deterministic overall perspective. 
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may be considered ‘positive power’ (albeit the inherent relativity of any evaluation). In 
a typically Foucauldian sense, ‘productive power’ refers to the production of subjects 
through their on-going subjection. While some authors considered that both senses are 
related, given the need to constitute the subject in order to achieve the ‘positive’ 
objectives, other authors argued that Foucault’s notion of ‘subjecting the subject’ 
depicted power as repressive and negative, in a striking paradox when compared to 
Foucault’s consideration of power as positive. However, it has been argued that 
Foucault’s views underwent through several stages (Lukes, 2005) – including as regards 
the positive nature of power. This is the topic of the next subsection. 
3.3.7 DISCUSSING FOUCAULT’S ‘PHASES’ AS SETTING GROUND FOR 
THEORETICAL DIALOGUE 
Several passages in this section highlighted that Foucault’s often extreme 
positions, and often expressed in a metaphorical way, should be interpreted with 
caution. Lukes (2005) devoted most of an entire chapter (out of the two new chapters 
included in this second edition) to argue that Foucault’s “ultra-radical view” (Lukes, 
2005, p. 88) should be, at best, taken less literally – if not plainly rejected. Indeed, such 
a ‘radical’ perspective would inevitably attract criticisms (see, as mere examples, Lukes, 
2005; Newton, 1998; Wickham, 1983). A short subsection cannot do justice to the 
challenge of fully exploring the convergences and divergences between the different 
positions; such challenge is left for future work. This brief overview, relying mostly on 
Lukes (2005), is useful to argue for a more theoretically accommodative stance, at the 
conclusion of this section23. 
                                                 
23 Clegg et al.’s (2006) analysis of the ‘Foucault effect’ must also be considered in detail, in future work. 
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Lukes (2005) noted that Foucault’s vision of ubiquitous power represented 
domination, “calculated manipulation”, in “a one-sided, monolithic image of 
unidirectional control” (Lukes, 2005, p. 93), concluding with the idea that “the subject 
is ‘constituted’ through subjection (assujetissement) to power” (p. 95). Lukes (2005) 
claimed this was an “ultra-radical view” characterising a first phase of Foucault’s 
thoughts - indeed even more radical that Lukes’ position in the first, 1974 edition. 
Determinism tends to the infinite, as agency tends to nil.  
Lukes argued that, in a second phase, Foucault accepted greater voluntarism, 
arguing that ‘governmentality’ assumes free subjects and, among other concepts, 
assumes rationalities of rule, “styles of reasoning embodied in governing practices” 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 96). It is within such an approach that Foucault (1988 – post-mortem 
publication) thus stated: “if there are relations of power throughout every social field it 
is because there is freedom everywhere. Now, there are effectively states of domination. 
In many cases the relations of power are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually 
asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited” (p. 12). 
However, Lukes (2005) noted that Foucault, in the interview cited above, 
towards the end of his life, actually developed a third stage in his thinking. Indeed, 
Foucault (1988) himself admitted that “I am not sure, when I began to interest myself in 
this problem of power, of having spoken very clearly about it or used the words needed. 
Now I have a much clearer idea of all that.” (p. 19). But, in a negative assessment, 
Lukes argued that this ‘Final Foucault’ actually dissolved his previous ‘ultra-
radicalism’. Lukes (2005, pp. 96-97) drew on particular passages from Foucault (1988, 
p. 11): “the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of self”. 
These practices are “not something the individual invents by himself” but “patterns that 
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he finds in the culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his 
culture, his society and his social group”. According to Lukes, this position “amounted 
to restating some elementary sociological commonplaces. Individuals are socialized: 
they are oriented to roles and practices that are culturally and socially given; they 
internalize these and may experience them as freely chosen; indeed, their freedom may 
(…) be the fruit of regulation – the outcome of disciplines and controls. Of course, it 
restates these truths in a distinctively Foucauldian way” (Lukes, 2005, p. 97). 
Lukes depiction of Foucault’s final position was summarised by Clegg et al. 
(2006, p. 256) as demeaning it to “old-fashioned sociological functionalism with their 
accounts on the centrality of the socialization process”. This pejorative evaluation of 
Foucault was rejected by Clegg et al.. The discussion of their defence of Foucault’s 
distinctive contribution (as well as the acknowledgement of some problems) is a worthy 
endeavour, but it is left for future work. Without developing such discussion here, it 
should be noted that Lukes’ (2005) second edition also contains major 
acknowledgements of previous limitations of his prior work and acceptance of 
alternative conceptions. Indeed, the overall defence of Lukes’ own position was 
grounded in several nuances and reinterpretations, as evident in the last pages of the 
book.  
The discussion of this subsection, albeit brief, is nonetheless useful for the 
potential it unveils. By revisiting ideas, tensions and reconciliations previously 
discussed and by incorporating Lukes’ (2005) critical assessment of Foucault, this 
discussion highlighted that there are common, fundamental principles which are mostly 
transversal. Based on those principles, various streams of research explored different 
perspectives, particular domains of social life and research topics; they developed 
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specific concepts and terms, endorsed peculiar styles and even deployed idiosyncratic 
metaphors. These differences are not irrelevant and, quite substantially, may allow 
certain streams of research to develop particular insights which would remain obscure to 
(and even remain unacknowledged and rejected by) other streams of research endorsing 
other characteristics. This diversity may be drawn upon in attempts to explore the 
potential of theoretical heterogeneity, cross-fertilisation and triangulation, such as in the 
attempts carried out in this thesis (see section 4.1; Hopper and Hoque, 2006; Lukka and 
Mouritsen, 2002; Major and Hopper, 2005). 
3.3.8 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT FOUCAULT – AND REFLECTING 
BACK ON OIE 
This section overviewed Foucault’s influential ideas about power, relating them 
with previously discussed conceptions. In particular, Foucault highlighted the 
limitations of episodic exercises of power and emphasised the advantages of a more 
continuous, all-pervasive capillary form of power, both in terms of efficiency but in 
particular in terms of effectiveness. Rejecting the notion of a single, sovereign source of 
power, Foucault emphasised technologies of administration, surveillance and 
assessment. In a distinctive perspective, Foucault argued that the fundamental effect of 
these technologies did not rely on the actual exercise of whatever activities they 
enabled. Instead, the fundamental effect, Foucault argued, lied in permanent self-
surveillance and self-discipline by the controlled himself, due to their knowledge of the 
sheer possibility of being monitored. Finally, Foucault’s conception of continuous, all-
pervasive capillary power must stop short of concluding for a total domination of actors 
and a corresponding total lack of agency. In broader (and very brief) terms, there 
seemed to be mutual acceptance of alternative – and after all complementary – 
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perspectives among key theorists of power, with some common basilar traits promising 
to establish at least a platform for dialogue. 
This section also analysed three topics particularly relevant for OIE. First, for 
Foucault, the ubiquitous presence of power ‘constitutes’ the subjects. Recalling chapter 
2, based on Hodgson (2000), OIE emphasises the notion of ‘reconstitutive downward 
causation’, of how institutions lead to individuals’ reconstitution and to the emergence 
of ‘The Institutionalised Individual’. Both perspectives suggest that the ‘influenced’ 
entity is somehow (re)constituted, but the differences between the ‘constitution of the 
subject’ (in Foucauldian terms) and ‘individuals’ reconstitution’ (in OIE terms) are not 
negligible and should be noted. Foucault’s notion of ‘constitution’ is an ontological 
metaphor to convey the image that the entity becomes a ‘subject’, a ‘subjected subject’, 
through subjection to power (in spite of the emergence of voluntarism in some of 
Foucault’s writings). On the other hand, the institutional approach does not invoke the 
same dramatic and radical imagery: the emergence of “The Institutionalised Individual” 
conveys a process of ‘adjustment’ of an (already previously existent) individual; a 
process of ‘moulding’, at the most. In addition, OIE’s notion of ‘upward causation’ 
arguably attributes a wider agency to individuals, than the acknowledgement of limited 
voluntarism and freedom in Foucault seems willing to concede. 
Second, Foucault views power as operating in a field of force relations, with 
multiple origins. Quite differently, the institutional approach emphasises one particular 
source of power, institutions, based on shared values and meanings (in Scapens and 
Macintosh’s, 1996 view; cf. Boland, 1996). It can be argued that there is room, within 
an institutionalist-inspired conception, to accommodate additional multiple sources of 
power. Recalling the above 1996 debate between the authors above, it should be noted 
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that Scapens and Macintosh’s position was more accommodative to plural perspectives. 
In fact, even Boland was, essentially, ‘merely’ “sceptical” (p. 692) about Scapens and 
Macintosh’s emphasis on shared values and meanings (in spite of Boland, in other 
occasions, plainly rejecting his somewhat radical interpretation of the two other authors’ 
position). Within the non-deterministic and non-exclusivist common trait across 
explanations of social life, there seems to be room for the accommodation of Foucault’s 
views within institutional theory, as welcomed contributions for a more holistic and 
realistic OIE framework.  
A third major difference between Foucault and OIE also concerns the 
ontological conceptions of actors, with Foucault – unlike OIE theorists - granting 
potential agency to entities beyond individuals. Foucault accepted that additional 
entities can be considered actors: collectives of individuals and non-human actors. The 
acceptance of such conceptions in OIE requires additional discussion, which is 
introduced in sections 8.2 and 9.1 and must be continued in future work.  
Granting an actor status to entities beyond individuals is a characteristic of 
Actor-Network theory (ANT), a stream of research which draws extensively from 
Foucault. As widely noted (e.g., Clegg, 1989; Peyton, 2009; Wickham, 1983), 
Foucault’s thoughts tend to be situated at a high level of abstraction and, in addition, his 
views on power were scattered over many different publications. On the other hand, 
ANT has provided a more helpful basis and guidance, including for empirical, 
organisational studies. Therefore, ANT is the focus of the next section. 
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3.4 ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY (ANT) 
3.4.1 AN OVERVIEW ON ANT 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is included in the wider post-structuralist 
movement, alongside Foucault, from whom ANT draws extensively. ANT has found 
widespread acceptance and usage within the academia and now counts with numerous 
contributors, in particular two key authors, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour (e.g., 
Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2005; see also contributions in Law 
and Hassard, 1999). 
ANT studies actors’ actual actions, by analysing the mechanics of power 
involved when actors constitute and maintain actor-networks, operating in specific sites 
of power relations (Clegg et al., 2006; Hyvönen et al., 2008). An actor-network is a 
“new hybrid” (Latour, 1997)24, including both human and non-human actors, 
“collectively referred to as actants”25, all “participants in a network of heterogeneous 
components” (Volkoff et al., 2007, p. 834; see also Legge, 2002).  
‘Human’ actors include individual people and collective entities (types of people 
such as managers, machine operators, police officers, lawyers, etc.; and groups that 
cannot be described as ‘types of people’, such as organisations or organisational 
subunits). This entails an important different ontological assumption as regards the most 
usual perspective of OIE: ANT considers that organisations have a particular type of 
                                                 
24 Given the HTML-form of this reference, no page numbering can be indicated. 
25 Quattrone and Hopper (2006, p. 216) cited the on-line article Latour (1999), clarifying that “[s]ince in 
English the word ‘actor’ is often limited to humans, the word ‘actant’, borrowed by semiotics, is 
sometimes used to include nonhumans in the definition”. However, neither the current on-line version, in 
www.bruno-latour.fr/articles/article/077.html, nor the published version (Latour, 2004), include such 
clarification. 
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agency: “collective agency”, as “collective forms of decision-making” (Clegg, 1989, p. 
188, 187), while OIE tends to restrict the capacity of agency to individual, human actors 
(see section 2.3.4). In an ANT perspective, “[w]here organization achieves agency it is 
an accomplishment, just as it is for the individual but more so, because it involves the 
stabilization of power relations across an organizational field of action, and thus 
between many subjectivities, rather than simply within one embodied locus of 
subjectivities” (Clegg, 1989, p. 188). 
In addition to ‘human’ actors (both individual and collective), ANT also accepts 
the notion of ‘non-human’ actors. The notion of non-human actors encompasses both 
non-human living entities (e.g., germs) and also technological devices - including all 
kinds of physical machines (computer, industrial devices, etc.) and even software. 
Therefore, as Andon et al. (2007, p. 276) summarised (leaving aside non-human living 
entities, likely less relevant for organisational issues), “ANT explores processes and 
relational effects within socio-technical networks of elements”, i.e., socio-technical 
relations. 
In ANT, the focus is the actor-network, as a ‘hybrid’, not the isolated actor. In 
fact, an actor-network is a quasi-object, and quasi-objects “do not exist outside 
networks of relations and thereby require something else to be defined.” (Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006, p. 219-220, emphasis in the original). An organisation is “a network of 
entities that do things; the network is constituted by the entities that connect themselves 
in the network. Both actor and network constitute, define and redefine each other” 
(Clegg et al., 2006, p. 238). As Hyvönen et al. (2008) described, drawing on Latour 
(2005), ANT conceives the social as a “circulating entity” and therefore “concentrates 
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attention on a movement” (p. 47, emphasis in the original). The focus is therefore on 
socio-technical relations.26 
Since the word ‘network’ may have so many meanings, it is important to clarify 
its meaning in the context of ANT. Hyvönen et al. (2008) argued that “the ANT 
technical ‘network’ metaphor has often been understood in perhaps a too concrete way. 
Latour (2005) did not wish to call the social a ‘network’ but instead to capture the 
interaction between various actors as a series of transformations and translations” (p. 
47). For ANT, ‘network’ does not have a “common technical meaning in the sense of a 
sewage, or train, or subway, or telephone ‘network’. Recent technologies have often the 
character of a network, that is, of exclusively related yet very distant elements with the 
circulation between nodes being made compulsory through a set of rigorous paths 
giving to a few nodes a strategic character, [such as] a computer network. Such is not 
however the basic metaphor of an actor-network. (…) An actor-network may lack all 
the characteristics of a technical network - it may be local, it may have no compulsory 
paths, no strategically positioned nodes” (Latour, 1997)27.  
The focus on the network, on the connections and relations within and across the 
networks, informs the ANT ontological view of power. In ANT’s “model the concept 
‘power’ is treated as a composition, that is, ‘the composition of a set of actors who are 
temporarily enrolled in the schemes of the powerful and who accordingly lend their 
                                                 
26 The reader should note that the expression ‘socio-technical relations’ was used, at the end of the last 
two paragraphs, to highlight the ‘socio-technical’ and the ‘relations’ components, respectively. 
27 Latour (1997) further explained, “[p]ut too simply ANT is a change of metaphors to describe essences: 
instead of surfaces one gets filaments (…). More precisely it is a change of topology. Instead of thinking 
in terms of surfaces - two dimension - or spheres - three dimension - one is asked to think in terms of 
nodes that have as many dimensions as they have connections. As a first approximation, the ANT claims 
that modern societies cannot be described without recognizing them as having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, 
stringy, ropy, capillary character that is never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, 
categories, structure, systems”. 
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efforts to his/her project’ (Law, 1986:17)” (Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003, p. 88).28 This view 
also entails that “networks are never completely fixed or stable, but rather fragile and 
transient and, hence, require hard work on the part of those who seek centrality in the 
network to develop and maintain it” (Legge, 2002, p. 78). 
The two previous paragraphs link back to the rejection of the notion of the 
power of a single sovereign (see section 3.2). Instead, the outcomes will depend 
crucially on “the concerted actions of many others - the orchestration of power – where 
it is less the power over some entity held by its possessor that matters so much as the 
concertative power that surrounds and embeds this potential power over resources” 
(Clegg et al., 2006, p. 224). 
In other words, organisation is key to any successful strategy of power (Ribeiro, 
2003). Latour (1997) further clarified the notion (already advanced in the previous 
section on Foucault) that an immense power may result from the strategic articulation of 
(individually) weak powers. “To remain at this very intuitive level, ANT is a simple 
material resistance argument. Strength does not come from concentration, purity and 
unity, but from dissemination, heterogeneity and the careful plaiting of weak ties. (…) 
[R]esistance, obduracy and sturdiness is more easily achieved through netting, lacing, 
weaving, twisting, of ties that are weak by themselves, and (…) each tie, no matter how 
strong, is itself woven out of still weaker threads.”29 
                                                 
28 See Callon (1986) for a seminal discussion of ANT’s four stages: problematisation, interessement, 
enrolment, and mobilisation. 
29 Granovetter (1973) is a classic work on the importance of weak ties. However, in spite of some (at least 
apparent) affinities with the ANT approach, there are significant differences. For example, Granovetter 
focused on social networks (while ANT’s scope goes beyond social actors and networks) and his main 
objective was to link the micro and the macro levels of sociological theory (a distinction which does not 
match ANT’s ontological assumptions). As such, in spite of apparent, first-sight similarities, Granovetter 
145 
 3.4 Actor-Network Theory (ANT) 
3.4.1 An overview on ANT 
In spite of the importance of ANT’s particular ontological conceptions about 
actors and networks, Clegg et al. (2006) argued that ANT offers, more than a theory, a 
method. ANT’s focuses on researching practices: “how the actors develop the 
mechanics of power as they construct and maintain heterogeneous actors networks” 
(Clegg et al., 2006, p. 238), and even extend them. As a suitable research method, ANT 
recommends following the actors and analysing the traces they left when deploying 
their strategies and carrying out their practices. By recommending to research the 
practices of actors and the traces they left, ANT belongs to the approach known as 
‘Strategy as Practice’ (Jarzabkowski and Whittington, 2008; see Carter et al., 2008a and 
2008b for criticisms).  
Foucault’s and ANT concepts highlight the limitations of the initial conceptions 
of power analysed in this chapter (especially Dahl’s and Bachrach and Baratz’s), which 
considered locatable, human As and Bs. Foucault and Actor-Network theorists expanded 
the concept of power and the entities which can enter power relations. These entities are 
seen as a dispersed mass, whose identities are relationally defined. They include both 
human and non-human actors (actants), individual or collective, all as connected 
participants in a socio-technical network. It is indeed the ‘network’ which constitutes 
the ontological referent of ANT.  
The fundamental outlines of ANT have been sketched above. Two particular 
contributions to ANT should now be analysed autonomously, in particular since they 
are key in Clegg’s (1989) framework, adopted in the next section. These contributions 
concern the connections and routes within a network. As such, the next subsection 
                                                                                                                                               
(1973) cannot be considered as (before its time!) representative of ANT. Similar comments apply to the 
revisit of this seminal paper, in Granovetter (1983). 
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analyses the notions of ‘nodal points’ and ‘obligatory passage points’, proposed by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Callon (1986), respectively. 
3.4.2 NODAL POINTS AND OBLIGATORY PASSAGE POINTS: THE 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF LACLAU AND MOUFFE, AND CALLON 
Upon an unstable terrain of shifting alliances, power outcomes would tend to be 
unstable. However, should disciplinary power be effectively deployed and achieve an 
overwhelming control over subjects, then it could be expected that the underlying norms 
and practices achieve some stability. In other words, as an effect of disciplinary power, 
(at least temporary) phenomena of stability and fixity may occur.  
The issue of fixity drew the attention of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) (see 
Wenman, 2003 for a discussion of the divergences between the later works of the two 
authors). Laclau (1983, p. 22, cited in Clegg, 1989, p. 178) took the relatively 
consensual starting point of the “[i]nfinitude of the social”. From there, Laclau 
considered that this “[i]nfinitude of the social” implied that “any structural system is 
limited, that it is always surrounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to 
master and that, consequently, ‘society’ as a unitary and intelligible object (…) is an 
impossibility” (p. 22).  
Most readers would readily agree with the epistemological side of this statement, 
concerning the impossibility of an absolute knowledge about society, and even with the 
ontological view that such society is not ‘unitary’. Beyond epistemology, Laclau 
developed more radical ontological consequences about society, rejecting the existence 
of a fixed system of positions. According to Laclau, no positions are fixed, in line with 
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Foucault’s ‘unstable terrain’. In addition, the same way Foucault considered that power 
is relationally attributed to actors, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) considered that also 
meaning (the main concern of these authors) within society and actors is relational; 
relations between society and actors are not fixed, so meaning can never be fixed in a 
final, stable and definitive way, either. And, like Foucault accepted the stabilisation 
(though temporary and precarious it might be) of norms and practices through 
disciplinary power, so Laclau and Mouffe proposed (merely) partial fixations of 
meaning.  
So, how can meaning be fixed (even if only partially and temporarily)? Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985, p. 113) proposed the “construction of nodal points which partially 
fix meaning”, as devices of a rhetorical, textual and semiotic nature. A similar notion of 
‘Obligatory Passage Points’ was put forward by Callon (1986). ‘Obligatory passage 
points’ represent devices that certain actors propose to impose certain rules, to conduct 
other actors towards certain meanings that favour the former actors. Callon considered 
not only rhetorical devices, but also material, physical devices. In addition to rules of 
meaning (the focus of Laclau and Mouffe), rhetorical and material Obligatory Passage 
Points can also fix the rules guiding actors’ actions, and constrain the possibilities of 
action available to the actors. When successful, these devices lead to a (temporary and 
partial) stabilisation or fixity of such rules - though permanently challengeable as actors 
continuously deploy their strategies.  
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3.4.3 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT ANT (AND FOUCAULT) – AND 
REFLECTING BACK ON RULES IN OIE 
Significant compatibility and even similarities exist between the positions 
explored in this section (on ANT) and the previous section (on Foucault) – hardly 
surprising, given the strong influence that Foucault’s writings exerted on ANT writers. 
The main differences reside in their key concepts and concerns. Foucault focused on the 
mechanisms of power to create a pervasive surveillance, leading to an ultimate 
‘subjectification’ of the subject, i.e., in constituting him as a subject. Laclau and 
Mouffe, on the other hand, stressed the lack of definitive, fixed positions and meanings; 
correspondingly, they were more interested in understanding how ‘necessary nodal 
points’ could be built and how they fixed meanings, though in only a temporary and 
partial way (although, clearly, such concerns were also present in Foucault’s work). In 
addition, Callon argued that rules may also be imposed by material devices, in addition 
to rhetorical devices. Finally, an extended interpretation of the applicability of ‘nodal 
points’ or ‘Obligatory Passage Points’ goes beyond only rules of meaning and includes, 
more generally, diversified unavoidable factors orienting and constraining actors’ 
actions. 
At this stage, it is useful to refer again to the previous chapter on institutional 
theory. A salient connection concerns rules. Two of the pillars (actually, structures) of 
Giddens’ theory are interpretive rules and normative rules. Interpretive rules form 
structures of signification, by creating meaning. Normative rules form structures of 
legitimation, producing a morality that involves value. The third pillar, or structure, 
consists of resources. There are clearly close parallels between Giddens’ three structures 
(interpretive and normative rules and resources) and the three aspects considered by 
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ANT to cause and fix power (rules of meaning, the rules orienting actions and material 
conditions). Such similarities ground expectations that the theoretical dialogue proposed 
in the previous section can indeed flourish, and this is attempted in the remainder of the 
chapter and thesis. 
Many of these insights, especially post-structuralist ones, were integrated by 
Stewart Clegg. Clegg (1989) proposed a framework of power suggesting the existence 
of various circuits of power. This framework is developed in next section. 
3.5 CLEGG’S FRAMEWORK OF ‘CIRCUITS OF POWER’ 
3.5.1 RATIONALE FOR ADOPTING CLEGG’S FRAMEWORK 
Clegg (1989)30 drew on the views of power and insights from various theorists 
analysed in this chapter, and integrated them within a Foucauldian framework. Clegg’s 
framework explored how different types of power circulate across the networks of 
actors, which effects those powers produce and how they are linked together, in 
relations of support or opposition, promoting stability and / or change.  
Many authors have used Clegg’s insights, although without using his entire 
framework (Antonsen, 2009; van Marrewijk et al., 2008, Wainwright, 2007 31 and 
Williams et al., 2006 are recent examples). Additionally, a significant number of 
authors presented, empirically applied or developed Clegg’s entire framework. Some 
examples are Wickramasinghe (2006) (a theoretical review), Davenport and Leitch 
                                                 
30 Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, ‘Clegg’ refers to Clegg (1989). 
31 In a thesis submitted at the University of Dundee, the author could not help mentioning this work on 
discipline and resistance of working women in Dundee’s jute industry. Wainwright (2003), also about 
Dundee’s history, was also inspired in Foucault and therefore shares a similar approach. 
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(2005) (about the use of strategic ambiguity within a facilitative circuit of power), 
Ribeiro (2003) (a case study about resistance to management accounting, partly 
summarised in Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006), Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) (an 
application to regional development), and a number of papers by Taylor and 
Hallsworth: Taylor (1995), about interrelationships of enterprises; Hallsworth (1995), 
about the institutional context of British retailing; Hallsworth and Taylor (1996) and 
Hallsworth (1997), about the role of power in shaping the environment of the retail 
sector; Hallsworth and Taylor (1999) and Taylor and Hallsworth (2000), about the 
dynamics of power plays at the transport industry level. Additional studies using 
Clegg’s framework are indicated in Clegg et al. (2006,  pp. 264-265). 
The studies above which used Clegg’s entire framework had a particular 
influence in this thesis, in different and complementary ways. Lagendijk and Cornford 
(2000) emphasised the benefits of the integrative nature of Clegg’s framework, 
including notions from institutional theory (in particular, NIS), organisational theory 
and ANT. Davenport and Leitch (2005) made a rather flexible interpretation of Clegg’s 
framework and still were the ones picked by Clegg et al. (2006) as an empirical 
application of the framework; this encouraged the researcher to go beyond the original 
framework. The various papers from Taylor and Hallsworth drew heavily on Clegg’s 
framework and, collectively, suggested its explanatory potential to various fields. 
Collectively, the papers mentioned in this paragraph encouraged the author to adopt the 
‘more ambitious’ option of applying the ‘whole framework’ in a single study, rather 
than only choosing “a segment” of the framework, as Wickramasinghe (2006, p. 354) 
more cautiously advised (an arguably questionable advice, given the integrative nature 
of Clegg’s framework). 
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In addition to the influence of the above mentioned studies, the most relevant 
indication came from Ribeiro (2003), who carried out the deepest analysis of all the 
cited authors, both theoretically and empirically (the larger size of Ribeiro’s work - a 
PhD thesis - also promoted the greater depth). Ribeiro suggested that Clegg’s 
framework provided explanatory power for his case study and that it could be fruitfully 
linked with the main branches of institutional theory, and OIE in particular. In addition, 
within the mentioned studies, Ribeiro (2003) was one of the only two case-based studies 
of a single organisation (the other was Davenport and Leitch, 2005) and the only one 
which had an intra-organisational focus. Therefore, Ribeiro (2003) was the research 
whose empirical setting, theoretical background and methodological approach most 
resembled this research. Together, these two works further suggested that the 
framework is indeed suited to research single organisations and intra-organisational 
processes. 
As the researcher reviewed the literature on power to interpret the empirical 
puzzle that emerged in a particular empirical setting (see sections 1.1 and 4.1), it was 
considered that Clegg’s framework contributed to make sense of the case study. 
Importantly, the researcher also perceived that Clegg’s framework was not only broadly 
compatible, but indeed a potential complement, to the institutional theory lenses initially 
deployed in the research. For these reasons, Clegg’s framework of ‘Circuits of Power’ 
became, in a gradual process, adopted as a structuring framework for this thesis. It 
should be noted that Clegg et al. (2006) revisited Clegg’s (1989) original framework, 
but without changing it. Therefore, following the option in chapter 2 (regarding the core 
models in Burns and Scapens, 2000 and 2008), the earlier publication was retained for 
referencing purposes. 
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3.5.2 SOME ASSUMPTIONS OF CLEGG’S FRAMEWORK 
As already noted, Clegg was eclectic in drawing inspiration from several 
theorists on power, ranging from Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, to post-
structuralists like Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe and Callon. However, the final framework 
clearly endorses a post-structuralist perspective, along with the insights of the last four 
authors. 
Clegg started by the premise that all organisational activities are saturated with 
political activity. “Power is the most central concept in the analysis of organization(s) 
and organizing” (Clegg et al., 2006). Sharing Mintzberg’s (1983) emphasis on 
obedience, Clegg drew on Foucauldian insights to consider such organisational 
achievement dependent on mechanisms labelled ‘disciplinary practices’. They are 
surveillance mechanisms of micro-techniques of power, affecting both individuals and 
collective bodies. Surveillance may occur through various mechanisms, and can be 
achieved through “personal, technical, bureaucratic or legal techniques”. Surveillance 
can range from simple direct control, “cultural practices of moral endorsement, 
enablement and suasion”, “more formalized technical knowledge” to the broader 
“disciplinary gaze” promoting self-monitoring and surveillance (Clegg, 1989, p. 191). 
These disciplinary techniques may be drawn by particular organisational actors 
attempting to achieve particular objectives in particular organisations, as particular loci 
of individual and collective decisions and actions. This perspective is in line with 
ANT’s focus on the micro level and on the actor-network itself, as a network constituted 
by connected entities. The diversity of organisational actors (individual and collective) 
promotes diversified agendas (as Mintzberg, 1983 concurred, when he analysed the 
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‘System of Politics’), and outcomes are highly contingent and not deterministically 
predictable.  
The recognition of the contingency of outcomes means that control is never 
actually total, along with the perspective, discussed in previous sections, on power as a 
contingent, non-deterministic capacity. No matter how much power an actor may, at a 
certain moment, manage to mobilise, that actor will never be capable of ensuring total 
control. 
The impossibility of ensuring total control derives from two main factors: 
unpredictability and agency. First, organisational life is naturally unpredictable – 
unpredictable events, by themselves, always have the potential to undermine virtually 
anything, including existing power relations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
instable and pluralist nature of the networked fabric of organisations warrants the 
emergence of resistance and points of fraction within the network. Agency is at stake 
here, and the recognition of the need of disciplinary practices is also recognition of 
potential resistance and diverging agency. Clegg (1989, p. 194) recommended 
conceiving agency in an integrated way, both “as an agent of signification” and “as an 
agent of production”. “Both meaning and body, fused in the person, are capacities for 
resisting the encroachment of organization control”, i.e., “two sources of resistance, 
which require some disciplining if any control is to be achieved” (‘any’ was emphasised 
to contrast with an unattainable ‘total control’). Hence the need to use the various 
disciplinary practices in an integrated way. 
The previous paragraphs depict the inherent instability of organisational fabric, 
relations and powers. As described in previous sections, power is seen as relationally 
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attributed or made available to particular actors, rather than being their own power or 
the power being in them. It is the relations of those actors within the actor-network, and 
the ‘obligatory passage points’ or ‘nodal points’ that those actors created, that actually 
make them (relationally) powerful. Importantly, those ‘obligatory passage points’ also 
take part in the eventual fixing of those actors’ power relations.  
Therefore, stability in power relations may emerge at particular times, periods 
and spaces. Like Laclau and Mouffe, Clegg was interested in understanding what may 
fix power relations – even if only temporarily. Using Ribeiro’s (2003, p. 71) 
visualisation, “[t]he very term ‘circuits’ conveys the idea of conduits through which 
social relations regularly flow. Sometimes, conduits may be tight and close off courses 
of action alternative to those that are fixed through them”. Furthermore, the imagery of 
‘circuits’ is also consistent with the ANT conception of the social as a circulating entity 
in which actors develop efforts, and may temporarily achieve, instances of stabilisation 
(Hyvönen et al., 2008). 
Conceiving that powers may be somehow ‘fixed’ means that the overall 
framework will have to go beyond an episodic view of power – in which power effects, 
by definition, do not extend beyond the particular situation, or episode, where they are 
exercised. This episodic perspective is the most visible part of the overall framework - 
presented in figure 3.3 as proposed by Clegg (1989), with minor visual changes. The 
three circuits of the framework function in an integrated manner, but for practical 
reasons they are explored separately in the next subsections, starting by the ‘episodic 
circuit of power’. 
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Figure 3.3: Circuits of power (Source: Clegg, 1989, p. 214 and Ribeiro, 2003, p. 73, with minor adaptations) 
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The most visible circuit in a social system is the episodic circuit of power. It is 
constituted by the actions carried out by actors in their social relations, through which 
they try to exercise power in their actor-network. Power is exercised by actors in 
particular social encounters or events, i.e., episodically, in order to try to secure the 
achievement of outcomes which favour their interests.  
At a first glance, this description may be related with the Hobbesian sovereign 
view of power, emanating from a single, identifiable entity. Still within the mainstream 
view of power, this description may be also considered compatible with the related 
concept of power as a commodity, a thing, something which can be acquired, possessed 
and exercised. This power is associated with the control of resources, exercised by an 
actor trying to cause a certain effect on the behaviour of others – the traditional views of 
‘power over’ and ‘power as cause’.  
However, the capacity to control resources and deploy them is variable and 
never total, resistance to the exercise of power is inevitable and causality is never 
guaranteed – unlike the universal laws of the natural sciences (Harré and Madden, 
1975). Moreover, this exercise of power based on control of resources occurs in a 
particular time, space and social setting – i.e., within particular standing conditions (see 
subsection 3.2.2). 
This consideration of the extant standing conditions distances this episodic 
circuit of power from Dahl’s single concept of power, which does not recognise other 
influences and views, as if it were “a free-standing circuit” (Clegg, 1989, p. 211). In 
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Clegg’s framework, the outcomes of any episodic exercise of power depend on the 
network of social relations, which have been stabilised through the other two circuits 
through which power flows: the established rules and technical (analysed next). In other 
words, the episodic circuit of power is not isolated or self-contained. On the contrary, 
“[p]ower, viewed episodically, may move through circuits in which rules, relations and 
resources that are constitutive of power are translated, fixed and reproduced / 
transformed” (p. 211). 
Therefore, the next subsections examine those two other circuits determining 
and stabilising the standing conditions in which episodic social interactions and power 
exercises occur: the circuit of social integration, dealing with established rules (analysed 
next); and the circuit of system integration, dealing with techniques (analysed 
afterwards). 
3.5.4 THE CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION – RULES AS ‘OBLIGATORY 
PASSAGE POINTS’ 
The circuit of social integration expresses the prevailing rules of practice within 
a social system. Ribeiro (2003) highlighted the importance of rules to achieve outcomes 
by coordinating the actions and interactions of actors, who may “enact them possibly in 
recurrent fashion” (p. 65). Therefore, ‘prevailing’, in this context, goes beyond the 
existence of such rules, either formal or informal, and includes their interpretation and 
acceptance by organisational actors – i.e., rules create the disposition among actors to 
behave in certain ways. Hence, Clegg identified this circuit with a type of power 
labelled dispositional. Additionally, Clegg also highlighted the practice dimension – 
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i.e., whether those dispositions to act according to a rule are actually followed by its 
actual enactment.  
These rules of practice essentially refer to rules of meaning and membership. 
Rules of membership are analysed first. Rules of membership refer to what actors 
believe to be appropriate behaviours. The desire to adopt appropriate behaviours is 
considered to derive from the actors’ status of members of certain groups – or, more 
fundamentally (Munro, 1999), from the actors’ ambitions to be included as members in 
certain groups, and to be accepted, retained and promoted members of those groups. 
Drawing from the discussion of Foucauldian insights on relational identities, in 
subsection 3.3.3, such membership should be “regarded as the effect of devices of 
categorization; thus identity [including the belonging to, and identification with, a 
group] is seen as contingent, provisional, achieved, not given, (…) as always in process. 
(…) Identities are not absolute but are always relational.” (Clegg, 1989, p. 151). Munro 
(1999) emphasised in particular the provisional and achieved nature of membership, 
rather than reified membership, and how this permanent quest for membership 
influences actors’ behaviours – through the rules of membership perceived and accepted 
by the actors.  
In turn, rules of meaning refer to the ways actors make sense of the world, 
events, the others and themselves. They shape the way actors’ knowledge is 
constructed. It should be noted that rules of meaning and membership are related. As 
Clegg noted, “meanings [may] become (…) fixed on local membership conditions” (p. 
226). Therefore, rules of membership – indicating actors which behaviours are 
‘appropriate’ – may include, and require, the endorsement of certain rules of meaning.  
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The circuit of social integration clearly shares important affinities with 
structuration and institutional theory, in particular Old-Institutional Economics (OIE), 
given their mutual concern on rules, the recognition of how rules may strongly 
influence actors’ actions, and even the two proposed types of rules (Giddens’ 
interpretive and normative rules). Furthermore, both approaches could converge in 
considering that in as much as rules are widely known, similarly interpreted, accepted 
and enacted within a social system, they provide one of the pillars of stability of 
organisational action (in Clegg’s terms, of the episodic circuit), and generate strong 
tendencies to isomorphism and uniformity within the relational field.  
Notwithstanding, there are noteworthy differences between these theoretical 
perspectives. First, institutional theory tends to assume that rules are indeed similarly 
known, interpreted, accepted and enacted within a social system. On the contrary, in 
Clegg’s circuit of social integration, such similarity is not so easily taken for granted, as 
discussed next. Second, both approaches do not converge in the underlying factor which 
may produce similarity within a social system. The similarities that institutional theory 
tends to assume to exist can be traced to institutions (which are also assumed to exist). 
Those similarities are traced to ‘shared values and meanings’ at a high institutional level 
(Scapens and Macintosh, 1996) and their isomorphic wide-ranging effect. On the 
contrary, in Clegg’s view, similarity within the circuit of social integration is dependent 
on the success of strategies aiming to disseminate and fix those rules.  
In Clegg’s view, full awareness, similar interpretation, total acceptance and 
flawless recurrent enactment of those rules (of meaning or membership) is, overall, 
unlikely, for a number of reasons. For example, formal rules may be unknown to actors, 
in total or partially. Importantly, there may be ambiguity in their interpretation, as 
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highlighted by Boland (1996). Clegg (1975) emphasised the indexicality of rules, i.e., 
how rules are dependent on the context in which they are drawn upon by agents. As 
analysed in subsection 2.3.1 , rules are dependent on the context of interpreters, i.e., 
the agents; and rules are dependent on the context of interpretation, i.e., the actual 
situation in which the rule is interpreted and potentially enacted. In addition, actors may 
not accept the rules and may decide not to enact the rules. “Choice is essential to rules”, 
and what is at stake is a “normative rather than a causal imperative” (Clegg 1989, p. 
211). Finally, actors may also not be able to enact the rules which they had accepted and 
wished to enact – because, e.g., there are no adequate conditions to enact them (this 
concerns the circuit of system integration, analysed next). 
In other words, the ‘prevalence’ of the rules underlying the actions within the 
actor-network is likely to be variable. In addition, the rules proposed to actors – formal 
and informal rules ‘external’ to actors (subsection 2.3.1) - are also subject to 
reproduction or transformation; they are not static, immutable across time and space.  
So, in brief, and in line with the discussion on rules in chapter 2, there is no a 
priori expectation or assumption that the various aspects of rules will be similar across 
actors. And when such similarity exists (or, more accurately, to the extent such 
similarity exists), that outcome is not only an achievement, but also a contingent, 
temporary and fragile achievement. And sustaining such achievement is likely to 
require efforts to fix that rule – to stabilise its knowledge, interpretation, acceptance and 
enactment across space (i.e., actors) and time. 
As such, considering a potential influence on rules, there are many positions 
within social networks which relationally attribute significant power to the actors who, 
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at a certain time, occupy those positions and develop strategies to influence prevalent 
rules. Examples of such positions are being a ‘creator’ of rules (a formal legislator, at 
whatever level; or a creator of informal rules); a divulgator or evangeliser; a provider of 
interpretations or re-interpretations of rules (i.e., authoritatively determine what they 
mean, and then fix such interpretation among actors); an actor who reminds or enforces 
those interpretations and their following. All these activities are important to make 
power flow through this circuit, and hence promote social integration – considering the 
content and direction pointed by those particular rules. 
So, actors who influence and achieve social integration through the creation and 
fixing of appropriate dispositions, based on widely known and accepted rules (and 
potentially enacted, later), are creating standing conditions which will favour their 
interests when the episodic exercises of causal power take place, within the episodic 
circuit. 
Clearly, the above does not imply that one single set of rules will be prevalent, 
or that one single actor will be active and successful in building this dispositional 
power. On the contrary, multiple actors may try to influence this dispositional power by 
proposing alternative, potentially conflicting rules, leading to “plurality of the rules 
governing the reproduction of particular sets of social structures” (Whittington, 1992, p. 
704). In this case, “the configuration of the circuit of social integration is not tightly 
built” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 74), making the circuit of social integration subject to 
contestation.  
As mentioned, the circuit of social integration concerns rules fixing relations of 
meaning and membership, ultimately influencing the episodic circuit of power. Clegg 
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suggested that this influence occurs whenever rules become ‘obligatory passage points’ 
(Callon, 1986) or ‘nodal points’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). When successfully 
established within a social system, rules may become pathways, points of reference 
through which actors go when making sense of the world and when deciding their 
course of action. If a rule (or a consistent set of rules) does become solidly established 
in a social system, if it is not challenged by competing, alternative rules, then that rule 
may establish itself as an ‘obligatory passage point’ in the actors’ sense-making, 
decision-making and action processes. On the other hand, if new rules are confronted 
with extant competing rules, then the ‘obligatory nature’ of the extant passage point (the 
extant rule) is challenged, and there will be a struggle within the network about defining 
‘the’ obligatory passage point, or defining how competing obligatory passage points 
may coexist. And, just like the prevalence of certain rules, in a certain time and space 
context, does not imply that such rules will be immutable, “[t]hese compulsory passage 
points may be stabilised in periods of quiescence but they can never be static” (Taylor, 
1995, p. 114). 
Summarising, the successful establishment of certain rules as obligatory passage 
points in actors’ mental (and action) processes corresponds to an achievement of the 
actors who strategically proposed them – though temporal and partial that achievement 
may be.  
This subsection focused on the circuit of social integration, and in particular on 
how it may influence the episodic circuit. In addition, the circuit of social integration 
may also influence the circuit of system integration - the third circuit of power, which is 
analysed next. 
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3.5.5 THE CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION – TECHNIQUES AS 
‘OBLIGATORY PASSAGE POINTS’ 
Clegg labelled the third circuit of power as ‘system integration’, consisting of 
the ‘material conditions’ of techniques of production and discipline. It conveys the 
view of power as facilitative and productive, of power as positive. The concept of 
techniques is a broad one, and can be as varied as production machinery, management 
practices, information systems, organisational structures, business processes and work 
practices. As Lockwood (1964, p. 251), cited in Clegg (1989, p. 224), summarised, 
techniques include “not only the material means of production, but what also Weber 
frequently refers to as the material means of organization and violence” (see also 
Nelson’s, 2007 argument for the close ties between ‘physical’ and ‘social’ 
technologies). This subsection only includes this brief overview of the circuit of system 
integration. The next subsections now analyse this circuit in greater depth and, in 
particular, in an integrated way, in its relations with the other circuits, reflecting the 
integrative nature of the overall framework. 
3.5.6 RELATING FIXITY AND CHANGE WITH THE CIRCUITS OF SOCIAL AND 
SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
A first main emphasis by Clegg was presenting the circuit of system integration 
as the major source of change, of potential instability and transformation in the circuits 
of power. Shifts in the circuit of system integration are typically described as a 
consequence of strategic attempts and actions by actors, in order to achieve particular 
goals. In a wider, supra-organisational context, “[i]n a Schumpeterian sense of creative 
destruction, technology can both build and destroy work regimes and regimes of 
accumulation” (Taylor and Hallsworth, 2000, p. 245). The circuit of system integration 
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thus stands in strike contrast with the circuit of social integration, which stabilises 
standing conditions by fixing rules of meaning and membership.  
However, in Clegg’s framework, being a source of change and innovation is not 
incompatible with creating ‘fixity’ features – on the contrary. Technologies introduced 
through the circuit of systems integration will also be a part of actors’ strategic attempts 
to create ‘obligatory passage points’ – a similar process as described above for the 
circuit of social integration. Strategic actors introducing new techniques suiting their 
interests will strive to consolidate those techniques as the pathways which actors must 
follow in their daily interactions and decisions. So, one of Clegg’s main emphases 
resided on how the circuit of system integration can empower or disempower agencies, 
and how it can create ‘obligatory passage points’.  
A second main emphasis was that the circuit of system integration “has to be 
fixed on obligatory points of passage through these [rules of meaning and membership] 
if it is to have any effectiveness” (Clegg, 1989, p. 224). I.e., the circuit of system 
integration is considered to be contingent of the circuit of social integration. Clegg 
argued that prevailing rules can facilitate or restrict the actual adoption and acceptance 
of new technologies – a capacity depicted in the framework by the downward arrow 
from ‘rules’ to ‘techniques’. Any technical innovation has to be made sense of, 
interpreted and acted upon by actors, so actors’ rules are indeed an unavoidable factor. 
“[S]ocial integration (…) cannot be avoided by any potential innovation, even where it 
has been exogenously produced with respect to any specific system of circuits” (Clegg, 
1989, p. 239). Moreover, ‘indexicality’ (context dependency) of rules interpretation and 
enactment reduces even more any direct causality implicit in a technological 
deterministic view. In fact, technological determinism (as any other deterministic 
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causation) is rejected in this framework32, and “no automaticity attaches to these 
processes” (p. 236).  
Finally, and in spite of the rejection of technological determinism, Clegg briefly 
referred that “the circuit of system integration (…) [can generate] new techniques of 
production and new modes of discipline which, if they are not already present within 
existing rules of practice, have the capacity to transform these” (p. 224). However, this 
capacity of techniques to influence rules, i.e., the capacity of the circuit of system 
integration to influence the circuit of social integration, is relatively neglected. For 
example, the graphic depiction of the framework does not represent the possibility of 
techniques influencing rules (this mismatch between the theoretical conceptualisation 
and the graphic representation of the framework is addressed in one of the contributions 
of section 8.1). 
3.5.7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT CLEGG’S FRAMEWORK – AND 
REFLECTING BACK AGAIN ON OIE 
This section presented Clegg’s framework of circuits of power. Clegg’s 
framework proposes an integrated and fluid conception of power as circulating within 
three circuits. One circuit is episodical and concerns the most visible aspect of power, in 
concrete interactions among actors. The two other circuits are structural: the circuit of 
                                                 
32 Some authors adopting Clegg’s framework characterised the potential of the circuit of systems 
integration to introduce change in the circuits of power in a technologically deterministic way which is 
inconsistent with Clegg’s approach. E.g., Taylor’s (1995) description of the potential consequences of 
new techniques neglects the constraining role of existing rules. Taylor claimed that, as a consequence of 
technological changes, “all the processes of the causal and dispositional circuits of power are challenged 
or subverted. Standing conditions no longer stand. Rule fixing, meaning and membership are changed” 
(Taylor, 1995, p. 116). Also, Taylor’s claim that the circuit of system integration is broader than the other 
circuits (also reflected in his graphic adaptation of the framework) is theoretically unjustified. Especially 
when compared with the circuit of social integration, no comparison of scope is possible: they are simply 
circuits with different natures. Finally, his graphic framework was inconsistent with his own 
technological determinism, since he preserved Clegg’s unidirectional link from rules to techniques. 
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social integration (concerning rules of meaning and membership) and the circuit of 
system integration (concerning material conditions – techniques in a broad sense). Both 
structural circuits may potentially create Obligatory Passage Points, defining the 
standing conditions in which the episodic interactions will occur. Therefore, agents 
wishing to achieve a more structural, less episodic and intermittent power, should 
attempt to introduce and fix rules and techniques promoting the attainment of their 
particular interests. Moreover, agents should attempt to resist the introduction of rules 
and techniques perceived to be detrimental to their interests and, should such rules be 
already prevalent, attempt to change them. 
The analysis of the circuits of power, and in particular of the two structural 
circuits of power, identified links with structuralist and institutional approaches. The 
most direct connections concern the circuit of social integration. There is a common 
concern on rules and there are clear parallels between rules of meaning and membership 
and Giddens’ interpretive and normative rules. However, institutional theory 
assumption on the existence of institutions and their profound and isomorphic effects 
favour the consideration that rules may tend to be ‘similar’ within particular social 
settings and hence promote cohesion, coordination and stability. On the other hand, 
Clegg’s Foucauldian focus on local and diversified arenas of struggles makes the 
occurrence of similarities a priori less plausible. The potential deployment of 
competing strategies of power by different actors, based on attempts to introduce 
alternative sets of rules, and further compounded with the inherent indexicality of rules, 
run counter to the acceptance of institutional uniformity across the social setting. 
Combining Giddens and ANT-inspired works in the accounting field, Moilanen (2008, 
p. 254) noted that “the meanings of accounting signifiers may vary in social 
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interaction”; therefore, a particular accounting concept “can be given different 
meanings” (p. 266) within an organisation.  
The circuit of system integration is depicted as the major source of change in the 
circuits of power, typically as a consequence of actors’ strategic attempts to achieve 
their objectives. Indeed, this view is also shared by theorists unrelated with post-
struturalism. E.g., Pettigrew (cited by Whittington, 1992, p. 700) discussed 
organisational structure (a technique included by Clegg in the circuit of system 
integration) and demonstrated “how aspects of structure (…) are mobilised or activated 
by actors and groups as they seek to obtain outcomes important to them” (Pettigrew, 
1985, p. 37). This depiction of the circuit of system integration as a source of change, 
vs. the circuit of social integration as promoting stability, actually finds a resonance in 
the dichotomy between technology and institutions in much OIE literature (Lawson, 
2003). According to such (criticised) dichotomy, technology “serves as a continuous 
internal impulse to change”, while institutions “merely (…)constrain, (…) render 
everything static: without technology there would be no change.” (Lawson, 2003, p. 
176). However, the dynamism of Clegg’s framework can also accommodate change 
processes originated in the circuit of social integration, although this is not the main 
source of change underlying the framework (this topic is addressed in one of the 
proposed developments to Clegg’s model, in section 8.1). 
Finally, the emphasis that techniques (and their introduction) are contingent on 
extant rules resonates with institutional theory insights. E.g., Burns (2000) and Burns 
and Scapens (2000) insistently emphasised such point. Nelson (2007), after a general 
argument for the need for the co-evolution of ‘social’ technologies and ‘physical’ 
technologies, then particularly emphasised one of the directions of causality: how 
168 
 3.6 Conclusion 
‘social’ technologies can support or constrain ‘physical’ technological change and 
economic benefits.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The researcher’s interest on the topic of power emerged during the course of an 
empirical fieldwork, since power was perceived to underlie key events in the empirical 
setting being studied. Given the initial theoretical lenses of institutional theory, an 
additional literature analysis was conducted and considered that power was a crucial and 
promising topic for institutional theory, although largely neglected for a long time.  
This chapter reviewed the adopted literature on power, situating it within the 
wider evolution of power conceptions.  Greater attention was given to recent 
Foucauldian and post-structuralist approaches, and in particular to Clegg’s framework 
of circuits of power. In addition, this chapter identified some common grounds between 
institutional theory and Clegg’s framework (and other approaches to power, mostly 
inspired by Foucault and ANT). There are close parallels between Giddens’ three 
structures (interpretive and normative rules and resources) and the three aspects 
considered by ANT to cause and fix power (rules of meaning, the rules orienting actions 
and material conditions). In turn, Clegg’s framework highlights how the definition of 
rules can be a part of strategic actors’ attempts to relationally gain power within the 
actor-network, to make those rules become accepted by the other actors and then 
enacted on everyday practices. In Clegg’s framework, rules are both a consequence and 
a source of power. Such perspective is not typically highlighted by institutional theory, 
which tends to emphasise the isomorphic role of institutions upon interpreted, accepted 
and enacted rules. 
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The case study, presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7, draws mostly on Clegg’s 
framework to explore and make sense of the empirical material, through a theoretically-
informed analysis, and also to propose theoretical developments directly based on the 
empirical material. Chapter 8 raises the level of theoretical development, through a 
greater abstraction from the particulars of the case, and proposes several developments 
to Clegg’s framework (section 8.1). In addition, section 8.2 draws on insights from 
ANT and from Clegg’s framework to propose an ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-
based action, whose original macro-structure was based on the OIE model of Burns and 
Scapens (2000). 
However, before proceeding to the discussion of the empirical material, the 
design of this research needs to be explained and justified. That is the goal of chapter 4, 
which now follows. 
 4.0 Introduction and overview 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Research design should be a primary concern from the early stages of the 
research process. This chapter analyses various assumptions, decisions and restrictions 
of the research design process. This reflection conveys how the research process 
unfolded and allows evaluating the adequateness of the various dimensions and stages 
of research design and execution. 
The first section characterises the emergent nature of the followed research 
strategy, as well as the most fundamental components of such strategy. This emergent 
strategy combines a mix of: 1) consistent fundamental assumptions and approaches and 
2) flexible adjustments as the research process evolves (as regards the theoretical and 
empirical foci and more detailed aspects of the research process). The most fundamental 
components of this strategy are made explicit: the basic ontological and epistemological 
assumptions; the initial choices regarding research topics, theoretical lenses, 
methodology and method (including the justification of the case study method); and the 
emergent changes to these initial choices, and how these changes affected the overall 
research design. 
The second section provides more detailed information about the case study. In 
addition to the discussion of the organisational scope, considerable attention is devoted 
to the (shifting) definition of the temporal scope of the research (in terms of both the 
fieldwork and the empirical referent). The various techniques deployed to generate case 
information are then presented, with a particular concern to discuss the concept of data 
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triangulation (and its limitations). Finally, the techniques deployed to analyse the case 
information are discussed. 
4.1 FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CHOICES IN RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research design can be considered as an encompassing research strategy. 
Research design should be a holistic and iterative process, combining fundamental 
aspects (such as the researcher’s core assumptions) with more detailed aspects (related 
with the actual research topic, methods and techniques).  
Research design, as a strategy, may not be conceived in detail at the onset and 
then enacted precisely as initially conceived. The strategy literature provides useful 
insights in this respect. The strategy literature has long identified the dichotomy 
between deliberate and emergent strategies and the continuum between them (Nixon, 
2006). In a broad brush description, deliberate strategies are more suited to well-known 
and stable environments, whereas emergent strategies provide the flexibility required in 
less known or shifting environments.  
The issue of flexibility is not equally applicable to all stages of the research 
design process. Typically, initial stages of research design consist mainly of reflecting 
and making explicit reference to fundamental, broad assumptions of the researcher 
(more than choosing between a range of alternatives strictly related with the research 
process). This is the case of the researcher’s ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. Since this part of research design consists more of making assumptions 
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explicit, rather than making choices, the issue of research design flexibility is not much 
applicable - unless the research process had actually changed the researcher’s 
assumptions. Instead, this part of research design should lay the foundations for later 
stages, which are focused on choices. In those later stages, research design is mostly 
about making theoretically consistent choices to achieve research objectives. Here, the 
extent of research design flexibility, as strategic flexibility, is pertinent. 
In a research context, a deliberate research strategy is suitable when the 
empirical referent and environment, the research topic and the theoretical framework 
can be defined in advance with certainty and in a detailed way. When the certainty and 
detail of the characterisation of one, some or all of these aspects decrease, then the 
adoption of features of an emergent research strategy is increasingly justified, 
recommended and even indispensable. An emergent research strategy provides the 
flexibility to adjust and/or sharpen the research foci and processes as the investigation 
evolves. And the need for flexibility, in multiple research aspects, may derive not only 
from factors essentially related with the empirical setting (Otley and Berry, 1994) but 
also from factors essentially related with the researcher: the researcher’s knowledge 
about the empirical setting; the researcher’s adopted research topic; and the 
researcher’s adopted theoretical framework (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). 
The next subsections reflect these two stages of research design. The next 
subsection makes explicit the researcher’s ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
The researcher’s fundamental assumptions remained stable throughout the research 
process. However, an increased exposure to the literature and the empirical field created 
awareness of new theories, concepts and issues. Some of those theories, concepts and 
issues were considered to be relevant. Therefore, they were adopted and became part of 
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the way the researcher sees the world, knowledge and the processes to develop 
knowledge about such world. The following subsection discusses initial choices 
regarding the research topic, theoretical framework, methodology and method, and the 
flexibility of the endorsed naturalistic approach, and the adopted flexibility in this 
research stage.  
4.1.2 ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY – MAKING ASSUMPTIONS EXPLICIT 
Acknowledging and substantiating the researcher’s assumptions is an 
“intellectual duty of all academic researchers” (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p. 456). Such 
is the objective of this subsection. The inception of this research was shaped by the 
researcher’s initial beliefs and assumptions about the world, the kinds of knowledge 
about that world and individuals’ freedom vis-à-vis external factors. These assumptions 
correspond to the researcher’s assumptions about ontology (the nature of the world, in 
general, and the research phenomena, in particular), epistemology (the kind of 
knowledge about the world) and human nature. A logically highly related aspect 
concerns the broad means to gain such knowledge, within the context of a PhD thesis – 
i.e., the adopted methodology. Rather than broad assumptions about the world or about 
knowledge, methodology refers to the research process and its main characteristics, and 
it is analysed in the next subsection in more detail.  
As many authors have pointed out (e.g., Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and 
Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Vieira, 2009), ontology, 
epistemology and methodology should be related as a cascade: the researcher’s 
ontological assumptions should affect the endorsed epistemological perspectives, which 
in turn should shape the adopted methodological approaches. In turn, the beliefs about 
human nature should also be consistent with the other three dimensions. In a classical 
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and highly influential work, Burrell and Morgan (1979) collapsed these dimensions into 
an aggregating dimension about the nature of social science, which is a continuum 
between objectivism and subjectivism.  
Objectivism adopts a realist view of the world (ontology), considering that the 
social world exists separately from individuals’ perception of it and resembles the 
natural world (see also Archer, 1998a). Accordingly, objectivism is associated with a 
positivistic approach to science (epistemology), based on a search of clear patterns and 
relations and ultimately leading to knowledge accumulation. Objectivism also considers 
that individuals’ actions are determined by external forces (human nature) and proposes 
the adoption of the scientific methodology to the social world, based on systematic 
development and testing of hypotheses. On the other hand, subjectivism views the social 
world mostly as concepts and labels created by individuals to structure reality. The 
epistemological perspective contrasts to the positivistic, rejecting the possibility to 
develop objective, generalisable, cumulative knowledge and emphasising the 
importance of direct experience and interpretation (rather than mere observation) to 
acquire knowledge. Human nature is considered to be voluntaristic, reflecting a belief in 
individuals’ free will. Finally, methodologically, subjectivism privileges ideographic 
inquiry and hermeneutics, to understand and explore concepts and subjective 
experiences in individuals’ minds. 
Ontological assumptions were shaped by the researcher’s background as a 
student, practitioner and academic (and, it should be added, as a human being in 
general). The researcher’s background made him consider that organisations, their 
members, their multiple and interacting influencing factors, and deployed techniques, 
structures, strategies and options, are above all social phenomena, within the realm of 
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the social world. As such, the researcher’s broad interest, at the outset of his PhD 
studies, on management accounting and control (MAC) and information systems was 
framed by the assumption that they are not mere techniques, detached from the concrete 
organisations in which they are, or may be, adopted. ‘Technical’ features such as MAC 
and information systems are social phenomena, a part of the social realm, rather than 
strictly technical features (let alone natural phenomena). Moreover, and importantly, 
those ‘technical’ phenomena emerge, operate and become meaningful through their 
inclusion in socio-technical relations, within heterogeneous socio-technical networks, 
and are therefore dependent of the idiosyncratic contexts of particular empirical settings. 
Social phenomena are different from natural phenomena. Social phenomena are 
less repeatable, less directly observable and uniform and there is greater difficulty in 
isolating the influence of individual factors (Wahyudi, 2004, based on Cohen, 1953). 
Social systems are holistic, they have “a characteristic wholeness or integrity” (Scapens, 
1990, p. 271), in line with the institutional concept of totality (Seo and Creed, 2002) and 
the Actor-Network Theory concept of network (e.g., Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987), as 
described in the previous chapters.  
These characteristics of social phenomena are in line with the broader 
assumption that (social) reality is socially constructed. In line with Ryan et al.’ (2002) 
clarification about a usual sense of “social construction of reality”, this term is here used 
to encompass all “subjectivist approaches, to distinguish them from the assumption of 
an independent reality which is assumed by the more objectivist approaches” (p. 38). 
This consideration brings about the issue of epistemology. 
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Epistemology, the kind of knowledge about the social world, was considered to 
rely on the researcher’s interpretation of the social world and phenomena, rather than 
on direct observation (e.g., Hopper and Powell, 1985). The researcher and his practices, 
experiences and reflections were considered to be an important part of the way 
knowledge and understanding of the world is developed, and the kind of knowledge that 
can be gained. Knowledge was then regarded as having an important personal nature. 
This epistemological perspective is more consistent with the ontological 
assumptions endorsed above and the mainly subjectivist approach to social sciences. 
The ontological assumption about a holistic world must be reflected on a holistic 
epistemology, opposite to the ambition to reduce complexity through reductionism, by a 
focus on, and knowledge about, separate and unrelated individual parts. Resuming 
Scapens’ (1990) above quote that “[t]he holistic approach is based on the belief that 
social systems develop a characteristic wholeness or integrity”, Scapens (1990, p. 271) 
concluded that “it is inappropriate to study their individual parts taken out of context”. 
As such, a holistic epistemology advises against the testing of individual hypotheses in 
a pursuit to uncover “laws capable of generalisation” (p. 253) hypothetically underlying 
an objective reality, totally independent from the researcher. 
Finally, a processual conception of organisations was adopted. This processual 
conception has, indeed, both ontological and epistemological dimensions. It conceives 
organisations as permanently ‘in process’, in a permanent state of becoming (Benson, 
1977; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Seo and Creed, 2002), rather than as a sequence of 
‘states’ at given (and isolated) points in time. In addition, organisational processes are 
continuous and cumulative; therefore, researching any particular interval of time should 
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consider the antecedent and the posterior periods1. This processual conception places a 
particular emphasis on the dimension of time, given the dynamic, rather than static, 
view of organisations, and is particularly interested in long-term processes. 
Processualist Andrew Pettigrew considered that research should be concerned 
about “catching reality in flight, and in studying long-term processes in their contexts, a 
return to embeddedness as a principle of method” (Pettigrew, 1995, p. 92). In other 
words, the ontological and epistemological assumptions should have consequences as 
regards the research methodology. The attention therefore now turns to methodological 
aspects of research, considering the research questions and theoretical framework 
adopted at the investigation outset. 
4.1.3 INITIAL CHOICES OF TOPICS, THEORIES, METHODOLOGY AND 
METHOD – AND THE ROLE OF FLEXIBILITY 
Methodology is frequently discussed in the context of the acknowledgement of 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. However, the discussion of methodology 
becomes particularly insightful when it is articulated with the theoretical questions 
addressed in a particular research and the iterations between methodology and research 
questions. In turn, focusing on such articulation and iterations highlights the issue of the 
flexibility of the research process. 
The ontological and epistemological holistic assumptions required a 
methodological approach based on a close contact with the empirical domain. In turn, 
the researcher’s interest on the broad topics of MAC and information systems was 
oriented towards more specific topics that considered the organisational context in 
                                                 
1 Considering posterior periods is, naturally, only possible when the fieldwork includes, or is posterior to, 
such periods.  
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which these techniques were used. This led to the adoption of a naturalistic 
methodology and the choice of the case study method. This subsection discusses these 
initial choices and analyses the role of flexibility in the research process. 
4.1.3.1 Initial research topic, theoretical framework and methodological choices 
The initial research topic 
The initial research topic was to explore, in a processual way, the long-term 
interactions between an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, the consultants 
that implemented it and management accounting and control, in a particular 
organisation. This initial research topic shaped the initial and fundamental research 
design options and emerged from the confluence of several empirical domains and 
streams of literature - reflecting the assumptions of holistic ontology and epistemology.  
There is significant literature on the individual topics of ERP systems and 
management accounting and control. However, less literature relates both topics, 
although there has been an increasing recognition of the relevance of such intersection 
(e.g., Booth et al., 2000; Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005; Dillard et al., 2005; Granlund 
and Malmi, 2002; Hyvönen, 2003; Ribeiro and Oliveira, 2009; Scapens et al., 1998; 
Wieder et al., 2000), in particular within an organisational change and processual 
perspective (Caglio, 2003; Chapman, 2005; Cullen et al., 2007; Dechow and Mouritsen, 
2005; Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005; Rom and Rohde, 2006; 
Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). 
In addition, the topic of consultancy has only recently been attracting more 
significant attention in academic research (e.g., Pellegrinelli, 2002, mentioning the early 
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work of Lippit and Lippit, 1978; Sturdy et al., 2009; the several chapters in Clark and 
Finchan, 2002 and in Buono, 2004a and the several papers in the special issue 
introduced by Sturdy et al., 2009), in various perspectives (e.g., the functionalist and 
critical perspectives - Hellgren et al., 2004). Research has been emerging on the role of 
consultancy in information technology in general (e.g., Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995; 
Swanson, 2010) and in the specific topic of ERPs (e.g., Benders et al., 2006; Boonstra, 
2006; Ko et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2009), particularly in the professional or popular 
literature (e.g., several contributions in Fahy, 2001). In fact, there is agreement that 
consultants are typically unavoidable, in various degrees and areas, to implement ERPs 
in organisations. When such role is considered in academic research, and particularly 
within accounting academic research, it is mostly merely another variable, a part of the 
context or only briefly mentioned. Some examples are Caglio (2003), Dechow and 
Mouritsen (2005) and Scapens and Jazayeri (2003); research like Soin et al. (2002) and 
Lodh and Gaffikin (2003) devoted greater attention to consultancy, but still without 
making consultancy a major, singled-out concern. Other authors analysed the 
‘consulting genre’ literature on management accounting, but not consultancy per se 
(Lukka and Granlund, 2002).  
Additionally, although the three topics (ERPs, consultancy and MAC) may be 
analysed in the same work, the intersection between the three has not been a major 
focus (e.g., Coad and Herbert, 2009; Hyvönen et al., 2008; Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003). 
Furthermore, the popular and professional literature on ERP systems suggested 
that there was a long time lag between the introduction of an ERP system and the 
production of organisational effects, and some academic research speculated that such 
factor might explain the merely ‘moderate impacts’ of ERPs in management accounting 
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(Granlund and Malmi, 2002; also Rom and Rohde, 2006; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). 
In fact, the short time period considered in some studies has been acknowledged as a 
potentially limitative factor; Rikhardsson and Kræmmergaard’s (2006) consideration of 
this long-term effect is a notable exception. Therefore, considering an extended time 
horizon seemed to be a particular relevant, and under-researched, setting. 
The initial theoretical framework 
The three topics (ERP systems, consultancy and MAC) were loosely tied, based 
on the institutional theory perspective focusing on the organisational level: Old-
Institutional Economics (OIE) (see chapter 2). OIE has already been used, in a 
processual perspective, to make sense of the relations between ERP systems and 
organisational change (e.g., management accounting change) (e.g., Quinn, 2010; 
Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). In an OIE perspective, the intervention of consultants may 
be conceived as an external influence upon a particular organisation. However, it was 
admitted that such characterisation could be considerably deepened (e.g., see Granlund 
and Lukka, 1998 for a relevant New Institutional Sociology perspective).  
Finally, within the organisational change literature, there were claims that 
research had privileged the focus on pre-conditions and outcomes, neglecting the 
analysis of how and why organisational characteristics change over time. Therefore, 
there were calls for research on the processes through which organisations became what 
they are, i.e., adopting a processual perspective (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Van de Ven 
and Huber, 1995). 
The adoption of a processual perspective could allow interpreting and 
explaining the detailed interactions between the multitude of factors and actors which 
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previous research has shown to have a role in the implementation of ERP and MAC. In 
particular, this in-depth, processual perspective is consistent with the OIE approach to 
research organisational change, and it might be particularly useful to explore the 
controversial issue of direction of causality between information systems and 
organisational characteristics (e.g., Markus and Robey, 1988 – updated by Paré et al., 
2008; Granlund and Mouritsen, 2003; Volkoff et al., 2007). As Markus and Robey 
argued, such type of research called for a longitudinal approach (see various 
contributions in Huber and Van de Ven, 1995). 
For the researcher to gain holistic insights and develop interpretations with a 
processual perspective about such multiple, simultaneously interacting factors and 
processes, situating them in their particular organisational and even social contexts, 
required an adequate research approach. I.e., the research approach (the methodology) 
had to be ontologically and epistemologically consistent and it had to exhibit potential 
to address the research question. This is analysed next. 
A naturalistic methodology 
Such an adequate methodology was the naturalistic research approach, also 
frequently called interpretive research2 (Ahrens et al., 2008; Berry et al., 2005; Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979; Kopanaki and Smithson, 2003; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; 
Wahyudi, 2004; Walsham, 1995a and 1995b). The naturalistic methodology 
                                                 
2 Some strands of critical research also share a subjectivist approach. Critical research, in a very 
simplified way, is particularly characterised by an emancipatory agenda intended to highlight and 
overcome situations of domination (including ideological) and correct injustice and inequities by radically 
changing the current status quo (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Chua, 1986; Hopper and Powell, 1985). As 
Baker and Bettner (1997) put it, “[c]ritical research can also be interpretive, but critical research adopts a 
particular point of view regarding the research question, whereas interpretive research purports to take a 
‘neutral’ stance” (p. 293). However, the same authors pointed out that some critical research endorses 
objectivist perspectives. Therefore, critical approaches, as a whole, should not be associated with the 
subjectivist approach, but rather with their change agenda (Berry et al., 2005). 
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(diametrically opposed to “naturalism”, based on “the importing of natural science 
presuppositions into the social sciences”, as clarified by Tomkins and Groves, 1983, p. 
362) attempts to research the empirical referent in its natural setting, i.e., in situ. This 
methodology attempts to encompass both the interpretations, meanings, perceptions, 
intentions and behaviour of the individual participants, as well the organisational, social 
and even physical contexts, in their complex holism3 (see Oliveira et al., 2009; e.g., 
Ahrens and Mollona, 2007). It is also particularly adequate to understand sequences of 
events, in a processual way. As such, a naturalistic methodology requires very rich data 
on the specific phenomena being studied, typically of a qualitative nature (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006). 
Tomkins and Groves (1983) drew on Blumer (1978) to characterise the 
methodology of naturalistic research, emphasising the flexibility of the approach in both 
‘exploratory’ and ‘inspection’ stages (see Yin, 2009 on the many instances were 
research flexibility may exist). According to Tomkins and Groves, in the exploratory 
stage, the researcher establishes a close contact with the empirical domain, 
“‘[d]eveloping and sharpening his enquiry so that his problem, his directions of inquiry, 
data, analytical relations and interpretations arise out of, and remain grounded in, the 
empirical life under study.’ (Blumer, 1978, p. 39) “Exploration” therefore involves 
                                                 
3 Baxter and Chua (2003) considered ‘naturalistic’ research as a particular category of ‘alternative’, non-
positivist research. However, the single common trait of naturalistic research that these authors identified 
was investigating “practice in its ‘everyday’ organisational context” (p. 99). Clearly, this concern is also 
shared by other ‘alternative’, non-positivistic types of research, including institutional, structuration, 
Foucauldian and Latourian research – which then added their own distinctive traits and concerns, like the 
development of general theoretical models. Therefore, it is questionable whether ‘naturalistic’ research 
should be considered as a distinctive type of research, as the other types of research mentioned above. 
Rather, it may be argued that naturalistic research, as a separate category in line with Baxter and Chua’s 
approach, might be defined mainly by the negative: highly fragmented, with an absence of shared 
theoretical topics and lenses and an absence of a concern to develop general theoretical models, and 
whose only commonality is restricted to the concern with studying practice in its natural setting. As a 
consequence, and unlike Baxter and Chua (2003), this text uses the concept of ‘naturalistic’ (and 
‘interpretive’) in its broader methodological perspective, which is shared by several non-positivistic types 
of research (Bhimani, 2002). 
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flexibility and shifting points of observation and lines of inquiry in order to gain a clear 
understanding of how to pose the problem, what data are relevant and how to identify 
significant lines of relationships for closer inspections” (Tomkins and Groves, 1983, p. 
363). Therefore, theoretical flexibility is both potentiated and required in interpretive 
research, given its “lower levels of prior theorisation”, as Batter and Bettner (1997, p. 
296) put it, using Laughlin’s (1995) framework.  
A second, ‘inspection’ stage follows the exploratory stage. The ‘inspection’ 
stage “involves a gradual deepening of the enquiry following themes which emerge 
from flexible, but close, observations of specific decision contexts. As the research 
intensifies one examines an analytical element of the study from different perspectives 
checking out, for example, how different people view events which occurred or are 
occurring and, indeed, gradually deepening one’s understanding of what views each 
person holds” (emphasis in the original) (Tomkins and Groves, 1983, p. 363). 
Consistently with the naturalistic perspective, the initial theoretical topic was 
relatively broad and the desired empirical setting was only abstractly defined, with no 
specific organisations in mind. As described below, the implementation strategy was 
based on obtaining access to a consultancy firm, first, and then to one of its clients, 
which met the requirements derived from the research topic. It was accepted that, as 
specific organisations were selected and the empirical setting became clearer, there 
would be a case for a revision or sharpening of the research topic4.  
                                                 
4 The lack of knowledge about the empirical setting persisted even when, based on the research topic, two 
particular organisations (a consultancy firm and one of its clients) were contacted and agreed to 
participate in the research (this is discussed later in this section). Although they are both well-known 
companies in Portugal, the researcher had no detailed, in-depth knowledge about them. In line with the 
naturalistic approach, it was recognised that, as detailed, case-specific knowledge was obtained, there 
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In addition, flexibility in the definition of the theoretical topic might also be 
needed to deal with pragmatic reasons related with the access to organisations. Access is 
typically not unlimited, is always precarious and should never be taken-for-granted. 
Therefore, even after the start of the fieldwork, there is no guarantee that planned or 
even adopted options (including the theoretical topic) may be kept throughout the 
fieldwork. As discussed below, denial of access prevented the pursuit of a potential 
research topic within the case study organisation. 
4.1.3.2 The naturalistic approach as an emergent research strategy 
The above characterisation of initial research options reveals that an emergent 
research strategy was adopted from the start. Contrastingly, there were only some 
features of a deliberate strategy. In fact, only the adopted, naturalistic methodology was 
considered to be an aspect unlikely to be revised, since alternative methodologies would 
probably be inconsistent with the ontological and epistemological assumptions and with 
the type of adopted research issues.  
This last insight requires an acknowledgement. The flexibility of an emergent 
research strategy is unlikely to be unlimited. I.e., as a naturalistic methodology is 
adopted in practice to address a given research topic and as the fieldwork is carried out, 
the gradually emerging insights and alternative research topics are most likely to be 
restricted to those which can be elicited by, and addressed by, this particular line of 
enquiry. As such, the adjustments within a flexible, emergent research strategy are 
unlikely to imply fundamental shifts in methodology and the kind of research topics. 
                                                                                                                                               
might be a case to adapt or narrow down the research topic – and this indeed happened, as discussed 
below. 
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In summary, conceptualising the research strategy as an emergent strategy was 
always not only accepted, but also viewed as desirable. March (1987, p. 163) long 
argued for the benefits to “recognise action as a way of discovering and developing 
preferences, as well as acting on them”. In line with the Processualist and the 
Evolutionary perspectives on strategy (Nixon, 2006), the actual strategy emerged 
gradually through the researcher’s incremental learning about the research context, in a 
process of “continual nibbling” (Lindblom, 1959, p. 25, cited by Nixon, 2006).  
4.1.3.3 The option for the case study method and a preliminary description of the 
approach to the empirical domain 
The choice for the case study method 
A naturalistic, interpretive and processual research perspective can be 
implemented through several research methods to obtain information. Obtaining 
information should be seen as a process of generating information, rather than merely 
gathering it, given the role of the researcher in the research process. “[D]ata (…) do not 
sit waiting collection (a practical impossibility given the vastness of MNOs)” 
(multinational organisations) (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006, p. 221, emphasis removed), 
as well as the vastness of the time horizons that may be elected, as discussed at the start 
of next section.  
Suitable methods for such naturalistic, interpretive and processual research 
perspective are predominantly (but not necessarily only) those which deal with 
qualitative data (Inglis, 2008; Vieira et al., 2009) (cf. Ahrens and Chapman’s (2006) 
association of the terms ‘qualitative’ with methodology, rather than method). However, 
a given method may be mobilised either quantitatively or qualitatively and, in addition, 
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methods are not mutually exclusive (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Silverman, 2005; Yin, 
2009). Therefore, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) argued that a researcher adopting these 
perspectives should be a ‘bricoleur’, drawing on the methods perceived to be more 
adequate to explore the topic under examination. Indeed, authors like Creswell (2003) 
and Modell (2009 and 2010) strongly recommended the adoption of mixed method 
approaches. 
Analysing the several available research methods is beyond the remit of this 
work (see, e.g., Silverman, 2005; Vieira et al., 2009; Yin, 2009). The case study 
method5 has been particularly popular among interpretive researchers, as a way to gain 
an in-depth, holistic knowledge about a particular empirical domain, in its natural 
(organisational and even social) context (Ribeiro, 2003; Scapens, 1990; Silverman, 
2005; Yin, 2009). Such was the aim of the researcher, and the case study method 
appeared as a suitable method6.  
Case studies have been classified according to their objectives. Usual 
taxonomies consider that case studies can be descriptive, illustrative, experimental, 
exploratory or explanatory (Scapens, 1990; see, e.g., Otley and Berry, 1994 for 
criticisms and alternatives). In this research, the case was designed to be mainly 
                                                 
5 The meaning of ‘case study’ is not consensual and has been described as “fuzzy-edged” (Hammersley 
and Gomm, 2000, p. 7). Case studies are here considered as a particular way (i.e., a method) to generate 
and analyse information (e.g., Otley and Berry, 1994; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009), rather than a 
methodology (e.g., Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
6 In early stages of research design, and even in early fieldwork when approaching the consultancy firms, 
careful consideration was given to alternative methods, such as action-research (Moody and Shanks, 
2003), the constructive approach (Kasanen et al., 1993; Labro and Tuomela 2003) and trailing research 
(Olsen and Lindøe, 2004) (in trailing, research, the evaluator acts as a facilitator in a learning process, 
focusing on generating dialogues among participants). In particular, these approaches were evaluated 
considering the possibility of the researcher joining a team of consultants implementing an ERP system. 
The main objective would be to closely studying accounting in action (more than bringing action to 
accounting, as encouraged by Labro and Tuomela, 2003). However, such possibility raised a number of 
practical difficulties and risks (Labro and Tuomela, 2003; Olsen and Lindøe, 2004). Moreover, it might 
not contribute to the research interest on long-term interactions, since the implementation might only be 
starting and it might take too long (given the time constraints of a PhD) for long-term interactions to 
emerge. As such, these alternative research methods were abandoned in favour of the case study method. 
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explanatory, given the ambition to understand, in a concrete empirical setting and in a 
processual way, the long-term interactions between ERPs, the consultants who 
implemented them and MAC7. In line with the endorsed holistic ontology and 
epistemology, the case study method holistic nature has the potential to “develop a 
nuanced view of reality and contribute to the effectiveness of theory” (Gil, 2007, p. 997, 
based on Flyvbjerg, 2001). It attempted “to expand our understanding of the empirical 
observations by developing theories which explain individual observations in their 
actual context” (Scapens, 1990, p. 271, emphasis removed).  
The research was designed as mainly inductive (rather than deductive) to 
develop a “pattern model of explanation”, providing “empirical explanations of 
particular occurrences” (Scapens, 1990, p. 271-2). Therefore, there would be no aim to 
develop statistical generalisations, which would be inconsistent with the adopted 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
The choice for a single case study 
The initial research question, in particular its processual nature, and the 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions and the need to achieve depth 
of analysis, promoted the option for carrying out a single case study (rather than 
multiple case studies; but see right below the consideration given to this alternative). In 
addition, it would be a holistic single case (Yin, 2009), since there would be only one 
unit of analysis: the case organisation (the organisation where the consultants had 
                                                 
7 Considering the often fuzzy frontiers between different types of case studies, it should be recognised 
that a relevant descriptive component has to underlie an explanatory case study. However, the 
classification of a given study should consider its main objective, which in this study is an explanatory 
objective. 
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implemented the ERP system and where potential interactions with MAC might have 
occurred).  
The (single) unit of analysis (the case organisation) was intentionally broad. A 
narrower focus on a particular area of the organisation (e.g., the management control 
department at the headquarters) was considered inappropriate for two reasons. First, it 
was anticipated that a high importance should be given to two areas: IT and MAC. 
Second, and more importantly, increasing literature depicts management accounting - 
and, particularly, management control - as a dispersed activity, rather than as the 
activities performed by management accountants. Burns and Baldvinsdottir’s (2005) 
and Caglio’s (2003) notion of hybrid accountants and Dechow and Mouritsen’s (2005) 
notion of management control as a collective affair, performed by multiple actors in 
addition to management accountants, both support the option that electing a particular 
functional department as a main unit of analysis would be inappropriate. In addition, 
both the production and the usage of management accounting information were 
encompassed by the research question, again advising against a restrictive definition of 
the unit of analysis. Furthermore, actors in different geographical locations (e.g., 
headquarters and subsidiaries, should they exist) were also considered relevant. Finally, 
it was considered that various hierarchical levels should be considered. Therefore, it was 
decided that the (single) unit of analysis should be broad and encompassing the entire 
organisation8. 
The high emphasis on the role of another organisation (the consultancy firm and 
their consultants) does not turn the study into an embedded, single-case study (Yin, 
                                                 
8 This option does not, obviously, require that every single part of the organisation must be studied, in 
particular if the case organisation is large. It merely intends to avoid setting, a priori, inappropriate and 
restrictive boundaries. 
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2009)9. However, the option of carrying out multiple case studies was considered and it 
was incorporated into the research design, as analysed next. 
Keeping the option of expanding to multiple case studies 
At the start of the empirical research, and notwithstanding the above choice of 
carrying out a single case study, it was decided that the research design should provide 
for the option of carrying out holistic, multiple case studies (Yin, 2009), focusing on 
multiple client organisations (the case study settings) of the same consultancy firm10.  
Multiple case studies have particular potentialities, in particular making cross-
case comparisons, either to replicate the theoretical explanations (when cases exhibit 
similarities) or to “extend the theory to a wider set of circumstances” (when cases are 
very dissimilar) (Scapens, 1990, p. 273). The endorsed holistic perspective tends to be 
suspicious as regards the notion of “similar” firms. On the contrary, it tends to highlight 
and explore the differences between the cases, and hence view the cases as essentially 
dissimilar. 
                                                 
9 The case would not be an embedded case study since the high emphasis on the role of consultancy does 
not make the consultancy firm a unit of analysis of its own, in addition (and in parallel) with the client 
organisation. Therefore, there would be no multiple units of analysis (within a given case) – the 
characteristic of embedded (single) case studies (Yin, 2009). 
10 Some details of the case study are now anticipated, to allow a methodological discussion. Although the 
following chapter separately presents three innovations in three sections, they should not be considered as 
separate, multiple case studies, but rather as related parts of a single case study. Such consideration is 
supported by three reasons: methodological; empirical and theoretical. First, the methodological reason: 
the fieldwork and the development of interpretations and theoretical hypotheses was a single, global 
research process; interviews typically encompassed topics relevant to explore various innovations, and 
interviewees systematically related various innovations. Second, the empirical reason: the innovations 
were, indeed, tightly related. Together, they are components of a wider organisational change process. A 
case study focusing on only one of those innovations, excluding the others, would be incomplete; at least, 
the inclusion of some references to the other innovations would be inevitable. While the option of 
focusing on particular innovations, separately, may be an option in the write-up of individual papers, the 
chosen option of writing a monograph allowed, and recommended, an integrated study of the various 
innovations. Third, the theoretical reason: the theoretical conclusions are also strongly related and the 
theoretical insights regarding the various innovations strongly support and reinforce each other. 
Importantly, the collective effect of various innovations was found to be crucial. Therefore, it was 
considered that a combined analysis of the various innovations provided a more cogent account and 
strengthened the validity of the final contributions – of a single case study. 
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This alternative research design, based on multiple case studies, would therefore 
be in line with the “pattern model of explanation” (Scapens, 1990, p. 271) mentioned 
above and contribute towards a wider research programme based on “theoretical 
generalisability” (p. 270). Indeed, such wider objectives can be aimed through the 
comparison of various case studies, carried out independently; in this situation, there 
would be the particular advantage that the research design and topic (and the researcher 
himself!) would be the same across the various cases11. 
However, multiple case studies were not considered to be either necessary or 
superior to single case studies, given the adopted holistic type of research (Scapens, 
1990). In fact, this alternative might even create tensions and difficulties, given the 
adopted ontological and epistemological assumptions, in particular as regards the 
endorsed ‘naturalistic’ emphasis on the uniqueness of each setting in its holistic 
complexity12. Finally, and importantly, even key methodologists who tend to privilege 
multiple case studies (e.g., Yin, 2009) acknowledge that single case studies are adequate 
to address a particular purpose, which is present in this study: to gain a temporal 
perspective, and understand “how certain conditions change over time” (p. 49). 
Therefore, planning for the option to later expand the number of empirical sites was not 
                                                 
11 This case study design corresponds mostly to a replication logic (e.g., Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009). Such 
logic may be faced with some suspicion by ‘naturalistic’ researchers (considering the highly restricted 
sense of ‘naturalistic’ research adopted by Baxter and Chua, 2003, as discussed above). However, when 
the topics were common across such ‘naturalistic’ studies, some connections between them could be 
identified (Oliveira et al., 2009). As Humphrey and Scapens (1994, p. 96) noted, based on Noblit and 
Hare (1988), “[c]ross-case comparisons, while losing some of the contexts of the individual cases, can 
provide richer interpretations of the research issues through the particular synthesis which the researcher 
develops to encompass the cases under consideration.” 
12 An additional challenge would lie ahead during the execution of multiple case studies: there would be 
the serious possibility that the unit of analysis might end up, perhaps inadvertently and gradually, shift 
from the client organisation to the consultancy firm (which would be common across the multiple case 
studies). In other words, research could shift towards a case study about the consulting organisation which 
implements the ERPs, and away from the client organisations where interactions involving management 
accounting might occur. Such eventual shift would require a new reflection about all aspects of research 
design (Yin, 2009). 
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motivated by a hypothetical consideration that the single case study alternative is, in 
abstract terms, unsatisfactory to address the research question. 
Therefore, carrying out multiple case studies was merely an open possibility - a 
‘real option’ in this research project (Gil, 2007). The exercise of this real option (i.e., to 
initiate a second case study) would depend upon an ulterior evaluation of the 
development of the first case study (i.e., the depth of analysis achieved in the first case 
study and the theoretical contribution emerging from it) and of the available resources 
(in particular, time). 
The consideration of the possibility to carry out multiple case studies had an 
important consequence as regards the way the contacts with the empirical field were 
initiated. Cross-case comparison might be facilitated should the same consultancy firm 
be the same in all the case studies, since it would introduce an element of (relative) 
commonality across cases13. This option made it advisable to approach large consulting 
firms14, with potentially various clients which both suited the desired profile and were 
willing to participate in the research. 
 
                                                 
13 The option of the presence of the same consultancy firm across the various cases would have its 
drawbacks. First, this option would have the cost of losing insights about possible differences among 
different consultancy firms. In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, it would still not guarantee that the 
consultancy ‘variable’ would be common in the various cases, even considering the widely depicted 
tendency of consultancy firms to adopt standard approaches across the clients (e.g., Fincham and Clark, 
2002 and various contributions in the same book). In fact, a holistic research approach rejects the concept 
of a ‘variable’, which might be considered as constant as in a mathematical equation. Instead, a holistic 
approach considers that there would be idiosyncrasy of consulting approaches across the cases, due to a 
wide range of possible (and even unpredictable) factors – among which, the probable diversity of 
individual consultants involved.  
14 The option of targeting only large consultancy firms does not create any particular restriction in 
addition to the one implied by choosing to research client organisations of one single consultancy firm: 
the research would focus on processes and clients of that single consultancy firm, regardless of its size. 
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A preliminary description of the approach to the empirical domain and the selection of 
a consultancy firm and one of its clients 
In line with the above options about the case study method, the researcher 
approached the empirical domain, in late 2004, by first establishing contacts with two 
major consultancy firms with a large experience in implementing ERP systems in 
Portugal (the researcher’s country of origin). One consultancy firm agreed to participate 
and suggested a client which, in a preliminary analysis, appeared to fit the research 
design requirements: having implemented an ERP in the financial area for a significant 
number of years. In fact, this client had started implementing the ERP market leader, 
SAP, in the accounting area in 1999, with SAP Financials (SAP FI). This client had 
production facilities in several countries, but its headquarters were in Portugal. The 
client was contacted and agreed to participate in early 2005 (the next section provides 
more details on the processes of approaching the empirical domain). 
Therefore, the fieldwork started under the primary option of conducting a single 
case study. However, the large client portfolio of the consultancy firm provided positive 
expectations that it could be possible to move to a multiple case study design, later, 
should such change be considered beneficial. 
The longitudinal and retrospective nature of the case study 
‘Processual research’ and ‘longitudinal research’ are often related concepts, but 
they are quite distinct. When ‘processual research’ is discussed in the literature, there is 
a systematic, and typically bidirectional, association, with ‘longitudinal research’. The 
two terms are so often associated, that sometimes they are treated as synonyms. 
However, Van de Ven and Huber (1995) ruled out such potential confusion, by 
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clarifying their focus “on longitudinal field research methods for studying processes of 
organizational change” (p. vii). I.e., on one hand, the processual dimension is a 
perspective of the empirical domain analysed in a certain research: the focus is on 
processes (in this case, processes of change). On the other hand, the longitudinal 
dimension refers to a characteristic of the research methodology: it involves prolonged 
contact with the empirical domain. This is consistent with a dictionary definition of the 
adjective ‘longitudinal’: “involving information about an individual or group gathered 
over a prolonged period” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, emphasis added). 
A processual approach can be achieved by other means than only the 
longitudinal perspective. A retrospective perspective, analysing past events, can also be 
fruitful. The longitudinal and the retrospective perspectives are discussed next, with the 
particular concern of highlighting the importance of a retrospective perspective - in 
virtually all cases and in this one in particular. 
First, a retrospective perspective is necessary when the phenomenon being 
studied occurred before the fieldwork started or when the researcher was temporarily 
away from the field (e.g., Glick et al., 1990). Another case is when the researcher was in 
other areas of the field other than the relevant one(s) as regards the phenomenon at 
stake. However, the important role of a retrospective component, even in longitudinal 
studies, is more complex and deserves a more detailed analysis. 
Conducting a case study in a strictly longitudinal perspective, exclusively based 
on real time ‘observation’ and interpretation, in which retrospective interpretation is 
non-existent, is virtually impossible – and even undesirable. The absence of a 
retrospective component could only be conceived in a hypothetical situation where the 
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researcher had been involved ‘from the start’ – a hypotheses which poses the additional, 
and virtually insolvable, difficulty of determining ‘the start’, in particular in a 
processual perspective. Even if the phenomenon under study is, e.g., a particular project, 
with reasonably defined temporal boundaries, it is most unlikely – and even undesirable 
– that a deep understanding of all aspects of that project can be made only based on 
information collected ‘as it was happening’. This would correspond to ignoring valuable 
historical and contextual information, but which referred to events which did not meet 
the ‘requirement’ of simultaneity with the researcher’s presence. E.g., it would imply 
ignoring information about previous projects, somehow related to the project under 
analysis, even including previously failed and aborted projects. More generally, it 
would require neglecting the background of this project, the history of the individual 
and collective actors involved – including the organisation at stake, and even other 
related organisations or institutional fields, as implied by the holistic ontological 
assumptions. 
Only in very particular, and probably exceptional, circumstances may a 
retrospective analysis be argued not to exist. Eventually, such a possibility may be 
considered in some cases of Insider Action Research or self-ethnography15. However, 
the researcher would need to have been involved with the studied organisation as an 
employee, manager or other relevant position for a sufficiently long time, in order to 
have acquired first-hand, direct knowledge about the relevant historical and 
                                                 
15 Insider Action Research exists when an organisational member, “already immersed in the organization 
and having a pre-understanding from being an actor in the processes being studied”, also carries out 
research (Coghlan, 2001, p. 49; see also Brannick and Coghlan, 2007). Self-ethnography is “an approach 
to study (…) settings which the researcher is highly familiar with, and has direct access to” (Alvesson, 
2003, p. 167), by being “an active participant, more or less on equal terms with other participants. The 
researcher then works and/or lives in the setting and then uses the experiences, knowledge and access to 
empirical material for research purposes. This research is, however, not a major preoccupation, apart from 
at a particular time when the empirical material is targeted for close scrutiny and writing. The person is 
thus not an ethnographer in the sense of a professional stranger” Alvesson (2003) therefore recommends 
the label of “observing participant” (rather than “participant observation”), since “[p]articipation comes 
first and is only occasionally complemented with observation” (p. 174). 
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organisational context (naturally, the definition of such ‘sufficient’ period cannot be 
defined in abstract and general terms). Another eventual possibility might occur when 
researchers have kept contact with the organisation for many years. But even in those 
rare and difficult to achieve situations, the researchers would unlikely have a permanent 
contact with the organisation. Rather, the most likely situation would be to keep a 
regular, yet sporadic contact, which would allow the researchers to ‘catch up’ with the 
developments within the organisation since the last interaction. This would clearly have 
a retrospective component, as well, as regards the periods during which the researchers 
were absent (e.g., Rowe et al., 2008). 
As a conclusion, virtually all longitudinal case study research has, de facto, a 
retrospective component. Case study research needs to rely on a characterisation, or at 
least an awareness, of the past of the organisation and its context before the start of the 
fieldwork (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). Such retrospective perspective should be 
acknowledged when presenting the research. However, such acknowledgment is the 
exception, rather than the rule (some exceptions are Boonstra, 2006; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988, who clearly titled their field study as “historically informed”; Luotonen, 
2009; and Kober et al., 2007).  
It may be speculated that two reasons for an infrequent acknowledgment of a 
retrospective component in case studies are the difficulties and limitations attributed to 
studying past events, and the corresponding appeal and advantages of studying events in 
‘real time’ (these are analysed below).  
However, the usual value and objective of researching organisational 
phenomena as they are occurring, even in processual studies, has been interestingly 
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questioned by Quattrone and Hopper (2006) and Busco et al. (2007). They noted that 
case studies utilising Structuration Theory (e.g., OIE, as analysed in chapter 2) “are 
often longitudinal to demonstrate how IT evolves over time (e.g., Burns & Scapens, 
2000)”, i.e., assuming “a linearity of time and evolution” (Quattrone and Hopper, p. 
218, 222, emphasis in the original). However, IT (or another organisational 
phenomenon) “is not necessarily a single, stable entity at a point of time. (…) [It] may 
not smoothly evolve over time (or space) but can acquire different forms simultaneously 
in different parts” of an organisation (p. 218). Referring to their own study, Quattrone 
and Hopper noted that “[t]he passage of time was important for the researchers to gain 
an understanding” of the complexities of the empirical field. “To understand what 
counts, what matters (…) is messy and time consuming. Here, but only here, time 
matters” (p. 222). 
In fact, time is not linear, neither as regards organisational changes (i.e., in an 
ontological perspective) nor as regards studying them (i.e., in an epistemological 
perspective). Certain periods may be characterised by dramatic changes, and a short 
fieldwork might (in this perspective) provide highly relevant empirical information; the 
contrary may also occur, and a prolonged fieldwork would not capture insights on 
significant changes. In addition, for several reasons related with the research process 
itself (e.g., frequency of opportunities to generate data and relevance of such data), 
some fieldwork periods may provide important empirical insights, while others may be 
less fruitful. For all these reasons, as Quattrone and Hopper argued, the outcome of the 
time spent in fieldwork is not linear. 
In spite of these caveats, a relatively lengthy fieldwork is typically 
recommendable. In addition to the most commonly indicated reason that studying 
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lengthy change processes require a lengthy presence in the field doing ‘real time’ 
research, three other main reasons recommend it. First, even a ‘real time’ fieldwork on 
change processes when there seems to be no change occurring may still provide highly 
relevant information as regards the other face of change: stability, a traditionally less 
focused phenomenon but which has recently attracted much attention (see sections 2.1 
and 2.4). It can even be argued that detecting and researching stability may require a 
lengthier fieldwork, when compared to change: in fact, if change is significant and 
quick, a short period may suffice to research it, even if only superficially; however, a 
claim of stability is likely to raise serious reserves if it only refers to a reduced empiric 
time frame. Second, the researcher may not a priori know when the change processes 
will occur, in which areas and with what strength and visibility; should longitudinal, 
‘real time’ enquiry be desired, the researcher’s presence in the empirical field may 
therefore be necessary to attempt to detect and capture the moment and places in which 
change processes emerge16. Third, and regardless of the conceptions of time, there is 
total consensus in acknowledging, along with Quattrone and Hopper (2006), that case 
studies are indeed time-consuming to gain an in-depth, holistic understanding of the 
empirical domain (Scapens, 1990; Silverman, 2005; Yin, 2009). Therefore, even if only 
due to epistemological reasons (the researcher’s cognition limitations), there is a case 
for recommending a relatively lengthy fieldwork. 
Finally, the retrospective component was, very simply, indispensable for this 
particular research. The research topic clearly emphasised long term interactions; 
whereas this long term focus did not define, in itself, a particular period, it would be 
likely that a ‘complete’ change process, including long term interactions, would extend 
                                                 
16 Naturally, the presence of the researcher does not guarantee success. The uncertainty about the time 
and place of occurrence of key events is actually an important justification for the existence of a 
retrospective component, as argued above (Glick et al., 1990). 
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beyond the period typically available to carry out a fieldwork within the context of a 
PhD. Indeed, this perception caused that one of the criteria to select an ‘appropriate’ 
case organisation was already having implemented the ERP system, to allow for ‘long 
term’ interactions to have already started to unfold. The researcher would therefore 
catch up with these interactions as they continued to unfold. Consequently, combining 
‘real time’ observation and interpretation with retrospective analysis was considered a 
very appropriate approach to address the processual, long-term concerns. 
Summary of the major characteristics of the case study 
This research had an explanatory objective, adopting a processual perspective. 
The need to have an in-depth knowledge about the actual holistic empirical setting 
promoted designing the research, primarily, as a holistic single case study; however, 
research design incorporated the concern to facilitate an eventual later expansion to 
holistic, multiple case studies. The research was also designed to be both longitudinal 
(real time) and also have a clear retrospective component (the latter intended to 
contextualise on-going change processes and also to research events prior to the start of 
the field study), in particular considering the objective to research long-term 
interactions. 
4.1.3.4 The naturalistic approach and flexibility during fieldwork: new emergent 
research topic, theoretical framework and research approach 
The fieldwork started off after the definition of a research topic and a theoretical 
background, as typically recommended by case study methodologists (e.g., Yin, 2009). 
However, Cadili and Whitley’s (2005) description of their limited knowledge about the 
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details of their particular empirical setting is largely applicable to this research project17. 
They were aware that a more detailed knowledge might call for a reflection about 
adjusting research design options, including the research topic and the theoretical 
framework; so was the researcher of this thesis.  
The acceptance of a possible revision of the research topic, typical during the 
‘exploration’ stage of naturalistic research (see above), was in line with the dilemmas 
faced by naturalistic18 researcher Thomas Ahrens: “What I find most difficult when 
drafting a new interpretive accounting paper is having to choose, from all the interesting 
things I found out about accounting practice, those which are really interesting for the 
readership, the ones that allow me to shed light on presumed knowledge or existing 
puzzles” (Ahrens et al., 2008, p. 853-4). 
In turn, the acceptance of a possible revision of the theoretical framework 
derived from two factors. First, from the possibility of revising the research topic: it is 
plausible that the adoption of a new research topic may call for the adoption of a new 
theoretical framework. Second, from the aim of achieving a better explanation of the 
empirical setting, as Humphrey and Scapens (1996) put it: “[a]ny apparent coherence 
achieved by using a predetermined theory as a lens through which to interpret a case 
could well be gained at the expense of ignoring organisational dynamics and tensions 
which do not readily fit the chosen theory. The researcher may need to refocus, regrind 
                                                 
17 Cadili and Whitley (2005, p. 175) thus reflected: “A priori knowledge of the case was limited at the 
outset to a general idea that the accounting department being studied had recently initiated a project to 
introduce a hosted SAP system. Although this general information enabled the preparation of some initial 
open-ended questions, the boundaries of the phenomenon remained relatively unclear. That is, the 
researcher entered the field with a broad area of study but with no specific research question and so hoped 
to narrow the focus after conducting the initial interviews and observations. Such uncertainty is not 
uncommon before data collection has commenced (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 38) and case analysis is a 
valuable means to develop and refine concepts for further study (Cavaye, 1996, p. 229).” 
18 Following Baxter and Chua’s (2003) classification of Ahrens (1997). A wider conceptualisation of 
naturalistic research (when compared with Baxter and Chua’s restrictive conceptualisation, as suggested 
above in this chapter) would reinforce the classification of Thomas Ahrens as a naturalistic researcher 
(see, e.g., Ahrens et al., 2007). 
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or reshape the chosen lens and even combine it with other lenses in order to secure a 
coherent theoretical framework for the specific case study” (p. 91). 
Finally, it was plausible that changes in the research topic and/or theoretical 
framework might call for a revision of the broader research approach and, more 
generally, the overall research design. As Yin (2009) cautioned, “if the relevant research 
questions really do change, you should simply start over again, with a new research 
design” (p. 52).  
During the course of the fieldwork and the on-going interpretation of the 
empirical insights, alternative research topics emerged (Ahrens et al., 2008). The next 
subsection examines the alternative research topic which became the main focus of this 
research, and the related changes in theoretical framework(s) and research design 
options. In chapter 9, additional potential research topics which were not developed in 
this thesis are discussed as future research avenues. 
4.1.4 EMERGENT RESEARCH TOPIC AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK(S) - 
AND A REVISION OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1.4.1 The exploratory stage of fieldwork, in practice: an account of a research 
process 
As the researcher gained a deeper knowledge of the empirical setting, alternative 
research issues emerged which appeared to be both empirically and theoretically 
relevant. In line with Tomkins and Groves’ (1983) recommendations about the 
‘exploration’ stage of naturalistic research, these alternatives were evaluated, 
considering their possible contribution and their feasibility (in particular, considering 
access possibilities and resources availability).  
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Persistence in the exploratory stage of the fieldwork and the evaluation of alternatives 
The first research endeavours focused around the three key pillars of research 
question: the ERP, consultants and MAC. The initial interviews and internal project 
documentation confirmed that the implementation of the financial accounting module 
(SAP FI) also required implementing some costing components. Although the main 
implemented module (about financial accounting) was not directly related with MAC, 
this did not compromise the adequacy of the empirical site, for several reasons. First, as 
stated, the implemented ERP also did include some costing components. Second, the 
implemented modules related to several aspects of accounting and control (even though 
neither mainly nor strictly about management accounting). Third, additional SAP 
modules had been since then implemented, with unknown (but potential – Dechow and 
Mouritsen, 2005) consequences for MAC. Fourth, very early informal conversations 
revealed that a product costing project was about to start. And fifth, it was recognised 
that the researcher’s knowledge about the case organisation was still superficial and 
further fieldwork could provide additional research insights. 
The first insights obtained about SAP modules implemented in 1999 
characterised the project mostly as technical, addressing a technical problem. In line 
with the initial research question, particular attention was devoted to exploring changes 
in MAC. However, initial interviews suggested little changes of a fundamental nature 
induced by SAP FI. Increased information quality, consistency and timeliness were 
recurrently mentioned, but hardly any insights about fundamental changes were 
obtained. The lack of early insights about fundamental changes did not, again, stop the 
fieldwork, on two grounds. First, because the reasons stated in the previous paragraph 
were still valid. And second, because the lack of change is an equally interesting 
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research topic (e.g., Burns and Scapens, 2000; Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005; Granlund 
and Lukka, 1998; Ribeiro, 2003) and is particularly well explored by institutional theory 
(Droege and Johnson, 2007; Granlund, 2001; Seo and Creed, 2002). 
During the first interviews, the researcher became aware of the creation, between 
1998 and 2002, of a Corporate Centre and a Shared Services Centre (SSC) in Portugal. 
But these two organisational structures also appeared, initially, to have created limited 
impacts in terms of new techniques or approaches in MAC.  
A very early interview with a CC member identified the creation of the SSC as a 
response to persistent limitations perceived by actors that could be classified as ‘central’ 
actors, i.e., associated with the organisational ‘centre’ (the categorisation of actors is 
discussed in page 262). This interviewee also provided insights about strong resistance 
from ‘local’ actors, and the topic of power was then, spontaneously, first raised by an 
interviewee (“[The SSC] was clearly perceived as a loss of power”). Ensuing 
interviews provided further insights about tensions between central and local actors and 
difficulties perceived by a number of central actors. However, the researcher did not 
consider, at that stage, that the distribution of power was a key issue and was 
fundamentally affected by several innovations introduced. In fact, at this stage, 
organisational innovations such as the creation of a corporate centre and a SSC in 
Portugal were considered as important, but merely part of the context (Yin, 2009). 
There was a particular attempt to identify ways in which the ERP system and 
consultants might have contributed to changes in MAC. In October 2005, the researcher 
requested permission to accompany the teams (which included a strong presence of 
consultants) implementing a new SAP module which replaced previous product costing 
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systems19. However, the organisation denied authorisation. Although interesting 
research insights about the background and central actors’ expectations about this 
project had already been obtained, it was considered that lack of possibility to obtain 
information about actual changes precluded this project to become the research focus. 
Therefore, this research alternative was abandoned, and insights about it became a part 
of the context. 
Therefore, during two years, the researcher kept the original research question, 
exploring the interactions between the ERP system, the consultants that implemented it 
and MAC, with a focus on the overall process of change since SAP FI adoption – not 
restricted to cost accounting but encompassing a broader interest about management 
accounting and control. 
Realising the importance of power: the trigger and ‘connecting the dots’ 
Only in March 2007, in an interview with a senior manager, did the researcher 
realise the full importance of the limitations perceived by key central actors in late 
1990’s and the early years of the new millennium, and how they had driven the 
organisational innovations.  
Until this interview (the 32nd), the researcher had considered, in line with the 
perspective of an early interviewee, that the creation of a Corporate Centre in Portugal 
was a consequence of increased information needs, due to the larger organisation size 
and complexity after the large international acquisition in 1998, promoting the adoption 
                                                 
19 The long-term perspective would still be retained, even in this research alternative, for two reasons. 
First, the fieldwork would be extended for some time after the implementation was concluded, at least as 
regards some countries. Second, the long-term perspective was ensured as regards the overall process 
since the adoption of SAP FI. 
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of more sophisticated accounting systems20. However, this senior manager rejected such 
a ‘rational’ explanation and highlighted the influence of the chairman and majority 
shareholder: 
Researcher: “When the transfer of the Corporate Centre to Portugal was 
considered, was it in a different concept from what existed in Spain? 
Respondent: No. I wouldn’t say it was different. We had some notion that 
we had to harmonise things, harmonise all the administrative and 
financial area, the management control area. We had started 
implementing Hyperion, the consolidation software (…); we were starting 
to centralise treasury. So, we already had the model and we were heading 
towards it. (…) The location in Portugal has to do with the origins and 
some proximity with the decision centres, exclusively. (…) [It made explicit 
that] this is a Portuguese company (…) and the decision centre is in 
[Portuguese city]. So that no doubts exist. (…) 
[The Corporate Centre relocation is above all justified] from the 
shareholder point of view. ‘I am a Portuguese company, I don’t want to be 
a Spanish company, and therefore I don’t want my decision centre in 
Spain, I want my decision centre in Portugal.’ (…) The rest, the concept 
[underlying the Corporate Centre] was exactly the same.”  
The initial reaction of the researcher was one of disappointment, leading to the 
following annotation in the interview transcript: “makes my story less interesting and 
substantial! No technical / organisational ‘novelties’ were being introduced, just a 
location + power issue.” 
However, this interview triggered a deeper reflection and re-examination of 
previous interview transcripts and analyses, far beyond the specific topic of the 
                                                 
20 This interviewee’s highlight of dependencies between the CC and SAP FI are valid and are indeed 
considered in the ensuing chapters. “The start of SAP (…) coincides with a phase of the group in which a 
corporate centre is created. The organisation itself (…), in its process of acquisitions and organic growth, 
reaches a stage in which it needs a corporate centre, with finance, management control, etc.. And that 
corporate centre needs tools and finds things [solutions] scattered all over the place. It has no tools, so it is 
urgent to have tools.”. However, this excerpt depicted a unitary view of the organisation, it explained the 
introduction of an innovation as a rational response to new organisation circumstances (its larger size) 
and, implicitly, suggested that the Corporate Centre concept was a novel concept in the organisation. 
These three factors threw the researcher’s attention away from potential underlying power and control 
motivations of particular organisational actors. 
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Corporate Centre. This reflection allowed to “reconnect the dots (…) looking 
backwards” (Jobs, 2005) at past research steps, interviews and analyses, shedding light 
on a particular perspective of the empirical material. This reflection suggested that 
various innovations (in particular, SAP FI, the Corporate Centre in the new location and 
the SSC) could be understood (at least, partially) as materialisations of strategies of 
power, as particular as regards actors broadly associated with the ‘organisational 
centre’. As regards some aspects, power emerged as having a fundamental relevance; as 
regards others, it was apparent only at a more fine-grained level.  
This interview brought numerous previous insights about power from the 
context to the core of the analysis. This interview had the effect, not as much to detect 
issues in previous interviews which had not been noticed at all, but rather to bring those 
previous insights to the forefront of the analysis. In addition, this interview and the 
ensuing adoption of a new research topic naturally influenced subsequent fieldwork, 
since ensuing interviews paid greater, specific attention to explore the issue of power21. 
Having the opportunity to develop significant additional fieldwork focused on the 
emergent research topic (and theoretical framework, as discussed next) was indeed 
crucial and avoided the limitation of a late adoption of a new theoretical framework 
(Coad and Herbert, 2009). In fact, 22 interviews were made after positioning the topic 
of power at the centre of the research. This significant number of further interviews 
provided additional focused insights, which added to the many insights on this topic 
obtained through the first 31 interviews - which were then reviewed with a particular 
                                                 
21 This shift in the research process highlights the epistemological assumption of naturalistic research that 
the investigator has an active role in the research process. Knowledge is socially constructed, not only due 
to the investigator’s emerging interpretation of the empirical domain, but also because knowledge is 
influenced by the particular foci that the investigator pursues or abandons, brings to the forefront or 
downplays to the background, at each moment of the research process. 
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concern on the topic of power (key interviewing figures are presented in the next 
section). 
4.1.4.2 An emergent research topic and theoretical framework: bringing in the 
issue of power 
Incorporating a new, broad concern on issues of power required the 
identification of a new, specific research topic and a new theoretical framework. These 
two changes were actually intertwined, with the search for theoretical frameworks being 
instrumental in defining precise research questions. This is analysed next. 
The new theoretical framework: Clegg (1989) and Ribeiro (2003) 
From an empirical perspective, the empirical insights suggested that the issue of 
power was important. But theoretical pertinence had also to be demonstrated - and that 
required a new stage of literature review, focused on power. This literature review 
included a search for a theoretical framework which could be mobilised to assist with 
the interpretation of this particular empirical domain and allowed addressing the 
emergent empirical puzzles. 
In addition, it was considered that the generated insights related with the initial 
institutional framework and the initial research concerns remained pertinent. 
Furthermore, fundamental notions underlying institutional theory can be stated in 
explicit power terms. For example, from an OIE perspective, it can be argued that 
prevailing institutions have the power to shape the behaviour and rules enacted by the 
institutional participants, and therefore have the power to stabilise the institutional 
context and prevent the introduction of incompatible innovations. Therefore, this new 
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stage of literature review also analysed the extent to which frameworks of power could 
be related with fundamental aspects of the original framework and research concerns. 
Ribeiro (2003) was a particularly influential work, as acknowledged in Chapter 
3. Like the author of this thesis, Ribeiro (2003) also took institutional theory (and, in 
particular, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) OIE model) as a starting point. Then, during the 
fieldwork, he reached out to literature about power (in particular, Clegg, 1989) to make 
sense of puzzling empirical insights. His work resulted in bridges between OIE and 
Clegg’s (1989) model, although Clegg’s model remained fundamentally unchanged. In 
addition, Ribeiro located key concerns of OIE (such as accepted and enacted rules) 
within Clegg’s (wider) framework of “Circuits of Power”. 
Therefore, Clegg’s (1989) framework and its linkages with institutional theory 
as proposed by Ribeiro (2003) were adopted as key interpretive lenses to orient and 
make sense of the empirical insights. In turn, these frameworks were also fundamental 
in defining the new research (general) topic and specific research questions. 
The new research topic: rules and techniques as crucial factors for power within 
organisations 
Rules and techniques (of discipline and production) emerged as theoretically and 
empirically relevant topics. From a theoretical perspective, rules are a major 
intersection between the OIE framework (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and the power 
framework (Clegg, 1989). As argued in chapter 2, rules have a central role in the 
adopted OIE model, but have been somewhat neglected when compared to institutions 
and routines. In addition, such neglect may be also related with a limited scope 
attributed to concept of rules: only formal rules. An alternative, broader concept of 
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rules, emphasising their role as cognitive structures orienting actors’ behaviours and 
interpretations, was argued to be preferable. 
From an empirical perspective, rules were also found to be relevant in this case 
study. In fact, the limitations perceived by the central actors in the late 1990’s and the 
innovations they introduced in the following years were strongly related with rules 
accepted and enacted throughout the organisation, and the repercussion of these rules on 
the attainment of (or failure to attain) central actors’ interests. This led to the 
identification of the following three empirics-related research objectives, which 
highlighted the high (though not exclusive) importance of rules. 
In turn, it was also apparent that extant techniques, such as information systems 
and organisational structures, were also a central piece of the puzzle of power. In 
addition, OIE views techniques more as external influences, rather than as active 
players. The new theoretical framework, by providing a stronger focus on techniques (of 
discipline and production) seemed to have potential to bring novel insights into OIE. 
The first research question set the background to contextualise the ensuing 
organisational changes, by analysing the limitations perceived by central actors by the 
end of the 1990’s – i.e., before the various innovations were introduced. Therefore, it 
provided a theoretically structured interpretation of the empirical setting, highlighting 
the aspects (‘circuits’, in Clegg’s framework) limiting central actors’ power. Therefore, 
the first research objective (addressed in chapter 5) is to… 
1) Explain why some formally powerful, central actors at the case study 
organisation were confronted with power limitations. 
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Building on the characterisation of the empirical setting by the end of the 
1990’s, and in particular of the power limitations of central actors, the second research 
question aims understanding why three innovations were introduced in the subsequent 
years. As mentioned, these innovations were the adoption of the SAP Financials 
module, the relocation of the Corporate Centre and the creation of a Shared Services 
Centre and they are conceptualised as technological and organisational innovations 
introduced in the circuit of system integration of the case study organisation (Clegg, 
1989). Therefore, the second research objective (addressed in chapter 6) is to… 
2) Explain why and how some central actors introduced and mobilised 
technological and organisational innovations.  
 
 
As argued, a major goal of central actors was to bring about the acceptance and 
enactment of rules aligned with their objectives. This repercussion on the circuit of 
social integration would constitute a major contribution to overcome the perceived 
limitations. Chapter 6 is both explanatory (‘Why’?) and processual (‘How’?), since it 
analyses central actors’ ex-ante motivations and expectations (rather than actual, ex-post 
repercussions of the innovations), as well as the processes related with the introduction 
of those innovations.  
The third research question analyses the actual repercussions of the three 
innovations, and how they contributed to achieve the objectives of central actors. The 
repercussions were multiple and across the various circuits of power, but with a stronger 
focus on the two structural circuits of power and, in particular, on the circuit of social 
integration. Therefore, the second research objective (addressed in chapter 7) is to… 
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3) Explain how technological and organisational innovations influenced 
the acceptance and enactment of rules and increased the power of 
central actors. 
 
 
Although the change processes are conceptualised as never ending, the long-
term, retrospective nature of this study allows considering that this chapter is mainly an 
ex-post, processual analysis, starting from the key period in which those innovations 
were introduced and spanning across the years, until the time of the fieldwork. 
It should be noted that these research questions still exhibited strong links with 
the original research purposes. The adoption of an ERP system (in particular, SAP 
financial modules) remained a key research topic, which was complemented by an 
additional and complementary focus on the creation of accounting and finance 
organisational structures. In addition, although the changes spanned beyond MAC, this 
area remained prominent in the analysis. Finally, these changes occurred in processes 
which spanned across many years, hence linking to the long-term concern of the 
original research question. The trilogy of the new research questions did not analyse 
consultancy as a major focus. Nevertheless, the empirical insights made clear that their 
role in the overall process was crucial in many and diversified ways (see, in particular, 
section 6.1). 
Two additional research questions were more directed towards theory 
development, in the two areas of the literature from which this work drew upon 
(literature on power and institutional literature), and in particular to the two main 
deployed frameworks (Clegg, 1989 and Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
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Clegg’s framework was proposed over two decades ago and, although numerous 
authors have already used it in empirical research, no substantial developments have 
been proposed yet. To the researcher’s knowledge, only minor adaptations have 
(sparsely) been proposed, without constituting actual theoretical developments (see 
section 3.5). Clegg’s (1989) framework was intensively and extensively deployed 
during the interpretation of the case study, and this contributed to highlight that some 
concepts and relationships of the framework could be clarified or completed. Therefore, 
a first broader research objective became to… 
1) Contribute to the power literature by developing Clegg’s (1989) 
framework 
 
 
In addition, based on the analysis of institutional theory, and OIE in particular, 
carried out in chapter 2, it was apparent that improvements in the original OIE 
framework (Burns and Scapens, 2000) might be possible. Over the last decade, several 
authors have presented proposals to develop, refine or complement the model (e.g., 
Coad and Herbert, 2009; Granlund, 2001; Lukka, 2007; Quinn, 2010; Ribeiro, 2003, 
Robalo, 2007). However, the limited attention devoted to rules within the original 
framework remained. In addition, the insights generated during the case study 
highlighted ways to enrich this particular area of Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework. 
Therefore, a second broader research question became to… 
2) Contribute to the Old-Institutional Economics literature by developing 
Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework 
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It should be noted that the development proposed to Burns and Scapens’ 
framework is actually very different from the original model (this discussion is 
developed in section 8.2). One of the reasons for such difference is that this proposal 
incorporates insights from Clegg’s (1989) framework and, inherently, from its 
theoretical underpinnings. Among such different theoretical backgrounds of Clegg’s 
framework, the Foucauldian approach and Actor-Network Theory are prominent. This 
combination of theories is further analysed when theoretical triangulation is discussed 
below in this section. Before that, a closer look is given to the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the theoretical strands at stake (interpretive and 
institutional theory; and the Foucauldian and ANT approach). 
4.1.4.3 A re-examination of the research approach: bringing in Foucault and 
Actor-Network Theory 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Clegg’s (1989) framework is based on Foucauldian 
and Actor-Network Theory (ANT) ontological and epistemological assumptions. The 
adoption of Clegg (1989) as a core framework presupposes the acceptance of its 
underlying assumptions.  
Foucauldian- and ANT-inspired literature is sometimes included among the so-
called critical (or radical) perspectives (e.g., Ryan et al., 2002); other authors prefer to 
classify it as postmodern (e.g., Baxter and Chua, 2003). Regardless of the adoption of 
one or the other classification (to be discussed below), it can be questioned the extent to 
which Foucauldian and ANT perspectives may have different assumptions from those 
which shaped the initial research design: the interpretive research perspective and, in 
particular, its particular field of institutional theory. 
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In fact, several authors have commented on the differences between the various 
research perspectives (e.g., Hopper and Powell, 1985; Laughlin, 1995; Ryan et al., 
2002), with Chua (1986) and, ultimately, Burrell and Morgan (1979) being the 
fundamental sources for their analyses. In this section, while agreeing on the existence 
of differences, it is argued that the Foucauldian approach can be more easily reconciled 
with the interpretive approach than the classification of research approaches in mutually 
exclusive ‘boxes’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) might suggest. In addition, Burrell and 
Morgan’s strong suggestion that paradigms are mutually exclusive (the widely 
discussed argument of ‘paradigms incommensurability’) has been criticised, e.g., by 
Chua (1996), Hopper and Hoque (2006), Laughlin (1995) and Willmott (1993) (see also 
Modell, 2009 and 2010, defending bridges between paradigms). It is now argued that 
these approaches are actually not very distant in the ‘continua’ of the two criteria 
typically used to classify research approaches: emphasis on change and the 
objective/subjective dichotomy. 
Therefore, this subsection now re-examines the overall research design. It 
analyses the extent to which this new framework and its underlying Foucauldian and 
ANT assumptions are compatible with the original institutional theory lenses and the 
adopted interpretive approach, including from a methodological perspective.  
Interpretive research, Foucault and ANT: a common, low emphasis on social change 
At the start of this subsection, it was argued that the main fundamental 
difference between critical (in which some authors have included Foucault) and 
interpretive approaches may arise from their different agenda as regards social change. 
Typically, critical research has a high emphasis on a political agenda to radically change 
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society. Since the interpretive approach has no such agenda, the inclusion of a 
Foucaldian perspective might be thought to cause contradictions.  
In spite of Foucault’s political engagement (Ryan et al., 2002), his approach to 
social change is fundamentally different from, and even opposed to, Marxist-inspired 
critical approaches (see chapter 3 and Clegg, 1989 and 2001; Clegg et al., 2006; Hardy 
and Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998; Lukes, 2005). Authors like Baxter and Chua (2003), 
Bhimani (2002) and Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) classified Foucauldian 
research as postmodern, rather than critical or radical. Benton (1989), in his review of 
Miller (1987), strongly downplayed the similarities between the concerns and 
approaches of Foucault and those of critical researchers. Foucault’s network ontological 
perspective is a clearly distinctive trait when compared to Marxists’ focus on social 
classes, with crucial consequences on how power may be distributed among actors and 
on what kind of domination the two approaches are concerned about. There is “no 
autonomous subject waiting to be liberated through critical awareness” (Hardy and 
Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998, p. 459). From an epistemological perspective, Clegg (2001, p. 
126) noted that “Foucault is unable to find any place for error or falsehood” or, as 
reanalysed in Clegg et al. (2006, p. 255), “[i]t is not that Foucault does not acknowledge 
truth; rather, he does not acknowledge a single truth. That is, he does not privilege any 
one version of truth over another; rather, he recognises that different social systems or 
cultural regimes will have versions of truth that reflect the regime’s historical 
constitution of knowledge” (emphasis in the original). Therefore, Hardy and Leiba-
O'Sullivan (1998) concluded, as regards the main topic of this thesis, power: “[b]ecause 
no privileged position exists from which analysis might arbitrate, a Foucauldian view of 
power differs from critical theory” (p. 459). (In addition, this perspective on the 
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(im)possibility of a single truth resonates with a subjectivist approach to research, 
another characteristic in interpretive research, as discussed below.) 
As regards the agenda of social change, importantly, Laughlin (1995) argued 
that Foucault’s “underlying emphasis that each historical period is no better, only 
different, from any previous era” removed “the urgency for change. (…) [W]hat is the 
point in changing the status quo when (…) all that is happening is that one ‘disciplinary 
power’ network is being exchanged for another?” (p. 76) (see also Hardy and Leiba-
O'Sullivan, 1998).  
Interestingly, the opposite perspective (of the promotion of change) also 
suggests convergence between Foucauldian and interpretive approaches. Although 
without constituting a major concern, an interpretive approach can also highlight the 
role of power, highlight that some actors may dominate (and be dominated by) others, 
and shed light on potential mechanisms and structures of domination (e.g., see Burns, 
2000 in an OIE perspective). Such ‘illumination’ by institutional theory can contribute 
to the dominated parties’ awareness and potential reaction and opposition against such 
domination – hence potentially serving an ‘emancipatory’ purpose, so typical of critical 
approaches. However, and importantly, both approaches view such phenomena as 
localised, specific tensions (e.g., in particular organisations, groups, etc.); neither 
approach views them as macro-social tensions, or reflections of macro-social tensions, 
as Marxists do. They do not have a clear and oriented emancipatory agenda at a social 
level and they do not take sides in the local struggles they focus; this is clear as regards 
interpretive approaches, and Laughlin’s (1995) quote above makes a similar, compelling 
argument as regards a Foucauldian approach.  
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Combining the two above perspectives, interpretive and Foucauldian approaches 
converge on their potential to highlight, and eventually contribute to overturn, situations 
of control of certain parties about other parties. However, and importantly, both do it in 
a quite non-partisan way, with no overarching ideology to take sides and with no 
emancipatory agenda. Given this last perspective, it is significant that Laughlin (1995) 
classified both ‘French critical theory’ (including Foucault) and ‘Structuration Theory’ 
(an important pillar of institutional theory, as discussed in chapter 2) in the same way: 
both have a low “level of emphasis given to the critique of the status quo and the need 
for change” (p. 70). Reflecting these dual perspectives (of a potential to promote 
change, but the absence of an emancipatory agenda, in both theories), Scapens (2004) 
diverged slightly from Laughlin and argued that both approaches have a medium 
emphasis on change. 
Therefore, overall, both interpretive and critical Foucauldian approaches place a 
low (or at most medium) emphasis on fundamental changes in society. As such, no 
major incompatibilities as regards this aspect seem to emerge from combining both 
approaches in this research. 
Interpretive research, Foucault and ANT: a similar subjectivist perspective and similar 
types of theories and methodologies 
At a more general level, interpretive, critical and postmodern approaches can all 
be considered as ‘alternative’ approaches to the mainstream, positivistic approach 
(Baxter and Chua, 2003). They all also share important assumptions. They all consider 
that social practices are socially constructed, rather than natural phenomena (Ryan et 
al., 2002). As regards the traditional objective/subjective dichotomy, interpretive, 
Foucauldian and ANT approaches would all be situated in the subjective side. The 
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above discussion about Foucault’s scepticism as regards a single truth in society is, 
necessarily, matched by scepticism as regards the pretension to achieve a single truth in 
research. Importantly, “rather than viewing the researcher as all-knowing, all-seeing and 
objective, (…) [a Foucauldian] perspective draws attention to the relation between the 
researcher, the research process, and the ‘knowledge’ produced” (Hardy and Leiba-
O'Sullivan, 1998, p. 459). Therefore, a Foucauldian approach fully accepts subjectivity, 
like interpretive research does – although adding a particular stress on highlighting 
researcher’s interests, arguing that “[t]he researcher is no disinterested observer” 
(ibidem). 
The three approaches remain identically positioned if the objectivist / 
subjectivist distinction is replaced by Laughlin’s (1995) proposal of the two dimensions 
‘prior theorisation’ and ‘theoretical nature of methods’22. As regards the two 
dimensions, Laughlin classified ‘French critical theory’ and ‘Structuration Theory’ 
equally (as he did regarding the emphasis on the need of change), as having similar 
‘medium’ levels of prior theorisation and ‘low’ levels of theorisation underlying their 
methodology.  
Therefore, at the macro level considered by Laughlin, interpretive and 
Foucauldian and ANT approaches do not exhibit drastic contrasts. However, these 
‘macro level’ aspects have consequences on more detailed case study aspects. This is 
analysed next. 
                                                 
22 The objectivist / subjectivist dimension has been contested (e.g., Laughlin, 1995; Chua, 1996) and 
alternatives have been proposed (e.g., Laughlin, 1995). However, this work does not get into such debate, 
since the alternatives converge in considering that the interpretive, Foucauldian and ANT approaches are 
similarly positioned as regards the classification criteria adopted by each alternative. 
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4.1.4.4 Keeping fundamental case study options  
The adoption of a new research topic (intersecting rules and power), theoretical 
framework (Clegg’s framework) and broader theoretical perspectives (Foucauldian 
theory and ANT) did not imply changing the fundamental option for qualitative 
research, for a processual perspective and for the case study method and its main 
characteristics (including its longitudinal and retrospective components). However, this 
maintenance should be justified. 
In fact, the key concerns which, in an interpretive perspective, led to the option 
for qualitative research and the case study method (obtaining an in-depth knowledge of 
the empirical setting in its natural and holistic context to understand processes of 
change) remain equally valid in a Foucauldian and ANT perspective. In particular, these 
concerns reinforced the option for a single case study (vs. executing the option of 
expanding to multiple case studies). As regards the number of units of analysis, it was 
considered that although several areas of the organisation would be encompassed 
(several central and local units of the organisation), the main thrust of the study would 
rely on its integrative nature. This confirmed the option for a holistic, single case, in 
which the single unit of the analysis corresponds to the case unit (as already clarified, 
this does not imply researching the entire organisation). 
Finally, the retrospective research component, which in the original design co-
existed with the longitudinal research component, maintained and even increased its 
relevance, for both empirical and theoretical reasons.  
From an empirical perspective, key events regarding the emergence of the 
organisational centre started occurring at the end of the 1990’s. Although they 
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continued to evolve and produce effects at the time of the fieldwork (therefore being 
adequately researched in a longitudinal way), understanding their antecedents, their 
unfolding and their multidimensional consequences required an in-depth research of the 
organisational past. The long period elapsed raised the importance of the retrospective 
component in the development of the empirical narrative and understanding. 
Theoretical reasons also justified attributing a central place to the retrospective 
component. Foucault was particularly interested in highlighting the ‘archaeology’ of 
phenomena (such as power). This archaeological interest requires the analysis of 
(current and past) continuous processes of translation (Callon, 1986; Legge, 2002; Lodh 
and Gaffikin, 2003). Therefore, although an ANT approach sets specific challenges 
about fieldwork exploring past aspects of strategies of power (to be discussed in the 
next section), the retrospective component was crucial to provide a historically-
grounded understanding of the empirical domain. 
4.1.4.5 Theoretical triangulation 
As described above in this section, the potential desirability of combining 
theories as the study progressed was acknowledged at the outset of the research 
(Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). Furthermore, it has also been discussed how this 
research started within an interpretative approach, and how Foucauldian and ANT 
approaches were also adopted during the course of research. The process of adoption of 
the new Foucauldian and ANT approaches did not imply the replacement of the 
previous interpretative approach, and “the research was not recast” (Major and Hopper, 
2005, p. 212) into the newly adopted approaches. Therefore, there is a need to discuss 
the theoretical triangulation (rather than replacement) carried out.  
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According to Hopper and Hoque (2006, p. 478), “[t]heoretical triangulation 
involves using various factors from a variety of theoretical perspectives simultaneously 
to examine the same dimension of a research problem”23. Theoretical triangulation is 
typically attempted by a particular researcher, or team of researchers. Recently, Modell 
(2010) defended that two teams analysed the same substantive issue endorsing different 
paradigms, in order to promote wider “meta-triangulation” and hence “engender inter-
paradigmatic engagement” (p. 124) – an objective Modell recognised to face various 
challenges.  
In this case, departing from institutional theory and then adding the Foucauldian 
and ANT approach represented drawing from, and combining, two different (though not 
opposing, as demonstrated above) theories. The adoption process could more aptly be 
described as an addition of particular topics of interest, concerns, scepticisms and 
language. E.g., ANT’s notion of a fluid, instable and ever shifting actor-network can be 
accommodated within an interpretative approach without radically changing it, without 
making it lose its fundamental and distinctive characteristics. Hence, it could be argued 
that this study performed a (mostly) “within-same tradition” theoretical triangulation 
(rather than a triangulation of fundamentally different assumptions) (Hopper and 
Hoque, 2006, p. 478). Therefore, the performed theoretical triangulation posed fewer 
and less serious challenges, than it would be the case if attempting to combine more 
‘opposing’ theories, or even paradigms (Modell, 2009 and 2010)24. 
                                                 
23 Alternative notions of theoretical triangulation (e.g., “[w]here a theory is taken from one discipline and 
used to explain a phenomenon in another discipline”, Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p. 78, emphasis 
removed) are not endorsed in this work. Data triangulation is analysed in the next section. For 
triangulation between researchers (not applicable to this study), see Creswell (2003), Hopper and Hoque 
(2006) and Yin (2009) 
24 Given the absence of a deep opposition between the triangulated approaches, the caveats expressed by 
some authors about theoretical triangulation involving more dissimilar theories are not so applicable to 
this case. E.g., Major and Hopper’s (2005) combination of a “labour process analysis with technical, and 
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Theoretical triangulation “offers alternative interpretations of the same 
phenomena (…), [b]ecause each theory can reflect distinctive insights on various 
dimensions” of the phenomena, in a complementary way in which “[n]o theory has a 
prerogative of truth” (Hopper and Hoque, 2006, p. 479). Researching “multifaceted and 
multi-dimensional” phenomena requires a theoretical “toolkit logic” (Nicolini, 2010, p. 
1395), which is indeed consistent with the endorsed concept of the researcher as a 
‘bricoleur’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
Complementarity between theories, in particular when they do not directly 
contradict each other, does not exclude an ‘explanatory competition’ between them, as 
particular lenses to analyse phenomena. In a slight adaptation of Becker (1970, p. 20), 
cited in Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 833), “[w]e should not expect identical results 
when (…) the same organisation [is studied] from different points of view [e.g., with 
different theoretical lenses]. What we have a right to expect is that the two descriptions 
be compatible, that the conclusions [based on a given theory] do not implicitly or 
explicitly contradict those of the other”. This ‘explanatory competition’ consisted in 
different theories highlighting different routes and factors for the interpretation and 
explanation of the empirical insights – which indeed sometimes both allowed and 
obliged the researcher to be more exacting as regards the acceptance of a given 
interpretation or explanation.  
The combination of two different (though not opposing, as demonstrated above) 
theories required such critical scrutiny to be permanently incorporated in the core of the 
                                                                                                                                               
factor and process approaches” involved theories which diverge in important aspects. Hence their caveat: 
“There is no attempt at theoretical integration or coherence - this would render violence to the findings 
and assumptions of each approach and, given their different assumptions, it would be philosophically 
doomed” (p. 212). Furthermore, as noted, authors like Modell (2010) are significantly more optimistic 
about the potential of theoretical triangulation, including between highly different perspectives and even 
paradigms. 
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explanation. It goes beyond a relatively ‘sanitised’ and almost ‘background’ check, 
when alternative theories other than the single theory adopted by the researcher are 
considered to cross-examine the empirical insights. It goes beyond a cross-examination 
with an alternative (but non-adopted) theory. In fact, it requires that the researcher 
reconciles the interpretation of the empirical insights according to the two theories that 
are both present at the core of the researcher’s framework - or, at least, it requires 
making those interpretations compatible. 
As discussed in the next section, a standard concern of case study research 
should be to search for, and evaluate, alternative or rival explanations (Yin, 2009). 
Since a major role of theory is shaping explanations, this search for alternative 
explanations should be extended beyond the empirical realm, and should include the 
attempt to deploy alternative, rival theories.  
When discussing theory development, Scapens (1990) argued that “all 
explanations are partial and capable of development in the future” (p. 276, emphasis in 
the original) and that theory should be adequate to address the research problem. 
Theoretical triangulation potentiated the attempt to anticipate some of those future 
moments into the present. 
4.1.5 CONCLUSION 
The first section analysed the fundamental assumptions and choices of this 
study. Like the empirical study itself, this analysis of the research design had a 
processual concern, i.e., to give an account of the research process. This section 
intended to highlight the various – and fundamental – dilemmas and choices of the 
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researcher and to explain why and how the research choices were taken (and also 
questioned and re-examined).  
Particular attention was devoted to justifying the option for the case study 
method as being consistent with the wider research assumptions, theoretical 
backgrounds and objectives. Further attention was directed to explain case study 
alternatives which were actually deployed, as well as alternatives which were an option 
but were never deployed (e.g., the option of expanding to multiple case studies). The 
two temporal perspectives of this research – the retrospective and longitudinal 
components – were also discussed in detail. 
During the course of research, some previous research aspects were confirmed 
and continued (e.g., the major ontological and epistemological assumptions, the 
naturalistic approach and the choice of the single, holistic case study method). However, 
there were also shifts and corrections (e.g., the research topic and the theoretical 
framework). In particular, theoretical triangulation was a key step, which shaped the 
study interpretations and explanations, as the researcher attempted to make sense of the 
emerging empirical insights. The next section now analyses more detailed aspects of the 
study. 
4.2 DETAILED CHOICES AND CHARACTERISTICS IN DESIGNING 
AND CONDUCTING THE CASE STUDY 
This section discusses more detailed aspects of choices taken during both the 
design and conduction of the case study. It also provides more detailed information 
characterising the conducted research, in order to support the evaluation of the work 
internal validity. The first subsection discusses the organisational and temporal scope of 
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4.2.1 The definition of the organisational and temporal scope and issues of anonymity 
the research, and how a deliberate research strategy had to be supplemented by an 
emergent research strategy to accommodate for unpredicted – and unpredictable – 
events (as recognised at the start of this chapter). The second subsection discusses 
various techniques deployed to generate information, ranging from general reflections 
on consequences of using various theoretical lenses, data triangulation efforts and more 
detailed information about the various techniques (with a particular attention devoted to 
interviews). The final subsection discusses techniques deployed to analyse information, 
including a reflection on the choice of not using computer-assisted techniques of 
analysis.  
4.2.1 THE DEFINITION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL AND TEMPORAL SCOPE 
AND ISSUES OF ANONYMITY 
4.2.1.1 The definition of the organisational scope 
As clarified in the previous section, the option for a single, embedded case study 
prevailed both in the original and the revised research design. The previous section has 
also already preliminarily described the approach to the empirical domain; a more 
detailed description is now provided.  
Given the research topic and concerns, the researcher established contacts with 
two major consultancy firms with a large experience in implementing ERP systems in 
Portugal (the researcher’s country of origin), in late 2004. In February 2005, the 
consultancy firm ‘ITC’ agreed to participate (‘ITC’ is an acronym for ‘Information 
Technology Consultancy’, fictitious expressions to preserve anonymity, as discussed 
below in this subsection). Given ITC’s agreement, the researcher withdrew the proposal 
still being analysed by the other consultancy firm. 
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4.2.1 The definition of the organisational and temporal scope and issues of anonymity 
In a preliminary analysis, the client that the consultancy firm suggested appeared 
to fit the organisation profile defined by the researcher: having implemented an ERP in 
the financial area for a significant number of years. This client, organisation ‘Industrial 
Company’ (identified by the acronym ‘IndCo’, both fictitious expressions to preserve 
anonymity) had production facilities in several countries, but its headquarters were in 
Portugal (section 5.1 characterises the organisation in greater detail). This organisation 
had implemented the ERP market leader, SAP, in the accounting area, between 1999 
and 2001. The core project had been the implementation of the financial accounting 
module (SAP Financials - SAP FI), including some cost accounting components. 
The consultancy firm facilitated the contact with a senior IT member of the 
client, the main interlocutor of the consultancy firm and a key member of the SAP 
project, who authorised the start of the case study. Two informal cooperation 
agreements, based on confidentiality, then started with both organisations, and the 
fieldwork started in March 2005.  
In line with the definition of an embedded, single case study, organisation IndCo 
(as the client in which the consultants had implemented the ERP financial modules) was 
conceived as the single unit of analysis of the (single) case organisation. Although no a 
priori boundaries were imposed on the empirical domain, and although the case was 
conceived as an embedded case study, not all parts of the organisation (and certainly not 
all individuals) would be included in the fieldwork. Given the large size and 
geographical dispersion of the company, such option was simply unthinkable – in 
addition to having a doubtful theoretical pertinence. The delimitation of the empirical 
domain was therefore primarily based on theoretical concerns, while also considering 
the feasibility of the options. 
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The initial research topic (long-term interactions between the ERP, consultants 
and MAC) oriented the initial functional delimitation of the organisational scope. This 
initial and provisional delimitation was defined in cooperation with the researcher’s 
interlocutor in the organisation, whose assistance was invaluable, given the researcher’s 
limited detailed knowledge about the internal (individual and collective) actors. The 
research topic recommended approaching the IT department and several departments 
related to the financial area (in particular, the management control department and the 
Shared Services Centre). A recently created Business and Processes Organisation (BPO) 
Department was also approached, given its role in change processes; in addition, its 
leader was one of the consultants who had been involved in the SAP FI implementation. 
To gain insights about the users of information, the commercial area was also included, 
although with a minor emphasis when compared to the IT and financial areas. It was 
planned that, for similar reasons, the production area should also be included, in a later 
stage. Finally, the consultants who had been involved in the implementation of SAP FI 
and still worked in the consultancy firm (who were external actors, vis-à-vis the 
organisation) would also be contacted.  
As regards the geographical delimitation of the organisational scope, and given 
the presence of the organisation in several countries, it was considered that the primary 
focus should be in Portugal, where the company was originated, the headquarters of the 
company (and its group) and various plants were located. Expansion of the research to 
other countries was considered as potentially relevant; however, it was also considered 
that the development of the fieldwork and analysis, along with the consideration of 
inevitable resource limitations, should orient the decision about the geographic scope. 
Such decision was discussed in the first interview at IndCo when access was negotiated, 
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and it was agreed that the fieldwork would be developed in Portugal until justification 
was found to expand such geographical scope. 
As already mentioned, the new topic about power was adopted after a key 
interview in March 2007 – two years after the start of the fieldwork. Researching this 
new topic required additional fieldwork in the previously mentioned functional areas. In 
addition, the strong emphasis on the local level led to the actual inclusion of the 
production area in the fieldwork scope (as planned from the start but not carried out up 
to that stage). Given the importance of the production activities beyond Portugal, the 
geographical scope was expanded to include Spain. IndCo had been present in this 
neighbouring country since the early 1990’s, and organisation structures located in 
Spain were at the core of relevant power issues. 
In addition, for both the original and the final research topic, the on-going 
fieldwork indicated that understanding IndCo’s processes of change required 
considering the group in which IndCo was included. IndCo’s group was considered as a 
prominent ‘contextual’ unit, as an important part of the organisational context (although 
not a part of the ‘core’ of the case - Yin, 2009). Therefore, considerable attention was 
also devoted to obtain information about it, through several research techniques (to be 
discussed in the next subsection). 
4.2.1.2 The definition of the temporal scope of the fieldwork and of the research 
focus 
As discussed, both the original and the final research topics implied a 
retrospective component (encompassing the research of past events), in addition to a 
longitudinal component (based on ‘real time’ fieldwork). The existence of a 
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retrospective component implies that the period of the fieldwork does not coincide with 
the period of organisational life focused by the researcher – the empiric time frame. 
Therefore, there were two decisions to be taken regarding temporal scope: the end of the 
fieldwork; and the start and the end of the empiric time frame (which may or may not 
coincide with the end of the fieldwork). These were not simple decisions (e.g., Lodh 
and Gaffikin, 2003). 
It was always considered that the empiric time frame would have to be extended, 
for several reasons. The first reason is related with the choice of researching long term 
interactions, in a processual perspective. However, the adopted processual view 
significantly complicates the definition of the boundaries of the empiric time frame 
(e.g., Pettigrew, 1995). A processual view depicts organisations as permanently ‘in 
process’, in a permanent state of becoming. Therefore, it is not possible to hermetically 
define the starting and ending points of a process. The adoption of particular dates – 
typically, dates of particular events with a high empirical and/or theoretical significance 
- has, to a certain extent, an inevitable arbitrary nature. Moreover, an extended 
fieldwork would also address the need to gain in-depth knowledge about the empirical 
setting (see p. 195 for a discussion about the roles of time in longitudinal research) and 
would increase the opportunities to triangulate data sources – a technique discussed in 
the next subsection. 
Therefore, the actual boundaries for the empiric time frame were decided as the 
research progressed, considering both the research objectives and the empirical issues 
which emerged during the fieldwork25.  
                                                 
25 Pettigrew (1995) mentioned other criteria, such as the researcher’s relationship with the case 
organisation and constraints related with funding or other resources (e.g., time). These factors did not 
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Temporal scope in the initial research design 
As already mentioned, the fieldwork initiated in March 2005. Given the initial 
interest in ERPs and the long term, the retrospective component of the study should set 
the start of the relevant empiric time frame no later than the start of the SAP FI 
implementation - i.e., 1999. However, it soon became clear that understanding the 
antecedents of this particular change process required focusing further back in time. In 
1995, one subsidiary implemented SAP financial modules and another one started 
implementing a complete (non-SAP) ERP package. In addition, it was considered that 
the acquisition of the Spanish subsidiary, in the first half of the decade, marked a 
substantial shift in IndCo (as the next chapter analyses). Additionally, insights about 
previous periods were obtained early in the fieldwork which should also be considered, 
mostly for a contextual purpose (as recommended in a holistic and processual 
approach). 
The definition of the end of the empirical time frame was complicated for 
several reasons, related with: 1) the research approach (the adopted processual view, as 
discussed above); 2) the case study method itself (Yin, 2009); 3) the long-term 
emphasis of the research topic; 4) the empirics. As regards the latter in particular, there 
were no clear ‘cut-off’ end points which were also consistent with the long term focus, 
as regards both the consultants and the ERP ‘variables’. Even after the SAP FI 
implementation ended, in 2001, IT consultants continued in the company due to other 
                                                                                                                                               
have a direct role in defining the boundaries for the empiric time frame. However, they had other types of 
influence. As described in this chapter, the researcher was denied the possibility to research a particular 
project; this prohibition eliminated this area of the empirical domain from the researcher’s analysis – a far 
more profound limitation than the mere definition of the empirical time frame. As regards time as 
resource, although the researcher substantially extended the originally planned fieldwork period, the time 
constraints inherent to a PhD also played a role in pressing for the conclusion of the fieldwork. By 
limiting the period of the fieldwork, time constraints had an indirect role in setting the cut-off end for the 
empirical time frame. 
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projects. In addition, the organisation had developed high levels of competence in SAP 
FI, internally; this enabled the continuous change of SAP FI (and the financial area) 
even without significant, and sometimes without any, assistance from consultants.  
Some preliminary examples suffice to support the need to analyse long term 
processes of change involving the ERP and consultants, including the period of the 
fieldwork. E.g., the creation of a SSC and the gradual implementation of SAP logistic, 
production and product costing modules, continuously involved SAP FI and the 
financial area - although in highly varied extents and with highly varied contributions 
from consultants (ranging from key contributions to none)26. Furthermore, even if 
consultants had totally left the company, or even if it was considered at a certain 
moment they ceased to have a significant involvement, the long term focus pushed to 
extend the empiric time frame beyond their departure time.  
All the above reasons highlighted the relevance of the longitudinal component of 
the study (i.e., the study was clearly not exclusively retrospective) and promoted the 
extension of the empiric time frame (and, therefore, of the fieldwork period). Therefore, 
in the absence of clear indications based on theory or on the empirics, it was considered 
that the cut-off point should primarily be dictated by fieldwork-related reasons. The key 
methodological criterion would be the researcher’s evaluation of having generated 
enough data to confirm interpretations and conclusions about the most important topics 
(data triangulation is discussed below) and to evaluate (and reject) major rival 
                                                 
26 In an observed meeting with SAP consultants, a IT member thus described: “FI was the first [module], 
it is generalised to all companies. But the information that was manually entered by accountants was not 
enough. So, there are many interfaces with external [i.e., non SAP] solutions related with purchasing, 
sales, stocks, salaries, which still haven’t been totally replaced [by SAP modules]. We still have many 
plants with those [legacy] systems. (…) These interfaces were done by people from outside the company, 
who are no longer here”. This description and the context in which was conveyed (a meeting with 
consultants) highlight the on-going nature of the change processes related with the ERP and consultants, 
up to the time of the fieldwork (and, most likely, beyond). 
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hypotheses or explanations (Yin, 2009). However, research constraints also had to be 
considered. In particular, the time constraints of a PhD suggested that the fieldwork 
(and hence the empirical time frame) should be concluded by the end of 2006 or start of 
2007, corresponding to a maximum fieldwork duration of nearly two years. 
Therefore, a ‘three-tier’ interval for the empirical time frame was conceived, 
based on ‘core’, ‘extended’ and ‘holistic’ empirical time frames, which diverged only as 
regards their ‘starting’ moment. The ‘core’ empirical time frame started when the 
implementation of SAP started being planned, i.e., 1998. The ‘extended’ empirical time 
frame started in the early 1990’s to encompass key antecedents, both at an IT level 
(other IT projects) and at an organisational level (mostly, international acquisitions). 
The ‘holistic’ empirical time frame reached further into the past, without a specific 
starting date, encompassing the ‘extended’ time frame and a previous, ‘contextual’ 
period, to know the history of the organisation and some key actors, and understand 
some of the resulting organisational characteristics. 
As regards the end of the temporal scope, the three intervals for the empirical 
time frame (‘core’, ‘extended’ and ‘holistic’) would have a common cut-off point, to be 
determined as the fieldwork progressed and mainly by fieldwork-related reasons. 
The following figure 4.1 depicts the above temporal scope designs. The different 
intensities of the lines depicting the three empirical time frames (ranging from the 
‘Core’, with a bold line, to the ‘Holistic’, with a traced line) represent the depth of the 
research regarding the empirics of each period. The greater length of all empirical time 
frames when compared to the planned fieldwork period (nearly two years) highlight the 
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importance of the retrospective component, when compared to the longitudinal 
component. 
 
Figure 4.1: The ‘three-tier’ empirical time frames in the initial research design. 
(Source: developed by the author) 
The ‘ups and downs’ of case study research and the extension of the fieldwork period 
At the end of 2005, the researcher formally requested permission to accompany 
the teams implementing the SAP product costing module (SAP CO-PC) across IndCo’s 
plants. However, six months later, the company refused on the grounds that the 
organisational and geographical scope of the research was very broad (multiple 
countries), that it required accessing highly sensitive (production and financial) 
information and that the organisation had limited (time) resources to provide an 
adequate support to the research project. 
This episode created substantial uncertainty in the project and caused important 
delays, for two main reasons. First, the contacts with the company were virtually 
suspended while the reply was awaited, not only to avoid developing research avenues 
which could end up not being fruitful, but mostly to avoid compromising the 
time 
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researcher’s acceptance in the organisation. The continuation of the contacts during this 
period, even if unrelated to the on-going implementation project, risked conveying the 
(false) impression that the researcher was attempting to advance the fieldwork before 
the authorisation was granted. As many authors commented about case study research, 
access to case organisations is always precarious and should be carefully preserved 
(e.g., Burns, 2000 and 2004; Ryan et al., 2002; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009).  
Second, after the refusal was communicated, the research project had to be 
substantially re-evaluated, especially because access to the organisation had been 
compromised beyond the scope of the refused proposal. In particular, the researcher 
evaluated whether already gathered empirical material could allow addressing the 
original research question. Up to that moment, the researcher had conducted 22 
interviews, attended eight meetings and had spent six days in the IT open-space 
(additional interview details are provided below). 
Upon this re-evaluation, the researcher considered that further fieldwork was 
necessary. The fieldwork was resumed in June 2006, but now restricted to the IT area 
and to the consultancy firm. However, the scarcity of previous insights from key areas 
as management control, the Shared Services Centre, non-IT top managers and plant 
level actors was preventing conclusions to be reached. By the end of 2006, the 
researcher decided to resume the contact with those areas, and it was felt that the only 
way to reopen access to non-IT areas was through a particularly senior manager. The 
researcher seized the opportunity to contact him during a public event and an interview 
was held in March 2007.  
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As explained in subsection 4.1.4, this interview was the trigger to highlight the 
role of power in key organisational changes and, subsequently, to ‘reconnect the dots’ 
through a re-examination of previous empirical insights; a few months later, a new 
research topic was adopted. The previous section has already re-examined the most 
fundamental aspects of research design, at the light of the new topic. Now, the temporal 
scope of the research is re-examined.  
Temporal scope in the final research design 
The new research topic highlighted the key events of SAP FI implementation, 
the CC relocation and the SSC creation, all occurred between 1998 and 2002. However, 
a clear insight was that there were on-going change processes as regards all of these 
innovations (and other related innovations) until the time of the fieldwork. 
It became clear that issues of power were relevant at IndCo throughout its 
history and still at the present time. Key decisions and events between 1998 and 2002 
fundamentally changed the networks of power at IndCo and clearly marked the 
emergence of a stronger organisational centre in Portugal, but their antecedents and 
consequences extended far beyond those years.  
Adopting the new topic did not substantially change how the research temporal 
scope was conceived, but the boundaries had to be redefined. A ‘three-tier’ interval for 
the empirical time frame, similar to the one presented above and also based on ‘core’, 
‘extended’ and ‘holistic’ empirical time frames, was developed. Again, they shared the 
same ‘cut-off’ point and only diverged among themselves as regards their ‘starting’ 
moment. There were also no major differences as regards the actual time frames – 
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although some criteria and some emphases were different to the ones in the initial 
research design. 
The major difference of criteria to define the start of the ‘core’ empirical time 
frame was that the implementation of SAP was no longer the only criterion. In fact, it 
was considered that the first preparatory steps to relocate the Corporate Centre and the 
acquisition of a large competitor in 1998 also had to be included in the empiric time 
frame. While the first new criterion derived directly from the identification of the 
(relocated) corporate centre as one of the mechanisms of power at stake, the second 
criterion derived from the finding that the mentioned acquisition accentuated, even 
more, prevailing organisational characteristics and central actors’ limitations27. This last 
criterion required a more detailed characterisation of the organisation at the time of the 
acquisition. Since all three events occurred in 1998, the starting year of the ‘core’ 
empirical time frame remained the same: 1998. However, the emphasis on the first year, 
including the emphasis in the ‘pre-acquisition’ stage, was reinforced (in addition, the 
‘organisational’ scope was functionally and geographically widened). 
As regards the ‘extended’ empiric time frame, it was kept at the early 1990’s, for 
the same reason: to encompass key antecedents, and in particular the acquisition in 
Spain in the early 1990’s. However, a higher importance was given to this ‘extended’ 
period, since it was understood that the organisational characteristics (and the 
limitations perceived by key central actors) by the end of the decade were not recent; 
instead, they derived from very long term organisational processes. Therefore, this new 
topic (and the permanent processual perspective) required a more profound 
                                                 
27 As discussed in the next chapter, central actors perceived to have limited visibility and capacity to 
actually intervene, in a permanent and detailed way, in the decentralised, autonomous and diversified 
organisation that IndCo already was during the 1990’s. The 1998 large acquisition only accentuated such 
a scenario. 
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understanding of this precedent period, when compared to the initial research design. 
Finally, the ‘holistic’ empirical time frame was kept as reaching further into the past, 
without a specific starting date, for the same contextual purposes.  
As regards the end of the temporal scope, and like in the initial design, the cut-
off point of the three empirical time frames (‘core’, ‘extended’ and ‘holistic’) could not 
be unambiguously determined on empirical or theoretical grounds. Therefore, the end of 
the empirical time frames would be determined as the fieldwork progressed and mainly 
by fieldwork-related reasons, as discussed above. An additional fieldwork period of six 
months was planned, from June 2007 until approximately the end of 2007. However, 
the increasing time devoted to empirical analysis, theoretical development and write-up 
reduced the intensity of contacts and led to an extension of the fieldwork until April 
2008 28.  
Finally, it should be clarified that the study maintained a longitudinal nature, in 
spite of the strong retrospective component. The new research topic made the 
characterisation of the company in the late 1990’s particularly important, as well as 
various processes which had occurred almost a decade ago – a part of the retrospective 
component of the study. However, the longitudinal component of the study was always 
preserved, for two reasons. First, it derived from conscious efforts from the researcher, 
particularly given the long term focus and the processual perspective that had always 
underlain the study. And second, it derived from the interviewees themselves. Even 
when queried about past issues, interviewees frequently related them with more 
                                                 
28 An additional interview was later conducted, in late 2009, to a former employee of the organisation. 
However, this interview can be considered to have occurred already beyond both the empirical time frame 
(especially because it focused exclusively on past events) and the fieldwork period. 
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contemporary issues, and even issues which they were facing on that very moment or 
would be facing in the future. 
This permanent longitudinal nature of the study, and the relations between 
retrospective and contemporary insights, indeed allowed for the development of 
important conclusions. It highlighted that the issues being researched were actually 
fundamental, long term, continuous and never totally settled. This conclusion reinforced 
the validity and relevance of two adopted perspectives. First, of the adoption of a 
processual approach. Second, of the adoption of the Clegg’s (1989) ANT-based 
insights, arguing that although fixity of structural features is possible, they have an 
inevitably temporary and contestable nature. This conclusion is resumed and developed 
in later chapters. As regards the current chapter, the key message resides in highlighting 
that the combination of both retrospective and longitudinal components was indeed 
crucial to develop such insight.  
The figure below depicts the ‘three-tier’ empirical time frames considered in the 
final research design, as well as the actual fieldwork period. 
 
Figure 4.2: The ‘three-tier’ empirical time frames in the final research design and actual 
fieldwork period. (Source: developed by the author) 
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The above figure differs in several, though small, aspects as regards the previous 
one, about the initial research design. The ‘core’ empirical time frame now clearly 
encompasses 1998, given the importance of that year to the new research topic. The 
‘extended’ empirical time frame is now represented with a stronger line, to convey the 
greater importance of the previous period (from the early 1990’s). The three empirical 
time frames now all end in April 2008 - the end of the actual framework period. 
The fieldwork actually extended for a period of about three years, from March 
2005 to April 2008. The contact instances with the field were rather well distributed 
along the three years’ period, although the fieldwork was more intensive in certain 
periods (interview details are provided below). Furthermore, the fieldwork had a highly 
recurrent characteristic in extended case studies in which the researcher remains mostly 
an outsider to the field (rather than an insider and, in particular, as a participant): the 
fieldwork was not continuous all through the 3 years, hence having a sporadic nature 
(Otley and Berry, 1994). 
4.2.1.3 The anonymity of the case organisation and its actors: a reflection 
Both the entire case and its informants are made anonymous - a highly common 
option in case study research, particularly within Europe, as an overview of major 
Europe-based academic journals reveals. The degree of acceptance of the option for 
anonymity varies across authors: while some accept it with no major objections, 
considering the potential advantages (e.g., Scapens, 1990), other recommend using it 
only as a last resort and should compromise alternatives be impossible (e.g., Yin, 2009). 
It should be noted, however, that one of the justifications for anonymity that even Yin 
accepted was quite relevant, when the fieldwork started. Anonymity is justifiable when 
the “issuance of the final case report may affect the subsequent actions of those that 
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were studied” (Yin, 2009, p. 181). A case study about the MAC area of an organisation 
may potentially deal with sensitive information, which if revealed could affect the 
organisation itself, namely through the actions of other organisations which gained 
access to that (until then secret) information (Scapens, 1990). 
At the start of the case study, it was unclear the extent to which the researcher 
would require access to sensitive information. Therefore, the researcher accepted the 
compromise to maintain anonymity, hence facilitating a greater access to interviewees, 
documentation and even observational instances (e.g., meetings, presentations, informal 
events, presence in the organisation open-office). 
In order to preserve the organisation anonymity, some information is omitted or 
disguised, such as the names of the industry and organisations, the products, most 
countries and precise dates as regards events more likely to be publicly known. As 
concerns geographical information, only Portugal, Spain and country ‘C’ are identified; 
as regards other countries, only general information required for the case analysis is 
provided. Portugal and Spain are identified for three reasons. First, the fact that the 
author is Portuguese would (correctly) suggest that the case company was based in 
Portugal. Second, the large number of references to these two countries implies that 
anonymously identifying them in a coded form would significantly worsen the text 
readability. Third, and importantly, it is believed that this limited disclosure does not 
compromise the anonymity of the company. A third country is identified in a coded 
form (country C) to allow singling out a relevant country to this organisation, while 
preserving anonymity. 
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Likewise, the researcher also considered that maintaining interviewees’ 
anonymity could potentiate a greater openness during the interviews and hence 
potentially increase the insights obtained. (Scapens, 1990) As such, interviewees’ names 
are not revealed and their organisational position (a relevant aspect when analysing their 
perceptions and actions) is also only described in broad terms (see p. 262 about the 
classification of interviewees). Finally, it was attempted that the content of the quoted 
comments did not allow the inference of the respondent by actors of the organisation 
who read the case, in particular if the content was considered as potentially sensitive 
(Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009). Occasionally, this implied a minor editing of the 
quotations, ensuring not to compromise their meaning. 
These anonymity agreements implied the exclusion of information which could 
denounce the company and the respondents’ identity but which was not essential to the 
understanding of the empirical context and to the analyses, conclusions and theoretical 
development issues. The inclusion of such information could arguably be considered to 
enrich the case, in particular by allowing ‘thickening’ the description in certain 
dimensions (e.g., by detailing the broader contextualisation of the organisation). 
However, it was considered at the start of the fieldwork – and it still is, after its end - 
that the greater access potentiated by the anonymity agreement actually facilitated 
developing ‘thicker’ descriptions of the detailed events and actors’ perceptions and 
strategies (Geertz, 1973) and a deeper understanding of the case (Maxwell, 1992). 
Greater access under the cover of anonymity, overall, benefited the case by allowing 
‘thick’ analyses of issues which were indeed core ones, and hence benefited the case 
‘plausibility’ and ‘trustworthiness’, which Ahrens and Chapman (2006) considered to 
be the crucial criteria to evaluate qualitative research. 
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4.2.2 TECHNIQUES TO GENERATE INFORMATION 
Case study researchers can potentially use a large number of techniques to 
collect information – or (more accurately, considering the acknowledged role of the 
investigator in the research process) generate information from the empirical domain. 
As common sources of information, Yin (2009) highlighted documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artefacts.  
This section starts by reflecting on two preliminary issues. First, it analyses the 
potential and limitations of information sources (in particular, interviews), considering 
the adopted Foucauldian and ANT research approaches, when compared to the initial 
interpretative approach. Second, it briefly discusses triangulation between and within 
the various information sources. The remainder of this section analyses the various 
techniques used to generate information: the researcher analysed documentation; 
observed socio-technical interactions and material aspects; observed key physical 
artefacts; and interviewed individuals who were, or had been, part of the organisation 
actor-network. 
4.2.2.1 Interpretive research, Foucault and ANT: specific concerns to research 
power 
Ribeiro (2003) reflected on the consequences that researching power in a 
Foucauldian and ANT perspective (rather than in a purely interpretive way) should have 
on epistemology and, therefore, on research methods. “An important epistemological 
aspect is that the description of strategies of power should not be solely based on actors’ 
accounts of the strategies they themselves conduct, of their intentions, objectives and 
actions” (p. 155, emphasis in the original). As Ribeiro noted, observing actors’ 
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strategies of power is often not possible (and this was certainly the case as regards the 
retrospective component of this research); indeed, ANT’s recommendation of 
“‘following the actors’ does not mean ‘being with them’ when they undertake their 
strategies” (p. 281). As Ribeiro (2003) commented, ‘being with the actors’ “when they 
undertake their strategies (…) would indeed be inconsistent, as the presence of a 
researcher would probably constitute a factor hindering those strategies” (p. 281-2). As 
such, the focus should be on “the collection of the ‘traces’ they leave behind them” (p. 
155), such as “material traces” and “memories about events” (p. 156).  
The fieldwork included observation of socio-technical interactions and technical 
artefacts and gathering of documentation (some of which constituted the mentioned 
“material traces”); however, it must be recognised that most insights about the strategies 
of power were obtained through the conducted interviews (the “memories about 
events”). The minor (albeit not unimportant) resort to observations was strongly related 
with the major retrospective research component, focusing on past events (Creswell, 
2003): observation of socio-technical interactions is particularly adequate for 
longitudinal (‘real time’) research, rather than for retrospective research.  
In turn, the limited resort to documentation was also related with the topic of 
power itself: it is plausible that important parts of power strategies do not get to be 
explicitly stated in documentation. In addition, the limited resort to documentation was 
also related to a characteristic of the analysed IT projects: apart from their technical 
aspects, they were little documented. Right in the second interview at the case 
organisation, with a senior IT member, when the grounds of cooperation were 
discussed, the researcher expressed interest in obtaining documentation related with the 
SAP FI project. Although the respondent accepted, and later facilitated, the access to 
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documentation, he informed that the (not many) documents which existed were mainly 
technical, rather than conceptual or about pursued objectives. Therefore, it was 
suggested that access to such non-technical information could virtually only be obtained 
through interviews, as means to obtain access to such information “from our 
[respondents’] heads”.29 
However, and in spite of the important role of interviews to obtain information, 
the researcher’s interpretation did not rely solely on the accounts of the very actors who 
promoted the change processes, and not even solely on the accounts of the actors who 
were somehow directly involved in those processes. Rather, interviews were “ways of 
collecting traces left on others’ memory” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 157, emphasis in the 
original), which were then triangulated with insights obtained through other sources 
(including, but not restricted to, other interviews). 
This fieldwork strategy incorporated particular concerns raised by Foucauldian 
and ANT perspectives. However, the general approach was mostly maintained: e.g., the 
interview technique is still adequate and understanding the interviewees’ meanings is 
still relevant – subject to the above additional concerns. Importantly, the incorporation 
of these additional concerns should actually also underlie an interpretive approach. 
                                                 
29 The hypothesis that the respondent might be merely avoiding granting access to documentation was 
rejected during the fieldwork. First, IndCo’s actors indeed granted access to documentation – mostly 
technical documentation. Second, the scarcity of non-technical documentation was later corroborated by 
other sources, including by sources outside the organisation. Consultants argued (and some IT actors 
recognised) that the IT area of IndCo traditionally had a very informal – yet effective – way to achieve 
coordination. Furthermore, as analysed in the next chapter, the SAP FI project had a narrow, technical 
scope, particularly in its start. The project scope was mostly internally defined, with consultants being 
given little possibility to introduce broader organisational changes and having, fundamentally, an SAP 
technical consultancy role. As such, consultants did not produce the amount of structured, non-technical 
information (e.g., regarding business analysis, client needs, model analysis) which they typically do when 
they play a wider role. These two factors (informal internal coordination and very limited intervention 
from consultants regarding non-technical issues) contributed to scarcity of documentation regarding non-
technical issues. Even so, all the non-technical documentation obtained (either through IndCo’s actors or 
consultants) had been produced by the consultancy firm. Therefore, the respondent’s indication “you’ll 
need to get what you want mostly from our heads, through interviews, rather than from well structured 
documentation” proved to indeed reflect the actual scarcity of documentation of a non-technical nature. 
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Questioning, scrutiny and triangulation of interviewees’ accounts, in particular when it 
refers to strategies in which they themselves were involved, is indeed positive to any 
research endorsing an interpretive approach30. 
4.2.2.2 Data triangulation across and within techniques to generate information: 
potentialities and limitations 
Triangulation between data from different sources and generated through 
different techniques is a recurrently emphasised requirement of qualitative research 
(e.g., Modell, 2005; Yin, 2009) (theoretical triangulation was analysed in subsection 
4.1.4). Data triangulation efforts have actually a dual role, since they “help the 
researcher to generate a rich source of field data with internal checks of its validity” 
(Hopper and Hoque, 2006, p. 482). In this study, generated data was triangulated, 
increasing the case internal validity, reliability and hence credibility - although without 
the unrealistic assumption (and presumption) that an ‘objective’ description of reality 
would be achieved, as analysed next. 
Data triangulation efforts 
In this study, drawing on diversified information sources and techniques 
contributed to data triangulation (Creswell, 2003). The concerns raised by the 
Foucauldian and ANT approach about reliance on interviews and the proposed remedial 
solutions (as discussed above in this subsection) are such an example. The remainder of 
this subsection provides additional examples of such triangulation efforts. 
                                                 
30 Naturally, these increased concerns were only incorporated in subsequent fieldwork. Previously 
gathered empirical material was reviewed according to these increased concerns. In addition, subsequent 
fieldwork was tailored to explore the insights previously developed, at the light of these increased 
concerns. The opportunity to contact many interviewees again in a late stage of the fieldwork (as analysed 
below) potentiated this validation. 
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Furthermore, significant efforts were made to triangulate information generated 
within (rather than across) a given technique. E.g., the interview technique was applied 
to multiple respondents and in multiple occasions, therefore generating information 
whose consistency was carefully checked. Naturally, such consistency was also checked 
even within each particular interview event. Specific characteristics of the interviewing 
process which improved triangulation are discussed below in this subsection, when the 
interviewing technique is analysed (e.g., various respondents were interviewed multiple 
times across long periods). 
Limitations of data triangulation and the alternative criteria of plausibility and 
trustworthiness: striking a balance between objectivism and subjectivism 
As mentioned, data triangulation is often seen as central to validity. However, 
the very concept of validity in qualitative research is highly controversial and discussed 
(Creswell, 2003) and, in addition, sometimes not made explicit (Maxwell, 1992). 
Authors like Ahrens and Chapman (2006) argued that “triangulation is a problematic 
concept for the conduct and assessment of qualitative field studies”. First, the concept of 
triangulation has an underlying “presumption of an objective reality” (p. 834), 
“borrowed from positivistic methodology” (p. 819). The acknowledgement, earlier in 
this chapter, that such objective vision of the social world is unattainable, implies the 
acknowledgement of a degree of subjectivism and hence challenges such presumption. 
Second, contradictory empirical data (either verbal or non-verbal, written or unwritten, 
‘material’ or ‘social’) do not necessarily represent ‘anomalies’; they may be mere 
consequences of a diversified and complex empirical field, populated by actors with 
multiple and diversified perspectives. As such, generating (apparently) contradictory 
data may indeed be a powerful way for a researcher to probe deeper. On the other hand, 
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contradictory data may indeed be an ‘anomaly’, in particular as regards issues in which 
a higher degree of ‘objectivism’ is expectable (e.g., dates or people involved in a 
particular process). Even though those more ‘objective’ issues may not be the core of a 
qualitative study, they are by no means irrelevant, either. On-going fieldwork should 
attempt to ‘solve’ those issues through data triangulation. “What we have a right to 
expect is that (…) two descriptions be compatible” (Becker, 1970, p. 20, in Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006, p. 833)31. Given these two perspectives, there is a need to clarify the 
researcher’s position. 
Ahrens and Chapman’s (2006) strong opposition to the concept of triangulation 
may be considered as reflecting a rather extreme form of subjectivism (Tomkins and 
Groves, 1983). However, their objections are grounded. While in this study 
subjectivism is considered an unavoidable, overarching characteristic of researching 
social phenomena, the possibility of some largely objective features is also accepted. 
While interpretation is considered to be an inescapable characteristic of research, the 
concept of observation cannot be made redundant, either (see the start of this chapter). 
Hence, Ahrens and Chapman’s position is considered, above all, as a pertinent call of 
attention against the “misleading” illusion of “certainty (…) gained in the capture of an 
objective reality” (p. 834) which is (typically only) implicit in the concept of 
triangulation32. Hence the acceptance of Ahrens and Chapman’s (2006) proposal that 
validity and reliability in qualitative field studies should be assessed primarily by their 
plausibility and trustworthiness, rather than absolute (yet likely either illusory or 
                                                 
31 This quote, already cited when discussing theoretical triangulation, referred to compatibility between 
qualitative studies about the same organisational setting; however, it also expresses the compatibility that 
should be present between accounts about the same organisational setting, in particular when they deal 
with issues with a more objective nature, as discussed above. 
32 Yin’s (2009, p. 117) figure depicting multiple sources of evidence converging towards a “Fact” 
highlights this underlying assumption of the possibility to achieve a single, objective and true view of 
social phenomena. 
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unattainable) data convergence derived from triangulation (see also Creswell, 2003, 
who added the similar terms ‘authenticity’ and ‘credibility’). 
Therefore, the selection and application of techniques to generate information 
during the fieldwork attempted to strike a balance between objectivism and 
subjectivism. On one hand, it was accepted a (not naïf) possibility and even desirability 
of data triangulation in a search for convergence and consistency as regards (mostly) 
objective issues. On the other hand, the case plausibility and trustworthiness was built 
by providing detailed information about the study, as regards its empiric, theoretical, 
analytical and methodological support. I.e., the case plausibility and trustworthiness 
was built beyond the particular chapter on research design, and was also built on the 
chapters on the case study description, analysis and theoretical contribution. This 
information included the study’s assumptions, choices, steps, advances and drawbacks, 
on-going hypotheses which were later rejected or confirmed. In order to build a 
convincing empirical and theoretical argument, there were continuous efforts to 
generate “[f]urther data (…) [to] support or question the relations made between the 
initial data and the argument” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 834). With such detailed 
data, it is expected that the case can be considered plausible and trustworthy – but there 
is no claim to be objective. 
4.2.2.3 Documentation analysis 
The analysis of documentation is frequently mentioned as a virtually obligatory 
feature of any case study, typically to “corroborate and augment evidence from other 
sources” (Yin, 2009, p. 103). From an ANT perspective, as discussed above, 
documentation may represent ‘material traces’ left by the actors when carrying out their 
activities. However, this ‘objectivity’ suggested by the material nature of documentation 
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should not be taken as a synonym for accuracy and freedom from reporting bias (e.g., 
Creswell, 2003) 
Both publicly available and private documentation was analysed. Publicly 
available documentation referred to the organisation, its holding company or individual 
actors. It included the websites and financial reports and releases of IndCo and its 
group; an internal magazine of IndCo’s group; general and industry-specific 
publications and business websites; and three academic studies. Information about the 
industry, including a characterisation of the markets, the types of products and even the 
production process, was also gathered from the internet, in particular from the 
organisation’s website; documents from the European Commission about some of 
IndCo’s markets were also examined. 
Private documentation included presentations, proposals, quality plans and 
progress reports about key technical projects (SAP financial accounting and SAP 
production) and organisational projects (the creation of the Shared Services Centre). 
Internal SAP manuals were also obtained. Private documentation was provided either 
by the organisation or by the consultancy firm (upon authorisation of the client).  
Documentation was most useful to provide both contextual and detailed 
information and orient subsequent inquiries from other sources, and it was particularly 
useful to indicate detailed dates of the various stages of the projects (e.g., the dates of 
the various roll-outs of the Shared Services Centre), the people involved and the 
detailed scope of the projects.  
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4.2.2.4 Observation (and interpretation) of human actors in socio-technical 
interactions 
The ‘observation’ carried out was, essentially, non participant observation - and, 
it should added, non-participant interpretation (for simplification purposes, the 
following text usually only refers to ‘observation’, the most common term in the 
literature on research methodology). The researcher therefore had the role of a complete 
observer (Creswell, 2003). The observation is considered to have had a highly non 
obtrusive nature, not affecting the actors in their daily interactions and, more broadly, 
not affecting the natural setting being directly observed. The following analysis focuses 
on the observation of human actors in socio-technical interactions, i.e., interactions 
between human actors occurring within a particular technical environment and between 
human and technological actors. Then, the following part in this subsection focuses on 
artefacts – which may be, in ANT terms, considered as non-human actors, as discussed 
below. However, as it will be noticeable, observation and interpretation usually 
encompassed human and non-human actors simultaneously and in interaction (socio-
technical interactions). 
Observation of human actors took place in various temporal and spatial settings, 
through a wide range of formal or casual activities. As formal observational activities, 
early in the fieldwork, the researcher observed seven meetings between consultants33 
and IndCo’s IT members, from both the ‘functional’ and ‘technical’ teams34. SAP 
                                                 
33 Nearly all consultants were from SAP. One member from the consultancy firm cooperating with the 
researcher was present in one of the meetings, as he had an in-depth and on-going involvement in IndCo’s 
SAP projects. This consultant was later interviewed. 
34 The IT department in IndCo’s headquarters (the ‘Global IT’ team) has two main areas. The ‘functional’ 
team is focused primarily on business processes and was structured around particular SAP modules (at the 
time, financial, logistic and production). The ‘technical’ team is focused primarily on core IT issues, such 
as databases, IT architecture and IT infra-structure. 
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consultants had been called to advise on an SAP upgrade35. Since most SAP consultants 
attending these meetings did not know IndCo’s SAP system, this consultancy 
assignment required that IndCo’s IT employees made a number of presentations to SAP 
consultants, in which they explained how SAP had been implemented in IndCo and 
discussed upgrade issues. Each meeting involved between one and five IT members and 
one or two consultants. The meetings consisted in a mixture of oral descriptions and 
interactive discussions and of demonstrations of the implemented SAP system (and 
other related IT solutions). The researcher also attended a final meeting with 17 
participants, where the consultants’ diagnosis and recommendations about the upgrade 
were presented and discussed. Finally, later in the fieldwork, the researcher also 
attended a meeting, organised by the Shared Services Centre, in which four members of 
this centre described the reporting process to a newly hired IT member, resorting to a 
demonstration of the various tools (both SAP and non-SAP). 
The researcher was mainly a silent observer in these meetings, intervening only 
occasionally when a particular topic raised an especial interest. Observing these series 
of long meetings allowed the researcher to obtain insights about the perspectives, 
concerns and interests of the various parties, in a natural setting and in a relatively non-
obtrusive way. In addition, these meetings also allowed for the observation of SAP as 
an artefact being mobilised by human actors for particular purposes, as discussed next. 
As casual, informal observation activities, during the six working days which 
the meetings with the consultants took, the researcher was located, in-between meetings, 
                                                 
35 At the time, IndCo had SAP version 4.6c and was contemplating various upgrade options (SAP 2004b). 
Researching this upgrade process could be, in itself, an interesting (and emergent) research topic (e.g., 
explaining why it was mainly considered as a technical upgrade by IndCo’s actors; why technical 
concerns dominated the project; and why enhancements in the financial area were systematically 
downplayed or rejected by IndCo’s IT actors). However, this topic has not been developed. 
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in the open space office of the ‘functional’ teams supporting SAP. The researcher spent 
some days at a desk next to the SAP FI team, and others next to the SAP Sales and 
Distribution (SD) team. He also regularly had lunch and coffee breaks in the 
organisation canteen, together with the IT members and the consultants. These instances 
were useful to observe interactions, both between IT actors and between IT and non-IT 
actors (e.g., members of the Shared Services Centre and consultants). Additionally, 
these instances (along with occasional conversations, to be analysed below as a type of 
interview) facilitated the acceptance of the researcher in the organisation and the 
development of personal relations with organisational members. Later, during the visits 
to the plants, the researcher also had lunch with interviewees and individuals who were 
not interviewed. 
In addition to the benefits mentioned above, attending these meetings and having 
these informal contacts was particularly important in the exploratory stage of the 
fieldwork (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). It allowed the researcher to become 
familiarised with the (social and technical) natural setting of the organisation, including 
the particular language of organisational actors. Furthermore, it allowed sensitising the 
researcher about important organisational aspects. It allowed identifying, e.g.: ‘hot’, 
contemporary issues (e.g., the imminent start of the project to implement SAP product 
costing project); perceived important problems (e.g., persistent problems of lack of data 
reliability and consistency); organisational tensions (e.g.: between IT, users and 
consultants, and even within the IT area). These early insights, in an exploratory stage 
of fieldwork, were important to uncover potential research avenues and improve the 
conduction of other research methods (e.g., by revealing basic organisation-specific 
knowledge during the subsequent interviews). 
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In total, the researcher spent six days in the IT open space. During these days, 
the researcher attended eight meetings (the seven smaller-scale meetings plus the large 
final meeting), over more than twenty hours. The additional meeting organised by the 
Shared Services Centre took nearly three hours. Most of the meetings were recorded 
and, according their perceived research relevance, three of them (the two about SAP FI 
and the final meeting) were transcribed, almost in full, in a total of over nine hours. 
Annotations were taken as appropriate36, either in paper or, preferably, in a laptop37. 
4.2.2.5 Observation (and interpretation) of artefacts 
Yin exemplified “a physical or cultural artifact” as “a technological device, a 
tool or instrument, a work of art, or some other physical evidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 113). 
However, an Actor-Network Theory perspective has a particular concept of artefact, 
taking issue of a putative absolute distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘material’. As 
mentioned in section 3.4, in an ANT perspective, Law (1997, p. 4) argued that 
“relations of other [putatively non-social] materials are inserted into what we sometimes 
call ‘the social’” – like, symmetrically, “social relations aren’t simply social. Instead 
they are inserted into other materials”. “Relations (…) take the forms that they do, if 
they do (and they do so only contingently and often enough precariously) because they 
are performed, held in place, in a variety of different media: words; bodies; texts; 
machines; buildings. All mixed up. Materially heterogeneous”. Endorsing an ANT 
                                                 
36 The annotations extracted key aspects emerging during the several hours long meetings - which, 
because they unfolded in a natural setting and virtually unaffected by the researcher, were not exclusively 
directed to address the researcher’ areas of interest. These characteristics of most meetings made full 
transcription of their recordings unnecessary, and only annotations were used instead. Resort to the actual 
recordings was made when appropriate to complete, clarify and confirm annotations and recall particular 
passages. 
37 Using a laptop allowed greater speed than if notes were hand-written. It was considered that the IT 
environment of these meetings (in which various participants used laptops) and the background and 
observer role of the researcher (who typically did not intervene in the meetings) allowed the researcher’s 
usage of a laptop to be accepted as natural and not to interfere with the researcher’s relation with the other 
participants.  
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perspective, ‘artefacts’ were conceived as potentially constituting non-human actors 
(actants), considering their potential capacity to produce effects through socio-technical 
interactions – i.e., their potential inclusion as a part of the actor-network. E.g., as 
analysed in section 3.4, an Actor-Network is a quasi-object and SAP itself has been 
described as a quasi-object (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006). Two types of artefacts are 
analysed next: IndCo’s implemented systems; and non-IT artefacts. 
IndCo’s implemented IT solutions – in particular, SAP 
The key observed artefacts were IndCo’s implemented information systems. 
These observations were done in various occasions. As described above, in the various 
meetings the researcher attended, SAP and non-SAP systems were the basis for the 
presentations organised by IndCo’s actors to inform other actors (rather than the 
researcher) about implemented IT solutions in IndCo. In addition, one interview was 
organised mainly to present SAP’s production modules exclusively to the researcher. 
Finally, in some meetings occurring at the interviewee’s desk (at the Shared Service 
Centre and at a plant), interviewees mobilised SAP and other systems to describe 
aspects like accounting processes or accounts structures.  
Observation instances were rather diversified as regards the degree of tailoring 
to the researcher’s interests, but overall they were extremely useful. When the 
presentations were organised to meet the information needs of third parties, sometimes 
they focused on issues which were not a main concern to the researcher (e.g., SAP’s 
production modules); in other occasions, they became highly technical, beyond the 
researcher’s knowledge. However, this was the exception, rather than the rule. 
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Moreover, even from non-core presentations and from technical discussions, relevant 
insights were obtained. 
As such, presentations to third parties based on IT (in particular, SAP) 
mobilisation by IndCo’s actors were indeed an invaluable way to obtain both a general 
overview of IT solutions and architecture and detailed technical insights. Importantly, 
they allowed this without requiring an extensive time investment from the case 
organisation actors – which would likely be unfeasible, at least to achieve the in-depth 
analysis enabled by the presentations. 
Finally, apparently minor IT details were considered to reflect significant 
organisational issues. For example, the business cards (one of the non-IT artefacts 
analysed next) that interviewees provided when the fieldwork commenced still 
exhibited a recently-abandoned logic for the email service. Email addresses changed 
their termination from “IndCo_group.com” to “IndCo.com”, reflecting the reduction of 
the (historically high) influence of IndCo’s group over IndCo. 
Non-IT artefacts 
Non-IT artefacts also conveyed relevant insights. These observation 
opportunities arose in a mix of intended and unintended ways, during the interviews and 
beyond them. The ensuing text merely provides some examples, providing a summary 
explanation of their research relevance.  
A business card, exchanged at the start of the interview with a plant director, 
was an artefact upon which the interviewee drew particular attention. He mentioned that 
the inclusion of IndCo’s name and logo, next to the name of the subsidiary name, had 
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happened only recently – a change dictated by IndCo’s central structures and which was 
interpreted as a manifestation of the increasing relevance and visibility of IndCo’s 
organisational centre.38 
Common areas and offices where the interviews took place, and even the trips to 
the plants (as regards road signs), also provided research insights. E.g., the researcher 
paid attention to the references to IndCo’s name (rather than, or in addition to, local 
subsidiaries’ name) in the posters and in the product samples hung on the walls. 
Different plants (including a closed-down plant observed from the outside, beyond the 
planned visits) had different names and logos in the large signs outside the plants, which 
suggested a different balance between the importance of the local and central levels of 
the organisation. Photos hung on walls also revealed what the plants looked in the past 
(as regards the buildings and, in particular, as regards the names and logos in the outside 
signs), allowing the comparison with the present artefacts and the interpretation of 
identified changes. 
As mentioned, observation – and interpretation - even included road signs, along 
the local roads leading to one of the plants. These examples highlight that meaningful 
artefacts can be situated outside the organisation physical boundaries and reached 
beyond planned research instances. Moreover, these examples also highlight that 
observation should have a holistic concern, in line with the adopted holistic ontological 
and epistemological perspectives. 
                                                 
38 This example interestingly highlights that the researcher’s interpretation of the artefact did not rely 
solely on independent observation. Rather, the interpretation was shaped by the way the human actor 
mobilised the artefact, suggesting the organisational significance of a small detail which would otherwise 
go unnoticed by the researcher – particularly because the researcher would have no possibility to know 
which names and logos had been previously included in the business cards. 
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4.2.2.6 Interviews 
General considerations about the interviewing technique 
Interviews were a key source of information throughout the fieldwork, as typical 
in case studies (Yin, 2009). As discussed at the start of this subsection, in spite of the 
emergent adoption of a Foucauldian and ANT approach, the interviewing technique 
retained a key place in the research. The interview technique was hence both a way to 
collect ‘traces’ of actions of key members left on other members’ memory and (in an 
interpretative research aim not incompatible with a Foucauldian and ANT approach) to 
explore the meanings attributed by interviewees to organisational phenomena. 
Interviews were in-depth, face-to-face and almost always individual. The 
objective was to ask interviewees about “facts of matter as well as their opinions about 
them (…) and even ask the interviewee to propose her or his insights into certain 
occurrences” (Yin, 2009, p. 106). In general terms, they were fundamental to “provide 
an understanding of complex situations” (Moll et al., 2006b). Such insights were then 
used to orient subsequent fieldwork. To achieve these objectives, interviews were semi-
structured and open-ended, mostly as guided conversations. Interviewees could answer 
in their own words and were allowed to raise new issues, rather than being restricted to 
a structured and ordered set of queries (Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003; Moll et al., 2006b; 
Yin, 2009) with predetermined response categories (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). 
Occasionally, in some cases, previously obtained documents were emailed to 
respondents prior to the interview or exhibited at the time of the interview, identifying 
specific issues to be discussed. This was particularly relevant concerning SAP 
implementation plans, in order to research areas where the actual implementation 
(mobilisation) process differed from initial plans; since a considerable number of years 
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had passed, reviewing the original plan allowed the interviewee to recall it and better 
identify areas of divergence. 
These interviews may be considered to fit the “general interview guide 
approach” (Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p. 80, emphasis added). Like in the general 
interview guide approach, questions were intended to obtain information from 
respondents about recurrent topics about the case and they were tailored to each 
respondent’s particular position, experience and involvement with the research topic. 
These two orientations shaped what Yin (2009) labelled “level 1” questions, those 
questions which are asked to specific interviewees and which reflect the “level 2” 
questions (the lines of inquiry of the case). 
However, a new expression to characterise the adopted interview guide approach 
is here suggested: a ‘rolling interview guide approach’. In addition to the concerns of 
obtaining information about recurrent case topics in an interviewee-specific way, 
interview scripts (the ‘level 1’ questions) gradually evolved to reflect progresses in the 
fieldwork and case analysis (a particular consequence of using previous insights to 
orient the fieldwork, as mentioned above). Specifically, new questions were 
incorporated into a particular interview script to address previously developed insights 
and interpretations - to corroborate, reject and/or develop them. Moreover, previous 
questions were deleted from the script, when a particular topic was abandoned because 
it was considered that either it had already been sufficiently researched and clarified or, 
alternatively, it was not sufficiently relevant. This concern of deleting particular 
previous questions was crucial, since although interview time was usually quite 
reasonable (in average, one hour and three quarters), it is never unlimited. In addition, 
interview time is often found to be insufficient to analyse all topics from a given 
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interview script when greater latitude is conceded to the interviewee to determine the 
course of the interview and to pursue unplanned (yet potentially relevant) topics39. 
As such, the proposed expression ‘rolling interview guide approach’ 
encapsulates: 1) the existence of recurrent topics across interviews; 2) the tailoring of 
interviews to each respondent; and 3) the continuous critical analysis of the pertinence 
of including or excluding each particular topic, as a consequence of fieldwork and 
analytical progress. This approach, of course, merely reflects a particular concern within 
the ‘general interview guide approach’ (rather than being an opposite or exclusive 
alternative to it), to dynamically shape each interviewing encounter to reflect the 
dynamic, wider research process – a benefit which is particularly relevant in extended, 
longitudinal fieldwork such as the one of this research.  
In addition, the researcher held conversations with several actors, in particular 
(but not only) during the six days in which he stayed in the company (see above). These 
conversations approached the concept of an “informal conversation interview” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p. 80). However, the opportunistic (unplanned) nature 
and short time of these conversations made them fall short of the requirements which 
would be necessary were they to take a more prominent role for gathering information. 
These conversations ranged from highly informal (e.g., during work breaks, often as a 
general conversation) to somewhat more formal (e.g., after the final meeting between 
IndCo’s IT members and consultants, a conversion was held with a senior IT member, 
who conveyed his views and strategies regarding the meeting). Typically, questions 
were not previously selected; sometimes, there were no questions at all. These 
conversations contributed to obtain relevant insights and to a greater acceptance of the 
                                                 
39 As analysed below, the high percentage of respondents who were interviewed multiple times often 
allowed overcoming the problem of not being able to cover all topics planned for a given interview. 
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researcher among organisational actors, hence facilitating subsequent fieldwork (along 
the lines discussed in 4.2.2.3 “Direct observation”). Finally, some phone call 
conversations primarily directed to organise the fieldwork ended up by eliciting relevant 
insights, when these conversations evolved into other topics beyond the immediate, 
original purpose. 
The interviewees: selection criteria, identification and approach 
The initial interviews to obtain the agreement to cooperate from the consultancy 
firm and from the case organisation were held, respectively, with a senior consultant 
and a senior IT Director (see the start of this section). As mentioned, the latter become, 
in practice, the ‘representative’ of the organisation and a key informant.  
Subsequent interviewees were fundamentally selected based on purposeful, 
snowball sampling (Gil, 2007; Wloszczak, 2000). Given the initial research topic (long 
term interactions between the ERP, consultants and MAC), two main requirements 
defined the interviewees’ profile: having been involved with the ERP system40; have a 
long-term involvement with the company, in order to potentially have relevant insights 
about the long-term processes under research. Actors might have been involved with the 
ERP in two main ways. First, they might be, or have been, designers of the system - 
typically, but not exclusively, IT actors. Second, they might be, or have been, users of 
the system; however, given the large number of users, the target were actors from the 
accounting area and other actors who, in spite of not hierarchically belonging to the 
management control department, were nonetheless involved in management control 
                                                 
40 The requirement of involvement with the ERP included all actors from the accounting and management 
control area – even though the latter’s work was fundamentally based on non-SAP solutions, which 
mostly drew on SAP data. 
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(Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005); this last criterion led to the inclusion of various 
directors from both financial and non-financial areas. 
Having had a direct contact with the consultants was not a necessary condition to 
be a potential interviewee. In fact, actors who might not have had direct contact with 
consultants could still provide relevant insights about the other two factors (the ERP and 
MAC). In addition, even actors with no direct access to consultants (e.g., because the IT 
teams intermediated the contacts between them and the consultants) were not oblivious 
of the consultants’ role. Therefore, their perceptions about this topic were not irrelevant 
to the research, although they were awarded a less prominent importance when 
compared to the perceptions of the actors who had had direct contact with the 
consultants. 
According to this profile, the case company ‘representative’ initially suggested 
six actors, to be approached in the first round of (mostly exploratory) interviews. These 
initial six interviewees were directors with different levels of seniority and from the 
following areas: Management Control; the Shared Services Centre; Sales (two actors 
with different geographical responsibilities); IT; and the Business Processes and 
Organisation department. Either during of after the interviews, several of these 
respondents indicated other members (both from within and outside their teams) with 
potentially relevant insights and facilitated the scheduling of interviews involving their 
team members. In some cases, the snowball sampling technique was applied again to 
these lower level members – although their lower hierarchical level limited their 
capacity to take the initiative to promote meetings with other members. As such, when 
potentially relevant actors were identified during the interviews with lower level 
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respondents, the researcher sometimes had to contact the higher level respondents again, 
in order to authorise and facilitate meetings with those actors. 
Another important way to identify potential interviewees within the IT area was 
the researcher’s attendance of meetings, right at the start of the fieldwork (see above). 
The researcher then asked their hierarchical superior for authorisation to schedule an 
interview. 
Contacts with three actors in particularly high hierarchical positions and long 
term involvement with the company and/or its group were also obtained: a particular 
senior manager, a senior group director and a former senior group advisor. Contacts 
with plant level staff were also considered to be invaluable, particularly when issues of 
power took a central stage in the research. The criterion to select the plants to be visited 
was (beyond being in Portugal or in Spain, due to access limitations) that their plant 
director should have a long history in the company, so that they could provide first-hand 
insights regarding the empirical time frame, which starts in the early 1990’s. Newly-
hired plant directors would be of little use to provide insights about the organisation’s 
history. 
Finally, as regards the consultancy firm, its ‘representative’ directly promoted 
initial meetings with other involved consultants. The reduced number of consultants 
with relevant involvement and who were still in the company limited the use of the 
snowball sampling technique.  
The text above highlighted that individuals’ evaluated pertinence to clarify the 
research topics was a main criterion to select interviewees. This was also a main 
criterion for the researcher to attempt to contact particular interviewees multiple times, 
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as discussed below. Moreover, the text also highlighted the steps taken to deal with the 
challenges to access the field and its actors. The ensuing text reflects on the adopted 
categorisation of actors as ‘central’ actors, ‘local’ actors and consultants.  
Actors’ categorisation as ‘central’ actors, ‘local’ actors and consultants. 
In this study, actors are classified into one of three groups: ‘central’ actors; 
‘local’ actors; and consultants. Sunder (2010) highlighted the unsolvable, general 
problem of any categorical classification, which inevitably imposes upon the 
interpretation of the social setting a particular criterion, one among possible others. 
Such imposition from the researcher is hardly ever a ‘natural’ or ‘neutral’ one, and 
therefore the role of the researcher should be explicitly acknowledged. It may also be 
argued that the implicit classification criteria of ‘central’ vs. ‘local’ and ‘internal’ vs. 
‘external’ mirrors a quite traditional (and contested) view of organisations (e.g., 
Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005. However, even Quattrone 
and Hopper (2005) recognised that one of the organisations they studied did maintain a 
‘centre’ and ‘peripheries’, even in an ERP environment, and Hyvönen et al. (2008) built 
on ANT to understand how the ‘centre’ (the headquarters) developed visibility over 
‘local’ actors and ‘local’ sites. In addition, these criteria have indeed largely emerged 
from the fieldwork and the accounts of organisational participants - the way they were 
perceived and interpreted by the researcher. Therefore, it was considered that these 
categories of ‘central’ actors, ‘local’ actors and ‘consultants’ were adequate to frame the 
main perspectives and tensions at stake in the case study organisation.  
It should be emphasised that this classification applies to both individual and 
collective human actors, as well as to both human and non-human actors - in line with 
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the endorsed ANT perspective (see section 3.4) Collective human actors are the first 
main distinctive concept. Some examples are the SSC, the CC, the team of consultants 
and the collective of (local) plant directors (described in the next chapter has having, 
particularly in the past, significant power and the effective capacity to counter ‘central’ 
initiatives). A collective of multiple individual actors is something different from a 
simple aggregation of its individual components, in particular when this collective is 
somehow organised and ‘capable’ of producing effects – i.e., of having agency (Clegg, 
1989). It should be clear that the acceptance of the concept of collective actors implies 
neither the assumption of homogeneity (Law, 1997) nor overlooking individual actors. 
On the contrary, ANT emphasises the multiple individual actors interrelated within the 
network that each collective actor constitutes. Finally, it should be noted that although it 
was possible to identify the objectives and the repercussions of the activities of these 
collective actors, they obviously cannot be interviewed – only their individual members 
can. 
In addition, as stated, non-human actors may also be included in this 
classification - as central or local actors. However, it should be recognised that some 
classifications are not straightforward. E.g., SAP has been described as 
“heteromogeneous” (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006, p. 212), as a homogeneous 
technology while possessing diversity and attracting and generating heterogeneous uses. 
In this case, SAP, although it was (differently) used by both central and local actors, 
was considered as a ‘central’ actor, for two reasons. First, SAP was essentially under 
structural control of central actors (see section 6.1). Second, in an overall evaluation, 
SAP significantly supported the attainment of objectives of central actors who had been 
involved in its introduction and development within the organisation – while, on the 
contrary, a mix of positive and negative repercussions upon local actors was quite 
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noticeable (see chapters 6 and 7). On the other hand, certain IT solutions were classified 
as ‘local’ actors, such as the Excel spreadsheets locally developed and used by (local) 
plant controllers, which supported a significant degree of discretion to local human 
actors in their socio-technical relations, both with central and other local actors. 
Interviewees were categorised based on the position held when they were last 
interviewed (or when leaving the company, if the last interview occurred after the 
departure). Consultants were all included within the same category, given their reduced 
number, but IndCo’s interviewees were classified in smaller categories, reflecting their 
broad functional area and, in some cases, their hierarchical position. Ensuring 
interviewees’ anonymity (see subsection 4.2.1, p. 238) was a major concern; therefore, 
very specific categories were avoided. Central interviewees were functionally and 
hierarchically diverse. The case study analysis adopted four categories of central 
interviewees: 1) ‘IT members’; 2) ‘CC members’ (including Finance, Management 
Control and another Department focused on Business Processes and Organisation, 
although outside the CC structure); 3) ‘SSC members’; and 4) ‘senior managers’. This 
last group includes senior managers from other areas, including the CEO, the senior 
group manager and the senior group advisor. Local level interviewees were kept within 
a single category (rather than, e.g., distinguishing between plant directors and plant 
controllers), given their reduced absolute number.  
Key figures of the interview technique 
A total of 54 interviews were held with 29 actors, corresponding to 57 person 
interviews (in three occasions, two actors were interviewed simultaneously at IndCo’s 
headquarters). Total interviewing time amounted to over 90 hours, corresponding to an 
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average duration of one hour and forty minutes (varying from 50 minutes to three 
interviews over three hours long). Employees of the case organisation were interviewed 
in 44 occasions; the remaining 10 occasions corresponded to employees of the 
consultancy firm. One consultant involved in the implementation of SAP later became a 
member of the case organisation; according to the above criterion of classifying 
respondents based on their last position, this actor (interviewed twice) was not classified 
as a consultant, although his insights were important to understand the consultants’ 
perspective. 
Some figures are now presented as regards the adopted three broad categories of 
actors (‘central’ actors, ‘local’ actors and consultants). Central actors were interviewed 
42 times. The groups interviewed the most were IT (18 times) and the CC (11 times), 
but the two other categories were also well represented. The table below indicates this 
information for all groups, as well as the number of actors in each group and how many 
times each actor was interviewed. 
Number 
of actors Actors’ description 
Number of 
interviews 
Number of times each actor was 
interviewed 
6 IT members 18 (1 person x 8 times, 1 x 4, 2 x 2, 2 x 1) 
6 CC members 11 (1 person x 3 times,           3 x 2, 2 x 1)  
4 SSC members 7 (1 person x 3 times,           1 x 2, 2 x 1) 
5 Managers (in other functional areas) 6 (1 person x 2 times,                     4 x 1) 
21 TOTAL CENTRAL ACTORS 42  
Table 4.1: Distribution of interviews across ‘central’ actors (Source: developed by the 
author) 
From these 21 actors which, considering their current position, were classified as 
central actors, nine had previously held positions at a local level. The length and 
distance in time of the ‘local’ experience of these now central actors was varied. It is 
recognised that these once-local actors’ perspective was naturally influenced by their 
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current ‘central’ position and perspective and, in particular, by their current central 
membership (Munro, 1999). In spite of such limitation, they were useful to characterise 
the ‘local’ level, in particular regarding the past periods in which they were located in 
the local sites – an important contribution to the retrospective component of the 
research. 
Five local actors (two plant directors and three plant controllers41) were 
interviewed, in the same number of occasions. Three consultants were interviewed over 
10 occasions: the consultant acting as a ‘representative’ was interviewed five times; 
another consultant was interviewed four times; the third was interviewed once.  
As mentioned above in this section, the interviews were distributed throughout 
the three years’ period of the fieldwork; however, there were very different stages 
during the fieldwork, translating into some differences in the number of interviews in 
each stage. Figure 4.3 below depicts the interviews distribution along the fieldwork 
period on a semester basis42. 
                                                 
41 One local interviewee had been a plant controller for five years and had been very recently transferred 
to the logistic area. Given that this respondent’s experience was still virtually entirely based on the plant 
controller function (indeed, that was the reason why this individual was selected for interviewing), this 
respondent is here considered as a plant controller 
42 As indicated in footnote 28, an interview carried out in late 2009 was considered to be beyond the 
fieldwork period and was therefore excluded from the figure (whose figures only add up to 53 interviews) 
and from the remainder of this analysis. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of interviews across the fieldwork period, on a semester basis. 
(Source: developed by the author). 
The first year included not only a significant number of interviews (23), but also 
extended periods of observation (see above in this subsection). The very low number of 
interviews (only one) carried out during the first half of 2006 corresponded to the period 
in which the researcher awaited for authorisation to study the on-going implementation 
of an SAP module (see above in this section). Since this authorisation was refused in 
June 2006, access to other areas beyond IT became compromised and interviews during 
the second half of 2006 were restricted to the IT area and to the consultancy firm. These 
restrictions, associated with the need to re-evaluate the research project, justified the 
low number of interviews during this period (only four). The first semester of 2007 
included the interview with the senior manager that reopened the researcher’s access 
beyond the IT area and brought the issue of power to the forefront of the research (this 
was the 32nd interview). The number of interviews rose steadily after that: three more 
interviews in that semester (three had occurred before, in the IT area); seven in the 
second half of 2007; and eleven until April 2008, when the fieldwork was ended. As 
mentioned in subsection 4.1.4, 22 interviews occurred after positioning the topic of 
power as the centre of the research - a significant number of further interviews, 
providing additional focused insights. Importantly, these additional insights added to 
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those obtained through the first 31 interviews, whose transcripts and notes were 
reviewed with a particular concern on the new topic of power. 
One final characteristic of interviewees should be noted: a very high percentage 
of interviewees had a long company history. This characteristic is particularly pertinent 
to highlight the adequacy of the case organisation and the selected interviewees to 
research long-term processes, in particular with a strong retrospective component. The 
purposeful, snowball sampling technique allowed identifying a large number of actors 
with a long company history, with current or past organisational positions which were 
relevant as regards the research topics. Considering the last time each interviewee was 
contacted, more than one third of the interviewees had experience at, or with, IndCo for 
almost two decades; this percentage approached 50% for twelve years of experience and 
90% for six years or more. This demographic characteristic of a stable organisational 
membership, as well as an adequate sampling criterion, was indeed indispensable to 
allow researching past and long-term processes. 
The text above has already included data about the number of times that actors 
where interviewed. The ensuing text now reflects on the various advantages of having 
often interviewed respondents multiple times. 
The importance of multiple interviewing  
There was a recurrent concern to interview respondents multiple times. In fact, 
interviews to respondents who were contacted three or more times represented 47% of 
total interviews. This percentage rises to 72% when the threshold is placed at two or 
more contacts (41 person contacts, out of 57). 
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Several objectives made the researcher often attempt to obtain multiple 
interviews with the same respondent, particularly when the respondent was considered 
to be knowledgeable about the research topics43. One reason was related with the need 
to obtain in-depth insights. The initial interview time might not have been enough to 
cover, with the desired depth, all planned topics. Additionally, given the interviews’ 
open-ended nature, issues might emerge during the initial interview that could not be 
suitably developed during that encounter.  
Another reason was related with the on-going nature of the study. The 
development of the fieldwork and analysis raised issues about which further insights 
from previously interviewed actors could be particularly relevant. That was particularly 
the case when new research areas emerged.  
Another reason was related with data triangulation across several sources (with 
the caveats expressed about the limits of the triangulation concept). Seeking mutual 
support across information sources was particularly relevant in this study, since its long-
term and retrospective nature created particular challenges to the reliability – and even 
availability - of interviewees’ accounts. The reliability of interviewees’ accounts about a 
quite distant past may be compromised by their selective memory, forgetfulness or 
long-term post-rationalisation (e.g., Miles and Huberman, 1994; Christensen, 2005; 
Quattrone and Hopper, 2006; Silverman, 2005). These risks did materialise in several 
instances: sometimes, interviewees recognised that they did not recall specific events, 
and some detected information inconsistencies between sources were clearly 
attributable to forgetfulness, in particular as regards detailed, technical aspects. In a few 
                                                 
43 The researcher also considered the respondent’s perceived willingness to further cooperate. In the few 
cases where this willingness was perceived to be low, such request was usually not formulated, to prevent 
potential damages in the access to other actors. Furthermore, should international trips be involved, their 
cost (both financial and in terms of time) was also considered. 
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cases, recall problems, especially regarding detailed aspects, made the interviewee 
recommend additional contacts with other participants or call them on the phone for 
clarification or even to join the on-going interview. It is nonetheless acknowledged that 
these solutions to circumvent forgetfulness do not eliminate the overall risk of the 
interviewees wanting to appear knowledgeable and therefore ‘‘tell more than they really 
know’’ (Lillis, 2006, p. 471). 
A related aspect was that there were often lengthy intervals between interviews 
to the same respondent (several months or even more than two years). The long elapsed 
period between interviews had important benefits. First, it allowed a ‘fresh start’, 
reducing a possible constraining influence of the prior meeting. Second, it allowed that 
more (potentially conflicting) insights were generated from other sources and hence 
they could be triangulated. The third benefit is related with multiple interviewing in 
general: long period between interviews promoted that additional empirical and 
theoretical topics might have emerged after the previous interview; therefore, the 
subsequent interview could be more useful, both to obtain insights on those additional 
topics, as well as to allow triangulation. 
Finally, multiple interviewing also contributed to the longitudinal component of 
the research, by obtaining the views of the same respondents at different moments of 
continuously evolving change processes. 
Further details about interviews 
Virtually all interviews were digitally recorded. Interview recording lessened the 
need to take hand-written notes and allowed the researcher to concentrate on ‘real time’ 
and deeper analysis of the interviewee’s discourse (verbal and non-verbal), potentiating 
271 
 4.2 Detailed choices and characteristics in designing and conducting the case study 
4.2.2 Techniques to generate information 
interaction and the immediate detection and inquiry of particular points requiring further 
clarification or development. Interview recording was also indispensable to produce 
exact quotes, which enhances the credibility of inferences drawn (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1995; Moll et al., 2006b; Yin, 2009).  
Only seven interviews were not recorded: the two first interviews in the 
consultancy firm and the first interview in IndCo, in which the main topics were 
discussing the research project and negotiating access, at a time when personal relations 
were still at a very early stage; two interviews, upon respondents’ request; and two 
interviews whose relatively informal nature made using a recorder inappropriate. A 
technical problem caused the recording of one interview to be lost; the researcher wrote 
down immediately all the still very recent memories about the interview. In all 
unrecorded formal interviews, notes taken were particularly extensive. These extensive 
notes were then rewritten and complemented with the researcher’s memories, right after 
the interviews were held. 
Recorded interviews were then transcribed, in Portuguese, even when the 
interviews were conducted in Spanish. Although the researcher has a reasonable 
command of oral Spanish, his more limited spelling skills would render transcribing in 
Spanish considerably more difficult, without any clear advantage over the immediate, 
and relatively unproblematic, translation to Portuguese. As the case study analysis and 
write-up progressed, relevant interview sections were identified and translated into 
English. These translations were used in the analytical techniques described below and 
as quotes for the case study write-up. Exact quotes have been used in the case study, 
with very occasional and minor editing when needed. In the few non-recorded cases 
where no interview transcript was available, but where the respondent had provided 
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relevant insights, the researcher attempted to reconstruct the original sentences as 
accurately as possible, identifying these very few quotes as ‘approximate quotations’. 
4.2.2.7 Conclusion 
As in Soin et al. (2002, p. 253), “the research was an emergent process” where 
planned techniques of inquiry were blended with unplanned, opportunistic research 
possibilities. Planned interviews and meetings observation were particularly fruitful in 
creating opportunities to draw upon other techniques: e.g., interviewees might inform 
about future meetings and provide artefacts; the waiting periods before or in-between 
interviews and meetings potentiated observation of ‘socio-technical’ interactions. This 
‘emergent process’ of fieldwork was consistent with, and adequate to, the wider 
‘emergent process’ of case-study research, in which the “investigator can take 
advantage of changing opportunities, as well as shifts in theoretical concerns, to 
produce a (…) case study” (Yin, 2009, p. 71).  
This subsection described the techniques (documentation, observation of socio-
technical instances and interviews) mobilised to generate and collect information. The 
next subsection now focuses on analytical techniques, i.e., the techniques mobilised to 
analyse that information. 
4.2.3 TECHNIQUES TO ANALYSE INFORMATION 
There are various techniques to analyse, in an on-going basis as the fieldwork 
evolves, the information gathered up to each moment. Indeed, this on-going nature of 
information generation and analysis blurs the usual distinction between the two stages. 
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4.2.3.1 The evaluation, and rejection, of using computer-assisted techniques of 
analysis 
Moll et al. (2006b) confronted manual and computer assisted techniques of 
qualitative data analysis, noting that the former have tended to prevail in accounting 
research. There are numerous arguments in favour of such ‘modern’ techniques of 
analysis; e.g., in some strands of grounded theory, the usage of commercially available 
packages has become extremely popular. However, there is general agreement that by 
no means these techniques, by themselves, warrant more valid research results. As Yin 
(2009, p. 129) noted, “nearly all scholars express strong caveats about any use of 
computer-assisted tools” (p. 129).  
The researcher intended to have a de facto possibility to choose among ‘manual’ 
and IT-supported analytical techniques, without the common constrain of the 
researchers’ lack of knowledge about these IT tools (Moll et al., 2006b). In addition, the 
researcher had access to such commercial packages through his employer. Therefore, 
the researcher started evaluating IT commercial packages in 2005. Furthermore, in 
2006, he attended two courses at a Portuguese University (at an elementary level and at 
an advanced level) to learn about two particular solutions: N6 and, secondarily, 
NVivo44.  
This evaluation allowed the researcher to recognise that these IT tools have 
potential advantages, in particular to manage large volumes of data. Indeed, during the 
course of data analysis, the researcher did struggle with managing the over 1000 pages 
of annotated transcripts - more than twice the number of pages (500) that Creswell 
(2003) indicated as justifying the usage of specialised software. However, the researcher 
                                                 
44 The researcher had intended to attend the previous edition of such courses, in 2005, but there were no 
available places when registration was attempted. 
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also considered, along Moll et al. (2006b) that these IT tools “do not ensure that the 
important themes or patterns are identified” (p. 391). Moreover, the researcher had 
already developed a computer-based (yet ‘manual’) referencing system between the 
various stages of data analysis (see below), and considered that the commercial 
packages would provide little additional benefits as regards such linkages. Hence, all 
considered, the initial option of not using dedicated IT tools to analyse the empirical 
data was confirmed, and the analytical techniques described below were applied. 
4.2.3.2 Deployed analytical techniques 
Data analysis started by careful revisions of the transcripts and notes of the 
interviews (and meetings). Annotations were first included in each transcript file. Next, 
the most recurrently performed technique for analysing data was carried out: “creating 
data displays – flowcharts and other graphics” (Yin, 2009, p. 129). This technique was 
preferred over the alternative suggestion of “making a matrix of categories and placing 
the evidence within such categories”, since it was better suited to the actor-tailored, 
flexible interviewing strategy that was adopted. The researcher started by identifying 
categories in a deductive way, initially inspired by the theoretical framework and then 
by the ongoing empirical insights. Then, the transcripts were reviewed searching for 
additional insights related with those emerging categories.  
The main topics of analysis constituted the main structure of these displays. 
Under each main topic, various displays were created. Some of the displays were 
basically aggregations of insights and reflections about a particular topic, while other 
displays constituted a ‘causal’ network.  
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Linkages were created between the proposed displays and the original 
transcripts, with two simultaneous procedures. First, data was sorted within categories 
by copying transcript excerpts into categorical boxes in Microsoft ® Powerpoint ® (the 
selected excerpts were previously translated into English, to allow for examination by 
third parties and to provide the basis for subsequent case write-up). Second, a dual-
direction referencing system was kept between the original interview transcripts and the 
categorical frameworks (in the Powerpoint ® file). This dual-direction referencing 
system was then extended to the case report, hence maintaining a chain of evidence 
(Yin, 2009). 
Powerpoint ® functionalities allowed for a flexible manipulation of categorical 
boxes, as the fieldwork and analysis developed, contributing to the recommended 
‘playing’ with data (Yin, 2009). E.g., ‘boxes’ were shifted around, rearranged within or 
across slides45; relations (regarding, e.g., causality or temporal sequencing) were 
visually expressed through arrows or through encompassing larger figures; and 
‘syntheses’ were produced rearranging together multiple boxes after empirical details 
were deleted.  
Another manipulation suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), cited by Yin 
(2009, p. 129) was “putting information in chronological order or using some other 
temporal scheme”. This suggestion was implemented with the resort of various Excel ® 
spreadsheets, which chronologically represented various organisational aspects (e.g., a 
general company history; IT projects; organisational changes; key actors, etc.). This 
systematic representation of data not only helped organising the large volume of 
empirical information, but it was also a preliminary step towards inferring causal 
                                                 
45 Slides typically focused a particular, wide topic (e.g.: “IT integration”). But some topics (such as that 
particular one) with more theoretical ramifications or more empirical material extended for several slides. 
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relationships between events. (Obviously, while precedence is necessary to infer 
causality, it is nonetheless insufficient.) 
The search for, and testing of, rival explanations is a key step of any credible 
case study (Moll et al., 2006b; Yin, 2009). Throughout the analysis, serious 
consideration was given to examine whether the empirical insights could be explained 
differently – as regards particular interpretations of specific empirical insights and as 
regards wider theoretical conceptualisations, drawing from the (provisionally) adopted 
framework. Examining rival explanations was not an activity restricted to data analysis.  
Rather, this activity was taken to the fieldwork, as subsequent interviews attempted to 
generate additional empirical insights to corroborate, reject or develop the rival (as well 
as the proposed) explanations.  
It can be argued that a case study with holistic concerns may tend to 
accommodate complementary (though not exclusive) explanations. This creates ‘grey’ 
zones as to whether a particular explanation should be considered as rival or merely 
complementary. A paradigmatic case was the explanation of the SSC creation. The 
explanation most aligned with the emerging framework of power pointed out the 
objective to increase information and control (and power) of some central actors; a rival 
explanation indicated the (mostly economic) objective to reduce costs. This issue was 
explored in multiple interviews, sometimes with the same interviewee in different 
occasions, during which the tensions between these alternative explanations were 
explored.  
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the research design of this thesis, with the particular 
concern of conveying a processual view of research design – i.e., of research design as a 
process, related to a broad research strategy, with both deliberate and emergent 
components. This processual view entailed acknowledging non-linear research paths, 
their advances, drawbacks and uncertainties, rather than conveying a sanitised view of 
the research process (in line with the approach taken by various contributors to 
Humphrey and Lee, 2004). 
This chapter started, in the first section, by discussing fundamental assumptions 
and the initial choices regarding research topics, theories, methodology and method. 
Particular attention was devoted to justifying the option for the case study method and 
its main features. Then, it was highlighted how some of these assumptions and choices 
were questioned and re-examined, as the research progressed. The most relevant 
changes concerned the adoption of a new research topic and theoretical framework, 
requiring a discussion of the theoretical triangulation concept.  
The second section analysed more detailed aspects of the study. It analysed how 
the definition of the organisational and temporal scope was also subject to revision, as 
the project evolved, and it justified the option for anonymity taken. Then, it analysed, in 
separate subsections, the various techniques deployed to generate and analyse empirical 
information – whose theoretical interpretation is presented and discussed over the 
following three chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 – THE CASE STUDY: A FOCUS 
UNTIL THE END OF THE 1990’S 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The analysis of the case study organisation, anonymously referred to by the 
acronym ‘IndCo’ (standing for ‘Industrial Company’)1, is spread across the current 
chapter and the following two. As Czarniawska (1998, p. 2) suggested “[a] narrative, in 
its most basic form, requires at least three elements: an original state of affairs, an action 
or an event, and the consequent state of affairs” (see also Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 
2003). Each of the three chapters (5, 6 and 7) covers each element, respectively.  
The current chapter is the first building block of the case study narrative. Since 
“[c]reating meaning is always context-bound, and a narrative requires a plot to make it 
into a meaningful whole” (Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 2003, p. 222), this chapter sets 
the context of the case study and provides ‘the plot’ of the overall narrative. It provides 
general information about the organisation and key actors and a broad historical 
perspective. In addition, the current chapter characterises the organisation in more detail 
between the early 1990’s and the late 1990’s – occasionally using characterisations and 
examples of both previous and later periods, to emphasise the depth and persistence of 
certain traits. As clarified in chapter 4, the start of this period (early 1990’s) was chosen 
given the start of a new stage in IndCo’s general history (following an important 
                                                 
1 Given the confidentiality agreement mentioned in the previous chapter, details which might reveal the 
case organisation identity are omitted or disguised. Such details include the names of individual people 
and companies, the industry, the products, most countries and some time references. The majority 
shareholder is identified as Mr. A. The case organisation is identified as ‘Indco’ and the subsidiaries are 
identified according to their location (when disclosed). Most countries are not singled out, with the 
exception of Portugal, Spain and country ‘C’, as justified in the previous chapter. Finally, in most 
situations, time periods (rather than precise dates) are indicated as regards events more likely to be 
publicly known. 
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international acquisition) and in the specific field of IT (following the start of the in-
house development of information systems). The end of this period (late 1990’s) was 
chosen because the organisational and technological changes considered as relevant for 
this case study, as well as fundamental power shifts within the organisation, started 
unfolding at that time 
The next chapters focus on ensuing periods. Chapter 6 analyses the ‘action’ or 
‘event’ mentioned by Czarniawska (1998). It analyses the introduced technological and 
organisational innovations, actors’ motivations for introducing them, their expected 
repercussions and the implementation processes. Finally, chapter 7 analyses the 
‘consequent state of affairs’, the third element of the narrative, since it explores the 
repercussions which emerged throughout the years that followed, until the end of the 
fieldwork, in 2008. 
As discussed in chapter 4, no “linearity of time and evolution” (Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006, p. 222) is assumed. However (or, actually, precisely because of that), 
chronology roughly shapes the macro structure of the case study. Chapter 5 
encompasses the period until the late 1990’s; chapter 6 has a particular focus on the 
1998-2002 period, a time when evolution and change were clearly more drastic and 
non-linear; and chapter 7 encompasses the period after 1998 and until the end of the 
fieldwork, 2008. 
From a theoretical perspective, the first three sections of this chapter characterise 
the organisation and some key actors without imposing a particular framework. 
However, this initial characterisation identifies issues which provide clues to, and 
suggest the need of, the adoption of theoretical concepts and frameworks explored in the 
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previous chapters. For this purpose, the following two sections, 5.4 and 5.5, as well as 
the following chapter, adopt Clegg’s (1989) framework of circuits of power. 
The first section provides background data about the case study company and its 
industry, the economic group in which it is included, and a key actor in the company’s 
history – its chairman and majority shareholder. The second and third sections provide 
an overview of the company’s history up to the late 1990’s, based on a strategy of 
growth through acquisitions. The second section analyses the shifts in the location of 
formal decision centres and it argues that, taken as a whole, the case organisation could 
be described as a decentralised and diversified organisation. The third focuses on three 
particular functional areas (IT, production and accounting and finance). It concludes by 
preliminarily characterising the power (and limitations) of some actors, considering how 
the company’s history of acquisitions contributed to that.  
The fourth section develops the previous analysis of power and provides a 
theoretically structured answer to the first research question, which intended to explain 
why formally powerful, central actors at the case study organisation were confronted 
with power limitations. A preliminary conceptualisation of the empirical insights 
suggests the need to find the causes of power, distributed among various organisational 
actors. For such purpose, this section adopts the theoretical lens of Clegg’s framework 
of circuits of power. The fifth section discusses the interrelated nature of the circuits of 
power and provides two empirical illustrations. A final section summarises the chapter.
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5.1 THE INDUSTRY, THE COMPANY, THE GROUP AND THE 
MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER 
5.1.1 BRIEF INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION AND COMPANY HISTORY 
‘IndCo’ began its activity about half a century ago, as a small, family-owned 
company in Portugal. The products of IndCo’s industry are well-established, simple, 
low-technology and relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated, almost commodities. 
IndCo’s products are mostly targeted at two industries, whose players may purchase 
directly to IndCo or through retailers. 
Evolution at the core product level has been very slow. Major innovations, such 
as fundamental new product characteristics or distinctly new products, take decades to 
happen; innovation efforts are therefore mostly targeted at the production process itself. 
Overall, IndCo’s industry is mature, as it already was when IndCo was founded. The 
industry suffers from long-standing, structural over-capacity. In addition, demand is 
cyclical, as it is strongly influenced by global economic cycles. As a result, the market 
is quite volatile, with cyclical and frequent unbalances between offer and demand.  
Growth through acquisitions has historically been the prominent strategy of 
IndCo, pursuing a policy of having majority or absolute control in all acquired 
companies (with very few and recent exceptions). For several decades, IndCo pursued 
horizontal and vertical growth strategies within Portugal, through a mix of acquisitions 
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and organic growth. In the late 1980’s, IndCo made its first international acquisition and 
became established in international markets as a high-quality, low cost producer.2 
In the 1990’s, a strategic decision for globalisation was taken. In the early 
1990’s, IndCo purchased a controlling position in a Spanish competitor. At the time, the 
acquired company had a large greenfield project already underway in another country, 
rather distant from the other IndCo’s locations; industrial operations started in mid 
1990’s. This acquisition was extremely important in IndCo’s internationalisation 
process, as it expanded the company’s industrial presence from two to four countries 
and approximately doubled the number of plants and their capacity. 
After integrating this acquisition, a strategy of organic growth was defined, but 
the search for acquisition opportunities did not actually end. In late 1998, IndCo seized 
the opportunity to acquire a large competitor of country C, with production activities in 
two countries. This acquisition, combined with greenfield investments in several 
countries, substantially increased IndCo’s international presence by the end of the 
1990’s. Until the early years of the 21st century, IndCo continued its global business 
expansion cycle, diversifying the product range and modernising technical assets. IndCo 
carried out additional (smaller) national and international acquisitions, started-up 
greenfield plants and modernised and created new lines of production in existing plants. 
However, after this period of investment, the sector went into strong recession, 
characterised by industry overcapacity and decreasing prices. Reductions in margins led 
to a significant deterioration of IndCo’s financial performance. Operational and 
                                                 
2 This characterisation was made by a case study about IndCo’s group, published in 2001 in a refereed 
academic journal. Reference omitted for confidentiality reasons. 
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financial recovery was only felt after market recovery (demand increase and reduction 
of capacity through elimination of competitors’ plants, hence leading to price and 
margin increases) and turnaround programs developed by IndCo’s management.  
In the second half of the decade, IndCo performed additional acquisitions and 
opened an exception to its policy of having controlling positions, by creating a joint-
venture with a competitor. By the end of the decade, the global economy crisis started to 
affect the company’s performance. In spite of IndCo’s improvements since the start of 
its international expansion, IndCo remains inevitably exposed to the industry’s cyclical 
nature. 
As a consequence of this long history of international expansion, IndCo has a 
high geographical dispersion of its assets and markets. On the other hand, its products 
are relatively homogeneous. Therefore, both business risk and profitability are mainly 
dependent on the geographical aspect and, only secondarily, on business diversity. This 
is reflected in the management and financial reporting to the Board, structured primarily 
according to the geographical location of IndCo’s assets. 
5.1.2 THE CREATION OF A DIVERSIFIED GROUP AND THE MAJORITY 
SHAREHOLDER 
Two aspects had a significant impact in the evolution of IndCo: the diversified 
group which has developed from IndCo; and its long-standing majority shareholder and 
chairman, Mr. ‘A’. First, as regards IndCo’s group, investments outside the original 
core business were made since the 1980’s. This strategy of diversification still continues 
today. Separate holdings have long been created to promote a greater focus and 
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development of each core business, allowing the management of each business unit 
(such as IndCo) to be largely autonomous. 
The development of IndCo and its group is intimately linked with Mr. A – 
identified by the first letter of the alphabet because he was the ultimate and undisputed 
source of formal power in IndCo and in IndCo’s group, throughout the extended 
empirical time frame of this research (from the early 1990’s until 2008) and even 
beyond this period. He became the company’s CEO and key shareholder several 
decades ago, later acquiring majority control. The case study mentioned in footnote 2 
(above in this chapter) emphasised the importance of this particular individual in the 
development of the entire group. Mr. A maintained a complete and undisputed 
ownership over his various companies, with an active involvement in the business. 
Though the group management is widely regarded as being extremely professional, the 
ultimate control remains in the hands of Mr. A and his family.  
5.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMPANY UP TO THE LATE 1990’S 
This section characterises the company up to the late 1990’s. As clarified, both 
this section and the next are not structured by a particular theoretical framework. 
However, the insights of both sections gradually highlight the importance of the issue of 
power, to be explored later in the chapter in a theoretically informed and structured way.  
The first subsection analyses how the location of IndCo’s major formal decision 
centres (both individual and collective actors) shifted during the 1990’s. The second 
subsection characterises IndCo as a decentralised, autonomous and diverse company, 
largely due to its growth strategy through acquisitions. This subsection introduces the 
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view (to be developed in the following section) that by the late 1990’s IndCo’s 
decentralisation, autonomy and diversity led to a number of difficulties to actors who 
had an interest in the company as a whole, from a central perspective. These actors 
(labelled as ‘central’ actors, as justified in the previous chapter) struggled with lack of 
centralised information and central coordination, integration and control of autonomous 
and diverse subsidiaries and plants. In addition, these ‘local’ actors (individual and 
collective actors) differed from the central actors, as regards some interests, concerns 
and perceptions of the interests of the company as a whole. As a consequence, some of 
the formally powerful central actors were confronted with a number of power 
limitations. The third and final subsection consists of a brief reflection on the period 
prior to the 1990’s decade. 
5.2.1 SHIFTING LOCATION OF FORMAL DECISION CENTRES 
5.2.1.1 Ownership, top management and corporate centre locations 
IndCo’s main shareholder, Mr. A, has owned the company since the early 1980’s 
and he always had a strong intervention in the global management of both the company 
IndCo and the entire holding. He was always IndCo’s chairman of the Board of 
Directors, though much of the daily management was led by the other directors (or by 
the Executive Committee, during the periods when this body existed)3. As mentioned 
above, Mr. A was, for decades, the ultimate and unchallenged source of formal power. 
Until the early 1990’s, IndCo’s top management, including Mr. A, was located 
in Portugal. The acquisition of the Spanish competitor in the early 1990’s introduced a 
                                                 
3 The name of Mr. A’s position varied as the governance structure changed. However, regardless of his 
actual position within the governance structure, Mr. A had the ultimate say in the most important issues. 
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novel configuration of the highest level decision centres. After the acquisition, most of 
IndCo’s top management moved to Madrid – with the notable exception of Mr. A, who 
always remained in Portugal. Interviewees provided several reasons for this top 
management shift to Spain, two of which are now mentioned4. First, the acquired 
company had a similar dimension to IndCo, and its integration required substantial 
managerial attention. Second, it allowed top management to be located where the largest 
number of plants were, i.e., to be at the group’s geographical centre.  
Along with the move of most of IndCo’s top management to Madrid, a 
Corporate Centre also developed there, based on the CC of the acquired Spanish 
company. As the years passed, the Spanish CC encompassed an increasing number of 
functions, replacing the previous CC in Portugal. As a CC member explained,  
“All corporate structure had, in practice, migrated to Madrid. (…) The 
Portuguese corporate team had one single, part-time person. (…) Even 
though the decision centre [Mr. A] had not moved, in practice it had been 
totally transferred: the top manager of IndCo was there, Human 
Resources were there, everything was there.” (synthesised quotation) 
Some interviewees suggested that the maximum influence of the Spanish CC 
may have been reached around 1998, when the chairman of the Executive Committee 
became a non-Portuguese. He was from a Hispanic country5 and only had a very short 
two-year history within IndCo’s group. His profile was substantially different from the 
one of his predecessors, as a senior manager reflected: 
“[Before 1998,] IndCo’s CEOs alternated between [person X, person Y 
and person Z]: all Mr. A’s trusted people, who had been in the group for 
                                                 
4 Corporate governance-related issues also promoted this shift. However, since such disclosure might 
compromise the organisation anonymity and is not essential for this study, these issues are not discussed. 
5 Portuguese interviewees often identified this CEO as Spaniard, given his location in Spain and Spain’s 
historical and linguistic links with the CEO’s country of origin (not identified to preserve anonymity). 
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many years. [On the other hand, the new CEO] was a recent arrival. He 
had done some consultancy work for IndCo’s group, (…) Mr. A liked him 
and decided to hire him to IndCo.” 
Therefore, several interviewees reported that by 1998, in practice, the main 
decision centre was located in Spain. Although the ultimate decider, Mr. A, always 
remained in Portugal, he had now less opportunities to actively intervene in the daily 
management of the business, given his geographical distance from the top managers and 
the supporting structures. 
The following years witnessed a marked return back to Portugal: the gradual 
transfer to Portugal of the Corporate Centre (CC), starting in 1999; the creation in 
Portugal of a Shared Services Centre (SSC), in 2000; and the re-establishment in 
Portugal of a Portuguese-led top management in 2001. Understanding these shifts of 
key people and organisational structures, in particular as regards related power issues, is 
crucial for this thesis. Such understanding requires a more detailed analysis of the 
context which preceded these shifts (in the remainder of this chapter), as well as their 
motivations, processes of introduction and consequences (in the following chapters).  
5.2.1.2 The particular case of the location of IT organisation 
The Information Technology (IT) area has a particular relevance for this case 
study. The location of its staff and leadership also shifted during the 1990’s - but not 
totally in line with the top management shifts described above. The creation of an 
important IT team dates back to the late 1980’s. In 1989 and 1990, IndCo hired a large 
number of systems engineers to develop, in-house, a new operational system. This IT 
team was based in IndCo’s headquarters, in Portugal. In addition, during the 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, there were also IT teams in each plant, which not only performed support 
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activities, but also carried out some minor developments. The existence of local IT 
teams could be justified by technical reasons, since each plant had a separate installation 
of the same operational system; however, from an organisational perspective, their 
existence was also in line with the general autonomy of individual sites. 
The acquisition of the Spanish group in the early 1990’s and the ensuing transfer 
of top management and CC to Madrid also affected the IT area – but only for a short 
period. In 1995, IT leadership became shared between a Portuguese and a Spaniard, 
both reporting directly to the CEO and each leading his own IT team. Each team was 
partly specialised in certain tasks, but still had significant independence – which, e.g., 
allowed the Spanish IT team to carry out projects without the involvement of the 
Portuguese team and with a sole focus on the Spanish organisation, such as the Spanish 
SAP project, briefly discussed in the next chapter (page 382 and following). However, 
this dual structure was eliminated in 1998, due to unsatisfactory results. Therefore, the 
Portuguese leader regained formal power over the entire IT area. Additionally, in 1998, 
the IT teams of the acquired companies (in two countries) were also incorporated within 
IndCo’s IT structure.  
A new organisational model of the IT area, based on two levels, was then 
adopted: a ‘Global IT’ team, based in Portugal; and country-level IT teams. The ‘Global 
IT’ team concentrated all the development of new solutions, their roll-out across 
countries and most support activities. On the other hand, IT teams at country and plant 
levels were highly reduced, and their role became restricted to user-support and 
interface with the ‘Global IT’ team.  
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Since then, IndCo has devoted significant efforts to the IT area. Interviewed 
external consultants considered the ‘Global IT’ team as significantly larger and 
possessing significantly more competencies than the IT departments of an average 
Portuguese company. 
5.2.1.3 Conclusion: shifting formal decision centres at a glance 
Summarising the current subsection, figure 5.1 below depicts the location of 
formal, hierarchical power sources, in terms of company ownership, top management 
and IT leadership.  
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Figure 5.1: Formal power shifts between Portugal and Spain (Source: developed by the 
author) 
IndCo’s ownership has always remained under the control of Mr. A, as the main 
shareholder, in Portugal. Top management, including the CEO, was transferred to Spain 
after the acquisition in the early 1990s’, along with the supporting CC. In 1999, the 
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management structure started being transferred again back to Portugal, starting by a 
gradual transfer of the CC and culminating in 2001 with the appointment of a 
Portuguese CEO, located in Portugal. As regards the IT department, formal power and 
the main organisational structure were again centred in Portugal in 1998 (i.e., before a 
similar shift happened in the company as a whole). The next subsection provides a 
general description of key organisational characteristics in this period. 
5.2.2 AN ACQUISITIONS-BASED HISTORY OF A DECENTRALISED AND 
DIVERSE ORGANISATION 
IndCo’s history of acquisitions, in particular at an international level, promoted 
the development of a very decentralised and diverse organisation. The present 
subsection only sketches with a broad brush the origins and the main characteristics of 
this decentralisation and diversity, from the early 1990’s until the end of the 1990’s; the 
subsection finalises by providing brief insights about the period before the early 1990’s. 
A more detailed characterisation, focusing on different functional areas, is postponed to 
the next section.  
5.2.2.1 Decentralisation and autonomy 
Decentralisation and autonomy were salient features during the 1990’s, and they 
could be found both at plant level and at country level. As already described, throughout 
its history, IndCo acquired several companies (owning one or multiple plants) which 
were previously autonomous. Naturally, those acquired companies had organisational 
structures and capabilities which allowed them to operate independently.  
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This decentralisation and autonomy became more salient when IndCo’s 
international expansion accelerated, in the early 1990’s (see the next subsection). 
Although there were corporate centres in the multiple-plant companies (such as those 
acquired in the early 1990’s and in 1998), plants were far from being mere production 
centres; typically, plants also possessed local structures related with commercial, 
purchasing, financial, accounting and some IT support activities, making them (at least) 
partially autonomous in those areas. As a senior manager stated, in two different 
interviews6: 
“What we most often found [in the companies we acquired] were plants as 
business units, which had their own commercial and productive 
structures.”  
“From a control point of view, we had a number of companies (…) and 
each company had its own administrative and accounting processes, all 
that stuff. And everything was carried out locally. There was no 
integration. But that (…) is more related with the organisation, rather than 
the software [that was later implemented].”  
Even after the acquisitions, those structures, capabilities and autonomy, and a 
lack of central integration, mostly remained, at least during a first stage. Keeping a 
decentralised structure was also supported by a business characteristic: the 
transportation costs of IndCo’s raw materials and products are quite high. This favours 
that each plant should operate in a geographically defined and not very wide market 
(rather than in a very wide, even unrestricted market), both in terms of suppliers and 
clients7. So, traditionally, and especially before multiple-plants sourcing became 
                                                 
6 This introductory subsection mostly quotes a particular senior manager, due to the higher-level and 
more general nature of his comments. However, other interviewees were crucial to the development of 
these insights and they are quoted during the discussion of more detailed aspects, during the remainder of 
this chapter. 
7 The near-commodity nature of many of IndCo’s products and raw materials might suggest that wide 
geographical markets could exist. Recent European Commission official documents (references omitted 
for confidentiality reasons) suggested that the markets of some of IndCo’s products should be viewed as 
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current, interactions and commonalities between the various plants tended to be not 
significant, in particular at an international level. Consequently, there were fewer 
incentives for a centralising approach and more incentives to the preservation of units’ 
autonomy. 
Each country was also rather autonomous regarding IndCo’s corporate centre. 
Each of the multi-plant foreign countries had their own corporate centre – the ones 
which existed prior to their acquisition by IndCo. As regards single-plant countries8, the 
plants possessed the organisational structures needed for a highly autonomous 
operation. Although with some variation across countries, IndCo’s CC in Portugal 
generally played a minor role in the everyday planning, management and control of 
each country. A senior manager described this autonomy by characterising the first 
international subsidiary during the 1990’s. That subsidiary was…  
… “perfectly apart [from Portugal], at the time there were no connections. 
IndCo’s CEO visited the subsidiary each two months. Contact was done 
mostly by phone. And then there were the monthly reports, of course, 
closing the books and all that stuff. It had its own rhythm, it was highly 
independent.”  
The same interviewee added that around 1997 (i.e., before the large acquisition 
in 1998), IndCo was…  
                                                                                                                                               
geographically wider, and the transportation costs as lower, than what was suggested by the respondents. 
However, this characterisation may not equally apply to the markets of all products manufactured by 
IndCo and it clearly does not apply to the markets of some of IndCo’s key raw materials; such markets 
are smaller, in particular as regards raw materials. In addition, multiple-plants sourcing was more reduced 
in the past, in particular due to technological limitations. All the previous reasons support the 
organisation’s policy that the relevant geographical markets for each plant should be clearly defined and 
ideally not very wide. Naturally, this policy does not preclude the existence of some long distance 
transactions of IndCo’s products; however, they are costlier and hence, a priori, potentially less attractive. 
8 During the 1990’s, one of these countries had a second unit, but of a very small size; therefore, although 
the larger plant ensured most responsibilities, it could not really be considered a corporate centre. 
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… “still a relatively small – and isolated – set [of sites]. There were no 
major connections – except here, in the Iberian Peninsula. [The single 
plant] in [a particular country] had its own General Manager, in [another 
country] there was another General Manager. And so the information 
flowed a bit like… There was no cohesion, let’s put it this way.”  
The 1998 acquisition of an important competitor in country C (with plants in two 
countries) required drastic interventions to address its problematic situation9. However, 
in spite of this particular drastic intervention at a subsidiary level, the overall picture 
continued to be one of lack of intervention and coordination in the way the various 
regions were run. The same interviewee described how, in 2002, two directors split the 
responsibility of the countries outside the Iberian Peninsula. Their management 
approaches were drastically different, in particular as regards the degree of local 
empowerment and central intervention. Each approach was implemented … 
…“ because that was what each director thought to be the correct way. 
There was no strategic orientation. At the time (…) each one (…) did what 
thought to be the best.”  
In spite of this scenario of important autonomies at various organisational levels 
(plant, country and multiple-countries levels), there was not a complete absence of 
orientation and control from IndCo’s corporate centre, either. Strategic guidelines and 
broad objectives were set for each country. Control also existed, although typically on a 
periodic basis only, with a strong emphasis on financial control and heavily relying on 
the information provided by local teams.  
However, the lack of a global “cohesion” across the company was a dominant 
trait, both during the 1990’s (the temporal focus of this section) and even stretching into 
the start of the first decade of the 21st century. In brief, at the time,… 
                                                 
9 This drastic intervention included the dismissal of all top management one year after the acquisition and 
the closure of the corporate centre one year after that. 
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“We were an amalgam of plants, not a company.” (IndCo’s senior 
manager, in a public presentation) 
5.2.2.2 Diversity 
In addition to decentralisation and autonomy, there was also considerable 
diversity across the company sites during the 1990’s. This diversity can also be partly 
attributed to the company’s history of acquisitions. A strategy of acquisitions inevitably 
implies buying companies and sites which are, to a greater or lesser extent, different. 
So, when compared to a greenfield growth strategy, it is inevitable that IndCo’s 
acquisition-based growth strategy has created a greater diversity across companies and 
individual sites. 
Additionally, the small and separated geographical markets, promoted by the 
high transportation costs, also favoured diversity. In as much as the markets of the 
various units did not overlap10 and exhibited different characteristics, there was a 
rationale for specific (and hence diverse) management practices across countries or even 
plants. However, the international acquisitions in the late 1980’s and during the 1990’s 
was, indeed, crucial in shaping IndCo’s diversity. 
This diversity could be found at different levels, such as practices, rules, beliefs 
and identities. This diversity is discussed in greater detail in the following sections; 
therefore, only a brief and preliminary characterisation is made at the moment. 
                                                 
10 As already mentioned, IndCo avoided markets overlapping by defining ‘natural markets’ for each plant. 
However, before and shortly after some acquisitions, some plants belonging to the same company (in 
particular, while the acquired companies were still not under IndCo’s control) did compete with each 
other over the same clients, from the same geographical area. 
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Differences across sites included several types of practices. Financial practices 
differed, e.g., in their timeliness; accounting procedures and guidelines were not equally 
applied everywhere; even the design and organisation of the financial processes varied. 
Production practices across plants varied, ranging from strictly productive activities, to 
interface activities between the production and the commercial area (e.g., the time taken 
to indicate a delivery date for a given customer order). The IT department was already, 
to a large extent, centralised; yet, IT support still existed in each site, and even doing 
some minor solution development. This local presence of IT staff led to some variation 
across locations in the IT areas, although less significantly than in the financial and 
production areas.  
The level of rules and taken-for-granted beliefs11 is particularly developed in 
subsections 3 to 5 and throughout the entire third section. For now, it suffices to say that 
prevailing rules and beliefs at local levels were diverse, not only between the various 
local sites, but also (and particularly) vis-à-vis the prevailing ones at a central level. The 
differences in practices described above could be in part attributed to the enactment of 
different sets of rules and beliefs. 
Actors’ organisational identity can be conceived as a particular type of belief. It 
can both refer to a particular, singular actor, or to a plurality of actors. Actors’ 
organisational identity consists of a sense of belonging to, of inclusion in a particular 
and distinctive group, and it is deeply related with the sense of membership12. Here, 
                                                 
11 The very brief characterisation of rules and taken-for-granted beliefs (i.e., institutions) made at this 
point makes a joint analysis of both aspects an acceptable simplification. However, the close ties between 
them has recently been emphasised (Burns, 2008), up to the extent of recommending their joint inclusion 
in the institutional realm of organisations. 
12 Munro (1999) depicted membership as provisional, something which was not given by nature or by the 
formal inclusion in a particular group, but rather had to be achieved through the actors’ conduct – by the 
actors’ ‘membership work’. The ensuing discussion adopts this important alternative concept of 
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identity is analysed from the perspective of a plurality of actors. Local identities (the 
sense shared by actors of a particular local site that that site is somehow individual and 
unique and that, as a collective, local actors are included in such a group) were strong 
and enduring.  
Although the relevant dimensions of identities are the psychological and the 
sociological dimensions (as regards the individual and collective senses of identity), 
there are related legal and formal aspects which may impact the sense of identity. In 
particular, the official company names and commercial brands of the acquired firms 
were typically preserved for many years after the acquisitions, as the ensuing text 
explores.  
As regards the companies’ legal denomination, two examples are revealing: a 
plant acquired in Portugal in the mid 1980’s only adopted IndCo’s name about 20 years 
later, and Spanish plants acquired in the early 1990s still preserve the Spanish name 
today. Typically, even in those cases where the official name was changed into IndCo’s 
(such as the Portuguese plant mentioned above), many employees and the external local 
community kept using the original names for many years after the change – even today. 
Interestingly, in country C, some employees identify themselves neither with IndCo nor 
with the group which IndCo acquired in 1998; rather, they still identify themselves with 
a company which preceded the group acquired in 1998, as pointed out by several 
Portuguese respondents.  
                                                                                                                                               
membership. For now, the more current sense of membership as associated with the inclusion in a 
particular group is used. 
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Not only were the original names preserved, but there were few efforts to 
increase the visibility of the group name. For example, in a Spanish plant built in 2001 
(long after IndCo’s acquisition of the Spanish group, in the early 1990s), a respondent 
pointed out that only very recently their business cards incorporated IndCo’s name and 
logo, alongside the Spanish name.  
As regards commercial brands, the overall, long-standing policy has been to 
preserve existing local brands, due to their high recognition among local market players 
(in particular, clients). In fact, recognition was far higher in terms of the commercial 
brands, rather than in terms of the names of the companies that produced or distributed 
the products.13  
Identification with the local sites, rather than with the group, was found to have 
strong links with prevailing rules and beliefs, which when enacted had practical 
consequences. This local identification promoted the emergence and acceptance of rules 
with a local focus, which then affected how actors determined appropriate courses of 
action in practical issues. A member of the Shared Services Centre (SSC) provided 
several revealing examples14, such as in the complaint that… 
… [For some local people], “what matters to them are the [local] tax 
statements. ‘The group, it’s their problem, they’ll find a solution’. (…) 
Three or four weeks ago, we had a situation like that. The [local] person 
told us ‘Here, I do it like this. You guys there [at the centre]… basically, 
find your way around!’ [laughter between researcher and respondent]”.  
                                                 
13 In a related perspective, the low recognition of the names of the companies favoured IndCo’s 
acquisition plans. Should local companies be acquired and even disappear (by fusion or other means), it 
was expected that keeping the previous, local commercial brands would preserve the value of their 
recognition in the marketplace. 
14 Additional examples are provided throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
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These tensions between local and global identification, concerns and priorities 
are further illustrated and explored along the text. The quote above makes the point that 
these tensions were prevalent for a long period, and some still remain today – although, 
as the interviews also made clear, at a much lower level than a decade ago. 
5.2.2.3 Conclusion 
During the 1990’s, IndCo drastically expanded its industrial presence through 
international acquisitions, making it increasingly dispersed and, in particular as 
concerns foreign subsidiaries, quite autonomous and diverse. In general, the corporate 
centre had a reduced role, based on the definition of broad strategic guidelines and 
control. So, by the end of the 1990’s, IndCo was a rather typical multinational (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1991).  
5.2.3 LOOKING FURTHER BACK: A BRIEF NOTE ON THE PERIOD BEFORE 
THE 1990’S AND A CLARIFICATION 
IndCo’s description in this section focused on the 1990’s. As regards the 
previous, 1980’s decade (and, for the same reason, as regards decades before that), 
being a particularly remote period, the potential relevance of a detailed study was 
considered to be naturally more limited, when compared with the 1990’s – even in a 
retrospective study as this one. As such, the efforts put into researching such a distant 
past were, comparatively, less intense. 
In addition, there were various difficulties in researching the 1980’s and before. 
Few respondents had been at the company before the 1990’s. So, obtained insights were 
more limited, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Fewer respondents could provide 
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information and the amount and detail of information that each respondent could 
provide was lesser, in particular due to recall limitations – which, in turn, also 
potentially diminished information accuracy. Moreover, and importantly, data 
triangulation possibilities were reduced. Finally, when respondents were asked about 
the period before the events focused on this thesis (which occurred in the late 1990’s 
and after), they tended to describe the 1990’s, rather than previous decades. All these 
research difficulties diminished the plausibility and trustworthiness of a characterisation 
of the 1980’s and before (see 4.2.2.2, on the concepts of data triangulation, plausibility, 
trustworthiness and internal reliability). 
However, a brief analysis of the 1980’s can be made and is not unimportant – in 
particular because it allows identifying the acceleration of the internationalisation 
process in the early 1990’s as a key factor shaping the characteristics of IndCo. One 
respondent was particularly useful to characterise this earlier period.15  
Contrary to the insights obtained from the other respondents, this respondent 
argued that IndCo was, during the 1980’s, a quite integrated company, as far as Portugal 
was concerned16. Even though the acquired companies maintained their juridical 
independence, he argued that production, commercial and financial activities were 
                                                 
15 This respondent had an important position in IndCo’s CC for several years, until the early 1990’s. His 
insights about the 1980’s were particularly relevant, for four reasons. First, because of his first hand 
experience in an organisation-wide function. Second, because having left the company in the early 
1990’s, he had not experienced the major internationalisation period, from the early 1990’s onwards; 
therefore, his views were not influenced by IndCo’s later evolution. Third, because he was interviewed 
very late during the research, after all the fieldwork had long been done and the case study write up was 
almost finished; therefore his views were compared with the insights provided by all other respondents – 
which, as mentioned, tended to focus on the 1990’s. Fourth, because the entire two-hours interview was 
focused on the 1980’s – something never done in previous interviews, not least because interview time 
was typically allocated to more recent periods, considered to be more relevant to the research. 
16 As regards the only country beyond Portugal where IndCo had production activities at the time, the 
respondent confirmed that the subsidiary was very autonomous as regards the Portuguese headquarters. 
However, this subsidiary represented only a small part in IndCo’s activity; therefore, Portugal is the main 
focus of his (and this) analysis. 
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planned in a group perspective. For example, as regards the production area, production 
planning had to be coordinated in a group perspective, since several plants were 
producers of materials to be used by other plants. He recalled that many plant directors 
had close relationships and cooperated in sharing best practices - although admittedly in 
a limited extent. In the commercial area, even though the companies might have 
commercial employees located in their sites, these employees were integrated in a 
central commercial structure (a trading company owned by IndCo, which interfaced the 
production units and the clients). Several financial activities were also centrally 
coordinated, ranging from capital structure issues to treasury management. 
Relationships between individual companies and local bank branches were limited to 
current, transactional issues, and local treasury activities were merely administrative.  
Even more fundamentally, the respondent totally and systematically rejected the 
existence, at the time, of situations as those described above, regarding a strong focus 
on local issues in detriment to group-level issues, and especially outright, strong 
resistance from local units towards central directives. Such situations of resistance were 
simply unimaginable to him, based on his experience at IndCo from the late 1980’s and 
until the early 1990’s. Although some insights were common to other respondents (e.g., 
elementary information systems; finance and accounting transactional activities largely 
carried out at a local level) and although he recognised difficulties in implementing 
post-acquisition changes, the overall image was, definitely, not the same that emerged 
from the other interviews. 
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It became evident to the researcher, during the interview, that such diverging 
accounts could not be attributed simply to different personal perceptions, and in 
particular to the perceptions of this respondent17, 18. 
Still during the course of the interview, the researcher hypothesised (and the 
respondent considered that hypothesis to be very plausible) that the crucial factor 
accounting for these differences was the intensified internationalisation process, from 
the early 1990’s onwards. By 1998, when compared with the start of the decade, 
production capacity had been multiplied by more than 10 19. This dramatic increase 
brought into the company highly diverse companies and plants. In addition, the 
coordination and integration of the international operations raised incomparably more 
difficult challenges. This led to what a senior manager described, in a quote above, as an 
“amalgam of plants, not a company”.  
Both during this interview and later while writing the case, insights from other 
respondents were recalled which supported this interpretation. For example, as regards 
the IT Department, different respondents indicated the internationalisation process as a 
                                                 
17 Interview-based case study research may naturally generate insights reflecting different perceptions 
about any particular phenomenon (Yin, 2009). Different perceptions across interviewees are particularly 
likely when they had different experiences and activities, in different periods. This last aspect may be 
particularly relevant since, as noted in footnote 15, this interviewee did not experience (and hence could 
not compare with) IndCo’s evolution in the 1990’s and beyond. A brief example supports this 
interpretation. While this interviewee emphasised the coordinated and even centralised practices and 
organisation of the finance area in Portugal, a senior IT interviewee thus commented on the organisation 
of the finance function in Portugal: “[In the early 1990’s], plants still had an administrative and financial 
director. (…) Only later [around 1997] there was the unification of some administrative and financial 
directors and the accounting area of similar and even nearby plants. (…) That was the start of some 
centralisation. [So,] that problem also existed in Portugal. Each plant was autonomous. Here in [city X], 
there was [person Y]; he dealt with [plant in city X], nothing else”. Although there were no factual 
contradictions between the two interviewees, the emphases and the evaluation conveyed by each 
interviewee was strikingly different – hence highlighting the need of drawing from multiple data sources 
to strengthen the case plausibility and trustworthiness. 
18 An additional research note. The researcher had had a previous brief contact with this individual. At the 
time, it was clear that he could not relate to the very brief characterisation provided by the researcher – 
hence prompting the researcher to request a formal interview to explore this apparent puzzle. 
19 Calculations based on data from a public presentation by a senior manager. Other presented figures, 
such as the growth in the number of plants, countries and employees, are omitted to preserve anonymity. 
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key factor leading to the adoption of new information systems and the creation of a 
new, global organisational structure for the IT Department. The increased difficulties 
perceived by central actors (to be described in the remainder of the chapter) can also be 
clearly related to the international expansion, in terms of both size and geographical 
spread, and concerned almost always countries other than Portugal.  
Therefore, this subsection highlights that, while some IndCo’s features before 
the 1990’s are important to understand later traits (and may occasionally be drawn upon 
later in the thesis), the characterisation in this thesis about the 1990’s and beyond may 
not be representative of previous periods, since the company drastically changed in-
between.  
5.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THREE FUNCTIONAL AREAS UP TO THE 
LATE 1990’S: IT; PRODUCTION; ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 
5.3.1 THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AREA AND IT SOLUTIONS 
This subsection takes a mainly descriptive approach to characterise IndCo’s 
technological context and the evolution of the IT solutions most relevant to understand 
accounting and control at IndCo20. The links between these technological features and 
the research theoretical issues (including the topic of power) are explored in the 
following sections. 
Until the late 1990’s, the systems architecture as a whole could be broadly 
described as a bricolage of dispersed systems. Understanding how this architecture 
                                                 
20 The IT Department organisational structure has already been described in the first subsection. Further 
analysis about the IT Department, as regards prevailing beliefs, objectives and strategies, is developed in 
section 6.1.3. 
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emerged requires going one decade further back, to the late 1980’s. An IT respondent 
provided a general overview of the ISs in IndCo at this time: 
“At the start [during the 1980’s and early 1990’s], there were indeed a 
number of islands [in Portugal]. At the plant in city X, [the IS] was 
created from scratch. Company ‘A’ had one IS, company ‘B’ had another, 
the one in city ‘C’ had another, company ‘C’ had another…”  
Given the disparity of the characteristics and evolution of the various systems, 
the operational systems, the financial accounting systems and the management 
accounting and control systems are now separately analysed. 
5.3.1.1 Operational systems 
Until the late 1980’s, operational ISs were very rudimentary, especially as 
regards information for management purposes, and basically included production 
functionalities and order and sales register. Since production activities were still only 
performed in Portugal, complexity related to geographical dispersion was not 
significant. 
In the late 1980’s, given IndCo’s very poor operational ISs and the absence of 
commercially available solutions for the industry, IndCo hired a large number of 
systems engineers to develop, in-house, a new operational system. This system initially 
only encompassed logistics (labelled as the ‘SOIC’ system); later, a production system 
(the ‘PROLOG’ system) was also developed. Since it was a be-spoke system (Longdin, 
2000), developed by a large internal IT team, it was highly tailored to fit the specific 
requirements of the business and of company users, not only when it was first designed, 
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but throughout the years. With hindsight and a touch of self-criticism, an IT interviewee 
reflected that… 
…“we spent about ten years, until 1999, developing our own solutions, 
highly according to the users’ preferences, wishes, needs, probably with 
many ‘flowers’ that a [commercial] package would not implement.”  
The operational system was common to all subsidiaries. It provided integration 
across commercial and production sites, although neither on-line nor automatically: 
information had to be transferred across the units systems through interfaces (an 
operation very susceptible to errors, requiring a daily check of error logs). However, and 
importantly, the common operational system was physically installed in each site and it 
did not impose uniformity across plants. In fact, the plants required the development of 
site-specific functionalities, on the grounds of local specificities. And since there was a 
dedicated in-house IT team, it was feasible to implement such requests.  
These systems were focused on operations and all interviewees, both IndCo’s 
employees and consultants, considered that they provided sophisticated and suitable 
functionalities for users. In contrast, these operational systems only had very basic 
financial functionalities, such as stock valuation, to be used for financial accounting 
purposes only. And even the actual use of the few existing financial functionalities of 
these operational systems differed across sites and countries – and in some locations, 
they were not used at all, as discussed below in subsection 5.5. After this overview 
about operational systems, the focus now turns to the financial accounting systems and 
the management accounting and control systems. 
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5.3.1.2 Financial accounting systems 
Financial accounting was supported by different commercial packages across 
countries. This diversity, again, had its origin in IndCo’s history of acquisitions. By the 
end of the 1990’s, after the largest acquisitions had been made, there were various types 
of legacy financial accounting systems: some were completely standalone solutions; 
others were integrated, but in highly varied ways. 
In Portugal, each plant used a standalone financial accounting solution, 
integrated neither with the operational systems nor with IndCo’s consolidation software; 
a similar situation existed in two other countries. The Spanish subsidiary implemented 
SAP FI around 1995, but in a project (further discussed in the next chapter) whose 
scope only encompassed this particular country and that only considered country-
specific needs; in addition, some configuration options introduced diversity within the 
country itself21, and information was still introduced into the system at each plant. 
Finally, the company started as a greenfield project in mid 1990’s and the company 
acquired in country C in 1998 (operating in two countries) both had integrated 
solutions, but from different vendors: the former, from Ross; the latter, from SAP.  
Existing solutions addressed the needs of local actors, in particular for financial 
reporting and taxation purposes at country level, but created limitations for central 
analyses. IndCo’s solution for financial accounting consolidation - Hyperion Enterprise 
                                                 
21 As analysed in the next section, particularly on page 351, in the Spanish subsidiary, SAP controlling 
areas (“the basic organizational unit in Management Accounting”, SAP, 2005b, p. 26) were defined at a 
low hierarchical level: the plant level. In addition, cost centres nomenclature diverged across plants. 
Although these are cost accounting concepts, they are also relevant for financial accounting, given the 
integrated nature of the solution. 
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for Reporting22 - directly accessed none of these systems. This legacy of diverse 
systems brought along different accounting structures across locations, in addition to 
making remote access difficult or even impossible. Therefore, for financial reporting 
within IndCo, accountants at headquarters had to rely on information produced and sent 
by each local team and then manually enter that information in the Hyperion 
consolidation solution. Finally, IndCo’s consolidated information was incorporated in 
the holding-level Hyperion solution. 
Therefore, in brief, during the 1990’s, and even more after 1998’s large 
acquisitions, the Corporate Centre was confronted with severe limitations as regards 
accessing, interpreting and consolidating financial accounting information from the 
various subsidiaries.  
In late 1997, the decision to adopt SAP’s financial accounting solution (SAP FI) 
was taken. One year later, a leading international consultancy firm presented a proposal 
for its implementation, encompassing Portugal and two other countries. The project was 
approved and started in early 1999. By the end of the year, the decision was taken to 
develop and roll-out a global model of SAP FI to most remaining countries. SAP FI is 
one of the innovations focused on this thesis and its in-depth analysis is developed in 
the next chapter. 
                                                 
22 The Hyperion solution was selected by IndCo’s holding group, in order to consolidate the diversified 
investments of the main shareholder, Mr. A; therefore, it was common to all companies of IndCo’s group. 
IndCo’s group had been using consolidation solutions from Hyperion for a very long time, and in the late 
1990’s a new project around Hyperion was developed, encompassing the entire group (see start of 
subsection 6.1.3) 
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5.3.1.3 Management accounting and control systems 
Management accounting and control requires both operational and financial 
information. As described, the operational systems had very limited financial 
functionalities and were not integrated with specific solutions for management 
accounting and control. Likewise, existing financial accounting solutions, regardless of 
being standalone or integrated solutions, neither supported management accounting and 
control, nor were integrated with specific solutions.  
Globally, management accounting and control activities were supported by two 
systems at two levels: at a plant level and at a higher, headquarter level. At plant level, 
spreadsheets were the most important tool for cost and management accounting and 
control. These Excel spreadsheets were partly specific to each site and were usually 
developed by the local plant controller him/herself (although usually based on 
spreadsheets received from other plants). As a result, the sophistication of the 
spreadsheets varied across plants, especially as regards their interfaces with other 
solutions. In some sites, where no Excel interfaces had been developed, the plant 
controller was responsible to manually gather information dispersed across several 
sources (e.g., financial accounting systems, operational systems, human resource 
systems and direct observation of production machines meters). The plant controller 
then manually entered this information in the spreadsheet. In other sites, where Excel 
interfaces had been developed – in particular, interfaces with the operational system 
SOIC-, information entry into the spreadsheets was significantly more automatised.  
In these Excel spreadsheets, plant controllers calculated product costs and 
variances. In the sites where the stock valuation functionality of the operational system 
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(SOIC) was actually used (not all sites used it, as already mentioned), the costs of 
finished products were then transferred into the operational system. Additionally, and 
more importantly, product costs were imported, using an interface, to the consolidation 
solution supporting management control – mostly for use at headquarters. 
At headquarters, the management control Department used MicroControl until 
1992 and then adopted Hyperion Enterprise for Management23. This solution was 
installed both at headquarter level and at a plant level (at the computer of each plant 
controller). The plant controller autonomously entered all the information in the local 
database of his/her local application; the output of this local application was then 
emailed to the management controllers at IndCo’s headquarters. These would introduce 
the emailed files in their Hyperion application. Information was then ready for analysis 
at headquarters level. At the end of this convoluted process, information would finally 
be available for IndCo’s holding Hyperion application. 
This subsection provided an overview of ISs supporting operations, financial 
accounting and management accounting and control. While the focus was on the ISs 
themselves, it also introduced some of the processes of these functional areas. The next 
two subsections further characterise these functional areas. 
                                                 
23 Both solutions were produced by the same company, Hyperion (IMRS, at the time MicroControl was 
released). Like in the case of the consolidation solution for external reporting, these consolidation 
solutions for management control were also common to all companies of IndCo’s group. 
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5.3.2 THE PRODUCTION AREA 
5.3.2.1 A production-focused company 
The production area has always been, alongside the commercial area, the core of 
IndCo. This was confirmed by all the interviewees who expressed their views on what 
were IndCo’s privileged areas – in terms of both rhetoric and practice. The emphasis on 
these two areas was found to be one of the overarching, common characteristics across 
the organisation, as two CC respondents clarified: 
“IndCo is always in the plants.”  
“The administrative area is accessory [in IndCo]. It has always been and 
always will be. The important is the production, that you can ship to the 
customer, that you can place an order to the plant. That is what is 
essential.”  
A revealing, usual expression within the company is “On top of the machine, is 
where we manage well”. This expression colourfully conveys the belief in the focus on 
industrial activities. One interviewee had a narrow interpretation of this expression, and 
explained it by the need to go out from the office and into the plant floor. But another 
interviewee interpreted this expression more broadly, in terms of the virtues of having 
management processes physically close to the production sites – including support 
activities, such as accounting, finance and human resources. 
5.3.2.2 Diversity across IndCo’s production sites 
IndCo’s plants are specialised in one or just a few particular types of IndCo’s 
basic product – or in components for these products. This product specialisation of each 
plant inevitably introduced diversity across plants fabricating different products. But 
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comparing plants fabricating the same type of product allows for more interesting 
insights. Given the near commodity nature of these products, the variations between 
production processes across plants fabricating the same type of product are not huge – 
but they are not inexistent, either.  
In particular, IndCo’s history of acquisitions favoured the systematic inclusion 
of plants with slightly different ways to produce the same type of product: different 
technological levels, different machines, different production processes and, 
importantly, different people with different expertises. Unsurprisingly, all this diversity 
compounded into significant diversity in terms of production efficiency. Hence, some 
diversity across plants derived from IndCo’s acquisitions history.  
There were also differences in business practices across plants, which were 
unrelated with, and unaffected by, the existence of a common IS (and eventual plant-
specific functionalities). This diversity across plants caused difficulties in the 
relationship with other parts of the organisation, such as the commercial area. This 
became clearer when the business processes increased the complexity of inter-
relationships across production and commercial units. For example, should the 
commercial area query several plants for products availability to satisfy a customer 
order, the response times could vary from a few hours to a few days. Not only this 
implied a slower overall response to the customer, but it also introduced uncertainty 
around the time required, lowering the customer service level and satisfaction and 
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weakening IndCo’s competitiveness. For the commercial area, it was difficult to 
understand and accept the rationale for such diversity24. 
However, local specificities typically allowed plant directors to justify the 
distinct practices. As exemplified by an IT respondent, plants may be specialised in 
products with different production batch sizes. Larger batch sizes lead to lengthier 
production times and fewer batches to be planned. This provides incentives for the 
allocation of less time to production planning and, ultimately, less frequent analysis of 
new incoming requests from the commercial units.  
At a global level, this diversity of practices was considered to be a problem. 
IndCo organised regular meetings with managers from the various areas and these 
issues were raised, and the need to have uniformity in practices was stressed. However, 
changes were scarce, and local, plant-level logics and priorities tended to prevail.  
One final example relates production technologies with (lack of) company-wide 
cooperation and organisational learning. In spite of technological diversity across 
plants, some of the diversity in plants’ performance was attributed to staff’s different 
practices and knowledge level. Optimisation at a given plant largely depended on ad 
hoc, incremental and locally driven efforts, based on local people’s experience(s). 
However, initial attempts to share best practices and knowledge across plants were not 
highly successful, as a senior manager explained: 
                                                 
24 This example intends primarily to illustrate the diversity within the production area, rather than 
illustrate conflicts between the production and commercial areas. However, various interviewees did 
report conflicts between these two functional areas, spanning from the 1980’s to the recent years in which 
the fieldwork was being carried out. However, the analysis of conflicts between these two areas is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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“The idea was to make the people in charge of the [most productive] 
plants [in particular, plant directors] talk to people of the other plants, to 
transfer their experience. In theory, this works fine. But the power of the 
people resides in their knowledge – for some people, we cannot generalise. 
Yes, there were those who were willing to cooperate, but there were others 
who were reserved as regards sharing their knowledge with the rest of the 
organisation.”  
Although organisational sharing and learning process dramatically improved 
later, largely based on new technological features and new organisational structures25, 
these original difficulties revealed that individual and local interests often prevailed 
over global ones. These two examples (prevalence of local production practices and 
resistance to company-wide knowledge sharing) clearly revealed the large autonomy 
and power of local actors and, in particular, the power of plant directors – an important 
insight explored in the next section. 
5.3.3 THE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE AREA 
During most of the 1990’s, and like most organisational areas, accounting and 
finance activities were largely decentralised towards business units. In addition, as 
already mentioned, in IndCo the accounting and finance areas were attributed a 
significantly lower priority, when compared with production and commercial areas. 
Indeed, some accounting and finance limitations and inconsistencies analysed next may 
be better understood by considering this lower priority. This subsection analyses three 
main areas in accounting and finance (financial accounting; management accounting 
and control; and treasury) and concludes by arguing that by the late 1990’s there was a 
perceived lack of strategy in the accounting and finance function. 
                                                 
25 Recent machinery allows for an automated control of almost all production variables and provides 
detailed production information to actors outside the local plant. In addition, a Department dedicated to 
industrial optimisation (INDBEST) was created. 
 5.3 An overview of three functional areas up to the late 1990’s: IT; production; accounting and finance 
5.3.3 The accounting and finance area 
313
5.3.3.1 Financial accounting 
Most financial accounting activities were typically carried out at plant level, in 
significantly different ways. The various units used a wide variety of standalone or 
integrated solutions. Additionally (and unsurprisingly, given the variety of financial 
accounting solutions, their use by local people and the autonomy of the sites), the 
adopted charts of accounts (i.e., the system structures) were not the same across the 
sites.  
Financial accounting practices also differed across plants in multiple aspects. As 
a first example, accountants at different plants might classify a given transaction using 
different criteria and different accounts. Whether a given purchase of machine parts 
should be considered an asset or a period cost was an example recurrently mentioned by 
interviewees to illustrate this diversity. Even if the charts of accounts were similar (an 
unlikely event during the 1990’s, as noted above), accountants from different plants 
might post a given transaction in different accounts. A CC member described 
differences practices by 1999, even after the implementation of a single integrated 
system – further suggesting that before, during the 1990’s, when multiple solutions 
coexisted, diversity in practices was even more significant: 
…“[Before the Shared Services Centre, by 2001,] we already had SAP 
[for financial accounting] (…). But each country had its own chart of 
accounts. Some [countries] posted external personnel expenses in the 
personnel account, others in overheads, in commercial costs… It was a bit 
like it was more convenient or as they were used to do.”  
Interviewees also recurrently mentioned the diverse and often unsatisfactory 
timings of local financial accounting processes, with important consequences as regards 
financial reporting towards headquarters. Finally, CC interviewees converged in an 
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overall picture of poor (in addition to diverse) practices of financial accounting and 
control in the foreign subsidiaries, during the 1990’s. The following quotations from 
two SSC members as mere examples of such insights (the second example refers to the 
circularisation of creditors’ and debtors’ outstanding balances): 
“We had decentralised information, which was often sent with different 
timings, the [local] teams did not respect [the rules regarding the report 
timings].”  
“Before the SSC, most countries didn’t make the circularisation at all. (…) 
Once, to consolidate at the end of a semester and at the end of the year, we 
didn’t have the information from [a particular country]. (…) Of course, in 
the report to the Board [we wrote that] ‘[This country didn’t report’. (…) 
But in the next year, it was the same thing. (…) Then, we asked for the 
statements, and receiving them took ages, or never came. Or, if they came, 
no one understood, they came in such a way that no one understood 
them…”  
The combination of different solutions, different charts of accounts, different 
practices across locations and practices which in some aspects could be described as 
poor, caused significant difficulties in consolidation activities at the centre. The centre 
could not remotely access the varied solutions of the subsidiaries – and, even if it could, 
it would be faced with different structures, i.e., different charts of accounts. The 
information received from the various sites was not fully comparable, some of it was 
not timely, and the centre’s limited visibility restricted verification possibilities.  
These difficulties and shortcomings resulted in the perception of a lack of 
reliability of the overall process and of the ultimate consolidated accounts. Several 
interviewees expressed these concerns, ranging from an SSC member who was then a 
junior accountant, to a manager who at the time already occupied a senior position, 
whose views now follow, in respective order: 
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“At a corporate level, we had difficulties in obtaining information. (…) 
Often times, the way the reports were made… there were always doubts 
about their reliability.”  
“Closing, consolidating the accounts every month… we had Excel 
spreadsheets back and forth, always without a doubtful reliability.”  
Difficulties to consolidate information had been long felt. And after the 1998 
acquisitions and the drastic increase of the number and diversity of companies to be 
consolidated, the consolidation team faced additional challenges, as expressed by a 
member of the SSC:  
“The corporate centre had [set] some [common] rules, but it was very 
difficult for the consolidation team to consolidate. Very difficult indeed. 
Lost hours just to get the information - which arrived late. Dealing with 
intra-group [adjustments] was a headache. And to reach the point of 
having at least a consolidated balance sheet and profit and loss statement, 
nights were lost. [Researcher: “Because you had to check if the 
information coming from each plant was…”]. Respondent: “We didn’t 
even get to that level. Forget it. [The goal was] to manage to have, on the 
report day, a minimally acceptable balance sheet and P&L. Because (…) 
the accounting rules were different. Here, we made reclassification 
postings (…) in the major items, as regards major figures. Going more 
into the detail, no. There was no time. Finished. It was impossible for that 
team to go any further. It was information from so many places, so 
different, that we had to set priorities. And the priority was: major figures; 
to ensure that there was some consistency, but [only] with a high degree of 
materiality.”  
Respondents who had been involved in consolidation tasks at IndCo’s centre at 
this time clearly felt very strongly about these difficulties. They complained about “long 
hours”, “lost nights” and the “nightmare” of determining intra-group consolidation 
adjustments. However, apparently, these difficulties and the risk of some inaccuracies of 
consolidated financial statements were not a high concern, neither to the financial 
directors of each country, neither to IndCo’s top management. When discussing an SAP 
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FI feature which would facilitate the consolidation process at IndCo’s level26, an IT 
respondent explained that it had not been implemented in 1998 because…  
… “there was no interest in that. Each country was responsible for its 
accounts. Provided that [the new system] would consolidate in Hyperion 
[at a country level] – and it had to consolidate, by hand, ‘by foot’, 
whatever…-, (…) it satisfied the financial directors of each country, who 
were able to report the accounts of each independent company. So, there 
was no one asking for that uniformisation [at IndCo’s level]. There was no 
one. (…) There was not a single person requiring that. Not a single one 
[emphasis].”  
A senior director, once involved in the consolidation process, further developed 
this view, from an organisational centre perspective. Taking a different perspective as 
regards the lower level accountants and leaders involved in consolidating financial 
accounting information, he downplayed the difficulties of the task:  
“[Consolidation] required hard work, but it wasn’t something 
[extraordinary]. It wasn’t even part of the concerns of management. There 
was a team who had the obligation to provide consolidated information. 
So, it took care of that. (…) [Consolidation] got done, and it was even fun. 
That was not the problem.”  
This respondent also downplayed the importance of producing consolidated 
financial accounting reports, in the perspective of legal obligations to be met, and he 
emphasised instead the importance of non-financial information (e.g., national 
regulations) for strategic decisions. However, he also valued consistent financial 
information for decisions in areas such as “investments, (…) optimisations and (…) 
benchmarkin” – and its absence was considered a limitation for top management 
decision making. He complained about the excessive time and efforts required to 
produce and interpret the information from the various countries in order to support 
                                                 
26 The feature was a common chart of accounts, to be discussed in subsection 6.1.5. 
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global management. Moreover, he suggested that an important reason to create a Shared 
Services Centre (whose main initial function was to carry out, in a uniform and timely 
way, the financial accounting activities of the subsidiaries) was that, before the SSC,… 
“The information management processes, the information, was very weak. 
It was very dispersed. Very weak, because it did not allow for a view of the 
whole, it did not have the same criteria, the same principles, the same 
adjustments. So, it was very difficult to consolidate it in a perspective of 
strategic information management.”  
Another CC manager linked the above insights with the prevalent emphasis on 
the local level, when he acknowledged…  
“the perception that we didn’t have capacity to have consistent 
information for decision-making, because each one [at a local level] had a 
different method. Not that there was bad-will or whatever. Simply, each 
one did as he/she knew and was used to doing, giving total and absolute 
priority to the country’s reporting, and not the internal group reporting”.  
As a conclusion, even at an aggregate level of analysis, the diversity in 
accounting solutions and routinised practices, compounded with poor local accounting 
practices, limited the capacity of the centre to have an accurate, reliable, comparable 
and consistent visibility across the organisation. In turn, this limited visibility 
contributed to poorer decision-making at the centre and also limited the capacity for the 
centre to intervene. On the other hand, financial directors of each country were mostly 
concerned with locally oriented information – and existing systems satisfied their (local) 
concerns.  
Therefore, existing financial accounting systems appeared to better suit the 
needs of the locals, rather than the needs of the centre – both the accountants and top 
managers. This situation prevailed throughout the 1990’s – and the 1998 acquisition 
 5.3 An overview of three functional areas up to the late 1990’s: IT; production; accounting and finance 
5.3.3 The accounting and finance area 
318
further accentuated it. Consequences in actors’ power are already clearly perceptible 
from the above description, but an in-depth analysis is postponed to the next section.  
5.3.3.2 Management accounting and control 
Since this subsection has already overviewed the ISs of the management 
accounting and control area, the focus is now on its organisational aspects. Management 
accounting processes strongly relied on the original inputs of plant controllers. Excel 
spreadsheets were crucial tools for plant-level cost accounting, and the spreadsheets 
were typically distinct across plants. The lack of uniformity went beyond the different 
sophistication of the interfaces of each spreadsheet with other solutions. Importantly, 
numerous respondents from the IT and headquarters management control area stressed 
the lack of uniformity as regards the way costs were calculated, aggregated and 
presented in reports. One of the sources for the diversity of spreadsheets was the quite 
ad-hoc way that spreadsheets and related knowledge and practices were disseminated 
across plants, as an IT respondent argued: 
“It depended on the way and with whom each plant controller learned. If 
he came from outside [a certain plant], he probably brought some 
methodologies and ways of working. If no one imposes new ones, he’ll 
keep his. If it is a new plant, the plant controller will probably ask for the 
help of someone from outside, or from who is nearer; and then he will 
build on the information from the other. Some [plant controllers] are 
similar, because they learned among themselves. (…) It varied a bit across 
plants.”  
In a similar vein, and echoing the already described lack of coordination at a 
global level, a senior manager reflected on how costing traditionally developed in an 
uncoordinated way throughout the company, driven by the experience (and 
experiments) of people in each site or project, over the years: 
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“Each [participant in a 2005 SAP costing project] was supposed to have 
some information about it [costing]. But it was necessary to create, first, a 
concept of how to do it, the most correct way to do costing. (…) There was 
a very large discussion, for a very long time, about what was the most 
correct way to do it. Each one had his own experience. As all of us, at one 
or another moment in life, had the need to do costing, we all had different 
concepts.”  
Central actors commonly expressed various concerns about plant controllers’ 
high autonomy and the limited visibility of the centre over their activities. There were 
concerns about inconsistencies caused by distinct work methods and criteria and about 
the potential for manipulation of local information. A respondent from the management 
control area and two respondents from the IT area thus described these concerns: 
“We are sure that, in some cases, criteria are different across 
controllers.”  
“There were even situations in which we could not compare [information 
from different plants], because one [plant] had its costs calculated in a 
certain way, it did not incorporate a certain cost component, therefore 
making its costs lower than those of another plant. But since people, very 
often, did not know what was behind [the numbers], they said ‘Ah, you’re 
producing at a lower cost’’.  
“The plant controller does not invent. He gets information about sales, 
materials, a number of things, and then he enters it in the management 
control system. (…) And then he calculates. But, many times, he calculates 
using his own rules.”  
“[CC management controllers] received the information, analysed it in 
Hyperion [the consolidation solution for management], assuming that 
everything was… [correct]. [They] could not go to the source and check 
the information. (…) One of the objectives of the [SAP costing module] 
project is to automate the links between SAP and Hyperion for 
management control, so that the plant controller doesn’t grab a report and 
transcribe the data. ‘I mistyped a digit, by mistake’… or on purpose! When 
we say ‘on purpose’, we are not saying that it happens. But theoretically it 
can happen: by mistake or on purpose, you can manipulate.”  
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The diversity of cost calculation methods and systems across plants led to a 
limited possibility for the centre to compare information of different units. In addition, 
since corporate controllers could not access local sources of information, they could not 
easily (or at all) check the figures from the spreadsheets reported by plants; in fact, they 
even had difficulty in identifying the existence of diversity across plants and precisely 
locate its origins.  
Finally, an IT respondent revealed the lack of capacity of the centre to impose 
uniform practices, neither through relatively informal requests, not through explicit, 
formal rules in procedure manuals. The first example below (further analysed in the last 
section of this chapter) concerned the (lack of) actual use by plant controllers of one of 
the few financial functionalities of the SOIC operational system: valuate stock and 
calculate variance analysis: 
Respondent: “Not all companies were taking advantage of that possibility, 
because they preferred to do it through other tools, like Excel. (…) 
Researcher: Was there any attempt to try to ensure that, at least within a 
given country, all plants actually used that functionality?  
Respondent: Some people [from the centre] said that that should happen. 
But then, in practice, it didn’t happen, because they couldn’t pass that 
message almost as a law, obligatory. And so [controllers in plants] kept 
thinking ‘OK, as long as this is not…’ [compulsory, we won’t do].”  
“There was a procedure manual for management control. But not all 
[plant controllers] did in the same way.”  
In sum, in the management accounting area (like in the financial accounting 
area), central actors had limited capacity to have an accurate, reliable, comparable and 
consistent visibility over local units and, therefore, over the company as a whole. In 
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turn, this limited visibility contributed to poorer decision-making and control by these 
central actors and also limited their capacity to intervene. Like as regards financial 
accounting, the power consequences of this situation are analysed further below, in the 
next section. 
5.3.3.3 Treasury 
Treasury was one of first areas where moves towards centralisation were taken 
in the finance area, as already mentioned. Notwithstanding, many treasury activities 
were still performed locally during the 1990’s (and some even during the first half of 
the following decade). Treasury roles of the centre were basically restricted to planning 
and distributing the financial resources to the subsidiaries. However, even for this 
centralised treasury planning, the centre still had to rely on information and decisions 
originating at plant level. A CC member thus illustrated the dependence on information 
provided from plants: 
“Take the example of the Corporate Centre producing a treasury report 
with estimates. Instead of that report being produced, from the start to the 
end, by the Corporate Centre, probably more than half of the report was 
prepared by the plants. This might cause the loss of some input, or of some 
knowledge of the corporate area about the reality at the plant level.”  
The decision about which creditors should be paid and by which amount was 
also attributed to local actors (in fact, this still happened at the time of the fieldwork). 
They would then request headquarters the necessary funds to be transferred to the banks 
which worked with each plant. Finally, the payments to suppliers and workers were 
locally executed.  
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The importance and prevalence of local operations was sometimes reinforced by 
the importance and non-transferability of local inter-organisational relationships. For 
example, Spanish plants typically had local arrangements with regional banks, rather 
than with larger banks with a national presence (in the Spanish banking industry, 
regional banks were important players during the 1990’s, as depicted by García-Marco 
and Robles-Fernández, 2008 and Grifell-Tatj and Lovell, 1996). As recalled by a senior 
manager, 
“In Spain, the plants worked with the ‘Cajas’, with the regional banks, 
and that was a very local relationship. (…) The relationship and the trust 
established between the plants [and the ‘Cajas’] facilitated a lot (…), and 
it was difficult to achieve it in a centralised way. Until we gained size to 
start working with the large banks, the companies leveraged [on those 
local relationships] a lot, and there was basically no way around it.”  
The atomised, regional structure of the financial sector in Spain promoted the 
relevance of local-level inter-organisational relationships, which were difficult to be 
replaced by central actors. Since central actors could not, before the company started 
working with country-wide banks, propose alternative, global arrangements, the 
position of local actors was reinforced.27 
Therefore, in spite of the early moves towards centralisation of treasury-related 
activities, including treasury planning, during the 1990’s the centre still had limited 
direct access to local information. Such limited access made the centre dependent on the 
locals and diminished central knowledge about the subsidiaries. 
                                                 
27 A Spanish respondent restricted the scope of local arrangements exclusively to operational matters, 
excluding financing operations – i.e., in line with the situation in Portugal. This is an apparent 
contradiction with the previous quote. However, the researcher attributed the description of this Spanish 
respondent to a later stage, after the company had started relationships with country-wide banks. The 
indication, by this Spanish respondent, of a particular country-wide bank as one of the company’s banks 
supports this interpretation, which dissolves the apparent contradiction. 
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5.3.3.4 (Lack of) strategy for the accounting and finance function 
Many interviewees suggested that, in the late 1990’s, there was no explicit long-
term strategy for the accounting and finance function. The generalised opinion was that 
top management did not envisage any changes in the structure of this area – or, at best, 
it did not make it clear to lower level employees. When interviewing a member of the 
SAP FI implementation team, the researcher asked whether the organisation of the 
finance function in a particular country was very different from what the group desired. 
The interviewee quickly and plainly clarified that…  
… “what was desired was not clear. We were never told that” 
(approximate quotation). 
Similarly, there was no explicit strategy about the information systems 
supporting the accounting and finance function, as two other members involved at 
different levels in the SAP FI project, clarified: 
“There were still no directives about the future strategy of the financial 
area and its information systems.”  
[Initially, in 1998,] “…we chose SAP in the financial area still without a 
strategic vision. (…) The choice of SAP FI did not follow any strategy, (…) 
[except for] a uniformity from a point of view of technology, ISs-oriented.”  
However, around 1997-98, a movement emerged in Portugal towards uniformity 
across the sites, and which then evolved into a gradual centralisation. Accounting and 
finance teams (up to a Financial Director level) of two nearby industrial and commercial 
sites were aggregated into one single back-office28. A small scale centralisation, at a 
                                                 
28 Although other back-offices remained in operation for a few additional years in other Portuguese sites, 
centralisation continued and culminated, in early 2001, in the creation in Portugal of an SSC for most 
countries were IndCo operated. 
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regional level, was implemented and the results suggested that it was possible to 
decrease costs by increasing efficiency, without major losses in the services provided to 
individual sites29. 
In spite of this small scale centralisation process in Portugal, the overall picture 
during the 1990’s was still one of decentralisation and diversity across various countries 
and plants in terms of the organisation and systems of the finance and accounting area. 
Importantly, this centralisation move was not announced as, and it was generally not 
considered to be, a precursor of any intended and defined company-wide structural 
change30. This generalised perception of a lack of strategy for the accounting and 
finance function had relevant repercussions in the way the ISs in this area were designed 
and implemented, as analysed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
29 One respondent stated that there were local resistances to this centralisation process, while another 
respondent clarified that these resistances were not huge and the process was relatively unproblematic. 
Both respondents and a working paper (written in 2002; reference omitted for confidentiality reasons) 
indicated that this first centralisation move had been a successful one. However, the researcher did not 
have the opportunity to gather enough empirical evidence on these processes, which occurred even further 
back in time. So no attempt is made to explore these processes here. 
30 There was total consensus among interviewees that company-wide centralisation through an SSC was 
still not considered by anyone, at this stage. On a different tone, one respondent from a plant suggested 
that this first centralisation move was a “pilot-test”, but he clarified that this hypothesis was merely his 
perception. He further added: “[There was no plan,] not that I recall. But these things are more or less 
guessable. (…) These kinds of evolution are not spelled out. Of course, top managers know, but those in 
the local sites [may only] guess what is going to happen.”. Similarly, an IT member involved in the 
project to implement the financial accounting module of SAP (SAP FI) claimed that there were 
indications towards centralisation at a country level - though not at a company-wide level. However, the 
same respondent also indicated decisions in the SAP FI project that “showed that there was no great 
certainty of what was desired” among team members. Finally, the researcher queried a senior IT 
respondent if the decision to develop one single model for SAP FI derived from a generic orientation 
towards an increasing uniformity, regardless of whether that orientation was explicit or merely anticipated 
by participants; the reply was a straight and clear “No.”. The SAP FI project is analysed in the next 
chapter. 
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5.3.4 CONCLUSION AND A PARADOX: THE LIMITATIONS OF FORMALLY 
POWERFUL, CENTRAL ACTORS IN THE LATE 1990’S 
This section provided empirical information which, as a whole, reinforced the 
initial portrait of a decentralised, autonomous and diverse organisation. Existing 
practices, beliefs, identities, information systems and organisational structures, largely a 
legacy of the company’s history of acquisitions, satisfied the needs of the actors at plant 
level – in spite of financial and control practices which may be considered as poor.  
However, there were significant difficulties for actors at a corporate level. 
Central direct access to local information was difficult or impossible. The corporate 
centre had to wait for, and rely on, information produced at the plants; in addition, such 
reporting was often not timely, and occasionally some information was not reported at 
all. Information verification capabilities were reduced and there were concerns about 
data reliability, due to either unintentional flaws, intentional distortions or merely lack 
of local interest in the information requirements of the corporate centre. At the corporate 
centre, the level of information detail was low and the knowledge about the plants was 
limited.  
As summarised in a quote above from a CC respondent, the difficulties felt at the 
corporate centre created… 
…“the perception that we didn’t have capacity to have consistent 
information for decision-making”.  
Such information difficulties were also clearly associated with control 
limitations. Discussing how stock control was performed in the past, based on local 
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Excel spreadsheets rather than an integrated solution, two SSC respondents agreed that 
in the past… 
Respondent #1: “Stock control, e.g., was very low, very low indeed. 
Respondent #2: Yes.  
Respondent #1: There were often, product codes with negative stocks. (…) 
But since we started an application recording the stocks flows and the 
valuation of each product, [the lack of control] was over.”  
In addition to these systems-related problems, this section also identified people-
related difficulties. The high decentralisation, autonomy and diversity of local units was 
associated with the prevalence of rules, beliefs and identities emphasising local level 
issues. This local emphasis was accompanied by a lack of concern and identification 
with the organisation as a whole and, in particular, with the organisational centre. The 
following quote of a CC respondent expresses this clearly: 
“each one (…) [at a local level gave] total and absolute priority to the 
country’s reporting, and not the internal group reporting”.  
As a conclusion, the overall situation affected the capacity of decision making 
and control of actors situated beyond the local settings and, therefore, the capacity of 
those actors to effectively intervene at local levels. Given the adopted conception of 
power as a capacity – a contingent capacity (section 3.2)-, it became clear that power 
issues were involved. The described situation had consequences over the distribution of 
power across the organisation, among the various actors. In particular, some formally 
powerful actors were confronted with a number of important limitations. Addressing 
this apparent paradox is the focus of the next section.  
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5.4 AN ANALYSIS OF POWER CIRCUITS UP TO THE LATE 1990’S 
This section provides a theoretically structured answer to the first research 
question, which intended to explain why formally powerful, central actors at the case 
study organisation were confronted with power limitations. This section starts by 
identifying the organisational actors considered to be the most relevant for this research, 
by addressing the question “Who are the powerful?” (Seal, 2003, 95, emphasis in the 
original) – a question which, as noted, does not have a simple answer and raises an 
apparent paradox. Consequently, there is a need to characterise the power of some 
actors, and the lack of power of other actors; to explore the ways in which power was 
created, preserved and withdrawn by some actors, while other actors failed to achieve 
that. I.e., it requires addressing the question of ‘What caused (or limited) power?’ 
(Clegg, 1989; see subsection 3.2.4). The three following subsections characterise the 
power that the prevailing configuration of circuits of power attributed (or not) to those 
actors within the actor-network. They separately analyse the three types of circuits of 
power in IndCo up to the late 1990’s, and how those circuits of power attributed (or 
withdrew) power to particular actors. A concluding overview ends the section. 
5.4.1 MAIN ACTORS, THEIR POWER AND ITS SOURCE - AN INTRODUCTION 
Exploring the empirical material allowed to identify three organisational actors 
which revealed particularly interesting characteristics in terms of their power within the 
actor-network. The first actor is IndCo’s chairman and majority shareholder, Mr. A. The 
second is a collective actor, encompassing the actors at the corporate centre and the 
remaining key top managers. The third is also a collective actor, encompassing the 
actors at subsidiary and plant levels, and the plant directors in particular. Due to several 
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similar characteristics, the first two actors are typically analysed together, as actors 
related with the organisational centre. In turn, ‘local actors’ correspond to the concept 
of ‘types of people’ (see section 3.4), who have the (contingent) capacity, through their 
activities, even if not in an explicitly organised and intended collective way, to produce 
certain effects within the actor-network.  
5.4.1.1 Two central actors – Mr. A and IndCo’s top management and corporate 
centre 
The first identified actor, Mr. A, as longstanding and actively involved chairman 
and majority shareholder of IndCo and its group, had unchallenged formal power over 
the entire group. A senior manager who worked with him for many years highlighted 
that Mr. A had a particularly significant intervention at IndCo, when compared to other 
businesses of the group: 
“[Mr. A’s] participation had some common aspects [across the various 
businesses]. Those common aspects were to be up to date, to intervene in 
the strategic definition of the various businesses, to have an important role 
as regards motivation and evaluation of human resources; to have a word 
as regards the allocation of financial resources. (…) As regards a greater 
executive intervention in business decisions, I think there was clearly more 
so at IndCo than in the other companies, playing very executive functions 
in certain periods.”  
However, Mr. A remained in Portugal after the move to Madrid (in the sequence 
of the acquisition in Spain in the early 1990’s) of all key top managers and the 
corporate centre – the second, collective actor identified. The geographical separation 
of these two actors put into question the perceptions about what constituted IndCo’s 
organisational centre and the relational power of these two actors within the global 
actor-network. Interviewees did not agree, or were even inconsistent, over the actors 
which should be considered as ‘central’ actors and as constituting the organisational 
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centre. When referring to the organisational centre and to ‘central actor(s)’, interviewees 
might indicate: the individual actor Mr. A, located in Portugal; the collective actor of 
the corporate centre and top management, located in Madrid; or may explicitly identify 
this duality. So, regardless of (or actually, and more accurately, in line with) the 
diverging views among interviewees, these two coexisting ‘centres’ were identified as 
key within IndCo’s actor-network, during most of the 1990’s.  
Nonetheless, the wide formal power attributed to Mr. A due to his majority 
shareholder and chairman positions was confronted with some obstacles. A CC member 
presented the following view: 
“[In terms of formal and ultimate decision power], the decision power was 
in [Portuguese city where the group holding - and Mr. A’s office - was 
located]. [However,] de facto, [the decision power] was in Madrid, 
because [the Portuguese city, i.e., Mr. A and the staff located there] could 
only provide an indication but, in practice, it didn’t have the minimal 
conditions and means to make an adequate follow-up, in order to verify if 
the defined indications and strategies were actually being followed, at the 
desired speed, at the desired timings, in the desired ways. It didn’t have 
the slightest chance to ensure that.”  
Before going into more detail, it is interesting to note that, apparently, the most 
formally powerful actor experienced some power limitations by the end of the 1990’s. 
The quote above contributed to the identification and separation of these two ‘central’ 
actors: Mr. A; and the remaining top management and corporate centre located in 
Spain. The analysis now turns to the third identified, collective actor: local actors at 
plant level and, in particular, the plant directors. 
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5.4.1.2 The local actors 
During the 1990’s, plant directors had a considerable range of action and 
autonomy. As amply illustrated in this chapter, many plants were virtually independent 
companies, functioning in many ways independently from the rest of the group. Such 
decentralisation and autonomy reflected the company’s history of growth through 
acquisitions, both in Portugal and internationally, but it was also endogenously 
promoted. In the late 1980’s, IndCo designed and built from scratch a large plant in 
Portugal “almost as an independent company”, as described by a plant level respondent: 
“It was something isolated from everything, it operated as a company, 
almost as if it did not belong to IndCo. It had its own General Manager, 
all its structure, a Marketing Director, sales support… It was a kingdom of 
its own.”  
In addition, decentralisation and autonomy also reflected a broader strategy 
followed at the start of the 1990’s to implement a product-based organisational 
structure, in which each business (based on a type of product) would be managed 
independently31. A working paper written in 2002 32 quoted a manager stating that 
“approximately, in 1992, there was a total decentralisation” [of decision power], “i.e., 
top managers were placed in the factories, at the level of operations”. Such 
decentralised organisational structure had consequences over the formal powers of those 
in charge of the plants, as a senior manager stated:  
“The concept of a plant, not as a business unit, but as a production centre, 
was what always caused us more problems. Many times, the plant 
directors (…) considered themselves and were considered as General 
                                                 
31 In so far as most plants only produced one type of product, this move further contributed to a greater 
diversity across plants. However, it was soon generally recognised within the organisation that 
commonalities among the types of products far exceed differences. Therefore, this product-based 
organisational structure was short lived. 
32 Reference omitted for confidentiality reasons. 
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Managers [vocal tone suggesting the high importance attributed to plant 
directors], who controlled a number of things [functional areas].”  
Insights of central and local actors with a long history in the company suggested 
that plant directors controlled and deployed resources at a plant level. This typically 
allowed them to obtain a favourable outcome in particular interactions with other local 
actors – naturally, hierarchically inferior to plant directors. Moreover, plant directors did 
have considerable influence beyond hierarchically inferior actors. For example, an IT 
respondent, quoted in p. 304, acknowledged that until 1999 they had highly adapted the 
ISs to users’ preferences (including plant level users), designing what he called many 
“flowers”. Some interviewees interpreted that high degree of adaptation as reflecting 
local actors’ power to mobilise IT design to suit their purposes, neglecting organisation-
wide interests, as implicit in a senior manager’s criticism: 
“IT has to be a supplier of services to the organisation, rather than a 
supplier to the plants.”  
The situation in the 1990’s can be even more clearly grasped by examining some 
recent examples of difficulties of central actors – and resistance of local actors - which 
still reflect this historical legacy. Respondents’ examples of occurrences at the time of 
the fieldwork, rather than the late 1990’s, are particularly significant since those 
respondents also highlighted that in the late 1990’s there were even greater difficulties 
and limitations of central actors and a greater power of local actors, particularly of plant 
directors. 
For example, some respondents argued that, more recently, a more inflexible 
approach was being taken in ISs roll-outs across the plants. However, an IT respondent 
described that the current approach consisted in keeping the overall model, while still 
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adding specificities needed in particular countries and local sites. Moreover, and 
significantly, an IT member admitted that, still in recent years, during operational ISs 
roll-outs, the IT team was confronted with the difficulty that… 
…“[in a roll-out to plants], if the model embedded in the system does not 
adapt [to the local characteristics of the plant], we cannot convince the 
plant manager (who, in turn, always has the support of that country’s top 
management) that he has to change, because the system is configured this 
way and because country C (e.g.) operates that way. That’s the worst you 
can say. (…) We [IT] don’t have the power, and we don’t have the support 
of the organisation itself. (…) There is nothing to do, is there?”  
Similar situations of local actors succeeding in questioning and challenging 
central orientations occurred in other functional areas, such as accounting and finance. 
Again, and significantly, this still occurred at the time of the fieldwork. This chapter has 
already provided several examples, such as the following quote from a SSC member on 
page 297: “The [local] person told us ‘Here, I do it like this. You guys there [at the 
centre]… basically, find your way around!”. The following quote from the same 
respondent is revealing: 
[About the centralised scanning of documents as a part of the accounting 
process,] “Countries can, at any moment, say ‘No way, we don’t do any of 
this [centralised scanning]. We are going to decentralise’. And that is 
happening in one country. (…) ‘We don’t agree with this. Theoretically, 
we were supposed to be doing it, but we never did it quite like this. And 
now we make it clear that we are not going to do it and each plant will 
scan its own documents. End of story’. And this is a problem we have 
today. We have this in our hands” [suggesting this is a hot and difficult 
issue].  
Therefore, local actors, individually or in coalitions assembling actors from 
several local levels (such as the plant and the country level), often managed to attain 
their objectives in concrete interactions with central actors. Local actors often managed 
to challenge and even prevent global projects and objectives to be developed as planned, 
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and enforce initially unplanned and undesired (from the central actors’ perspective) 
local adaptations.  
So far, a theoretically precise approach to the notion of power was deliberately 
not adopted to analyse the empirical data. The objective was to achieve a delicate 
balance, between introducing the empirical data in an intuitive way and in a language as 
simple as possible, and still avoiding any theoretically inaccurate characterisation. A 
more theoretically precise analysis is now developed. 
5.4.1.3 Conceptualising this introduction to actors’ power – the need to find the 
causes of power 
An apparent paradox was presented at the end of the previous section. Why were 
central, formally powerful actors confronted with limitations to achieve their interests, 
although they were capable of controlling and deploying important resources?  
The concepts of power in section 3.2 are useful to make sense of the empirical 
insights. The limitations central actors experienced represented a lack of power, in as 
much as those actors did not have the power to have visibility, monitor, control and 
influence local actors and relations in the extent and ways they desired. Their capacity 
to produce intended effects was limited and contingent. In turn, the limitations of power 
of central actors, and the power of local actors, were not intrinsic to them, as (individual 
or collective) actors. Rather, it derived from factors external to the actors, influencing 
their power, in line with the conceptual perspective of ‘power and its cause’ (rather than 
‘power as cause’). And the examples and analyses so far have already suggested that the 
explanation of some achievements, or failures, is not only restricted to actors’ episodic 
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control and deployment of resources (the most intuitive and commonsensical aspect of 
power, and more visible in concrete social encounters).  
Therefore, other types of causes of power have to be sought. Indeed, some 
examples, especially at the start of this section, have already hinted that existing 
dispositions of local actors and existing techniques did not promote the attainment of 
the objectives of central actors; on the contrary, dispositions and techniques might play 
in favour of local actors’ interests. 
Clegg’s framework of three circuits of power is now used to structure the 
remainder of the section and provide a more comprehensive explanation. The section 
resumes and develops the discussion about the episodic circuit of power, based on the 
control and deployment of resources. Then, it analyses the structural factors setting the 
standing conditions of episodic power exercise, by analysing the circuit of social 
integration (based on prevailing rules of meaning and membership) and the circuit of 
system integration (based on techniques of discipline and production). 
5.4.2 CIRCUIT OF EPISODIC POWER 
This subsection focuses mainly on the circuit of episodic power involving the 
individual actor, Mr. A, IndCo’s majority shareholder and chairman. Naturally, circuits 
of episodic power exist throughout the organisation and between all its actors (and not 
only as regards Mr. A), across the myriad of encounters during actors’ social relations. 
But several reasons justified focusing on Mr. A. First, and most important, the virtual 
total dominance of Mr. A within this circuit of power is theoretically relevant, since it 
contrasts with limitations as regards other circuits of power. Second, some episodes of 
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power exercise by Mr. A had far reaching organisational implications, both in terms of 
their geographical and organisational breadth and in terms of their structural, long-term 
impacts. Third, it would always be, given access and time limitations, more difficult to 
gather evidence on episodes of power exercise at lower organisational levels – which by 
nature occur throughout the entire company, involving the thousands of IndCo’s 
employees. Not that no evidence was found, as several insights in this chapter have 
already shown. However, evidence was more dispersed, as fragmented pieces on 
inherently dispersed phenomenon (episodes of power at lower organisational levels), 
across diversified topics. Given all the above reasons, the researcher opted to 
concentrate his efforts on the episodic circuit of power involving Mr. A. The potential 
research bias is acknowledged, but the research choice is considered to have been 
appropriate, both on theoretical and pragmatic grounds. 
5.4.2.1 Mr. A’s episodic powers 
Empirical insights left no doubt about Mr. A’s great capacity to achieve his 
objectives in concrete social interactions in which he directly intervened. Many sources 
indicated this, such as interviewees, direct observation of employees’ behaviours 
reacting to indications from Mr. A, the researcher’s personal experience while at IndCo, 
and general knowledge about the company and Mr. A (gathered through publicly 
available sources). Collectively, these sources indicated that when Mr. A. became 
directly involved in particular situations (episodes), his will was typically followed and 
enacted by the remaining actors of the network.  
Some heterogeneous examples suffice to demonstrate Mr. A’s power, when 
mobilised at particular episodes. Unsurprising examples relate to strategic decisions in 
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which a majority shareholder and Chairman may be expected to influence. In IndCo’s 
case, this influence was indeed very significant in crucial decisions. The large 1998 
acquisition and the ambitious restructuring plans of the late 1990’s were, more than 
merely influenced, “clearly led by the shareholder”, as stated by a CC manager.  
Mr. A’s personal intervention was at times crucial to overcome particular 
obstacles or address difficult situations. E.g., an SSC member recalled that a slower than 
planned construction of the SSC offices started compromising the project. And “only 
when Mr. A [intervened], (…) only when there was indeed a very strong pressure, 
construction was accelerated”. The selection of top managers was firmly in his hands, 
and at occasions he implemented drastic changes. An IT respondent exemplified: 
“He called all IndCo’s Directors (…) during a weekend. He called [the 
then CEO], who was considered as having the highest position and 
consideration, and (…) he withdrew him from all his functions, everything; 
he turned from ‘the best’ into ‘a beast’ just like that, over a weekend. 
[Note: The expression “from ‘the best’ into ‘a beast’” is a direct 
translation from the Portuguese version, a very informal equivalent to ‘fall 
from grace’]”.  
A senior manager also recalled that “During meetings, Mr. A may be extremely 
brutal (and that is publicly well known)” (approximate quotation) - a manifestation 
supported on his formal power, in concrete episodes and in the context of the social 
relations established within IndCo.  
This list of empirical insights concludes with a first-hand example regarding ‘car 
etiquette’, of little importance in itself but meaningful to characterise Mr. A’s episodic 
use of power, and how such episodic exercises of power were perceived by other 
IndCo’s actors. The researcher once parked his car about half a meter beyond the 
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delimited parking space, at IndCo’s headquarters. When Mr. A spotted that, he called 
the security guard so that the vehicle owner would move it to its proper location. 
(Needless to say, the researcher promptly relocated the car.) At the time, the topics of 
power (chapter 3) and rules (chapter 2) had still not emerged, so the researcher did not 
attribute particular research relevance to this power exercise and to the underlying the 
parking rule at stake (e.g., recalling section 2.3.1, the researcher did not clarify whether 
the rule was formal or informal). However, the reactions of IndCo’s employees sitting 
in the open space next to the researcher were meaningful. They clearly revealed that, 
even in seemingly unimportant issues, Mr. A did not compromise, established rules 
were meant to be enacted and that any episodic exercises of power were supposed to be 
swiftly accepted and complied by the targeted actors. I.e., this example is not only 
significant in its episodic nature, but in particular because it reveals the generalised 
acceptance of a rule of membership33 regarding how to behave in a situation of an 
episodic exercise of power by Mr. A. 
The circuit of episodic power corresponds to this characterisation of Mr. A’s 
power. These episodic exercises of power by Mr. A, within the social relations he 
established with members of IndCo’s actor-network, virtually always resulted in the 
attainment of Mr. A’s objectives in those particular encounters and situations.  
It is worth noting that these examples required the actual involvement of Mr. A 
in an exercise of power, through either the actual deployment of resources or the 
explicit or implicit threat or promise of deploying them, given his control over those 
resources. This highlights the importance of other actors’ perceptions about the 
possibility and the consequences of a potential deployment of resources, in a particular 
                                                 
33 Rules of membership are a part of the circuit of social integration, and are analysed next. 
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episode, as discussed by Bachrach and Baratz (1963). Their following insight is 
particularly relevant: “the successful exercise of power is dependent upon the relative 
importance of conflicting values in the mind of the recipient in the power relationship” 
(p. 633, emphasis in the original). Adopting these authors’ terminology of actors A and 
B, it is crucial to create the firm belief in actor B’s mind that actor A will (surely or if 
necessary) deploy certain resources A controls in the disadvantage of B, and that those 
resources will affect values which B considers to be more important than those which 
will be sacrificed by B’s compliance. 34 
This perspective highlights that acceptance by, and dispositions of, those 
subjected to power are crucial – hence relating the episodic circuit of power with the 
circuit of social integration (see next subsection). Additionally, the legal protection and 
rights supporting the (potential) exercise of power are also crucial – a relevant link 
between the episodic circuit of power and the circuit of system integration (Ribeiro, 
2003) (see subsection 5.4.4).  
However, in spite of the numerous examples provided above of successful 
exercises of power, Mr. A’s exercises of power cannot be guaranteed to be successful in 
every episode based on control and deployment of resources. Resources (and the control 
over such resources, as well as the capability to deploy them effectively) are unlikely to 
be unlimited, absolute and totally unchallengeable – even in the case of Mr. A. The 
possibility of resistance from other actors, failing supporting factors or adverse 
exogenous factors cannot be a priori excluded, and any given outcome can never be 
                                                 
34 It is acknowledged that the language of As and Bs is, clearly, not in line with Clegg’s framework. 
However, it was used here merely because of its simplicity and, importantly, because it was being used 
within the context of the episodic circuit of causal power. Even so, the following paragraphs make clear 
that such usage does not mean the endorsement of the classical metaphors of actors A and B and the 
mechanical clashing of billiard balls. This episodic circuit goes beyond simple interactions between 
individual actors, taken in isolation, and it is intrinsically linked with the remaining circuits of power. 
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totally secured. In addition, episodic exercises of power take place in particular standing 
conditions, in a particular time, space and social setting. These standing conditions are 
unlikely to be under the full control of any actor – even Mr. A. In particular, outcomes 
depend on the network of social relations and how these relations are stabilised by the 
other two circuits through which power flows: established rules (of meaning and 
membership) and technical conditions.  
The above analysis already depicted rules of meanings and membership and 
technical conditions prevalent across IndCo in the 1990’s. These rules and technical 
conditions represent the second and third circuits of power in Clegg’s framework: the 
circuits of social and system integration, respectively. Together, they defined the 
standing conditions in which episodic exercises of power occurred. The next two points 
analyse how these established rules and technical conditions promoted or made difficult 
the attainment of Mr. A’s objectives. 
5.4.3 CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION  
The circuit of social integration consists of the prevailing rules of meaning and 
membership. Returning to the detail of ‘car parking etiquette’ described above, the 
smiles and comments of the employees who also heard the indication for the researcher 
to move the car suggested that such infringement could only happen to an ‘outsider’ or a 
‘new kid on the block’, unaware of a widely known and accepted rule by ‘inside’ 
organisational actors! In fact, after the researcher was warned about the lack of 
precision in parking his car, he subsequently noticed that all other cars were indeed 
parked within the delimited spaces. Certainly no employee wanted to draw Mr. A’s 
attention for this particular reason. Therefore, the meaning of ‘correct’ parking seemed 
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to be clearly and consistently understood by organisational members at IndCo’s 
headquarters and actual parking practices were consistently in line with such meaning – 
in Clegg’s terms, these related rules of meaning and membership were consistently 
interpreted, accepted and enacted (see subsection 2.3.1). In addition, the other actors’ 
reactions to the order of relocating the researcher’s car were revealing that, in addition, 
complying with Mr. A’s orders was another firmly established rule of membership. 
Beyond this particular event, it was clear to the researcher that there was a long-
standing, widespread, deeply seated, taken-for-granted and consistently enacted rule of 
membership that Mr. A’s orders and preferences were indeed to be taken seriously and 
followed by organisational actors.  
Only very few (and senior) interviewees have expressed minor comments which 
contained, and most times only implicitly, some reserve or criticism regarding particular 
decisions or attitudes of Mr. A. Obviously, these comments were made with the huge 
benefit of hindsight – and, in addition, were made to the researcher, not to Mr. A 
himself. In addition, it is naturally impossible that all decisions of a person running such 
a wide organisation for several decades were, all of them, immune to failure, criticism 
or simply plausible alternatives. Finally, although the researcher had limited insights 
about actual debates between these interviewees and Mr. A, the researcher has little 
doubts that whatever decisions resulted from those possible debates, the interviewees 
would indeed attempt to implement them.  
Apart from those minor and natural exceptions (or, more precisely, nuances), the 
overwhelming insights remain: there was (and there still is) a long-standing, 
widespread, deeply seated and taken-for-granted rule that Mr. A’s orders and 
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preferences were (and still are) to be followed by organisational actors; and such rule 
was indeed (and still is) consistently enacted. 
However, episodic exercises of power of one man, as well as a single and 
generic rule of following his orders and preferences, are inherently limited. In 
particular, they are limited in shaping everyday behaviours, and in shaping additional 
rules to cover all areas of organisational life. A senior manager clearly acknowledged 
the limitations of episodic exercises of power: 
“We try, as much as possible, to avoid to command, because normally we 
prefer to involve the people in the processes.”  
Naturally, episodic exercises of power and that generic rule are even more 
limited in such a large and widely dispersed company as IndCo. The senior manager 
continued: 
“A change [in the purchasing process] that in a small company should be 
no problem, we would tell the person of the purchasing area ‘From now 
on, it’s like this’, and on the following day it would be functioning… here, 
it can take months, until the process has been ‘bought’ [by actors], 
implemented and is [finally] functioning”  
The importance of organisational actors having appropriate dispositions is very 
clearly acknowledged. What is at stake here is the mobilisation of dispositional power 
in order to try to secure desired outcomes. In Clegg’s framework, achieving such 
dispositional power depends on fixing appropriate rules of meaning and membership. 
Going back to the 1990’s, prevailing rules of meaning and membership across 
IndCo were not particularly supportive of Mr. A’s (and other central actors’) objectives 
and preferences of having control and intervention over IndCo’s activities – in addition 
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to company-wide financial objectives. Illuminating empirical insights have already been 
presented, and more are presented next. Altogether, they suggest the prevalence of rules 
in line with a decentralised, autonomous and diverse company, in which the local 
objectives and perspectives were paramount and which, at times, put at stake benefits 
for the group as a whole.  
5.4.3.1 Rules of membership 
Empirical insights suggested several examples of rules of membership. A broad, 
general rule concerned attributing a high priority to the ‘core’ areas of commercial, and, 
in particular, production activities. The characterisation of a ‘production-focused 
company’ (section 5.3.2) was synthesised by a CC respondent, quoted in page 309: 
“IndCo is always in the plants”. Such longstanding local level focus was also implicit in 
the traditional expression at IndCo that “on top of the machine, is where we manage 
well” (quoted in the same section), suggesting that management processes should be 
physically close to the production sites. About this expression, an IT interviewee argued 
that this orientation was particularly representative of past periods, when he thus 
commented: 
“I think that, at the time [1990’s], that line of thought was more prevalent. 
It invokes an operational, day-to-day management, rather than a more 
strategic management, on top. The link between the operational base and 
top management was perhaps not as strong as it is today. That is true.”  
The generalised agreement about the importance of commercial and, in 
particular, production activities had, nonetheless, consequences as regards a broad rule 
of membership of local actors which prioritised local issues, rather than organisation-
wide ones. When local actors enacted such rule during their everyday organisational 
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life, in their organisational area, they adopted behaviours more conducive to the 
attainment of local objectives, rather than global ones.  
This general rule, prioritising local issues, is linked with the insight that local 
identities tended to prevail over an identification with the organisation as a whole, 
IndCo. In more extreme cases, as in the country where the acquired country C 
subsidiary was also present, plants competed among themselves over orders from the 
same clients, damaging global profit margins (if no other negative consequences 
arise)35. A less extreme case is reported by a local actor about the persistence, still 
nowadays, of local priorities over company-wide interests. 
“Recently, the company [i.e., centrally] ordered a redistribution of orders 
among plants, to equilibrate activity levels. Depending on the plant, that 
redistribution is easier or more difficult. There are plants which resist that 
orders are taken away from them. And should it be an activity that 
requires the support of the plant which will lose the orders – due to raw 
materials, e.g.-, the plant will resist or not according to the attitude of the 
plant director, as regards facilitating the transfer of that order to another 
plant. That happens. There are all sorts of situations. In general, I think 
there is a positive disposition towards thinking about the group. But there 
are very ‘localistic’ situations.”  
“There are plants which clearly do not agree, accepting doing activities 
which are detrimental to them in order to benefit another plant and the 
group as a whole. First, comes the plant, locally. Second, locally. And 
third, OK, let’s think about the group. [Laughter]. There is great variety 
across plants.”  
It should be noted that this description concerns the recent period when the 
fieldwork was being conducted, whereas in the past – such as in the 1990’s – these 
                                                 
35 The kind of dispute between plants over a given customer order was not likely to have positive effects 
in terms of incentives to further improve the operations and management of the involved plants, as 
suggested in some literature promoting the benefits of creating internal competition within a group (e.g., 
Takeuchi et al., 2008). This dispute basically represented of a ‘win/lose’ situation, producing a worse 
aggregate financial result. 
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dispositions and actions reflecting a local focus and priority, at expense of organisation-
wide interests, was more acute and prevalent, as highlighted by the same respondent.36 
The same respondent alluded to the importance of local rules of membership, of 
what employees considered as appropriate actions as members of their local unit - or, 
more fundamentally, as actors in quest for membership, for being included, accepted, 
retained and promoted within that local unit (Munro, 1999). 
“At plant level, it depends on the person in charge of the plant, on the way 
he plans things. It depends on how he transmits [to others]. (…) We can 
tell very clearly that people react to situations depending on what 
[attitude] received from his/her boss.”  
The fieldwork identified that some rules prevalent at a local level required a 
given behaviour, while global rules required a different one. Moreover, the fieldwork 
provided numerous insights that suggested that local actors often enacted local rules, 
overlooking global ones, as they privileged, and sought to ensure and protect, their local 
level membership. The identified prevailing rules of membership tended to be 
functionally specific; therefore, the financial and the production areas are separately 
analysed. 
At a local, financial level, the priority of many sites resided on the production of 
local accounting reports, both for internal and external (mainly tax) purposes, rather 
than contributing towards the production of organisation-wide, consolidated accounts. 
One particular example (see page 313) was enacting (i.e. complying with) rules 
concerning local reporting timings, but not enacting rules concerning the (tighter) 
timings to report to the corporate centre – or even the more extreme case, described in 
                                                 
36 The reasons for the perceived reduction of this local focus are developed later in chapter 7. 
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the previous section, of the sheer lack of reporting to the corporate centre. In those 
cases, formal rules did not become locally accepted and enacted rules of membership. 
Whenever local actors did not enact the rules concerning reporting timings to the 
corporate centre (i.e., did not report in due time), central financial consolidation became 
more difficult. Those difficulties included tighter timings that central actors had to 
finalise the consolidation process, but went beyond that. It affected the very quality of 
the output of the consolidation process. The loss of quality of the consolidated output 
was typically not in terms of its timeliness, since the report date of the consolidated 
accounts was met. However, with less available time to work, the central consolidation 
team had to settle for lower thresholds of data reliability and materiality, a problematic 
issue given the poor information systems of this area. The quotations in subsection 5.3.3 
about the consolidation difficulties are revealing of these issues. 
At a local, production level, two examples about unwritten, yet locally enacted 
rules can be provided: rules about production planning; and rules about ignoring 
prescribed procedures when addressing emergent commercial or production problems. 
The first example concerns production planning, and was already briefly 
described in the description of the production area, in previous section. There were 
central orientations for plants to adopt similar response times to confirm orders from the 
commercial units. However, the actual practices often revealed plant-specific rules 
reflecting plant specificities, or even the simple disregard of the central orientations by 
local actors. Both practices represented an emphasis on local circumstances, the 
enactment of (unwritten) local rules, and a disregard for central concerns and rules. 
Actual practices led to inconsistent timings for order confirmation across plants, and 
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created obstacles for a global commercial activity, which increasingly relied on 
multiple-plant sourcing of products. Actors from the commercial area actively promoted 
attempts to change such practices (and underlying rules) and increase the uniform 
enactment of company-wide rules. However, such attempts were mostly unsuccessful, 
and local plant circumstances, agendas and rules continued to prevail in guiding local 
production actors’ everyday practices.37 
The second example of unwritten, yet enacted local rules concerns rules 
privileging production and commercial activities, sometimes at the expense of ignoring 
prescribed procedures. Previous sections have described IndCo as a company focused 
on production and sales, while neglecting support activities as accounting and finance. 
That broad brush depiction of these overriding traits is consistent, and can be enriched, 
with the more detailed analysis presented in this subsection. An IT interviewee 
mentioned the traditional rules privileging sales and production above all other 
concerns: 
Respondent: “You tell me: ‘OK, this is very urgent, so let’s plan and 
produce it [straight away]…’  
Researcher: And then we’ll see.  
Respondent: In the past, that was the philosophy. ‘Hey, I’m not going to 
stay around waiting for the order. Produce it [immediately]’. ‘Hey, I’m 
going to ship…’ [dramatised voice, suggesting the objective of ‘getting 
by/implementing a quick fix, expedite solution, outside defined 
procedures’]. Fundamentally, it’s always the rule: ‘What I want is to 
please the customer’. And why? Because he only sees that and doesn’t 
care a thing about the costs or any management implications, or 
whatsoever.”  
                                                 
37 An IT interviewee provided an interesting description of the prevalence of local rules and the 
(unsuccessful) attempts to address them. For a rich depiction of this tension, see in appendix the extended 
quotation #1, with minor adaptations.  
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Similar comments were made by other respondents, suggesting that these rules 
were indeed deeply embedded, especially in the past. These rules of membership 
consisted of beliefs about appropriate behaviour, in situations where tensions existed 
between two alternatives. On one hand, enacting the rules derived from the “traditional 
philosophy”, by adopting an immediate, quick-fix, one-off solution to that particular, 
idiosyncratic problem, in particular in the production and commercial area (e.g., a 
pressure to response to an urgent customer request). On the other hand, actors had the 
alternative of enacting the organisation-wide rules embedded in prescribed procedures, 
which attempted to orient actors in their daily practices and was therefore an alternative, 
proposed rule of membership. These organisation-wide, formal rules attempted to 
promote consistent behaviours throughout the company and bore in mind management 
needs, namely in financial terms, with a broader organisational scope and allowing for a 
consolidated view, in particular for central actors at higher hierarchical level. The 
overall conclusion was that, traditionally, the rules of membership privileging the local, 
operational and commercial areas tended to prevail. 
5.4.3.2 Rules of meaning 
As regards rules of meaning, in the financial area, actors of different plants and 
companies could attribute different meanings to the same account of the charts of 
accounts (indeed, the very existence of similar charts of accounts across plants and 
companies was, itself, uncommon, as already mentioned). Since actors from different 
locations enacted different local rules of meaning, the same transaction could be given a 
different classification, as regards the balance sheet or profit and loss statement 
accounts to be used. The enactment of distinct rules of meaning led to inconsistent 
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information and hampered global reliable visibility, control, comparability and decision-
making, in particular by central actors. 
Similar diversity of rules of meaning occurred in the operational area. The 
meaning attributed to products varied across countries and even within the same 
country. E.g., product references and commercial brands were not uniform in the 
1990’s. In fact, they were still not uniform even at the time of the fieldwork, but during 
the 1990’s, this type of diversity was indeed significant, as expressed by an IT 
respondent: 
“In a small corner [like Portugal], [a certain number of] plants 
[producing the same product] with different codes!”  
Therefore, the same physical product could be classified differently across 
locations due to the enactment of different rules of meaning. Conversely, actors from a 
given plant might not know the meaning of a certain product reference from another 
plant. Therefore, at a practical level, actors might not enact the appropriate rule of 
meaning, because they did not know it. At best, they would have to develop additional 
efforts to gain knowledge about that different rule, “find the equivalences” between the 
meanings (using an expression of the next quotation) and, in a one-off situation, enact 
that different rule.  
The existence of different rules of meaning may not severely affect an individual 
plant, if taken in isolation. However, as noted by the same respondent, such differences 
place obstacles at a global level, not only as regards ISs, but also as regards…  
“optimisation of stocks and even optimisation of production. (…) It is 
evident that in situations of high interaction, having different codes 
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introduces blockages. (…) Redirecting an order to another plant, is not 
just redirecting the order. It’s changing its code. It’s a manual operation. 
It’s not an automatic operation. It requires work, and work to find the 
equivalences. (…) There is no integration at all, we have to go back using 
papers, faxes…”  
While it is true that such optimisations and processual automatisms were less 
significant at IndCo during the 1990’s than in recent years, it is also nonetheless true 
that the described diversity of rules of meaning would hamper any attempt to introduce 
those measures which, at an organisational-wide level, would be beneficial. Therefore, 
the power of the central actors aiming at improving organisation-wide performance 
would be limited by constraints at the circuit of social integration, given inconsistent 
rules of meaning across the organisation. 
The examples above about prevalent rules of meaning and membership 
obviously had very different repercussions upon the interests of Mr. A and other central 
actors, as regards the type, scope and level of impact. However, collectively, they 
suggest that the circuit of social integration, the rules of meaning and membership 
accepted and enacted among local actors were not the most favourable towards the 
attainment of the interests of Mr. A and other central actors.  
5.4.3.3 The contrast between the episodic circuit of power and the circuit of social 
integration 
A striking contrast between the episodic circuit of power and the circuit of social 
integration has been highlighted. On one hand, as regards the episodic circuit of power, 
Mr. A was typically successful in attaining his objectives at episodic events in which he 
intervened. On the other hand, the circuit of social integration was quite different. The 
deeply seated rule that following Mr. A’s orders was the appropriate behaviour 
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obviously benefited Mr. A; however, this rule is not suitable to guide in detail the highly 
varied actions of everyday organisational life. On the contrary, various prevailing rules 
of meaning and membership guiding everyday behaviour and decisions throughout 
IndCo did not support the interests of Mr. A and of other actors which shared a concern 
about the organisation as a whole. Therefore, the power of Mr. A and other central 
actors was limited by inadequate (from their point of view) rules of meaning and 
membership which prevailed throughout IndCo. 
In addition to the episodic circuit and to the circuit of social integration, it is also 
necessary to analyse the existing material conditions, the technological conditions 
constituting the circuit of system integration. Such analysis is done in the next 
subsection. 
5.4.4 CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The previous section provided a general description of some of IndCo’s 
information systems and organisational structures and processes. Drawing upon Clegg’s 
framework, these can be classified as extant techniques - of discipline and production. 
During the 1990’s, several techniques did not facilitate the attainment of the interests of 
Mr. A and of other actors focusing on the organisation at a global level, and might even 
have been detrimental to them. On the contrary, existing techniques satisfactorily 
supported the needs and objectives of local actors. Additionally, the previous section 
also identified the lack of certain techniques which, if they were available, would 
facilitate the attainment of centrally-oriented objectives. This subsection analyses these 
claims in more detail. 
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Material conditions, both technological and organisational, are at stake here. 
The most relevant type of technology for this thesis is Information Technology (IT), 
although an example about production technology is also provided. As regards 
organisational features, the analysis focuses on organisational structures and processes. 
In turn, both types of material conditions (technological and organisational) had 
disciplinary and productive consequences. Both types of material conditions and both 
types of consequences are now separately analysed. 
5.4.4.1 Technological conditions 
Numerous extant technological conditions supported local actors better than 
central actors. A summary of previously described features exemplify. Disparate 
production equipments did not provide detailed information that could be used to 
improve efficiency in other plants. Focusing on information technology, the three types 
of information systems analysed (production, financial accounting and management 
accounting) were not integrated, neither between them at a local level nor between those 
systems at local level and those at corporate level. Accounting systems also reasonably 
addressed local needs, in particular to produce local financial statements for legal and 
tax purposes, but did not facilitate a more aggregated, consolidated view.  
Additional examples can be provided, such as particular features of the Spanish 
accounting systems during the 1990’s. The previous section has briefly described some 
features of the SAP financial accounting module (SAP FI) implemented in 1995. Each 
plant was allowed to have its own chart of accounts. Controlling areas were defined at a 
plant level - a very low level which made higher level analyses more difficult, as 
stressed by Portuguese IT members, and confirmed in the SAP definition of ‘controlling 
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area’: “A controlling area is the basic organisational unit in Management Accounting. A 
Controlling Area represents a closed system for the purposes of cost accounting. 
Allocations can only be executed within a controlling area, they cannot apply to objects 
in other controlling areas” (SAP, 2005, p. 26). Additionally, cost centres nomenclature 
diverged across plants: each plant had its own rules to define cost centres codes, i.e., to 
define the number and position of characters and their meanings, in the codes which 
identify the cost centres. Whereas such technical features (which actually correspond to 
rules about ISs matters) may provide flexibility to actors in local sites, a Portuguese IT 
respondent thus criticised this diversity of choice at such a low hierarchical level: 
“When the objective of a group is to have consolidated information at the 
highest level, if we start segmenting straight away [at a low, plant level], 
we won’t have the necessary information [at a high, consolidated level].”  
 
5.4.4.2 Organisational conditions – processes and structures 
Some organisational processes were designed with a local perspective in mind 
and were supported by adequate organisational structures (i.e., at a local level). One 
example (already presented on page 345 and developed in the appendix as quotation #1) 
concerns defining the frequency of the process of planning production orders on the 
basis of plant characteristics, rather than on the basis of global commercial activities. 
Local units were adequately staffed to carry out several local finance, accounting, IS 
and commercial activities. Human resources management of local employees was also 
in part attributed to local management, structurally attributing to local management – 
and to the plant director in particular – substantial autonomy in distributing rewards and 
sanctions. 
 5.4 An analysis of power circuits up to the late 1990’s 
5.4.4 Circuit of system integration 
 
353
A number of illustrative empirical insights have already been indicated, in 
particular as regards the accounting area. But additional insights were gathered. The 
Spanish subsidiary was an interesting example. The overarching scenario emerging 
from the fieldwork was that organisational structures and processes in Spain in the late 
1990’s were highly decentralised and particularly suited to local preferences and 
interests. In addition, Portuguese central actors had limited knowledge about the actual 
degree of (de)centralisation in Spain. The following quotes from two Portuguese 
respondents illustrate this, although with slightly different perceptions on the topic, 
most likely due to their different organisational positions. An IT manager, who had at 
the time a relatively junior position, recalled: 
“There were indications [from Portugal] to centralise in Spain, as well. 
(…) And some people had that mission; but then, in practice, they only did 
something to convey the idea that it [centralisation] had been done. (…) 
Concrete examples: people said that accounting in Spain was totally 
centralised in Madrid – lies! The transactional activities were all 
performed locally. Each plant performed its own [accounting]. Each plant 
executed its own payments. [This decentralisation] is visible if you are on 
the field. (…) The holding’s interlocutor said ‘Yes, [it is centralised]’, so 
you [the holding] believed. Only when you go out to the field and start 
‘digging’, you conclude that it is not true. I.e., they had a corporate centre, 
a number of people in whom those tasks were centralised. However, they 
kept everything decentralised – payments, accounting, everything was 
decentralised.”  
A CC manager provided a similar account - and in spite of his more senior 
position, he also recognised having at the time a limited knowledge about the Spanish 
subsidiary: 
“For me, it was clear that [accounting activities] were very decentralised. 
(…) Obviously, before you get into the details, you cannot say exactly 
what. But I recall, for instance, that at the time [1998] questionnaires 
were sent precisely to identify that: (…) what was being done in the 
corporate (or more central) team and in each of the units. As I managed, 
in spite of everything, to have some visibility, I did not have many doubts 
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that there was a high degree of decentralisation. But, [knowing] exactly 
the degree of decentralisation, it’s clear that it was only known [later]… It 
wasn’t even [known] with those questionnaires; that was [merely] an 
indication, which later was exhaustively [explored], when we developed 
much more complex processes, such as the treasury centralisation, with 
[Bank X].”  
Two concrete examples in the accounting area can be added, regarding Spain in 
the late 1990’s. Both involve technical and organisational configurations, and the first 
example is indeed quite related with the one provided above (about the definition of 
cost centres’ nomenclature and controlling areas in Spain). In Spain, strict access 
policies reflected the prevalent local focus and autonomy. For example, users from a 
given plant could not enter data regarding another plant. If a document (e.g., an invoice) 
contained data related with two plants, the accountant of the first plant would only post 
the data related to his plant and would place the remaining data in a ‘suspend account’. 
The process would then be taken by the accountant of the second plant, which would 
retrieve the data from that suspend account and conclude the posting.  
A similar limitation was that users might not be authorised to enter data in 
certain types of accounts. In such cases, one accountant would only post in the accounts 
which he had access to, and would use a suspend account in place of the accounts he 
could not access; a second accountant would then take on the process, retrieve the data 
from the suspend account, and complete the posting. In both situations, two partial 
operations had to be made and two employees would have to intervene to complete the 
postings.  
The extent to which each of these arrangements benefited the local actors was 
not totally clear to the researcher, although both respondents above conceded that these 
arrangements indeed granted local actors a great deal of (appreciated) flexibility. In any 
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case – and that was the most crucial aspect for this research-, it was clear that these 
arrangements did not favour the interests of central actors and of those interested in the 
organisation as a whole, not only due to the information restrains they implied, but also 
due to the higher costs globally incurred. 
5.4.4.3 Disciplinary consequences 
As regards the disciplinary consequences of these techniques (i.e., of the 
technological and organisational material conditions), the limitations of the centre to 
access, interpret, validate, control, compare and decide upon locally-produced 
information were clear.  
Indeed, visibility over the locals was highly limited in scope and depth, it was 
episodic and depended on information produced at a local level, whose validation was, 
at best, difficult. In particular, (at least some) central actors perceived the risk of lack of 
reliability (and hence relevance and comparability), due to intentional or non-intentional 
data errors at local level. The limited visibility capacity precluded a central ‘gaze’ in the 
line suggested by Foucault (1975/1977) (section 3.3) and reduced the capacity of central 
actors to effectively intervene and discipline local actors. 
5.4.4.4 ‘Productive’ consequences – the ‘mainstream’ and the ‘Foucauldian’ 
perspectives 
As regards the ‘productive’ consequences of these techniques, there is the need 
to separate the two senses of this concept, as discussed in subsection 3.3.6: the 
‘mainstream’ perspective; and the ‘Foucauldian’ perspective. 
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From a ‘mainstream’ perspective, existing techniques had limitations in terms of 
‘producing’ artefacts which contributed towards the attainment of central actors’ 
interests – such as consolidated financial reports. Moreover, there was a sheer absence 
of techniques which might facilitate that attainment– such as information systems 
allowing central access to local data and drill-down functionalities to analyse, validate 
and control data at a more detailed level. On the contrary, existing techniques tended to 
satisfy local actors’ needs. They allowed them to produce the required legal and tax 
reports and to control important variables, like stocks, at a local level. As an SSC 
member recalled, 
“Before, many subsidiaries worked with Excel a lot. In [two particular 
countries], they controlled stocks, exclusively using Excel. (…) What was 
important for them, what they took as correct, was what they had in Excel 
files.”  
Interestingly, a company-wide IS which could allow a tight stock control had 
already been implemented in certain countries, but local people did not use it and kept 
using the locally developed technologies (based on Excel) which provided them the 
locally required information. The same respondent continued: 
Respondent: “The [common] tools they had to control stocks, it was more 
for global purposes, or just to suggest compliance. (…) In [a particular 
country], they worked with Excel, so they left [the common tool] aside 
until they had time, or when they felt like it. (…)  
Researcher: So, it was not really a problem with the tools themselves. It 
was rather a problem about using the tools.  
Respondent: Yes”.  
At a more general level, a CC member thus described the visibility limitations of 
central actors in the 1990’s: 
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“At that time, it was much more complicated for the Corporate Centre to 
have the same level of satisfaction regarding information and analysis, 
when compared to local people. Due to that difficulty, due to that 
information structure, the CC always had a thicker fog to look into the 
future or the reality itself, than the locals. That passage of knowledge, or 
information, was not as fluid as desired.”  
From the alternative, Foucauldian sense of ‘productive’ consequences of the 
technique, the limited existing disciplinary techniques accessible to central actors did 
not significantly manage to ‘produce a dominated (i.e., subjected) local actor’. As 
discussed above, the limitations (or absence) of techniques which might provide 
insights over local actors limited the disciplinary ‘gaze’ from central actors. 
5.4.5 CIRCUITS OF POWER AND PRACTICES ACROSS INDCO: A 
CONCLUDING OVERVIEW  
At a late stage of the fieldwork, the researcher presented his evolving 
interpretations to a CC member. The ensuing transcript of the dialogue covers the main 
insights analysed in this section: 
“Researcher: From what we analysed, in 1998, at a pre-SAP stage, the 
acquisitions history led to a situation of high autonomy and differences in 
practices… 
Respondent: [adding] … and systems… 
Researcher: and systems. On the whole, in terms of capacity to intervene 
and visibility, the local interests, the local objectives ended up by being 
better met than those of the centre. 
Respondent: Of course. That is evident. 
Researcher: We’ve talked about systems and practices. And even in terms 
of the values of the people, there was also… [interrupted] 
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Respondent: When you make an acquisition and everything stays the 
same, keeping the previous systems, nothing changes. As much as you 
claim that you have a [single] culture… that’s irrelevant. What matters is 
how the people worked, and whether they continue to work in the same 
way, with the same logics and principles. If they continue, nothing 
changes. 
Researcher: What kind of logics and principles could you provide as 
examples and which were typical of the group’s lack of capacity to 
intervene at the time? (…) 
Respondent: That is precisely what we were talking about. I.e., when there 
is a decentralisation logic in terms of decision and implementation 
processes… [interrupted by phone call] (…) 
Researcher: So, effectively, those who could be identified as the powerful 
ended up by being the locals, rather than the centre – which actually had 
the formal authority inherent to being the parent company, but in terms of 
capacity to get results… 
Respondent: There were actually ‘two IndCos’: there was Portugal; and 
there was ‘the rest’. Spain had a decentralised plan, no doubt, in a 
reasonably consistent way; there were people there with great decision 
power, who implemented the policies – in the way they understood that 
were agreed at a corporate level with Mr. A and the Board, in which they 
also participated. But, as regards ‘the rest’… [there was total autonomy]. 
It’s also true that in ‘the rest’ there was not much more. By acquiring [the 
Spanish company, in the early 1990’s], we included a company in 
[another country], which at the time was a very small plant, which was in 
total and absolute autonomy, for many years. And there was a plant in 
[another country]. Only [in the second half of the decade, two additional 
countries] appeared.  
This interviewee agreed with the researcher’s interpretation that the centre 
experienced limitations. And although the interviewee downplayed ‘single culture’ as a 
potentially inconsequential rhetorical concept, he highlighted how the prevailing, 
organisation-wide logic and principle of decentralisation (i.e., an organisation-wide 
element of the circuit of social integration) impacted, and was embedded, on processes 
and practices. 
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This chapter has highlighted that in the late 1990’s there was a problematic 
situation as regards the disembedding processes which “lift[ed] up (…) local social 
relations to a global level” (Moilanen, 2008, p. 253), in particular as regards a financial 
perspective. Existing systems, processes and actual practices were perceived to be 
limited in producing the abstract, financially-expressed knowledge about local 
operations, in a way to address the needs of central actors. There was low reliability of, 
and trust on, extant “expert systems”, as “systems of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise” (Giddens, 1990, p. 27, cited in Moilanen, 2008, p. 253). This 
low ‘trust-in-systems’ compromised the disembedding process. In turn, limitations in 
the disembedding process limited central actors’ ability to “act back upon local contexts 
through reembedding” (p. 254, emphasis added) (see also Seal and Herbert, 2009). At 
the same time, ‘trust-in-persons’ was also limited by local actors’ rules of meaning and 
membership, which privileged local level issues. Processes of disembedding and 
reembedding and the role of trust-in-persons and trust-in-systems are further developed 
in the next chapter, in subsection 6.2.1. 
Summing up the current section, the majority shareholder and chairman, Mr. A., 
had a virtually absolute power during the concrete episodes of social interaction in 
which he became involved. He had also succeeded in firmly instilling the rule, at the 
circuit of social integration, that his orders were to be followed by other organisational 
actors. However, these achievements of Mr. A did not prevent some limitations 
experienced by himself and other actors with an interest on the company as a whole, 
from a central perspective, such as top managers and actors at the corporate centre.  
These limitations included the obvious insufficiency of the mentioned rule of 
‘following Mr. A’s orders’ to guide the myriad of decisions and actions taken by actors 
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across the company, during their everyday organisational life. In addition, other rules of 
meaning and membership were identified which did not promote, and sometimes even 
hampered, the achievement of the interests of central actors. There were prevalent rules, 
in various functional areas, about adopting a local level (the plant or country level) 
focus as the criterion to shape everyday decisions and actions, rather than a global level. 
These rules where enacted by local actors, and no evidence was found of central actors 
developing a significant, vigorous and straightforward contestation to those rules. 
Therefore, the local focus of such rules appeared to have become an ‘obligatory passage 
point’ guiding actors’ actions (Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989; see section 3.4). In addition, 
the existence of diverse rules of meaning also compromised the interests of central 
actors. 
Finally, a number of limitations existed in the circuit of system integration which 
also compromised the interests of central actors, although satisfying local actors. 
Information systems of various functional areas, and organisational structures and 
processes, which also became ‘obligatory passage points’ in actor’s activities, were 
more adequate to provide for the needs of the local actors, rather than the needs of 
central actors. 
Globally, prevailing circuits of social and system integration prevented central 
actors from having a clearer visibility over the company as a whole and detailed insights 
from the various subsidiaries and plants. These restrictions hampered global decision-
making and control and prevented having a more frequent executive intervention. In 
short, prevailing circuits of social and systems integration structurally limited central 
actors’ power, in a clear contrast with the episodic circuit. 
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Considering the analysis so far, it becomes apparent that the three circuits of 
power are highly interrelated. The next section explores such interrelationships. 
5.5 THE INTERRELATED NATURE OF THE THREE CIRCUITS OF 
POWER 
This section draws on the previous characterisation of IndCo in the late 1990’s 
and argues that the three circuits of power in IndCo were strongly related and must be 
understood in their related totality, rather than in isolation. To do that, it first explores a 
particular empirical example introduced in subsection 5.3.3, on page 320, about the 
information systems supporting stock valuation and variance analysis. Then, it adopts a 
broader, organisation-wide level, representing the overall relationships between the 
main circuits of power identified in IndCo during the 1990’s. A final subsection 
summarises the previous characterisation of the circuits of power.  
5.5.1 INTERRELATED CIRCUITS OF POWER: AN INTERPRETATION OF A 
PARTICULAR EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE 
The application of Clegg’s framework to explain the adoption at IndCo of 
particular solutions as ‘obligatory passage points’ for stock valuation and variance 
analysis allows for a better understanding of the theoretical model and the way the 
circuits are interrelated. It should be noted that the choice of this particular aspect (the 
adoption of particular solutions) does not mean that it was particularly significant, 
neither empirically nor theoretically. Rather, this aspect was chosen mostly as an 
illustration, in order to highlight of how Clegg’s model can be applied to a very specific 
empirical issue. 
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The following figure 5.2 depicts such tentative application of the framework – in 
spite of some problems as regards the depiction in Clegg’s graphical framework of 
certain relations, which are addressed later in the proposals for the development of 
Clegg’s model, in section 8.1. The framework component of ‘Exogenous environmental 
contingencies’ is not included, due to its lack of applicability to the interpretation of this 
particular example. 
SPECIFIC RULES AT STAKE:
- Existing rule: only use Excel for all cost accounting-
related activities
- Proposed rule: use Excel + SOIC’s financial features
OTHER RELEVANT RULES / ISSUES 
- Existing general rule: privilege local focus 
- Existing general rule: follow Mr. A’s orders (not 
applicable to this issue)
- Perception of non-compulsivity of proposed specific 
rule
SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES AT STAKE
- Existing technique: Excel spreadsheets
- Proposed technique: SOIC’s financial features (not 
new, but no company-wide use)
OTHER RELEVANT TECHNICAL ISSUES
- Limited SOIC’s financial functionalities and integration 
- Excel was essential for cost accounting
- Limited strong central organizational structures and 
tightly integrated, company-wide processes
Facilitate / 
restrict
Control / 
contest
Reproduce / 
transform
Fix / re-fix
Empower / disempower
EXCEL 
(and related rules) retained 
as Obligatory Passage 
Points (OPPs);
SOIC’s financial features 
(and related rules) failed to 
become OPPs
Circuit: 
Episodic
Power: 
Causal
Circuit: 
Social
Integration
Power:
Dispositional
Circuit: 
System
Integration
Power: 
Facilitative
Circuits of 
power
Outcomes
Central actors: efforts (but not strong ones) to make 
compulsory the usage of SOIC’s financial features
Local actors: significant rejection of using SOIC’s financial 
features
Social 
relations
 
Figure 5.2: IndCo’s circuits of power as regards the ‘Obligatory Passage Point’ status of Excel vs. SOIC’s financial features during the 1990’s 
(Source: based on Clegg’s, 1989 framework, with some adaptations) 
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Analysing the relationships between the circuits of system and social integration, 
it can be argued that technological features and prevailing rules of membership were 
mutually reinforcing in promoting Excel spreadsheets as the ‘obligatory passage point’ 
for stock valuation and variance analysis at a local level. The existing Excel 
spreadsheets were locally perceived as technically adequate to carry out these activities 
at a local level. On the contrary, the common tool SOIC, whose adoption for these 
activities was being proposed by some central actors, was not an accounting solution, 
but an operational one, and suffered from some limitations. The following quotation 
from an IT respondent clarifies the issue: 
“SOIC was a logistic solution, purchasing, sales and stock management. 
And there was the possibility to draw on those operations 
[transactions…..] and integrate them with accounting, to avoid manual 
operations which would have to be done at the end of the month. (…) You 
had to perform calculations outside SOIC, in the Excel spreadsheets of 
each plant controller, who would gather information from SOIC [and 
other sources]. Then the accounting area would reach a certain figure. 
Those figures (…) would be transferred to a table [and back to SOIC], and 
SOIC would then attribute an accounting value to all the transactions of 
the period. (…) 
From SOIC, you could get information, not only for financial accounting, 
but also for managerial purposes. Some companies had previously 
calculated costs38 (…) and introduced them to valuate the opening balance 
of the products. Until those costs were reviewed, all the transactions were 
valuated based on them. And then you could analyse the variances, 
comparing SOIC values with the actual costs, calculated by accounting.  
Researcher: Actual global [i.e., not detailed] cost. 
Respondent: Exactly [global costs]. But you could always calculate some 
variances. It also depended on the magnitude of the variances. If it was 
large, you had to look for the causes of those variances. 
                                                 
38 Other respondents clarified that these previously calculated values were an average of the previous 
three months. 
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But there were entities with many people who thought that doing that work 
was not worth it. (…) [So,] not all companies were taking advantage of 
that possibility, because they preferred to do it through other tools, like 
Excel, where they had calculated the stock valuation”  
Therefore, even if a given plant used the financial features based on SOIC, the 
plant would still continue to have to use Excel anyway, for both cost calculation and for 
more detailed variance analysis. Indeed, Excel was useful for cost calculation in two 
ways: to aggregate the information from SOIC and non-SOIC sources; and to allow 
more detailed cost calculations for individual products. A local actor thus highlighted 
the limitations of SOIC and the need to resort to Excel for detailed analysis: 
“Within SOIC, there was a module to valuate stocks in a generic way, 
aggregating the products into groups – just a few, it didn’t go to the detail 
of individual references. A [type of product] can be very cheap or very 
expensive, depending on the design or [a particular raw material]. (…) If I 
wanted to know precisely the cost of a particular product or reference, I 
would manually calculate it (…) using Excel (…) because I would not use 
such a generic cost [as the one in SOIC]”  
In addition, the benefits for central actors from having financial information in 
SOIC were also limited, due to SOIC’s technical characteristics. As the last IT 
respondent described, 
“[An automated aggregation of financial information from SOIC] could 
never be done, because SOIC was not a multi-company solution. There 
was a [separate] database in each company. (…) [Even] when [four 
distinct juridical entities] merged into one, their databases were not 
merged; they were kept separate, autonomous, as if they continued distinct 
juridical entities. This made aggregating information [in SOIC] 
impossible or very difficult.”  
As a summary, some local actors considered that their local needs were 
adequately met by Excel spreadsheets alone; and although some central actors argued in 
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favour of the organisation-wide adoption of the financial features based on SOIC, the 
benefits for the same central actors were also limited by technological features.  
Therefore, the option for local actors was whether: 1) enacting the traditional, 
general rule of membership of privileging a local focus and concerns, and the specific 
rule to only use Excel spreadsheets for stock valuation and variance analysis; or 2) 
enacting the new rule proposed by the central actors, and start using the financial 
features based on SOIC. And in spite of the attempts of some central actors to introduce 
the new rule, some local actors continued to enact the traditional rule and only use 
Excel. 
As a conclusion, this particular example regarding the (non) usage of SOIC’s 
financial features, as well as various examples presented in this section, suggests the 
overarching insights that there was a bidirectional (although obviously non-
deterministic) causality between the circuits of social and system integration. On one 
hand, the prevailing circuit of social integration did not support the adoption of a 
technique (the financial features of SOIC) which did not meet the requirement of the 
‘local interest/focus’ rule, since the local needs could be satisfied by Excel alone. On the 
other hand, technical issues also promoted the local rule. The SOIC solution was limited 
for financial purposes, including for a higher level analysis (given its lack of detailed 
functionalities and fragmented, non-integrated nature), and Excel spreadsheets would 
have to be locally used for other related purposes anyway. Additionally, there was, at 
the time, a lack of strong central organisational structures and a lack of tightly 
integrated, company-wide processes – hence creating a lesser pressure towards the 
enactment, by local actors, of the rule to use SOIC’s financial features.  
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Therefore, an overarching insight from various examples presented in this 
section was that there were bidirectional (yet non-deterministic) repercussions between 
the circuits of social and system integration – although Clegg’s framework only 
graphically depicts the influence from the circuit of social integration to the circuit of 
system integration (this limitation is addressed in a proposed contribution to Clegg’s 
framework, in subsection 8.1.3) 
In addition, central actors did not firmly develop explicit and strong exercises of 
episodic power to attempt to enforce uniform practices and usage of systems. 
Commenting on a stock-related functionality of this global tool, an IT respondent stated 
that (as already quoted in page 320)… 
“Some people [from the centre] said that that should happen. But then, in 
practice, it didn’t happen, because they couldn’t pass that message almost 
as a law, obligatory. And so [controllers in plants] kept thinking ‘OK, as 
long as this is not… [compulsory, we won’t do]’”.  
In the social relations established between central and local actors as regards the 
adoption of SOIC’s financial features, it appeared that the exercise of formal power by 
the central actors promoting this tool was not significant39. However, insufficient 
control and/or mobilisation of resources may not have been the only reason for the lack 
of success at the level of episodic circuit of power. The objectives addressed in these 
particular episodes faced obstacles at the level of the circuit of social integration – as 
mentioned above, they were inconsistent with the ‘local interest/focus’ rule. The 
                                                 
39 Although this aspect was not fully clarified by the researcher, it appeared that the central actors at stake 
were not in a high hierarchical position and hence did not have a great formal power. In addition, it 
appeared there was no involvement of higher level actors backing up their attempts. The researcher 
believes (although, again, this was not fully clarified) that such lack of higher level support was due to the 
fact that, given the multiple other limitations, implementing this particular feature would not make a 
substantial difference within the overall picture. Since gains from changing this particular feature would 
likely be limited, it discouraged a stronger pressure by key central actors in the social relations with the 
locals, at the level of the episodic circuit of power. 
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combined effect from these two circuits led to the rejection of the attempted innovation 
at the circuit of system integration, at the practical level of actual and accurate usage. 
The material conditions (the financial features of the common system), whose adoption 
was being proposed by central actors, did not succeed in becoming fixed as an 
‘obligatory passage point’. On the other hand, the previous Excel-based technologies, 
whose usage as the single tool with stock valuation allowing for some managerial 
analysis was being (half-heartedly) contested by central actors, nonetheless prevailed as 
an ‘obligatory passage point’. 
As a consequence, no major shifts occurred in terms of the relative 
empowerment of the actors at stake. Local actors continued to be ‘empowered’ by 
existing Excel-based techniques40. On the other hand, factors from all three circuits of 
power promoted that local actors did not use appropriately, or not at all, several 
technical features of SOIC. Therefore, central actors struggled with a mix of structurally 
limited tools, which crucially depended on (failing) local actors’ input. Therefore, the 
empowerment of the central actors was limited, vis-à-vis local actors, in the social 
relations they established. 
5.5.2 INTERRELATED CIRCUITS OF POWER: AN INTERPRETATION AT AN 
ORGANISATION-WIDE LEVEL 
This section has also explored empirical insights suggesting a broader picture. 
The following figure 5.3 synthesises the main and contrasting features of the prevalent 
circuits of power in IndCo’s, during the 1990’s and up to last years of the decade, as 
highlighted in this chapter. 
                                                 
40 Clegg’s framework links empowerment to social relations, rather than to actors. A change in this 
linkage is proposed in section 8.1.5. 
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Figure 5.3: IndCo’s circuits of power during the 1990’s (Source: based on Clegg’s, 1989 framework, with some adaptations) 
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From a theoretical point of view, the most interesting outcome is that Mr. A, 
although virtually always victorious in concrete episodes of social interactions, was 
nonetheless (along other central actors) confronted with structural limitations, in various 
areas of the organisation. In the terms of Clegg’s framework, Mr. A had limitations 
derived from the structural circuits of social and systems integration. 
These power limitations of central actors derived from the circuits of social 
integration (rules of meaning and membership) and system integration (material 
conditions). In spite of the well-accepted rule that Mr. A’s orders were to be followed, 
everyday behaviours of actors throughout the organisation cannot be directed solely 
neither through permanent episodes of power exercise, nor through the rule of 
‘following Mr. A’s orders’. Mr. A’s orders and general objectives are obviously unable 
to address and guide the multitude of actors in their multitude of everyday actions and 
decisions. 
On the contrary, this section highlighted examples of rules and techniques which 
promoted the attainment of the objectives of local actors but did not promote, and 
sometimes even hampered, the attainment of the objectives of central actors.  
As such, and as a synthesis, the traditional (i.e., not recently introduced), general 
(i.e., not functionally-specific) local rule of privileging a local focus and local concerns 
may be considered as the most crucial obligatory passage point. In fact, its recurrent 
enactment had strong implications in the power relationally attributed to the various 
actors (and, in a particularly noticeable and negative way, the central actors) within 
IndCo’s actor-network. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS 
This chapter initiated the analysis of the empirical setting, by providing a brief 
characterisation of the case study organisation and its industry, the group in which it is 
included, and its chairman and majority shareholder, Mr. A. The remainder of the 
chapter analysed the organisation until the late 1990’s, depicting the “original state of 
affairs” (Czarniawska, 1998, p. 2), as the first building block of the case study narrative. 
The second section argued that the case organisation, by that time, could be described as 
a decentralised and diversified organisation, with autonomous subsidiaries and local 
sites. The third section characterised the IT, production and accounting and finance 
areas. It then preliminarily characterised the power (and limitations) of some actors, and 
it introduced the paradox of some formally powerful actors being confronted with a 
number of important limitations. 
Clegg’s framework, adopted from the fourth section onwards, illuminated how, 
in the 1990’s, the power of different actors differed across the three circuits of power: 
the circuit of episodic power; the circuit of social integration; and the circuit of system 
integration. Clegg’s framework was an effective tool to dissolve the apparent paradox 
of formally powerful actors being confronted with limitations to achieve their interests, 
because it guided the interpretation of the empirical setting to identify the causes of the 
power limitations of central actors. Therefore, Clegg’s framework was useful to answer 
the questions ‘Who are the powerful?’ and ‘What causes (or limits) their power?’ 
(Clegg, 1989; Seal, 2003). 
The limited attainment of interests of central actors did not emerge from the 
episodic circuit of power, i.e., from issues related with an episodic control and 
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deployment of resources. In fact, on one hand, Mr. A had an overwhelming power 
based on the control and deployment of resources, which he might draw upon in 
concrete episodes of social interaction in which he became involved. To a certain 
extent, a similar assessment can be made when top management and the corporate 
centre engages in particular episodes with actors from lower organisational levels – 
although at a clearly lesser extent, as demonstrated by difficulties in implementing some 
change projects. 
The limitations of central actors emerged mostly from characteristics of the 
circuits of social and system integration, where those central actors experienced power 
limitations at a more structural, permanent and continuous level. In the circuit of social 
integration, and as regards rules of membership, the widely accepted and enacted rule of 
following Mr. A’s orders was limited in guiding actors’ everyday actions; on the 
contrary, the general rule of privileging the local level and the diversity in rules of 
meaning played against central actors’ interests, and in a more direct, effective and 
wider way. In the circuit of system integration, several ISs and organisational structures 
and processes were arguably more adequate to address the needs of the local actors, 
rather than central actors’. Together, these structural limitations in these two circuits 
reduced central actors’ visibility, control and capacity to influence actions of actors 
throughout the company. 
Finally, based on the previous analysis, the fifth section argued that the circuits 
of power are highly interrelated. It first illustrated this argument with the particular 
empirical situation of the (lack of) enactment by some local actors of a particular 
technique that central actors had proposed. Then, it expanded the analysis to an 
organisation-wide level.  
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Next, chapter 6 describes several innovations introduced in the circuit of system 
integration from the late 1990’s onwards, identifies the driving motivations and actors 
behind them and proposes some expected shifts in the circuits of power. Later, chapter 7 
explores the actual shifts in the various circuits of power and the multiple interrelations 
between (and within) those circuits. 
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CHAPTER 6 – THE CASE STUDY: A FOCUS ON 
THE END OF THE 1990’S AND LATER 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyses three innovations – one technological innovation and two 
organisational innovations - introduced in IndCo between 1998 and 2001 which affected 
the distribution of power in the organisation actor-network. Drawing on Clegg’s (1989) 
framework, these technological and organisational innovations were introduced in the 
circuit of system integration and succeeded in structurally becoming Obligatory Passage 
Points, affecting the distribution of power flowing through this circuit of power.  
This chapter constitutes the second element of the case study narrative. After the 
previous chapter analysed the “original state of affairs” (characterising IndCo until the 
late 1990’s), this chapter now focuses on the “action or (…) event” (Czarniawska, 1998, 
p. 2), i.e., the introduction of the innovations in IndCo, between 1998 and 2002. The 
next chapter analyses “the consequent state of affairs”, i.e., the actual repercussions of 
the innovations. 
This chapter intends primarily to address the second research question related 
with the empirical setting: to explain why and how central actors introduced and 
mobilised technological and organisational innovations. Therefore, this chapter focuses 
primarily on two areas: motivations and expectations of repercussions of these 
innovations; and processes through which they were introduced, developed and became 
fixed in IndCo’s actor-network. Nonetheless, it is at times inevitable to anticipate some 
actual repercussions, particularly when analysing the various stages of these processes. 
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As such, this chapter briefly mentions some actual repercussions, although these are 
mainly analysed in the next chapter.  
Each of the first three sections focuses on a particular innovation, as related 
components of a single case study1. The first section focuses on a technological 
innovation: the introduction of the financial accounting module of an ERP package 
(SAP FI). The two following sections analyse organisational innovations. The second 
section focuses on the relocation of the Corporate Centre (CC) from Spain back to 
Portugal. The third section analyses the creation of a Shared Services Centre (SSC), 
also in Portugal. A brief final section summarises the chapter. 
6.1 A TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: SAP FOR FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING 
This section analyses the design and implementation process of SAP FI (i.e., its 
mobilisation process) in IndCo2. It starts by providing a chronological account of the 
gradual adoption of various SAP modules, in a long process which started by the 
financial accounting module (SAP FI). The second subsection makes a brief 
introduction to the SAP FI project. The two following subsections examine, 
respectively, how certain design options promoted uniformity and central visibility in 
SAP FI; and, on the opposite direction, how other design options accommodated 
diversity and autonomy, reducing central visibility. The fifth subsection analyses how 
SAP FI was redesigned to support the objectives of central actors. A sixth subsection 
                                                 
1 See subsection 4.1.3, page 189, footnote 10 for a discussion about this research design clarification. 
2 The SAP FI project was analysed as a separate working paper (Oliveira, 2007c), when the research was 
strongly focused on ERP repercussions (see subsection 4.1.3) and the PhD was planned to be constituted 
by three papers. However, when the research topic changed and included additional innovations 
(subsection 4.1.4), an in-depth examination of very specific SAP-related topics (e.g., the selection of the 
software vendor) became less relevant and even inappropriate. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of the 
SAP FI project was left for future work. 
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re-examines the motivations concerning SAP FI design options, with a particular focus 
on the accounting and finance function. The seventh subsection argues that SAP FI 
became an obligatory passage point, influencing enacted rules and thus affecting actors’ 
power within IndCo’s actor-network. The final subsection provides a summary and 
highlights the crucial need to also consider additional innovation processes – to be 
analysed in the ensuing sections. 
6.1.1 A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAP 
MODULES IN INDCO 
In 1997, IndCo decided to implement the financial accounting module of SAP 
(SAP FI) in the Portuguese subsidiary. In the following year, the scope of this project 
was expanded to include two new plants in two other countries. Within the SAP FI 
project, parts of other accounting modules were also implemented: SAP CO 
(Controlling) and SAP FA (Fixed Assets); however, they were implemented in order to 
support SAP FI, rather than as main objectives themselves. Implementation in the three 
countries occurred during 1999. By the end of 1999, it was decided to roll-out a global 
SAP FI model to the remaining countries (except one); implementation was finished by 
2001.3 
In 2000, the Sales and Distribution module (SAP SD) started being 
implemented. At a first stage, only commercial functionalities were implemented (e.g., 
clients’ orders, invoicing, etc.). This process included all countries (except the one also 
excluded from the SAP FI project) and, in general terms, it was finished around 2003. 
                                                 
3 The implementation of SAP modules never actually finished, given the on-going creation of new plants 
and the acquisition of new companies. The indicated ending dates merely represent the end of the most 
substantial part of each SAP project. 
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Some features of the module on Materials Management (SAP MM) were also 
included during the implementation of Sales and Distribution module. However, a more 
complete implementation of the SAP MM module only started in 2001, along the 
Production Planning module (SAP PP), in a pilot plant. This project integrated the 
operational area in the same countries where SAP was already present, in a long process 
which, in general terms, only finished in 2007. 
By 2005, it was decided to adopt the costing module SAP CO-PC (Product 
Costing). Given the close links between the production module and the product costing 
module, it was decided that SAP CO-PC should be included in the still on-going SAP 
PP roll-out. Therefore, this module was implemented in the locations where SAP PP 
was already present, as a separate roll-out; and it was implemented in the remaining 
locations, along with SAP PP, finishing in 2007.  
The case study focuses on the design, implementation and repercussions of the 
SAP FI module. However, the longitudinal and long-term perspective adopted in this 
research implied that often the other SAP modules (SAP SD, MM, PP and CO-PC), as 
well as non-SAP solutions, were also found to be relevant actors in the ongoing 
organisational change. Therefore, occasionally, these other solutions are also mentioned 
during the case study analysis, although they are not at the core of the thesis. By 2006, it 
was decided to adopt the Human Resources module SAP HR. This project was totally 
excluded from the research scope. The remainder of the section now analyses the SAP 
FI project. 
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6.1.2 MOTIVATIONS, OVERVIEW AND MOBILISATION OF THE SAP FI 
PROJECT: AN INTRODUCTION 
In a preliminary way, it may be argued that the motivations to adopt the SAP FI 
module were mainly IT-related. In 1997, IndCo identified a potential “Year 2000” 
(Y2K) bug issue in the financial accounting solutions of some sites. Driven, above all, 
by the desire to avoid that risk, IndCo decided to replace the existing solutions, as many 
other organisations at the time did (Fahy, 2001). IndCo, as many other large 
organisations, opted for the SAP software and its financial accounting module, SAP FI, 
to be implemented in all Portuguese entities.  
Soon afterwards, in 1998, it was decided that the same model would also be used 
in two new plants, planned to start operating in two other countries in the following 
year. So, in early 1999, a project team was set up to design and implement SAP FI for 
those three countries. This project team included IndCo’s accounting and finance 
employees from Portugal, IT employees from Spain and consultants from the 
consultancy firm which cooperated in this research. By the end of 1999, a decision was 
taken to develop and roll-out a global SAP FI model to the remaining countries, in a 
process which finished in 2001 (one country was excluded, as discussed in the next 
subsection, particularly in footnote 10, in page 386). Later projects referred mostly to 
roll-outs to newly acquired companies 
By 2001, the most important developments of SAP FI had already occurred4. 
SAP FI became the financial accounting solution of nearly all subsidiaries, although 
                                                 
4 The configuration of a system at any moment in time should only be considered as a temporary 
outcome, as discussed below. However, by the end of 2001, the fundamental and structural options 
concerning SAP FI had already been made, enduring at least until the time the fieldwork was conducted. 
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with a configuration which still potentiated some diversity, as discussed below in this 
section. Later that year, SAP FI was reconfigured to adopt a common chart of accounts, 
linked to country-specific charts of accounts and supported by a common database 
located in Portugal. This project, although in the financial accounting area, also 
involved management accounting and control, and intended to set the formal rules to be 
enacted by local actors, as a CC manager explained: 
“At the time, IFRS [International Financial Reporting Standards] were still 
not adopted, but rather ‘IndCo’s chart of accounts’, setting the rules to be 
applied also for management control, establishing what should be recorded 
in each account, regardless of existing many other accounts [in country-
level charts of accounts] for whatever needed purposes. But, as concerns 
sub-totals, everything – whatever could be expected, at least – would sum 
up to those accounts, allowing for comparisons [across the countries].”  
In an extremely summarised way (to be developed in this section), it can be said 
that by 2001 such integrated solution increased comparability, facilitated consolidation 
activities and provided greater visibility over the organisation as a whole, and over 
individual countries and sites in particular. Among other possible beneficiaries, this new 
technical condition benefited, in particular, the central actors who had an interest in the 
organisation as a whole, and who started having a tool providing faster and more 
reliable and comparable information. 
However, this (always temporary) ‘outcome’, in terms of the particular adopted 
configuration of SAP FI, was not ‘technically deterministic’. Software vendors (e.g., 
SAP 2003, 2007), the professional literature (e.g., Scapens et al., 1998) and the 
academic literature (e.g., Quattrone and Hopper, 2005) converge in stressing that the 
generic SAP package offers a plethora of alternatives, in particular during the design 
stage of a first time implementation. There is also consensus that implementation in 
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each particular organisation requires choosing among those alternatives, through system 
configuration and / or customisation – i.e., the actors involved not only may wish to, but 
indeed have to, mobilise the generic package in a certain way.  
Additionally, in a particularly revealing example of the temporary nature of 
project outcomes, the SAP implementation at IndCo did not follow a linear direction 
towards a hypothetical initial, clearly defined, end objective. Although some initial 
design options promoted uniformity and central visibility (subsection 6.1.3), other 
options promoted diversity and autonomy (subsection 6.1.4). Importantly, after SAP FI 
started being used, the system configuration itself, through the actions of local actors, 
evolved in a direction which the project team had not anticipated. Local actors were 
able to autonomously mobilise SAP FI configurations in a way that promoted the 
maintenance of diversity across the various countries, by changing country level charts 
of accounts (subsection 6.1.5). This divergence across countries made consolidation and 
central visibility more difficult, and created difficulties in the adoption of additional 
SAP modules. As a reaction, additional adjustments and changes of orientation were 
incorporated in SAP design during 2001. I.e., central organisational actors mobilised 
SAP FI again, to align its configuration with their objectives. At this later stage, 
configurations of SAP FI were mobilised towards the creation of uniformity and central 
visibility and control within the organisation, and affecting the extent of autonomy of 
local sites. 
Therefore, in line with the discussion in chapter 2, the financial accounting 
module SAP FI can be conceptualised as a mechanism involved in disembedding and 
reembedding processes, to order “social practices (…) across space and time” 
(Moilanen, 2008, p. 253, based on Giddens, 1990 and Jones and Dugdale, 2001). 
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Viewing SAP FI as a disembedding mechanism, this section starts explaining the 
mobilisation of SAP FI. Actors attempted to shape, in a relatively structural way, the 
particular “interpretative scheme” underlying SAP FI and according to which SAP FI 
would “lift[] up (…) local social relations to a global level” (Moilanen, 2008, p. 253). In 
turn, (disembedded) uniform information produced through SAP FI would facilitate 
central visibility and control and hence facilitate a greater intervention of central actors 
(the reembedding processes). The focus of this research is on the disembedding 
processes to be carried out through SAP FI (as analysed in this section) and other actors 
introduced in the network (the CC and the SSC, as analysed in subsequent sections), 
rather than on the subsequent reembedding processes. 
A combination of a processual and dynamic perspective (e.g., Burns, 2000; 
Carter et al., 2008a and 2008b; Jarzabkowski and Whittington, 2008; Pettigrew, 1995) 
and Clegg’s (1989) framework (Ribeiro, 2003) enriches the above discussion about how 
SAP may be (and indeed has to be) mobilised by (human) actors. As argued in this 
section, SAP FI configuration at IndCo at particular moments represented (temporary) 
outcomes of potentially conflicting strategic attempts by various actors to mobilise the 
package. These mobilisation attempts pushed in divergent directions and towards 
different configurations, in order to achieve actors’ strategic objectives, by creating new 
Obligatory Passage Points. 
6.1.3 INITIAL DESIGN OPTIONS PROMOTING UNIFORMITY AND CENTRAL 
VISIBILITY 
The SAP FI system, as initially designed in IndCo, included a number of 
features promoting organisation-wide uniformity and central visibility. This subsection 
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first analyses how this outcome was supported by a group level decision, related with its 
consolidation solution. Second, it analyses the influence of previous projects, beliefs 
and rules within the IT Department. Then, it analyses the influence of consultants, 
which varied across various dimensions and timings of the project. Finally, it argues 
that the role of the actors from the accounting and finance area was less clear and 
therefore is only analysed later, after additional insights about SAP design options have 
been discussed. 
6.1.3.1 The influence of IndCo’s group and its consolidation solution 
Some features of the implemented SAP FI promoting uniformity and central 
visibility derived from the influence of IndCo’s group. An important requirement for 
the new SAP FI model was to interface with the consolidation solution Hyperion, 
adopted by IndCo’s group and every group company5. A consultant directly related that 
imposition with a Hyperion-based accounting consolidation project developed at 
IndCo’s group level shortly before the start of the SAP FI project: 
“At the time, IndCo’s group had developed a parallel project in 
consolidation, with Hyperion software. That was a software and a set of 
processes which (…) immediately created a kind of a basilar rule, a central 
rule in the definition of processes.”  
This imposition was a striking difference when compared with previous SAP 
implementations at IndCo. In 1995, the Spanish IT department developed a project to 
                                                 
5 Additionally, SAP FI also had extensive interfaces with the operational legacy system, SOIC. A 
consultant described how “SAP allowed ‘mapping’ the information between the [consolidated] 
management component [Hyperion for Management] and the operational component of SOIC, through 
traceability. Showing how the [information] flows passed through SAP. The roads that traversed SAP”. A 
similar traceability existed between the Hyperion consolidated financial accounting solution and the 
operational SOIC solution. 
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implement SAP FI and two other SAP modules in Spain6. However, no interfaces were 
created between SAP FI and the existing consolidation solution. As a consequence, 
without such interfaces, the financial accounting information produced by SAP FI in 
Spain was sent to the consolidation team, whose members then had to manually enter 
that information in Hyperion – implying a loss of central visibility and reliability, in 
addition to a significant work load to the consolidation team members. 
The same consultant above, as well as various other respondents, noted the 
striking differences of the impositions faced by the project team in Portugal, when 
compared with the previous Spanish project. 
“That project [in Spain] was done at a time when Hyperion and a number 
of harmonisation processes were not  a given yet. So, it was mostly 
developed considering Spain and its reality, which was a little different from 
the Portuguese reality and the reality which was presumed to be 
implemented in other countries in the future.” 7  
“There was a group-wide norm imposing Hyperion. (…) All sub-holdings 
had to obey to that tool and to those data structures. There was that group-
wide norm, right at the start, which worked both in favour of the project 
(since the SAP template of the first implementation project developed that 
functionality) and against [the project], when someone wanted to get away 
from that straight-jacket.”  
It should be noted that Hyperion, as a technological device, only became a 
technological imperative due to group level imposition that new financial accounting 
solutions at company level (such as IndCo) should interface with the Hyperion 
consolidation solution. Otherwise, without that group imposition, an outcome similar to 
                                                 
6 The other modules were SAP Human Resources (SAP HR) and SAP Profitability Analysis (SAP PA). 
This particular architecture (SAP FI, HR and PA) did not include SAP’s operational modules and could 
not really be considered an integrated solution. Evidence of the lack of integrative potential in such 
architecture, as indicated by two Portuguese IT interviewees, is that the Profitability Analysis module 
never actually worked, due to the absence of operational data in the implemented system. 
7 As described in the previous chapter, the Spanish decentralised “reality” this interviewee was referring 
to was reflected in controlling areas defined at a low hierarchical level (the plant level) and in cost centres 
nomenclature diversity across plants. 
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the one occurred in the 1995 SAP FI implementation in Spain (the lack of interfaces 
between SAP FI and Hyperion) might have emerged.  
In a processual perspective, it may be argued that the technological path-
dependency was limited and actually only apparent. On one side, there was 
technological path-dependency, since a previous implementation of the consolidation 
solution across the group created a technological device which subsequently adopted 
technological devices had to interface with. However, on the other side, this imposition 
or “path-dependency” was not purely technological; as above, it can be argued that it 
was not technological at all, since the imposition derived from central, powerful actors 
at group level, who defined constraints to new solutions related with the previously 
implemented technical solution. As a conclusion, the path-dependency concerned 
technology, it was about technology. However, the dependency did not derive from 
technology, but rather from decisions and impositions of organisational human actors – 
impositions which were accepted by the other involved actors.8  
6.1.3.2 The influence of the IT Department and previous IT projects 
The IT Department influenced the way SAP FI was mobilised in two note-
worthy ways. First, previously developed beliefs and strategies of the IT Department 
promoted the selection of a single, integrated solution for IndCo. Second, the 
distribution of power within the IT Department promoted the development of a single 
model to be applied across IndCo. These two influences are now explored. 
                                                 
8 This analysis is developed in the next chapter. 
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The first promoters of a unified approach were the IT Department beliefs and 
strategies, derived from previous projects and experiences. As mentioned, in mid 
1990’s, IndCo started industrial operations in a new country, quite distant from IndCo’s 
centre and other locations. Due to the distant location of this subsidiary, there were (and 
still are) few operational interactions with the rest of the group. Therefore, 
implementing the same information systems which existed in other locations had less 
potential benefits. After considering various alternatives, Ross was the chosen 
commercial package for the new plant, as a single, integrated system, including all 
functional areas, in preference to alternatives such as SAP and Oracle9.  
As indicated by an IT interviewee, the “first global ISs strategy” was developed 
during this project. During the planning stage, the then CEO and the IT department 
developed the vision to develop and test this integrated system in that country, so that 
later it could be rolled-out to the entire IndCo. This global ISs strategy left an enduring 
effect within the IT Department. It created the belief, within the Portuguese IT 
department, that centralisation of ISs through the implementation of a single, integrated 
system, would be the future direction. This belief, at this stage, referred only to a broad 
vision of a future system, but was a “visionary object”, a conceptual object with “high 
levels of legitimacy within [this] particular [IT] community” (Briers and Chua, 2001, p. 
242). 
However, there were delays in the start of operations at this plant and in the 
development and testing of the Ross model. Therefore, a mature, fully-integrated Ross 
system was not ready to be implemented in Portugal in 1997/1998 yet (to replace the 
                                                 
9 Ross strong customer and solution support in that country at the time proved to be crucial.  
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existing financial accounting solution) and in the new plants to be soon set up in two 
other countries (as regards both financial and operational systems).  
In spite of the impossibility to roll-out a Ross-based model throughout the 
organisation, the decision taken during the Ross project had an important consequence. 
This decision shaped the global strategy, vision and beliefs at the IT Department: 
centralisation of ISs was the future, requiring progressive consolidation of the disparate 
solutions into a single system. As a visionary object, “the precise identity” of this future 
integrated system was not yet known, and allowed for the flexibility for this vision to be 
fulfilled through other systems other than Ross (Briers and Chua, 2001, p. 242). As 
mentioned, SAP came to embody this visionary object, as SAP came to be adopted over 
the years in an increasing number of functions and locations10. 
The second promoter of a unified approach was the distribution of formal power 
within the IT Department. This influence was less visible and, from an overall 
organisational strategy perspective, less intended. As described in the previous chapter, 
by 1998 the formal power within the IT Department had been restored to Portugal, 
where the Global IT team carried out the major IT developments. As regards the SAP 
project, an IT respondent pointed out that the development of a single model (instead of 
multiple, country-specific models)… 
                                                 
10 A remarkable exception was the country where Ross had been implemented. This country preserved 
Ross at least until the end of the fieldwork, in 2008, for a number of reasons. At a first stage, when SAP 
FI became the financial accounting solution of virtually all subsidiaries, implementing in this country the 
financial accounting module of SAP alone (while leaving the remaining Ross system) would disrupt the 
country-level integration achieved with the integrated Ross system. In addition, the highly autonomous 
operation of this subsidiary limited the gains of integrating this subsidiary with the rest of the 
organisation; this limitation existed both in the mid 1990’s (when the distinct Ross system was developed 
in this country, in isolation from the others) and in later years (when there could be a case for replacing 
Ross by SAP). Finally, it was also considered that, given the typical long life-cycle of ERPs (Fahy, 2001), 
abandoning the Ross ERP only a few years later after its implementation would be premature. Only by 
the end of the fieldwork, the replacement of the Ross system by SAP started being planned; this plan was 
not included in the research. 
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“…depended on the structure of the ISs [Department]. If the structure of the 
ISs of all the countries was within their power and had their own teams to 
do this… ‘OK, fine, SAP has been chosen, but now each one does it in its 
own way.’ But all development capacity was in the team in Portugal.” “We 
thought that if we did only one project, it would be (…) cheaper, because 
there would be just one single team; but also in a perspective of ISs 
uniformity, rather than – this wasn’t even mentioned – in an organisational 
perspective, or thinking about a possible SSC, or something similar.” 
“First, we [in Portugal] already had experience in integrating solutions. 
Moreover, if there’s only one single team developing the model, it is natural 
that it will develop a single model. Why should it do a different model here, 
another one there?”  
Therefore, the centralisation of formal power and resources within the IT 
Department in Portugal, and the creation of one single team which developed one single 
project for the various countries, contributed to the development of one, single financial 
model, with a central set of processes which were common to the three countries11. This 
centralisation facilitated the materialisation of the IT Department’s beliefs and strategies 
about a future single ISs architecture – the first identified promoter. The combination of 
these two promoters helps explaining the central role of the IT Department in the 
selection of options favouring uniformity, during the SAP FI project. 
6.1.3.3 The influence of consultants 
A methodological note and an introduction 
As discussed in chapter 4, an important perspective of the initial research topic 
concerned the role of consultants implementing ERP systems in the management 
accounting and control area. Exploring this issue, the fieldwork highlighted relevant 
roles of IT consultants in both general and particular aspects of the various SAP 
projects, including not only the original SAP FI project, but also the more recent 
                                                 
11 Nonetheless, this common set of processes allowed accommodating different processes, if desired or 
legally required. 
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Product Costing project. In addition, some insights were also obtained about the role of 
consultants beyond the particular IT area.  
However, during the fieldwork the research topic changed and started exploring 
the power shifts within IndCo, in which three innovations were considered to be crucial: 
SAP FI, the CC and the SSC. Consultants played a particularly relevant role in the first 
and third innovations, but less in the second. In addition, the consultancy firm involved 
in the SSC implementation was not the one which cooperated with the researcher; 
consequently, the researcher had no access to the consultants’ perspective. Therefore, 
the role of consultants in those innovations could only be adequately researched as 
regards the SAP FI project. 
In addition, a highly detailed analysis of the SAP FI project, both in depth and in 
width (in line with Oliveira, 2007c), would further enlighten the multiple roles played 
by consultants; however, it might also distract from, rather than be aligned with, the 
(new) research focus, encompassing the three innovations. Therefore, the concern is on 
understanding how consultants influenced the degree of uniformity and central visibility 
which emerged from the SAP FI mobilisation process. 
For the issue currently under examination (the initial design options promoting 
uniformity and central visibility), consultants’ influence was different across various 
areas. Consultants’ influence was limited as regards the definition of initial strategic 
issues. However, some SAP configuration options had long term repercussions in 
fundamental organisational issues, such as the introduction of the other innovations 
analysed in this chapter. In addition, their contribution was crucial to the operational 
stage of SAP FI design process, not only in a technical perspective, but also as regards 
 6.1 A technological innovation: SAP for financial accounting 
6.1.3 Initial design options promoting uniformity and central visibility 
389
the outcome of conflicts which emerged within the project team. These contributions 
are now analysed. 
Consultants’ constrained strategic influence in initial choices 
The role of consultants as regards the initial, strategic choices in the SAP project 
was constrained by directives provided by IndCo. Very significantly, IndCo’s 
employees and consultants converged on this insight, as the following respondents (an 
IT respondent and two consultants, respectively) illustrate: 
“We had a pragmatic approach since we started, because we have 
[internal] people in the project who know the processes well, who know 
what they want and so we went directly to the point. I’d almost say that 
we’ve considered consultants more as SAP technical consultancy, rather 
than business consultancy - in our case.”  
“The projects were neither about processes, nor about organisation. They 
were about systems. Always were: information systems. (…) The 
organisation was a given. If there were [organisational] change objectives, 
they were considered as a given. The company communicates its perspective 
for the organisation. Of course, when the system forces a certain way, the 
organisation also adapts a bit, to use that system well, but only in this 
aspect. Therefore, there was no process redesign, not at all.”  
“These [systems and routines from Hyperion] were walls built around the 
borders of the project. You can ask me ‘But were those limitations? Could 
things have been done in another way?’ It wasn’t a ‘forum’, it wasn’t part 
of the work. (…) We already had lots of work within that area, so no one 
dared to entertain himself by climbing up  the nearest skyscraper, to try to 
look beyond or jump the fence. Everyone thought: ‘these are my limits and I 
have to create pipes [between SOIC, the legacy operational system, and 
Hyperion, the consolidation solution]; the connection points are exactly 
here, in this position, neither more to the left nor to the right; so let’s 
assemble the building, so that the screw fits right there’.” (slightly adapted 
quotation)  
In general terms, consultants’ contributions had limited influence on initial 
strategies. In fact, consultants’ reduced autonomy to shape the scope and objectives of 
the SAP FI project limited their strategic influence. As Legge (2002) noted, “if (…) 
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clients have clearly defined problems for which they require a solution then they are less 
malleable than if they are relying on the consultant to participate in problem definition” 
(p. 79). In fact, although consultants did contribute to the adoption of single, unified 
approaches, they did so largely within a scope and direction defined by IndCo. 
At an initial stage, consultants contributed to the adoption of single, unified 
approaches because other actors (central actors at a group level) had set rules imposing 
that new, company-level financial accounting solutions should interface with the group 
consolidation solution, Hyperion. Importantly, this team of consultants had recently 
implemented SAP FI in a retailer business unit of IndCo’s group, including its interface 
with Hyperion. This greatly facilitated that consultants used their previous experience to 
create a model supporting the central, uniform perspective required to interface with 
Hyperion (see discussion on page 395 and following). In addition, their contribution 
was framed by their inclusion in a single development team, defined by IndCo’s IT 
department. At a second stage (see subsections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6, in particular page 415 
and following), consultants contributed to the remobilisation of SAP FI in order to 
further increase uniformity across IndCo. However, the contribution of consultants was 
again framed by other actors: this time, by central actors from IndCo’s accounting and 
finance area. 
Notwithstanding consultants’ constrained influence in defining initial strategies, 
as acknowledged by both IndCo’s actors and consultants alike, the way SAP was 
mobilised under the strong influence of consultants (during the design and 
implementation stages) had strategic and long-lasting repercussions in IndCo. For 
example, as the last quote anticipated, SAP FI was implemented as a “simple” financial 
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accounting system, linking the operational system and the consolidation solution and 
trying to prevent future constraints in SAP development. As a consultant summarised,  
“It was a simple system, in terms of its basic structures, of its configuration, 
of its functional and technological components. (…) No one wanted to make 
more than what was needed, knowing that if one did more, one might be 
creating a future constraint. (…) It was the necessary and sufficient system 
for that reality.”  
Empirical insights, from both IndCo’s members and consultants, depicted how 
emerging interactions between these actors converged into ruling out more sophisticated 
analyses (e.g., adopting profitability analysis) and into avoiding certain related 
transversal SAP concepts (e.g., the “division” concept12). While the constraints set by 
IndCo’s members, limiting the scope of the project, were important, consultants’ 
awareness that such alternatives could create future constraints in SAP development 
was decisive.  
The attempt to avoid creating future technological constraints, or virtually lock-
ins, was particularly important for two reasons. First, from a technological perspective, 
the (not yet decided, but plausible) possibility of replacing the operational legacy 
solution SOIC with SAP operational modules in a near future advised against high 
investments in sophisticated financial systems; in fact, such systems would have to be 
significantly changed if, and when, SAP operational modules were adopted. Second, 
from an organisational perspective and as argued below in subsection 6.1.6, strategies 
for the financial area were, at best, only emerging at the time. As such, developing the 
strictly “necessary (…) system for that reality” (in the above quote of a consultant) was 
also adequate for such strategic uncertainty. 
                                                 
12 See SAP (2005d and 2006).  
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Consultants’ influence was also crucial in more short term issues – but which, in 
turn, also had longer term repercussions. The importance of consultants’ technical 
experience as regards the activities of the project team and as regards conflicts which 
emerged within the project team is now explored. 
Consultants’ technical influence within the project team 
To understand consultants’ technical influence (as well as their influence in the 
conflicts within the project team), there is the need to examine the composition of the 
project team and the expertise and perspective of the various actors. The project team 
included IndCo’s members from four countries: Portugal; the two other countries where 
SAP was going to be implemented; and Spain. The team also included consultants from 
Portugal who, as already mentioned, had been involved in a previous SAP FI project in 
the Retailer business unit of the group.  
Considering only internal, IndCo’s members of the project team, Spanish 
members had a massive advantage over Portuguese members as regards IT knowledge 
and, in particular, SAP knowledge. The integration of five Spanish employees in the 
operational team was motivated by their knowledge about the SAP system implemented 
there in 1995 and which was planned to be used in the actual design of the model, as 
discussed below. In addition, Portuguese members at an operational level had mostly a 
functional expertise in the accounting and finance area. However, no Portuguese 
members from the IT department joined the operational team13.  
                                                 
13 The main reasons for the absence of Portuguese IT members were that they had no knowledge either 
about SAP or accounting. In fact, the IT department had not provided support to accounting and finance 
applications before. Moreover, existing IT members were indispensable to support the development and 
support of the SOIC operational system – a task that only they could carry out, since it was an in-house 
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As a result, SAP knowledge (and, in general, IT knowledge) was restricted to the 
Spanish IT members and to consultants. In addition, since the consultants had recently 
implemented SAP FI in the retailer business unit of the group, they had already 
developed several processes which supported the linkage with the group consolidation 
solution, Hyperion. This combination of technical expertise (general SAP FI knowledge 
and specific experience implementing and linking SAP FI with IndCo’s group 
consolidation solution) was a distinctive edge over the other project team members (the 
Portuguese and, importantly, even the Spanish members).  
Consultants’ unique expertise was crucial as regards SAP technical issues – as 
anticipated by IndCo’s actors when consultants were integrated in the project team. In 
addition, this unique expertise was also crucial as regards the project dynamics at the 
operational level, where conflicts emerged around the design of the SAP FI model, as 
discussed next. 
Consultants’ influence in the conflicts within the project team 
Consultants’ expertise was crucial to influence the outcome of conflicts which 
emerged within the project team during the design stage, and which were largely 
unforeseeable at the outset. 
The initial plans as regards the design of the SAP FI model relied significantly 
on the Spanish experience and system. As described in project documentation, the 
Spanish system would be a basis, e.g., for SAP configuration, interfaces with other 
systems and conversion processes. As a consultant summarised, 
                                                                                                                                               
developed system. Finally, it was perceived that strictly technical IT expertise would not be central to the 
project success at a detailed level, and therefore such area could be allocated to other people. 
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“[Initially], we thought about the possibility to reuse something which 
might have been done in Spain. So, in that logic, at the start, we thought of 
conceiving a system for Portugal and the other countries which would be a 
merge, (…) inheriting many things from the Spanish system.”  
However, the project did not evolve as initially planned, given emerging 
objections of Portuguese team members from IndCo. IndCo’s Portuguese members 
lacked knowledge about SAP and IT in general and, in particular, the Spanish SAP 
model. Therefore, at the start, it was difficult for them to fully understand the Spanish 
model, to take conscience of its assumptions and to conceptualise its consequences. But 
as the work progressed, they became aware of certain features about which they took 
issue. 
The contested features of the Spanish model have already been briefly described 
in the previous chapter, during the analysis of the prevailing circuit of system 
integration in the late 1990’s (see 5.4.4). The Spanish model accommodated a high level 
of diversity and autonomy. Two examples are the existence of distinct charts of 
accounts and controlling areas at a plant level; and the requirement that invoices 
including items of distinct plants should be posted in several stages and across several 
plants. As argued below in this section, at the time, Portuguese team members had no 
clear directives to privilege a central perspective within SAP FI. However, it became 
apparent to Portuguese team members that the Spanish configuration options were not 
adequate to produce consolidated information at a higher level and were not aligned 
with the preliminary steps towards centralisation taken through the creation of regional 
back-offices in Portugal (see subsection 5.3.3, page 323). 
However, IndCo’s Portuguese team members were constrained by their lack of 
SAP (and even IT) knowledge, when compared to Spanish team members. Consultants 
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were then crucial to support the perspectives and objectives of the Portuguese team 
members, as expressed in the following quote from an IT member and from a 
consultant, respectively: 
“People from Spain were always trying to impose their model, which no one 
knew. They knew something about SAP and we knew nothing at all. (…) But 
we had consultants, from Portugal, that I came to confirm that had in-depth 
knowledge about SAP FI and about the model from the Retailer, because 
they had been there. So they started providing us some information. (…) 
And we started realising that the Spanish model was not as good as they 
[the Spanish] thought it was. And then we started this [new] model.” “It 
was essential to have on the side of the – say – ‘headquarters’ someone who 
could actually argue with them [Spanish members] at an even level [of SAP 
knowledge].” 
Initial choices were altered as the design process progressed. Interviewed 
consultants emphasised the inadequacy of the Spanish model, with a country-level 
scope and largely aligned with a highly decentralised organisation. However, 
consultants – as well as some IndCo’s members - also highlighted the importance of 
having been able to provide effective and quick alternatives, some of which based on 
the Retailer project. The following quotes (the first two from two interviews with one 
consultant, the third one from an interview with another consultant) highlight this: 
“What actually happened was that (…) the Spanish system was hardly ever 
used. It had been developed within another logic, another scope, another 
environment. And so it did not have capacity to support the required 
functionalities in an heterogeneous environment, with various companies, 
various company codes, various charts of accounts, etc..” “The core 
template was much based from the Retailer [SAP FI], because there was the 
Hyperion solution for management and financial accounting [at a group 
level]. (…) I’d say that 80% of the Retailer project (…) was used in IndCo.” 
“A good deal of the configuration was transposed as it was in the Retailer. 
But that is not “copy-paste”, because you need to know how to do that. (…) 
Know-how was transferred between the projects. Have no doubt about it. 
(…) When I say ‘know-how’, I mean programs themselves! Much work was 
spared.” 
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Therefore, consultants were decisive in the creation of a global SAP FI model as 
an alternative to the Spanish model and addressing (in part only emerging) objectives of 
Portuguese actors. Considering the conflicting objectives and perspectives of the 
Portuguese and Spanish members of the implementation team, consultants were crucial 
in several ways. Consultants provided the Portuguese members with the technical 
knowledge of the SAP tool which they lacked. In addition, they contributed with ready-
made functionalities and a model aligned with the group level Hyperion consolidation 
solution, which provided significant intra-group legitimacy. 
Finally, consultants’ intervention had important repercussions as regards power 
issues, both at a micro level (and short term horizon) and at a macro level (and long 
term horizon). At the micro level and short term horizon of the SAP FI implementation 
team, consultants were decisive in determining the outcome of the conflict between 
Portuguese and Spanish members, overcoming the knowledge disadvantage of the 
Portuguese members of IndCo. Therefore, consultants’ interventions had clear short 
term power repercussions, at the micro level of the implementation team.  
In addition, at a broader, macro level of the entire organisation, consultants 
contributed to the construction of a circuit of system integration promoting the 
objectives and interests of key central actors. This contribution becomes clearer if a long 
term horizon is considered. Indeed, as this chapter argues, subsequent innovations (the 
Corporate Centre and the Shared Services Centre) promoting the objectives of central 
actors were strongly supported by these initial choices in the mobilisation of SAP FI – 
and to which consultants were crucial. 
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This section has already analysed the influence of IndCo’s group and its 
consolidation solution, the influence of the IT department and previous IT projects, and 
the influence of consultants. The motivations and influence of key actors from the 
accounting and finance area are preliminarily analysed next; a re-examination of these 
issues is made later in subsection 6.1.6.  
6.1.3.4 The influence of the accounting and finance area – a preliminary 
examination 
The accounting and finance area played an important role in some structural 
aspects of the mobilisation of SAP FI, such as imposing the compatibility and interface 
with the consolidation solution. However, this requirement derived mostly from 
accounting and finance area at a group level - rather than specifically from IndCo.  
At this point, a research note is required. The influence of IndCo’s accounting 
and finance area was less clear for the researcher, and presented more nuances and 
puzzles. The complexity of the analysis was caused, first, because there are two levels 
and two types of actors to be considered: ‘central’ actors; and ‘local’ actors scattered 
across the subsidiaries. Second, the complexity of the analysis also derived from 
apparently contradictory insights from the field research, suggesting alternative (or, at 
least, different) mobilisation objectives and actions from some of its actors, in particular 
from the accounting and finance area. 
Therefore, a fuller exploration of the influence of the accounting and finance 
area is postponed to subsection 6.1.6. Before that, the next subsection explores forces 
which influenced initial design options promoting a diversified approach and making 
central visibility more difficult – the opposite outcomes of those explored so far. 
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6.1.4 INITIAL DESIGN OPTIONS (UNINTENTIONALLY?) PROMOTING 
DIVERSITY AND AUTONOMY 
In spite of the promoters of uniformity identified above, some initial 
characteristics of the SAP project suggested traits of autonomy, in line with previous 
approaches prevalent in IndCo. Three aspects are analysed: the number and location of 
servers; the articulation between charts of accounts; and local actors’ capacity to 
change local configurations. Initially, the implementation team did not anticipate major 
consequences of these technical aspects in terms of accounting practices. However, the 
actual daily operation of SAP by actors across IndCo proved otherwise. This subsection 
now analyses the reasons underlying these initial choices, as well as their unanticipated 
consequences. 
6.1.4.1 Number and location of the servers 
The first aspect concerns the number and location of the “production” servers14. 
A different production server was set in each of the three countries. IT members and 
consultants highlighted that this option intended primarily to avoid the risk of 
communication failure with a particular country. However, as discussed below, the lack 
of clear directives to promote uniformity within the financial area and systems was an 
important factor to contemplate and adopt this option – an option in line with previous 
IT architecture options, in which production servers were decentralised. 
At a first stage, the SAP FI model was designed and tested in a single 
“development” server, in Portugal; the centrally defined model was then transferred to 
                                                 
14 A “production” server supports everyday operations, storing the databases with actual business data and 
processing actual business transactions. Typically, solutions used in the production server are previously 
designed and tested in a “development” server; when the solutions are ready to “go live”, they are 
transferred to the production server. 
 6.1 A technological innovation: SAP for financial accounting 
6.1.4 Initial design options (unintentionally?) promoting diversity and autonomy 
399
the production servers. Given the development of one, single model, consistency across 
countries was thought to be ensured. However, this model could only be guaranteed to 
be the same for all countries a priori, at the “go-live” moment. After the “go-live” 
moment, the model could be subject to local changes - as made clear below. 
6.1.4.2 Articulation between charts of accounts 
The second, related aspect concerned whether the charts of accounts of the three 
countries would be articulated, or not; and if so, how. The issue was adopting parallel 
accounting (hence, allowing articulation) or not (in which case the charts of accounts of 
the various countries are independent). In a parallel accounts approach, there is a 
common chart of accounts for the various countries15; additionally, each country has a 
parallel chart of accounts (if desired or legally required), and each of these parallel 
accounts is linked with the common chart of accounts. A parallel accounting solution 
has the potential to greatly improve financial accounting consolidation activities. In fact, 
parallel accounting allows companies to incorporate different valuation approaches and 
to obtain, simultaneously, a tailored solution to each country, and a common, uniform 
basis for all the companies.  
However, initially, the option for parallel accounting was not made, and each of 
the three countries had an independent chart of accounts16 – in line with the pre-SAP 
                                                 
15 A parallel accounts approach is one of the alternatives to implement parallel accounting in SAP. 
Another alternative is the ledger approach, consisting of a Leading Ledger (for group reporting) and 
Parallel Ledgers (for individual countries, etc.). For details, see SAP (2005b). Only the parallel accounts 
approach is analysed here, since this was the alternative chosen by IndCo at a later stage. ‘Parallel 
accounting’ is here analysed at a country level, in line with IndCo’s case, although it can be defined at 
different organisational levels. 
16 The later SAP FI roll-out to an additional country, again based on a separate server and chart of 
accounts, increased the number of countries with independent platforms and structures to four. In this 
fourth country, there were important implementation problems, since the standard SAP package did not 
accommodate some country specificities (e.g., tax-related, among several others). The consideration of 
this fourth country would considerably complicate the analysis of the issue at hand (the adoption of 
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situation. Changes could be made in any chart of accounts, producing no effects on the 
others, since they were not articulated. It is true that, when compared with the previous 
Spanish SAP model, which allowed for different charts of accounts across plants, this 
model promoted greater information uniformity and simplified aggregation, since it 
imposed uniformity at a country (rather than plant) level. However, the technique of 
parallel accounting - which would best support the production of aggregated 
information - was not adopted. 
In spite of the independence of the charts of accounts, the project team still tried 
to obtain uniformity. An important, legal aspect was that only Portuguese legislation 
imposed a legal chart of accounts, whereas legislation of the two other countries did not; 
therefore, a priori, for those two countries any chart of accounts would do. 
Additionally, IndCo was just starting its industrial activities in one of those countries, 
and the accounting activities of its previously existing commercial companies had been 
outsourced; therefore, it had no past accounting configurations which might conflict 
with the new ones and potentially create some kind of lock-in (e.g., Dechow and 
Mouritsen, 2005). So, it was decided to adopt the Portuguese legal chart of accounts in 
the three countries – which was therefore the (same) starting point for the three 
countries.  
6.1.4.3 Local actors’ capacity to change local configurations 
Finally, the third aspect which was in line with previous arrangements and 
accommodated diversity and autonomy was allowing country-level IT staff to change 
the local charts of accounts in their local server – an operation which affected their 
                                                                                                                                               
country-level, independent servers and charts of accounts), with no major empirical or theoretical 
advantage. Therefore, the remaining analysis is restricted to the first three countries of the roll-out. 
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country only. Granting that capacity to locals was pragmatically justified by the lack of 
central, remote access to the local production servers. Therefore, should that option not 
exist, a central IT member would have to travel to each country in order to locally, on 
site, implement any required change – which was considered to be a clearly unfeasible 
option. 
6.1.4.4 Consequences of keeping in line with existing configurations 
The decisions, mostly due to IT concerns and objectives, to decentralise SAP FI 
production servers and their access to local IT members, and to allow for independent 
charts of accounts across the countries, were in line with previous IT and financial 
accounting configurations. 
However, the existence of a different production server in each country, each 
one with an independent chart of accounts, combined with the authorisation of local IT 
members to change local configurations, created the risk that, as time passed, the 
models could start diverging. As a CC member acknowledged, the initially chosen 
configuration … 
“…left the doors open for local teams to start making changes.”  
A priori, these configurations did not imply diversity across the sites. However, 
the actual use of the system by local actors, after it “went live”, soon did lead to 
divergence between the models across the sites. This divergence is now discussed. 
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6.1.5 SAP FI IN USE: DIVERGENCE AND REMOBILISATION 
As the system “went live” and as the actors started using the system, the risk of 
divergence between charts of accounts (stored in local production servers and 
changeable by local IT actors) actually, and quickly, materialised. The models did start 
to diverge across the countries. Local actors’ usage of the system soon revealed that the 
chosen configuration would not facilitate consolidated activities and analyses. An IT 
interviewee provided very precise examples of how the models started diverging: 
“Accounts creation; the very concept included in those new accounts; the 
lack of information to the other entities about the creation of a new 
account.”  
Interestingly, the limitations of the existing “autonomic” configuration of SAP 
FI were unexpectedly highlighted by developments on a totally distinct area, beyond the 
areas of accounting and finance: the development of SAP’s logistic modules. 
“When we started linking the financial area with the logistic area, including 
the commercial and purchasing parts, we started noticing there would be 
problems. (…) If we didn’t have the same [common] chart of accounts (in 
SAP FI), we would have to have, in parallel for each country… [distinct 
parameters for the logistic modules]. If we had ten countries, we would 
have to set ten different sets of parameters. On the other hand, should we 
have one single model, we would only need to have one set of parameters.”  
Among the several respondents who analysed this situation, a CC manager 
argued that… 
“The moment that [divergence] was detected, a change of logic was 
immediately implemented. We changed to a very large single chart of 
accounts [(…) and to a single server], which allowed, already within the 
logic of a Shared [Services Centre], that each country would work with the 
accounts we defined – and if it wants to open accounts, it has to ask to a 
centralised manager, who is here [in Portugal].”  
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Therefore, after the divergence across charts of accounts was detected, the 
project team quickly returned to the design stage, to mobilise the package differently. 
Technical and organisational changes were quickly implemented to enforce uniformity: 
installing a single server in Portugal; adopting a parallel accounts solution (with a 
common chart of accounts, articulated with country-level charts of accounts); and 
restricting to (only about five) central actors in Portugal the capacity to modify the 
country-level charts of accounts. In addition, and obviously, only central actors could 
modify the common chart of accounts. 
An IT interviewee thus commented the rationale orienting the creation of the 
common chart of accounts and, after its creation, the centrally constrained possibility to 
create additional accounts (in line with the current approach in SAP roll-outs of keeping 
the overall model, while still adding specificities when locally required): 
Respondent: “The idea has always been the following. We have a structural 
plan [chart of accounts]. If a plant or a number of plants needs more 
information, we will add it [the specific, detailed accounts] here [a location 
in the accounts structure]. The other plants don’t use it, they use [the 
accounts] only down to this [higher] level; but there is this detail 
[potentially] available for all: those who need it, can use it; those who don’t 
need it, don’t use it. If we have service companies which have a [specific] 
need, we will add [the specific, detailed accounts] here. (…) That’s why the 
chart of accounts had more than three thousand accounts and suited all 
needs. 
Researcher: The chart of accounts had many accounts, but I believe there is 
a “struggle” between the SSC and some countries, in order not to multiply 
the accounts even more. 
Respondent: Of course. One thing is to have the notion that there are plants 
or activities which have some particularity and therefore need something 
else [specific accounts]. Another thing is to grant people creative freedom, 
so that they invent.”  
 6.1 A technological innovation: SAP for financial accounting 
6.1.5 SAP FI in use: divergence and remobilisation 
404
It is clear that, although some interviewees described this aspect as a mere IT 
issue, these apparently minor technical issues actually had consequences about 
‘conditions of possibility’17 in the accounting domain, in particular as regards local 
actors. In other words, it defined which alternative courses of action were offered (or 
denied) to actors, and defined the conditions of possibility on whether accounting 
models and practices could evolve differently in the various locations (or not). 
The efforts to create uniformity across the organisation were not limited to 
structures orienting information entry. Outputs were, as much as possible, uniform 
across the plants. As an IT respondent explained, 
“We always try to use the [SAP FI] standard [reports] (…). Because if we 
go along meeting all the preferences of the final clients, we’ll have different 
reports to each person, for the same information. In fact, that also happens 
in the other areas [beyond the financial area]. We try that there is not much 
freedom to create, otherwise…”  
Indeed, as a SSC member noted, not a single member of the SSC was able to 
create SAP reports. All actors – including members of the (central) SSC – had to resort 
to the (central) IT team should they require a new SAP report. This restriction promoted 
uniformity in accounting information usage and in the underlying accounting rules of 
meaning across the entire organisation. And this example sets the problematic beyond 
the central vs. local dichotomy. Local actors are not the only ones who are confronted 
with restrictions; in this respect, central actors of the SSC are confronted with similar 
restrictions.  
                                                 
17 The concept of ‘conditions of possibility’ is often associated with Foucault’s work on ‘archaeology’ 
(see Baxter and Chua, 2003, Llewellyn, 1996 and works referenced therein). 
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This section examined SAP FI design options promoting uniformity and central 
visibility, as well as options that accommodated diversity and autonomy. Then, this 
subsection revealed how the actual use of the system led to its divergence across 
countries - and how the system was subsequently (re)mobilised in order to restore the 
initial uniformity and prevent that divergence to (re)occur. This additional empirical 
material is crucial to explore, next, an aspect left so far mostly unexplored: the role of 
the accounting and finance area.  
6.1.6 RE-EXAMINING MOTIVATIONS FOR THE DESIGN OPTIONS AND THE 
ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE AREA 
Subsection 6.1.3 concluded by explicitly postponing the analysis of the influence 
of actors from the accounting and finance area in the mobilisation of SAP FI. Now, 
considering the insights about the SAP FI project already presented, and additional ones 
to be presented now, this subsection discusses the various interpretations about the role 
of key actors in this area. 
6.1.6.1 SAP FI initial configuration as a result of absence(s) of mobilisation 
efforts? 
In a preliminary analysis, it may appear that the selection of SAP FI, as a 
common financial accounting solution was, to a great extent, derived from technical 
reasons: addressing the perceived threat of the Y2K bug in an existing financial 
accounting solution; replacing obsolete financial accounting solutions; selecting a 
financial accounting solution to new sites, in countries whose legislation did not impose 
a particular chart of accounts stringent legal requirements; enacting a general IT strategy 
of moving towards single, organisation-wide solutions.  
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A further analysis should recall the initial mobilisation of the package, 
configured as a single system but allowing for local adaptations of some features. This 
initial outcome may actually be interpreted as a consequence of an absence: the absence 
of a determined attempt of central actors from the accounting and finance area to 
mobilise SAP FI to enhance their central visibility and intervention capabilities. It may 
be argued that an attempt to achieve such objective would require the exclusion, from 
the start, of any possibility of divergence of the financial systems, across a rather 
heterogeneous and autonomous organisation. It appears that such ambition of those 
central actors was, at best, incipient. Although a CC manager stressed that “the idea, 
from the start, was to uniform and standardise, to allow closing the books faster”, this 
(stated) objective did not materialise in several initial options by the implementation 
members, who mostly rejected the existence of an explicit orientation towards imposing 
uniformity.  
In the final part of subsection 5.3.3, it was briefly argued that by the end of the 
1990’s, there was a lack of a clear, perceived strategy for the accounting and finance 
function. This lack of strategy included both the structure and the information systems 
supporting this function – which at the time, and in brief, were mostly decentralised. An 
IT member was one of the respondents who shared these insights about the lack of an 
explicit strategy: 
“At the start of the SAP FI project, I cannot say that there was a precisely 
delineated strategy, because there was the need to address certain 
problems, such as the Y2K. The evidence that there was no delineated 
strategy, was that only in 2000, as we were preparing the roll-out project 
for [a particular country] and Spain and integrating the logistic and the 
financial areas, (…) did  we start realising that it would be very difficult to 
continue with the existing configuration of each country having its own 
chart of accounts. (…) If there was [a strategy for an integrated SAP FI], it 
wasn’t conveyed [to the implementation team] and it wasn’t carried out.”  
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This lack of (an at least explicit) strategy caused uncertainty and affected the 
evaluation of alternative courses of action, both in the IT and in the accounting area. As 
regards the IT area, an IT respondent reflected on consequences of this uncertainty on 
the decision about the number and location of the production servers: 
“Sometimes, there can be a very well delineated strategy, and we know 
precisely what we want. Other times [like in our case] it’s not like that, we 
don’t know precisely what we want, there are very distributed issues, 
different cultures, etc.. And the people have fear, are afraid. Even within 
ISs. There was fear of placing a single server here [in Portugal], while the 
plants are in [a distant country]. [Researcher: Should the communications 
fail…]. Respondent: Exactly. What conditions were there to take a chance? 
It’s far simpler to place a server there”.  
As regards the accounting area, a quote from the same respondent (already 
included in the previous chapter, but reproduced again due to its significance) expresses 
a similar perspective, on the possibility of adopting a single chart of accounts, within a 
parallel accounts solution: 
… “there was no interest in that. Each country was responsible for its 
accounts. Provided that [the new system] would consolidate in Hyperion [at 
a country level] – and it had to consolidate, by hand, “by foot”, 
whatever…-, (…) it satisfied the financial directors of each country, who 
were able to report the accounts of each independent company. So, there 
was no one asking for that uniformisation [at IndCo’s level]. There was no 
one. (…) There was not a single person requiring that. Not a single one 
[emphasis].”  
Another member of the SAP FI implementation team further elaborated on how 
the lack of strategic guidance contributed to allow certain “conditions of possibility” 
through the system configuration (in this case, it allowed independent charts of 
accounts) and, ultimately, to privilege requests from local actors: 
“If, from the start, there was commitment and information (…) towards that 
direction [of global analyses, benchmarking], then there wouldn’t have 
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been the opportunity to create that flexibility, or that range of various 
possibilities in the charts of accounts. [But] because that specific order [to 
impose a single chart of accounts] did not exist, it was assumed that [a 
flexible approach] was also within existing directives (…) [Due to the lack 
of directives], many requests [of ISs development] were more adapted to the 
local powers. That is a reality. (…) Meeting the needs of local financial 
directives was imperative. Anything above that, was a surplus.  
Therefore, the above insights suggest that the mobilisation attempts by IndCo’s 
central actors of the accounting and finance area were, at best, incipient, and the 
outcomes were indeed influenced by this initial absence of such mobilisation attempts. 
Additionally, SAP’s initial configuration cannot be attributed to strategies from 
local actors, either, as a hypothetical strategy to preserve previous autonomies and 
power. It is true that local actors from the accounting and finance area requested to 
preserve their capability to continue producing the locally required reports, as the above 
quotes demonstrate; but the research insights do not allow concluding that such requests 
were active strategies to mobilise SAP FI in a way to preserve previous autonomies and 
power.  
Restricting the analysis to a short period around the start of the SAP FI project, 
this lack of influence from central actors of the accounting and finance area made way 
for a more successful mobilisation of SAP FI by the IT Department, to pursue its 
strategy of systems unification. The absence of a clear and determined attempt by 
central actors of accounting and finance to mobilise SAP FI to enhance their central 
visibility and intervention capabilities had a consequence: it reduced the incentives of 
the project team and the IT Department to include such features in SAP FI. Such 
features would imply new, more complex and riskier technical options. Should a single 
production server centralise all the data of all countries, a communication failure would 
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imply serious consequences – and communication failure risks were perceived as 
relevant as regards one of the three countries involved. In addition, adopting parallel 
accounting appeared to be more complex than adopting totally independent charts of 
accounts and, in particular, a more radical change throughout the organisation (indeed, 
the desire to avoid or at least postpone wide-reaching changes are further documented 
below in this subsection). Therefore, the project team and the IT Department did not 
implement them.  
As a consequence of the above, in spite of the IT Department long established 
strategy of moving towards single information systems, the initial features in SAP FI 
configuration did preserve some local autonomy and powers. But these outcomes 
resulted more from the pursuance of lower risk strategies by the IT Department (given 
the absence of clear mobilisation attempts by accounting and finance central actors 
towards uniform approaches), rather than from purposeful mobilisation attempts by 
local actors. And these IT lower risk strategies led to options which preserved and 
emulated past arrangements – even though the strategic objective of preserving past 
arrangements, in itself, did not exist, as suggested by a longer term analysis, presented 
next. 
6.1.6.2 SAP FI initial configuration as a result of strategically-phased 
mobilisation efforts? 
Considering a larger time span than the one considered in the previous analysis 
provides a different perspective, since it highlights strategically-phased mobilisation 
efforts by central actors of the accounting and finance area. Based on insights provided 
by other respondents, the researcher confronted a CC manager with the suggestion that 
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the initial SAP FI configuration (unarticulated and locally modifiable charts of accounts 
in local servers at a country level)… 
Researcher: “…was a solution which introduced a minor rupture with the 
previous situation. The autonomy that each [country] had to open accounts 
(…) remained preserved for some time”  
Although the respondent acknowledged the factual accuracy of the researcher’s 
statement, he then countered that keeping the status quo was “not (…) purposeful [i.e., 
intended]” (see above). In addition, he reflected that… 
“We need to ponder, the desirable and the feasible. And when we are at the 
stage of creating a corporate team, it was at least excessively ambitious… 
(…) With a team like this, with so little experience, with so little business 
knowledge, implementing a completely distinct logic would be impossible. 
So, the option was basically ‘For now, let’s introduce a single system, and 
then, when things start to… (…) There were no conditions for such a type of 
strategy [implying ruptures].”  
This recognition of the impossibility, at that initial stage, to introduce “a 
completely distinct logic” relies on the balance between what is “desirable” and what is 
“feasible”. At this initial stage, lack of knowledge about available design options and 
their possible consequences was an important restriction. This insufficient knowledge 
and hence poor judgement led to a random choice, i.e., a misguided, insufficiently 
reflected choice: adopting unarticulated and locally modifiable charts of accounts in 
local servers at a country level. This inadvertently mobilised the package in a way 
which did not support central actors’ objectives.  
A CC manager argued that such configuration, being adverse to the “desirable” 
outcomes, …  
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 “… was clearly a random solution, I have no doubts, and probably due to 
our lack of experience at the start”. “We were not aware from the start 
(also because we had few resources) that having decentralised servers 
would allow [local] people to make changes. A local server administrator 
can make changes.”  
Importantly, this account, provided by a central actor, relies on the assumption 
that there were indeed clear objectives to be achieved. As such, only a “random” 
evaluation and decision justifies the adoption of choices which led to unintended and 
undesired consequences, not aligned with those objectives. Indeed, the same CC 
manager reaffirmed (as quoted above) that…  
“… the idea, from the start, was to uniform and standardise, to allow 
closing the books faster. You can only achieve that with a single chart of 
accounts.”  
In fact, the same IT member who stated (quote above in this subsection) that 
“[i]f there was [a strategy for an integrated SAP FI], it wasn’t conveyed [to the 
implementation team] and it wasn’t carried out.”, also added, later in the same 
interview: 
“Based on the indications we were given, we thought that we could not 
design a model which would suit exclusively Portugal. The only thing that 
was not created from the start was the common chart of accounts. All the 
rest was thought in a common way: the structures, the size [number of 
characters] of the accounts was the same for Portugal and [the two other 
countries]. The same as regards cost centres and [internal] orders. 
Everything was designed equal.”  
These accounts suggest a pragmatic multiple-stage plan, matching the 
restrictions of available resources with the (still emerging) ambitions of advancing 
towards uniformity and introducing radical ruptures. The introduction of a single system 
was considered to be a first, easier and faster move which could later potentiate further 
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developments, as the following quotes from a consultant and the same CC manager, 
respectively, make clear. 
“The project was not meant to rethink the way to organise the corporate 
centre, or the countries’ administrative structures. It wasn’t. It was to 
implement a system, which was SAP, and the FI module”  
“Regardless of immediately implementing the model you’d prefer or not, 
one thing is to do things leaving open the possibility of making changes in 
the future. Another thing is to do a model that, if you want to make changes, 
you have to throw it away and do it again.”18 
Finally, a senior manager provided similar insights, but added a new perspective: 
following a satisficing approach to reduce resistance to change (see extended quotation 
#2, in the Appendix). Although this respondent did not have a detailed knowledge of 
this particular project, his views corroborated the lack of a detailed analysis by top 
management of a project such as this (related to financial accounting), leaving its design 
mostly to members of the accounting area (as expressed by other respondents, above). 
He also rejected the notion that there might be, at a high hierarchical level, the strategic 
objective of maintaining, in the long run, the existing decentralised model. Additionally, 
and significantly, he emphasised the importance of a satisficing approach (Cyert and 
March, 1963; March, 1987) as regards non-essential issues, in particular when 
considering the potential resistance against the change or destruction of previous 
references, of symbolic features which might provide a sense of identity. 
Therefore, the efforts of central actors from the accounting and finance area to 
mobilise SAP FI should be viewed in a temporal perspective, in two stages. The first 
                                                 
18 A consultant provided a clear example: IndCo’s actors immediately rejected the introduction of the 
SAP Profitability Analysis solution, at that initial stage, for two reasons. First, it did not fit the limited 
project scope and resources. Second, it would probably have to be abandoned and completely redone, 
should IndCo pursue the implementation of additional modules, particularly in the logistic area – a 
scenario which was not yet planned, but soon emerged after the adoption of SAP FI. 
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stage corresponded to a fast, ‘plain vanilla’ project, of a ‘mere’ introduction of a single 
financial accounting system in three countries. During a first stage, the project was 
mostly driven by the IT Department, only subject to high-level, broad impositions that 
the new solution would have to interface with the group-wide consolidation solution, 
Hyperion. Given time and human resources restrictions, a ‘minimalist’ intervention 
from central actors from the accounting and finance area conceded the adoption of 
options which were not fully aligned with their objectives. Importantly, those very 
objectives were still on the process of emerging, and at an initial stage there might be 
more a broad vision and ambitions for the future, rather than concrete objectives. In 
fact, this emergent nature of the formation of objectives was tightly related with the 
only gradual and initial emergence of the Corporate Centre in Portugal (an 
organisational innovation analysed in the next section)19.  
Therefore, a coincidence occurred. Orientations and decisions from the IT 
Department (a previous strategic option in favour of integrated systems, a centralisation 
of IT formal power and resources in Portugal and the definition of one single project 
team) were supportive of longer term (yet basically still unstated) objectives of central 
actors of the accounting and finance area, since it led to development of one single, 
common model. Therefore, central actors only ensured, at this first stage, more by 
monitoring than by active intervention, that the model could accommodate potential 
                                                 
19 A quotation of a CC manager about the gradual emergence of the CC is anticipated here to reinforce the 
notion that objectives in accounting and finance, as well as the actors themselves, were still emerging: 
“The transfer [of the Corporate Centre to Portugal] was done only gradually. It was necessary to recruit 
people, we started by management control, it was all that process (…). To recruit one or two people to 
treasury and finance area, to start working on centralisation solutions, as far as possible … Or, at least, 
first get the data and then talk to the banks to see what could be done in terms of solutions for financial 
centralisation and coordination. (…) Naturally, things started growing, developing, gaining their own 
body… And then things came a little by… (…) The logic was to have, in this team, the essential 
competences to start creating an infrastructure to allow the required business monitoring.” 
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future changes conducive to their longer terms objectives, when their attainment became 
feasible. 
At later stages, however, central actors gradually promoted the development of 
SAP FI in ways which were more supportive of uniformity and central visibility across 
the organisation. In particular, the shift to a single server and the adoption of parallel 
accounting were done soon after the divergence between charts of accounts was 
detected, and at a time when the CC in Portugal was already fully operative. 
Interestingly, the trigger of this change process was a technical factor derived 
from implementing the logistic modules, i.e., from developments beyond the accounting 
area. Multiple charts of accounts in SAP FI made linking the logistic and financial 
modules rather complicated (see quote in page 402). The short time period elapsed 
between the detection of the ‘problem’ and the reconfiguration of SAP FI architecture 
(the remobilisation of the package) prevents an interpretation of any substantial change 
in terms of central actors’ objectives or available resources. However, these shifts, even 
if triggered by technical reasons related to the implementation of the logistic modules, 
represent an enactment (and therefore a clarification to all actors) of the objectives 
towards uniformity and centralisation - which, until then, might have been less clearly 
assumed or less well perceived within the organisation.  
A consultant provided an extensive, very rich and insightful description of this 
later stage, when key central actors enacted objectives which until then were not explicit 
or not even fully developed. He emphasised the…  
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“…very strong [project support] from [Mr. A], very forward-thinking, avid 
of centralisation and modernisation (…), who many times even wished we 
[consultants] were bolder.” 
“[His incentives were particularly in terms of] speed. Many times, we 
proposed certain things, and he looked at us and asked ‘Why hasn’t that 
been done yet?’. And we looked at him ‘Sir, you have to approve, first’. 
‘Consider it approved’. It was his very unique style. (…) In terms of 
decisions and organisational changes (…); when we left, he created the 
conditions for it to happen, wrote the internal memos, communicated to the 
people… It was a (…) young and dynamic way to conduct the meetings, to 
incentivise and entice us. (…) His ‘Yes’ meant ‘It should have already been 
done’. That’s why he had arranged that meeting. (…)” 
Reinforcing the notion of an initial lack of an explicit and clear strategy for the 
accounting and finance area, the consultant clearly identified the role of the SAP 
technical innovation and the consultants themselves as facilitative and legitimising of 
previously unstated and unfulfilled objectives. 
“For example, when we started the project, the [objective of] 
organisational change and the centralisation of functions was not 
transparent. When the processes were aligned, specially as regards the 
treasury component, it was visible to everyone that there were enormous 
synergies to centralise the payments and treasury components. And so we 
recommended that organisational change. And automatically, he looked at 
us and said ‘Of course, move on, that should have already been made’, in 
the sense that he himself had tried to do it in the past but due to constraints 
in the systems, he hadn’t managed to do it. Or because, perhaps, he thought 
that for reasons related to people management, career development 
expectations, etc., he thought it wasn’t the right time.  
So, he took the system change, to say ‘If you gentlemen say that it is 
fundamental, then who am I to say the opposite? I even think that should be 
already done’. And that’s an excellent argument for us to do it immediately. 
And so, things were accelerated that way.” 
Going beyond the particular case of IndCo, this consultant further argued that 
SAP is often used as both a facilitative device and a legitimating support to other 
previously existing objectives, in line with existing literature (e.g., Dillard et al., 2005; 
Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). In particular, the perceived legitimacy of this ‘modern’ 
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technical device may be useful for particular actors to justify options of an 
organisational nature which they expect to face opposition by other organisational 
actors. 
“There’s an issue, which I hope you won’t write20, but  it’s fundamental. 
The issue of organisational change is often attributed to SAP, but sometimes 
there are old plans and ambitions that companies have had for a very long 
time, and they blame certain decisions on SAP. And they are not, they are 
decisions of an organisational nature.  
‘Oh, it’s because of SAP that we have to centralise this, and certain people 
will no longer be needed.’ Lies. In SAP, it’s far easier to do it like this, in 
fact, because it frees up functions. It was more difficult, but we could keep 
the old functions and the old [work] systems. But, actually, people say 
‘Since we needed to do that, don’t know when, and if we make the [new 
SAP] system like [the current system], then we’ll have to make a rework 
later. Then, let’s put it all together, and we solve the problem immediately’. 
Then, SAP is to blame”. 
This extensive quote is a particularly vivid example of insights provided by 
other interviewees. At a certain stage, after an initial lack of strategic orientation and 
guidance, key central actors started actively orienting the project to mobilise the SAP FI 
package in order to support organisational changes that were now explicitly desired. 
6.1.7 SAP FI BECOMING AN ‘OBLIGATORY PASSAGE POINT’ 
The process through which SAP FI (and, indeed, the other innovations analysed 
in this chapter) became an Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) is explored in greater detail 
in the next chapter. But before such wider analysis, it can be noted that, at a more 
immediate level, SAP FI started becoming established as a passage point in each of the 
sites where it was implemented, since no other tool existed to carry out many financial 
                                                 
20 The researcher obtained written authorisation from the interviewee to include this quote. 
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accounting tasks21. Importantly, after the remobilisation of SAP, it started ‘routing’ all 
local actors through the same path, through the same standardised processes. 
However, the effectiveness of SAP FI as an OPP, as routing all local actors 
through the same path in order to produce uniform, comparable financial accounting 
information, was not total. Additional innovations were crucial at later stages – in 
particular, the organisational innovations of relocating the Corporate Centre and 
creating a Shared Service Centre in Portugal, near the chairman and majority 
shareholder, Mr. A. These two organisational innovations (and the SSC in particular) 
contributed, alongside SAP FI and other innovations, to build a network of “Obligatory 
Passage Points”, which collectively were clearly supportive of central actors’ interests. 
This discussion about how SAP FI affected IndCo’s circuits of power, in 
particular at the level of system integration, has already started to be addressed in the 
text above. However, a more thorough discussion about how SAP FI became a fixed 
OPP within a larger network of other OPPs in IndCo, constituting a technical, material 
condition which promoted the interests of central actors, is postponed to the next 
chapter.  
6.1.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This section focused on the first of the three major innovations introduced in 
IndCo to be analysed in this chapter: the implementation of the financial accounting 
module of SAP, SAP FI. In particular, this section explored various stages of decision, 
                                                 
21 As an exception, in one country where SAP FI was implemented, the subsidiary had to keep using a 
prior local solution to perform various activities, such as producing tax reports, due to a number of 
specificities not supported by the standard SAP package (and which were also not fully known by the IT 
team). 
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design and implementation processes, as well as identifying the actors involved in those 
stages and scrutinising their motivations and strategies. 
This section proposed conceiving the design and implementation of SAP FI as 
mobilisation attempts of a generic software package by various actors. Depending on 
the mobilisation attempts at each stage of the process, and on the success of those 
attempts, the package was configured in certain ways, rather than in other alternatives.  
More specifically, this section identified a first stage when particular influences 
over the mobilisation of SAP FI promoted the adoption of characteristics promoting 
uniformity and central visibility, while other influences promoted the accommodation of 
previous diversity and autonomy features. Particular influences at this first stage were 
originated from organisation-level and group-level actors; other influences were traced 
to non-human actors, such as the group-level consolidation solution Hyperion. 
However, a closer analysis revealed that the influence of non-human actors was 
importantly mediated through organisation- and group-level actors and the rules which 
they produced and the remaining actors accepted and enacted. At a second stage, after 
the system went live, additional mobilisation moves were identified to reinforce the 
promotion of uniformity and central visibility.  
Analysing the identified mobilisation moves along the various stages of the 
design and implementation process, this section then discussed alternative perceptions 
about the role and strategies of the accounting and finance area. One perception argued 
for its initial lack of strategy and mobilisation efforts. However, taking a longer term 
perspective, alternative perceptions highlighted a more strategic stance. Key actors 
evaluated and confronted emerging objectives and (limited) available resources, as well 
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as the on-going configuration of the package, to strategically determine the mobilisation 
attempts to be enacted at each stage of the process. 
However, this section acknowledged that more empirical information and 
additional conceptual developments were needed to draw a more comprehensive 
account of this technical and associated organisational change process. In particular, the 
development of SAP FI and its establishment as an “Obligatory Passage Point” was 
related with additional organisational innovations, such as the relocation of the CC to 
Portugal and, in particular, the creation, also in Portugal, of a SSC. The empirical 
description and analysis of these two innovations are the focus of the next two sections, 
and are essential to the understanding of the SAP FI implementation processes in 
IndCo.   
6.2 AN ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION: THE RELOCATION OF 
THE CORPORATE CENTRE TO PORTUGAL 
This section analyses an organisational change which started being implemented 
in 1998: the relocation of IndCo’s Corporate Centre (CC) (along with IndCo’s top 
managers) from Spain back to Portugal. Significantly, this shift brought IndCo’s CC 
and top managers back to the same location of Mr. A, IndCo’s chairman and majority 
shareholder. The change in location represented a change within IndCo’s actor-network, 
in the relative position and centrality of components (actors) of the network, in the 
relations established among the network components. Therefore, although a CC already 
existed in Spain, the change in location is conceived as an innovation within the actor-
network, at the level of the circuit of system integration. This section explores the 
empirical insights about the motivations, process and consequences related with this 
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organisational innovation, and it notes that all circuits of power must be considered to 
fully understand this change. 
The first subsection addresses the motivations for this innovation, analysing how 
existing organisational and technological arrangements and local rules created a number 
of limitations to key central actors, and Mr. A in particular. The subsection also 
analyses how the innovation attempted to address these limitations. The second 
subsection briefly summarises the process of the CC relocation. The third subsection 
analyses some consequences for IndCo’s actor-network – and preliminarily indicates 
expected changes in IndCo’s circuits of power. The fourth subsection describes the 
persistence of perceived limitations of the introduced innovations (SAP FI and the CC), 
and the emergence of the idea to introduce an additional organisational innovation: a 
Shared Services Centre. A summary closes the section. 
6.2.1 THE MOTIVATIONS TO RELOCATE THE CORPORATE CENTRE  
6.2.1.1 Limitations of central actors due to adverse top management structure 
and mechanisms: the circuit of system integration 
As described in the previous chapter, after the acquisition of a large Spanish 
competitor in the early 1990’s, IndCo’s top managers and the CC moved from Portugal 
to Spain – with the notable exception of the chairman and majority shareholder, Mr. A, 
who always remained in Portugal, where the CC of IndCo’s group was also located. 
Therefore, top management became increasingly split between Portugal and 
Madrid. Portugal was the location of the chairman (who, throughout all the company 
history, always had a de facto executive intervention) and of the CC of the holding 
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group. On the other hand, Madrid was the location of the top managers (including the 
CEO) and of IndCo’s CC (based on the CC of the acquired Spanish competitor). 
Several interviewees emphasised the importance of Portuguese key directors 
who, although based in Spain, kept a close relationship with Mr. A during this period, 
until 1998. These directors – in particular, the Portuguese CEOs - had a long history in 
IndCo or in IndCo’s group, and interviewees always described them as “people of Mr. 
A’s trust”. Significantly, a senior manager made the point to clarify that, to Mr. A, the 
kind of relevant trust is “professional trust”, based on their capabilities and honesty, 
rather than “personal trust”, based on an unquestioning submission to Mr. A.  
In order to preserve Mr. A’s knowledge, intervention and control, he strongly 
relied on such key people – the CEOs and other directors in whom Mr. A trusted. This 
“people-based” approach at a high hierarchical level was particularly needed, given the 
shortcomings of available information, particularly the type of information oriented 
towards the needs of central actors, requiring a global visibility over the organisation.22  
Therefore, Mr. A had to rely in ‘trust-in-persons’ at a higher hierarchical level. 
This was particularly important given the more generalised limitations arising from 
rules of meaning and membership at a local level, emphasising local level issues (which 
prevented a more generalised ‘trust-in-persons’) and to a lack of ‘trust-in-systems’, as 
analysed in subsection 5.4.5. “Trust in abstract systems involves faith in the correctness 
                                                 
22 Recalling a quotation from a CC manager (subsection 5.4.1, page 329) is useful: “[In terms of formal 
and ultimate decision power], the decision power was in [Portuguese city where the group holding - and 
Mr. A’s office - was located]. [However,] de facto, [the decision power] was in Madrid, because [the 
Portuguese city, i.e., Mr. A and staff located there] could only provide an indication but, in practice, it 
didn’t have the minimal conditions and means to make an adequate follow-up, in order to verify if the 
defined indications and strategies were actually being followed, at the desired speed, at the desired 
timings, in the desired ways. It didn’t have the slightest chance to ensure that.”. 
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of the principles within the system, not the good intentions of others (trust-in-persons)” 
(Moilanen, 2008, p. 254; see also Seal and Herbert, 2009, both based in Giddens). As a 
CC manager reflected,  
“Follow-up [by Mr. A] (…) was much more based on a relation of personal 
trust between – let’s put names on this – Mr. A and, in Spain, [Mr. X], 
rather than in an organised system working more or less independently from 
people A, B, C or D occupying whatever function.”  
However, as an IT member recalled, in spite of Mr. A’s reliance in these key 
people, during this period, 
“[One of the CEOs] started defining a certain distance: (…) the 
shareholder (…) intervenes in strategic issues, but not in daily 
management.” 
This distancing of Mr. A from some decision making instances was at odds with 
his known preferences. As a senior manager described it, 
“Mr. A likes intervening, and it’s evident that if IndCo’s Corporate Centre 
is in Madrid, his capacity to intervene is more limited.” 
However, in 1998, the last of these CEOs left the group, as well as other senior 
group advisors. For the CEO position, Mr. A appointed a Hispanic, a former partner of a 
large consultancy firm, who had recently joined the group. Although a senior manager 
rejected the notion that Mr. A might trust this new CEO less than previous ones, all 
other interviewees clearly identified a distinction. In the direct continuation of the last 
quote, the senior manager confronted the significant difference in the length and trust of 
the relations between Mr. A and the new, Hispanic CEO, when compared to previous 
CEOs. 
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“We also have to consider the type of people, right? [Before 1998,] IndCo’s 
CEOs alternated between [Mr. X, Mr. Y and Mr. Z]. All Mr. A’s trusted 
people, who had been in the group for many years. [The new Hispanic 
CEO] was a recent arrival.” 
Another senior manager characterised the appointment of this CEO as…  
“an emergency solution, while Mr. A prepared a longer term strategy. And 
this CEO was very supported and monitored until he proved himself” 
(approximate quotation) 
The account in this subsection closely mirrors the two stages of trust 
relationships, as proposed by Tomkins (2001) and supported by Johansson and 
Baldvinsdottir (2003). As regards the long-trusted people who previously took key 
positions, Mr. A accepted “incompleteness of information” in this “trusting relation” 
(Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 2003 p. 222). However, the trust relationship with the 
new CEO was still in its infancy, since “trust is grounded in learning from experience” 
(p. 222). However, there was no adequate information to support such learning 
processes, required at the early stages of trust relationships.  
Therefore, Mr. A was confronted with the anticipation of the departure of long-
trusted key members and the limited ISs addressing his organisation-wide information 
needs. When compared with the evaluation made in subsection 5.4.5, the departure of 
these individuals further reduced Mr. A’s confidence of receiving accurate information 
about IndCo as a whole (as regards the disembedding process) and his capacity to 
effectively intervene (as regards the reembedding process) (Moilanen, 2008, drawing on 
Giddens, 1990). On a more cautionary note, a CC manager stated that… 
“because possibly it was already being anticipated that (…) the people, say, 
closer to the group, would be leaving Spain and the group itself, the more 
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important it would become to exist a more solid structure here. It’s mere 
speculation, but looking backwards… [so it seems]”. 
This concern was aggravated because IndCo was not only increasingly larger, 
but was also increasingly centred in Spain. Although the Spanish company was acquired 
by IndCo (and it was always, ultimately, owned by Mr. A), it later became the owner of 
most of IndCo’s assets, both in Portugal and internationally. The increasing importance 
of Spain was further bolstered because the large acquisition in the late 1990’s was 
carried out by the Spanish subsidiary. As an IT respondent described with some 
humour,  
[The corporate centre had] “increasingly more power, the “head” was 
growing in Madrid, in areas such as finance, controlling, even ISs, several 
corporate areas. And there was a moment when some discomfort emerged 
among the Portuguese, who were IndCo’s “oldies”, [because] the power 
was escaping to Madrid. And that’s when there was an intervention of Mr. 
A, because things started escaping his reach, in the finance area and in the 
controlling area” 
Interviewees were unanimous in attributing to Mr. A the initiative for this 
process of relocating IndCo’s CC back to Portugal, in the same site of the group CC and 
therefore near Mr. A himself. The following quote from a CC manager is illustrative. 
“There was a decision of the shareholder to create again, closer to the 
headquarters, a corporate centre which allowed a better monitoring of the 
information.” 
Significantly, among those interviewees with whom this topic was discussed in 
more detail, they all converged in their perception of “proximity” to Mr. A (or to the 
group headquarters23) as the driver behind this shift. “Proximity (…) to allow a better 
                                                 
23 The interviewees often mentioned “Mr. A” and “group headquarters” interchangeably, reflecting not 
only the same geographical location but also, and significantly, reflecting a high degree of perceived 
alignment between both actors. 
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monitoring of the information” was clearly the perceived overriding motivation. In 
contrast, the conclusion (or at least the advanced stage) of the Spanish company 
integration (one of the reported justifications for the move of the CC and top managers 
to Spain after the acquisition), was typically not depicted as a relevant motivation.  
The location of organisational structures, and hence of the location where their 
activities are performed, was therefore not inconsequential as regards power issues, 
because it changed the relative positions and proximities within the actor-network. The 
change in location made top managers and the CC become closer to Mr. A and the 
group headquarters, and that increased the influence of the latter over the former. 
Therefore, from a research point of view, there may be the need to consider both the 
existence and the location of the relevant structures and innovations, whenever location 
affects relations from an actor-network perspective. This may apply to both human and 
non-human actors - e.g., the previous section also highlighted the repercussions of the 
locations of SAP FI databases, since this affected the socio-technical relations within 
the network.  
The analysis above focused on elements which Clegg (1989) included in the 
circuit of system integration. Organisational structures (alongside techniques, such as 
information systems) are part of the material conditions which influence the way power 
is distributed across actors or, putting it in another perspective, influence the way power 
is attributed to, or withheld from, actors in the organisational network. Therefore, 
tensions and actors’ dissatisfaction with prevailing organisational structures (and 
information systems), as reflected in Mr. A’s combined lack of trust-in-systems and 
trust-in-persons (Giddens, 1990; Moilanen, 2008) can therefore be a particularly 
important motivation for organisational change – including changes at the very same 
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circuit of system integration. In brief, some components of the circuit of system 
integration were not supportive of central actors’ and, in particular, of Mr. A’s interests, 
and have motivated this organisational innovation. A second type of motivations was 
related with the circuit of social integration, which is now considered. 
6.2.1.2 Limitations of central actors due to adverse rules: the circuit of social 
integration 
The difficulties of central actors, and of Mr. A in particular, were aggravated by 
prevailing rules in IndCo - some long standing, others more recent and emerging. At a 
local level, prevailing rules of practice, including rules of meaning and membership 
(Clegg, 1989; Ribeiro, 2003; see section 3.5), largely reflected local problems, from a 
local perspective (as analysed in the previous chapter and particularly in subsection 
5.4.3). Some problems experienced by central actors were not a major concern at a local 
level – as a reflection of rules of membership oriented towards local membership. This 
particular configuration of the circuits of social integration, regarding the rules which 
were actually accepted and enacted by actors, was simultaneously caused and reinforced 
by the high autonomy of local sites. In turn, both characteristics (a local focus and 
autonomy) can be partly attributed to IndCo’s history of growth by acquisitions. 
Longstanding, prevalent heterogeneity of rules accepted and enacted across the 
sites, and their misalignment as regards central actors’ objectives, represented an 
increasing concern to central actors, in particular as IndCo continued to grow. As a CC 
manager stated, 
“an emphasis was placed in the need to start having a stronger corporate 
team here and to start implementing common methodologies and systems.”  
 6.2 An organisational innovation: the relocation of the Corporate Centre to Portugal 
6.2.1 The motivations to relocate the Corporate Centre 
427
“Methodologies” referred basically to extant ‘rules of practice’, rules de facto 
enacted by local actors across the sites. Therefore, an important motivation for the 
creation of the CC was the gradual introduction (and ultimate enactment) of new rules, 
as well as increasing the actual acceptance and enactment of some extant formal rules 
which were not accepted and enacted by local actors across the sites (at least, not in a 
degree acceptable to central actors). However, as further discussed below, this change 
would require integrated contributions from additional actors (in particular, SAP FI and 
the SSC). 
In addition to long standing rules, an emerging perception about the location of 
the organisational centre was an additional component of the circuit of social integration 
which played against Mr. A and other central actors located in Portugal. As described in 
this subsection, the increasing transfer of organisational resources to the Spanish 
subsidiary promoted the perception that the organisational centre was, indeed, Spain. 
This perception affected rules of membership, further reducing the importance of 
Portuguese ‘central’ actors. Before this perception emerged, some rules of membership 
were already previously oriented towards the local (rather than central) level; this 
emergent perception promoted that rules of membership became even less oriented 
towards Portuguese central actors – which now had a less central position within the 
network. Therefore, the new location of the CC, in Portugal, also intended to have a 
symbolic meaning, as a senior manager reflected: 
“[The Corporate Centre relocation is above all justified] from the 
shareholder point of view. ‘I am a Portuguese company, I don’t want to be a 
Spanish company, and therefore I don’t want my decision centre in Spain, I 
want my decision centre in Portugal.’ (…) The rest, the concept [underlying 
the Corporate Centre] was exactly the same.” 
 6.2 An organisational innovation: the relocation of the Corporate Centre to Portugal 
6.2.1 The motivations to relocate the Corporate Centre 
428
6.2.1.3 A summary of motivations 
By 1998, Mr. A was confronted with a number of adverse situations, at the level 
of both the circuits of system integration and the circuits of social integration. 
As regards the circuit of system integration, top managers, and the entire CC, 
were geographically distant from him, which limited, in practical terms, his active 
intervention in the business - something which did not meet his personal managerial 
style. Key top managers, who were his trusted link and support, were leaving the 
organisation. Formal information channels were weak, given the limitations of existing 
information systems to provide a reliable central visibility over the entire group. The 
weakness of these formal, ISs-based communication channels, became even more 
critical for Mr. A given the departure of those key managers, which supported the 
existing people-based (rather than ISs-based) communication channels. Therefore, 
perceived, combined problems of lack of ‘trust-in-persons’ and ‘trust-in-systems’ 
emerged (Giddens, 1990; Moilanen, 2008). 
As regards the circuit of social integration, long-standing prevailing rules of 
practice at a local level privileged local concerns and priorities, attributing a low priority 
to the needs of central actors. And the recent shift of organisational resources and 
functions to the Spanish subsidiary had promoted an emergent perception that the 
organisational centre was in Spain, rather than in Portugal – further orienting prevalent 
rules of membership away from Portuguese ‘central’ actors. 
As a result of the above adverse features at the circuits of social and system 
integration, Mr. A was confronted with structural practical power limitations – 
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limitations not in line with his uncontested formal power over the entire organisation, at 
the level of the circuit of episodic power. In line with one of the main conclusions of the 
previous chapter, it was clear that there was an unbalanced situation between the circuit 
of episodic power (where Mr. A had ultimate and undisputed formal power and control 
over resources) and the power flowing in the circuits of social and system integration 
(where he experienced structural, practical power limitations). Addressing these 
structural limitations was among the motivations to relocate the CC from Spain to 
Portugal, in a process which is analysed next. 
6.2.2 THE PROCESS OF THE CORPORATE CENTRE RELOCATION 
In early 1998, Mr. A triggered this process of relocation of IndCo’s CC back to 
Portugal - to the same site of the group CC and therefore near Mr. A himself. It was, 
clearly, a process supported by Mr. A’s control over organisational resources. In the 
terms of Clegg’s model, Mr. A’s dominance at the episodic level of the circuits of 
power was, clearly, decisive. 
However, even with the support of Mr. A and his control over resources, the 
process of restoring the CC in Portugal – i.e., the introduction of an organisational 
innovation at the level of the circuit of system integration - was a slow and gradual one. 
In fact, before this change, IndCo’s CC in Portugal was virtually non-existent (only one 
person, half-time).  
As a project virtually “from scratch”, the choice of the person responsible for it 
was critical, since the roots of virtually all future aspects of the CC were then being 
conceived and designed. The manager appointed to lead this process was described by 
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an IT interviewee as “a person already with a history at IndCo”, as one of those 
managers Mr. A trusted.24  
To staff the management control area and the treasury and finance area, external 
recruitment and selection processes were carried out. As regards the consolidation area, 
three members of the group consolidation team were transferred to IndCo. As a CC 
manager explained, 
“the logic was to have, in this team, the essential competences to start 
creating an infrastructure to allow for the required business monitoring.”  
This quote very clearly reveals the gradual nature of this process and of its very 
ambitions. At the start, the newly-hired team of recent graduates was indeed reduced 
and lacked experience. With such human resources limitations, the very short term 
ambitions were also limited. However, it aimed to gradually create an organisational 
structure aligned with the objectives of the central actors (in particular, Mr. A) to 
achieve greater business visibility – which, in turn, would enhance the business control 
and intervention those central actors felt to be lacking.  
Additional factors promoted the only gradual emergence of the CC. Further 
hiring processes and logistic developments were needed. The learning process of the 
newly hired staff was, obviously, also gradual. Finally, an important support was only 
then emerging: an information system promising to centralise some financial 
information from across the organisation in a quick and reliable way, SAP FI. The 
                                                 
24 Reinforcing the notion that important power issues were at stake in this process, the same interviewee 
soon afterwards added that that manager “lived intensely those power issues”. This manager was 
interviewed three times. 
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following figure 6.1 sketches the SAP FI and the CC timelines and highlights the close 
temporal association between both innovations. 
Figure 6.1: Chronology of the SAP FI project and the CC (Source: Developed by the 
author) 
SAP FI promised to greatly facilitate central actors’ central, global visibility, as 
it was gradually rolled-out (and only by 2001 did it encompass all countries, except 
one). However, the implemented SAP system had two limitations to attain this 
visibility. First, as explored in the previous section, some initial design choices did not 
favour this central, global visibility: only after an additional mobilisation of SAP by 
central actors, was SAP redesigned, facilitating this visibility. The second limitation 
concerned the type of information processed by SAP FI. SAP FI only concerns financial 
accounting – hence, providing limited support to management control. Several types of 
information were not included in SAP, among which information for management 
control. Management control by the CC had to continue to rely on information produced 
at a plant level and then transferred to the CC – and which, as argued in subsection 
5.3.3, was perceived to suffer from lack of reliability, consistency and timeliness.25 
                                                 
25 This perceived limitation of visibility for central management control extended for several years 
beyond the adoption of SAP FI. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the project to design and 
implement the SAP modules to include cost accounting and management control information only started 
in 2005, finishing in 2007. 
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Therefore, the potential visibility and intervention capability of the new 
organisational structure (the CC) was initially compromised by the early stage of 
development of supporting integrated systems. Interestingly, empirical insights from the 
previous section on SAP also indicated scarcity of resources (such as the ones provided 
by a CC) as limiting factors preventing the choice of a “completely distinct logic”, of 
more “radical” departures from prevailing arrangements.  
As a conclusion, the kind of interdependency between these two material 
conditions (SAP FI and the CC) varied according to their development stage. Initially, 
the embryonic state of each of them limited the possibilities of development of the 
other; later, as each innovation matured, that mutual dependency became a mutual 
reinforcement, as developed in the next chapter. 
The creation and gradual expansion of the CC created new organisational actors, 
both individual and collective. As the years passed, the CC in Portugal created new 
areas of intervention. At the time of the fieldwork, the CC included the areas of 
management control, corporate finance and treasury, legal, human resources, 
environment and eco-efficiency, and industrial benchmarking. The next subsection now 
analyses how the emergence of the first new organisational actors of the CC (related to 
finance, accounting and management control) affected IndCo’s actor-network and could 
be expected to change IndCo’s circuits of power. 
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6.2.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE CC ON INDCO’S ACTOR-NETWORK – AND 
EXPECTED CHANGES IN INDCO’S CIRCUITS OF POWER 
The relocation of the CC to Portugal may also be described as the creation of a 
new CC in Portugal. Indeed, this innovation was not a mere geographical shift of the 
previous CC; its members did not remain the same and were not simply moved from 
one country to another. On the contrary, the CC was built virtually from scratch. As 
described, there were external recruitment and selection processes to staff the areas of 
management control and of finance and treasury, while others were transferred from the 
group’s consolidation team (located in Portugal). 
Therefore, the conditions in which the CC emerged promoted a rupture and a 
very clear endorsement of a central perspective aligned with Portuguese central actors, 
for four main reasons. First, the new organisational structure was created as a direct 
consequence of a decision of the chairman and majority shareholder and it was located 
near him and the group headquarters. It gradually, but clearly, replaced the previous 
control structure of the Spanish CC; although the concept of a CC was the same, it 
radically signalled a shift in the organisational centre, identity and power perceptions – 
IndCo was a Portuguese company, and owned by Mr. A. As a preliminary remark, this 
context in which the CC was created, as a clear initiative of Mr. A, promoted that the 
CC and its members would be aligned with these central actors and would endorse a 
central perspective. 
The second promoter of a central, organisation-wide perspective can be related 
with the very nature, objectives and scope of the activities of a CC, which a stream of 
research on organisational culture has associated with certain characteristics. Subject to 
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important caveats26, Hofstede’s (1998) empirical work and the resulting typology of 
organisational cultures are now used to provide broad indications. It may provide 
suggestions of perspectives and values, of “psychological dispositions (…) of (…) 
organisational members” (Ahrens & Mollona, 2007, p. 307) which, in a “functional 
conception of organisation” (p. 307), may be typically associated with certain types of 
activities within organisations. Hofstede’s conclusions supported the intuitive notion 
that different functional activities and objectives may be related with different 
dispositions, perspectives and values. Hofstede characterised, necessarily with a broad 
brush, three typical subcultures (professional, administrative and customer interface), 
using six “dimensions”. These subculture types are briefly reviewed and related with the 
differences analysed across IndCo, in particular between local and central actors. 
The two types of subcultures Hofstede found to be the least different can be 
associated with the various levels and types of activities of actors of a CC. First, the 
labelled ‘professional’ culture is associated with non-routine and difficult tasks, 
performed by skilled personnel. Hofstede identified this culture among management 
(and top management in particular), central departments and other specialised 
employees. The associated tasks include the more conceptual and non-routine activities 
of the CC (e.g., related with strategy control), and also complex tasks of a more 
operative nature (e.g., complex consolidation operations). Second, the labelled 
                                                 
26 It should be emphasised that Hofstede’s work and conclusions should be used with caution in any 
particular case study. No claim can be made, and no claim is made in this thesis, that the characterisation 
of a given organisational area, in a particular organisation, corresponds to Hofstede’s typology. The 
characterisation must always rely on the interpretation of empirical insights. Hofstede’s typology is used, 
in this specific part of the work, merely as a comparative characterisation. The ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions and approaches of Hofstede’s work and the current 
thesis are substantially different. The discussions between, on one hand, Hofstede (2002 and 2003) and, 
on the other hand, Baskerville (2003), Baskerville-Morley (2005) and McSweeney (2002a and 2002b) are 
elucidative of such differences; see also Williamson (2002) (these discussions do not refer to Hofstede’s, 
1998 work on organisational cultures, but rather to Hofstede’s, 1980 work on national cultures; however, 
many ontological, epistemological and methodological issues raised in the mentioned discussions apply 
to both works). Therefore, no conclusions are drawn based on this particular part of the analysis, based on 
Hofstede’s typology. 
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‘administrative’ culture is associated with routine production processes and 
standardised work. These tasks can describe the more operative and routine activities of 
the CC (e.g., gathering data across the organisation and checking for their consistency; 
routine variance analysis). 
The third subculture is the “customer interface” subculture, which is farther 
away from the remaining two and, in particular, is a “counter-culture” to the 
professional culture. The characterisation of this subculture recalls some empirical 
insights about IndCo’s local sites, focused on meeting customer requirements, as 
analysed in the previous chapter. A comparison of these two groups (professional and 
administrative, vs. customer interface cultures) along two of the dimensions is 
particularly revealing: the customer interface culture is clearly more results-oriented 
(rather than process-oriented); and it has an unequivocal preference for a loose control 
(rather than tight control). Therefore (and recalling that Hofstede’s work is merely used 
as a rough suggestion and comparison), Hofstede’s typology of organisational cultures 
suggests that the activities and objectives of the CC would foster a strong alignment 
between extant central actors and the new CC (as a collective actor) and its individual 
actors, while distancing their members from the traditional perspectives at IndCo’s local 
sites.  
The third promoter of alignment may reside on conventional human resource 
management issues. The importance of selection processes to attempt to hire candidates 
with adequate skills and values has long been acknowledged (Ouchi, 1979). In 
particular, considering the candidates’ values is important to promote alignment 
between candidates’ values and the desired orientation for the job position and the 
overall organisational structure in which the person may work (Donnelly et al., 2000). 
 6.2 An organisational innovation: the relocation of the Corporate Centre to Portugal 
6.2.3 Consequences of the CC on IndCo’s actor-network – and expected changes in IndCo’s circuits of power 
436
The CC was staffed with two types of people: those who had been already involved in 
consolidation at a group level (and therefore had already been immersed in a context 
promoting a central perspective); and those recent graduates who were newly hired.  
As regards this last group of newly hired recent graduates, being new to the 
organisation, they had not been influenced by IndCo’s prevalent rules of practice, 
tending to privilege the local level. Additionally, their recruitment and selection process 
(whose interviews, e.g., were carried out by the responsible of the project himself) 
clarified what was expected from the candidates. Furthermore, a self-selection process 
occurs, whereby candidates who are not pleased with the job being proposed 
(considering the job in an holistic way, with its various dimensions) will probably not 
take it (e.g., Merchant et al., 2005 and Oliveira, 2001). Therefore, it could be expected 
that this newly-hired group might more easily endorse from scratch this centrally-
oriented perspective.  
Fourth, and beyond the selection stage, membership to a given organisation is, in 
general terms, always provisional. In addition to formal and legal mechanisms of human 
resources management to exclude employees due to an unsatisfactory fit or 
performance, Munro (1999, pp. 445-6) expands these mechanisms and recalls the more 
subtle pressure over employees to be considered – and continue to be considered - a part 
of a certain group, in particular the group of “‘good managers’”. Membership of a 
certain group is “provisional – and kept provisional”; “within daily practice, (…) 
questions of membership are seldom fully settled: they usually remain as questions” 
(emphasis in the original). “And it is exactly this provisionality over membership that is 
important to understanding power effects”. Therefore, there is a need to continuously 
perform “membership work” to ensure continuous membership of desired groups, both 
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in informal grounds and in formal grounds (including the formal and legal mechanisms 
for defining job relations)27. Importantly, the referents for membership of these newly 
hired actors were the CC and the other central actors, in particular the top managers 
involved in the creation of the CC.  
Therefore, IndCo’s actor-network was expanded with a new, emerging collective 
central actor (the CC itself) and several new individual central actors (working at the 
CC), which could be expected, for the four above reasons, to be aligned with the 
perspectives of other central actors (including Mr. A). 
The emergence of these new central actors could be expected to create changes 
in the distribution of power within the organisation. The first power shift may derive 
from this new component of the actor-network endorsing rules of practice aligned with 
central actors’ objectives – i.e., a power shift related with the circuit of social 
integration. The second power shift may derive from the CC as a material condition 
becoming an Obligatory Passage Point and/or reinforcing the centrality, unavoidability 
and effectiveness of other OPPs – i.e., a power shift related with the circuit of system 
integration. The next chapter examines to what extent these possibilities of institutional 
and power change actually happened.  
                                                 
27 Employment contracts may offer a definitive formal affiliation to a given organisation. The ‘definitive’ 
nature of formal membership of these job relations is an exception to Munro’s notion of provisional 
membership. But, not only Munro was not concerned (or mostly concerned) with the formal and legal 
aspect of membership, but also this exception to the “provisionality over membership” was not applicable 
to the new actors being hired to the new CC – the empirical issue under examination. 
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6.2.4 PERCEIVED CONTINUED LIMITATIONS… AND AN ADDITIONAL 
ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION: A SHARED SERVICES CENTRE 
By 2000, the technological and organisational innovations introduced (SAP FI 
and the CC, respectively) could be expected to have a significant contribution towards 
achieving the objectives of allowing a reliable global visibility over the organisation and 
granting central actors a more effective capacity to be aware of, control and intervene in 
the business activity.  
However, central actors perceived that these technical and organisational 
innovations would not be sufficient, by themselves, to achieve the above goals. In fact, 
central actors producing and analysing global financial information continued to 
experience problems. In spite of the implementation of SAP FI, and although this single 
system had already been further aligned with the objectives of central actors, 
information timeliness and comparability across the various sites continued to be 
unsatisfactory. In fact, these are the same types of problems which existed before SAP 
FI (see subsection 5.3.3), although now at a significantly minor scale.  
The persisting problems (from a central actors’ perspective) were attributed to 
the fact that financial accounting activities were executed locally and, inherently, by 
different actors. The decentralised execution of financial accounting, in particular 
heavily transactional activities (data posting, reconciliation, etc.) was perceived as an 
obstacle to the objectives of central actors. This was one of the reasons which triggered 
the idea, in late 2000, to create a Shared Services Centre in Portugal. This new 
organisational configuration is the focus of the next section. 
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6.2.5 SUMMARY 
This section analysed the second innovation in IndCo’s circuit of system 
integration: the relocation of IndCo’s CC to Portugal and, in particular, to the same site 
where Mr. A and the group headquarters were located. This section analysed underlying 
motivations, processes and expected consequences. Central actors, and Mr. A in 
particular, perceived that top management structure and functioning mechanisms, as 
well as prevalent rules, limited their capacity to gain knowledge and effectively 
intervene, hence ultimately reducing their power. This was a strong motivation for 
introducing this innovation.  
The analysis of the relocation process introduced the insight, to be developed in 
the next chapter, of a strong mutual dependency between the CC and SAP FI. Each 
innovation was an important resource to the development of the other. Initially, the 
embryonic state of each of them limited the possibilities of development of the other. 
But as each innovation developed, in parallel and interrelated processes, that mutual 
dependency gradually became a mutual reinforcement.  
After the CC innovation, IndCo’s actor-network was expanded with a new, 
emerging collective central actor (the CC) and several new individual central actors 
(those working at the CC). As discussed, it could be expected that these new actors 
would be closely aligned with the perspectives of other central actors (including Mr. A). 
Additionally, some expected consequences on IndCo’s distribution of power were 
anticipated. Finally, this section identified perceptions among some central actors of the 
desirability of an additional innovation: a Shared Services Centre. This additional 
organisational innovation in the circuit of system integration is analysed in the next 
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section, as an additional and important component of a gradually developing and 
strengthening network of Obligatory Passage Points. 
6.3 AN ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION: THE CREATION OF A 
SHARED SERVICES CENTRE IN PORTUGAL 
This section analyses the creation of a Shared Services Centre (SSC), an 
organisational innovation introduced in 2001, shortly after the adoption of SAP FI and 
the relocation of the CC. The creation of a SSC implied a new corporate model. The 
new model included three areas: the CC, focused on global, organisation-wide issues; 
the Strategic Business Units, focused on sales and/or production in defined geographical 
areas; and the SSC, providing services to the Business Units. Figure 6.2 below 
represents the new corporate model and indicates the main responsibilities attributed to 
each area. 
 
Figure 6.2: IndCo’s new corporate model (Source: Internal presentation, 2005) 
• transaction-oriented, volume 
sensitive services to BUs 
• specialised functional expertise 
to BUs
• geographic strategy 
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• customer focus 
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• resource allocation 
• strategic technical 
expertise 
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This section starts by identifying the actors who proposed this innovation and 
examining their motivations, as regards the SSC’s creation and its location; Clegg’s 
framework of circuits of power again assists in interpreting the limitations and 
motivations of the actors. The second subsection analyses four stages of the process to 
create the SSC: evaluation and approval; project design; implementation; and 
optimisation. It highlights the main choices and challenges and relates them with the 
limitations and motivations of the actors involved. The third subsection analyses some 
consequences for IndCo’s actor-network – and preliminarily indicates expected changes 
in IndCo’s circuits of power. A brief summary closes this section. 
6.3.1 THE MOTIVATIONS TO CREATE A SSC 
The motivations to propose the SSC were a consequence of limitations perceived 
by the proponents. Key actors involved have a common trait: they can all be associated 
with IndCo’s centre. In particular, Mr. A, IndCo’s chairman and main shareholder, was 
identified as a key proponent and supporter of the SSC. Additionally, other actors 
associated with the emerging CC, and of the accounting and finance function in 
particular, were also crucial. The motivations about the creation and the location of the 
SSC are analysed separately, as they are different, though related. 
6.3.1.1 SSC creation: improving financial accounting data quality and reducing 
costs 
As regards the creation of the SSC, the decisive issue is the identification of the 
actor(s) who originally put forward the idea of creating a SSC. Mr. A may be 
considered as the key proponent of the SSC concept. An IT interviewee emphasised the 
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vision of Mr. A and his role for the creation of the SSC (in contrast with the previous 
lack of a clear long-term strategy for the accounting and finance area): 
“I appreciate Mr. A, for that [the proposal and defence of the SSC]… He 
had a dream… And there were many opponents to the SSC. (…) He started 
realising that other (…) multinationals had SSCs. So why shouldn’t IndCo 
have one?” 
A key member of the SSC implementation, in a work in 2003 (reference omitted 
for confidentiality issues, henceforth referred to as “anonymised work”), stressed the 
role of formal power in overcoming the initial lack of consensus, at a top management 
level, about the SSC concept. While the study did not mention the name of Mr. A, 
during the interviews for this thesis the author identified Mr. A as that key, formally 
powerful actor. 
A project as large and complex such as the creation of a SSC obviously does not 
rely on one man alone. Overall, the key actors supporting the project can be broadly 
described as central actors, who ranged from the newly emerged actors of the newly 
emerged CC in Portugal, to top managers – up to Mr. A.  
Two motivations were identified: to improve information quality and reduce 
costs. The first motivation, improving accounting information quality, was typically 
stressed as the primary objective by respondents of central accounting and finance 
areas, who produced and analysed financial information at a global level. They 
considered that the implementation of SAP FI had not been sufficient to ensure 
satisfactory information quality, in terms of consistency and timeliness, to support their 
decision making and control processes. The implementation of SAP FI, even after 
adopting a parallel accounting solution, ensured uniformity only as regards the 
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information system and the accounts structure. However, two CC and SSC managers 
agreed that…  
Respondent #1: “You could not ensure that the costs and profits were 
classified uniformly in all locations. Respondent #2: Even with the [same] 
chart of accounts. Respondent #1: The chart of accounts can be the same, 
but one [accountant] can post ‘up there’, another ‘down there’, the other 
‘in the middle’… You don’t have the slightest chance to control. It’s not a 
matter of controlling for the sake of controlling. It’s because the only way to 
guarantee that there is consistency, is to have the same team processing, 
posting the information.”28  
This lack of consistency in posting accounting transactions created problems for 
management control and decision making by central actors. There were also problems 
regarding disparities between financial and management accounting, which a SSC 
member considered that “sometimes were not that simple to explain”, largely due to the 
lack of central visibility and understanding of the detailed criteria and choices actually 
followed by the various accountants throughout IndCo in their everyday practices (as 
discussed below in this subsection, these problems concerned prevalent rules of 
practice). It should be recalled that the SAP FI project also included some basic costing 
components and that, given SAP’s single point of data entry philosophy, consistency 
problems entering information in SAP for financial accounting purposes have 
repercussions in other types of information, such as management accounting. 
As a secondary (rather than primary) objective of creating the SSC, both 
managers agreed in indicating cost reduction:  
“The great driver of the decision was not cost savings; it’s obvious that it 
also counted, but it was not [decisive]. (…) It is clear that there is a savings 
                                                 
28 See related quotes in subsection 5.3.3. A particularly relevant sentence of one of these managers is here 
reproduced again: “Simply, each one did as he/she knew and was used to doing, giving total and absolute 
priority to the country’s reporting, and not the internal group reporting.”  
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component [in the decision]. But that was, let’s say, a surplus which came a 
posteriori.” 
There were several expected sources of cost savings. It was expected that 
concentrating transactional accounting activities in one single location (rather than 
being scattered across many of IndCo’s sites) would eliminate duplicate activities, 
create synergies and economies of scale. It was also expected that a continuous learning 
process at the SSC would allow faster and more systematised operations. Therefore, it 
was expected that, at a organisation-wide level, fewer employees would be required. 
Moreover, the chosen location of the SSC, Portugal (to be analysed below), also 
allowed for lower labour costs, when compared with the total labour costs of the 
accountants and other staff from the various locations whose functions would now be 
eliminated.  
Although the two managers, as well as other respondents, stressed that cost 
reduction was a secondary objective, other respondents argued that it was the sole 
motivator - as the following IT respondent, who highlighted an emergent perception of 
cost inefficiencies: 
“Many times, [innovation] doesn’t come from a logic of ‘let’s have a single 
model and so on’. Sometimes, things follow an economic rationality and we 
realise that [we’ll] only [make it] by standardising…. The idea of the SSC is 
born precisely from an emerging awareness that there are ‘n’ people in 
Spain, both at a corporate and at a plant level, etc. (…) There was the 
evidence of Madrid. There was the evidence of [country C]. [Country C] 
had the centre in [small village X], the centre with the lakes and the ducks, 
a whole bunch of people doing almost nothing – in addition to the people at 
the plants. So, there was increasing evidence that [there were 
inefficiencies]. Studies were made, quick headcounts, to know how many 
people were working in the financial area. Doing the accounting postings, 
etc., etc.. Then, there is a rationalisation work; and to rationalise, there is 
obviously a need to [centralise] (...). It is impossible to have a 
rationalisation process like this and tell [the local people] ‘You, 
rationalise!’. They will immediately say that it’s impossible, etc.. So, the 
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only way is precisely to aggregate (…) in a single function. So, let’s do it 
centrally.” 
In another interview, the same IT respondent again emphasised the importance 
of cost reductions, arguing that SAP FI, by itself, had been sufficient to ensure 
information access and control: 
“In terms of control, you log-in in the [SAP] system (…) and view all the 
accounts from [a particular country]. You have control. Technologically, 
any person who logs-in in SAP in Portugal, logs-in in SAP [of country C]. 
(…) The SSC issue emerged due to… [pause, choosing words] Human 
Resources. (…) One started realising that a common back-office would 
reduce… [total staff in the financial areas, at a company level]. And the 
decision was strongly based on the reduction of staff numbers. Control 
already existed before [without the SSC].” 
All respondents discussing the motivations for the creation of the SSC agreed 
that there was a cost saving objective, and typically both objectives (cost savings and 
information quality) were mentioned. However, it should be highlighted that 
respondents emphasising the cost saving objective (and neglecting the information 
quality objective) were not involved in accounting and finance. As such, they were less 
affected, if at all, by issues of (lack of) quality of financial information for decision 
making and control and were therefore less aware of the extant limitations highlighted 
by actors directly involved in the accounting and finance area. In addition, their IT 
perspective promoted an emphasis on IT-based information control, neglecting the role 
of organisational structures. 
As a conclusion, as regards the motivations for creating a SSC, there is 
convincing evidence to acknowledge, at the very least, some role of concerns about data 
quality for management decision making and control, in addition to the unanimously 
mentioned cost reduction goal. 
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6.3.1.2 SSC location: creating proximity to central actors 
The SSC was located in the same site of the corporate centres of IndCo and 
IndCo’s group, in Portugal. The anonymised work mentioned above and several 
interviewees indicated several reasons to support this choice: economic; technical; and 
power related. 
A number of economic and technical reasons supported the choice of this 
location. There were cost savings due to the lower wages in Portugal, when compared to 
most other countries where IndCo had operations. One particular country might allow 
lower labour costs; however, it did not satisfy other selection criteria, it was distant 
from all other locations and was considered little attractive as a destination for the 
Portuguese who would have to work there (a basic assumption of the project). It was 
also considered that the Portuguese labour market would be able to satisfy the 
significant labour demand that was predicted, especially during the early stages of the 
SSC operations. Also, in this site, IndCo and its group already had a high level of 
competences and organisational and technological structures in the relevant areas which 
could facilitate the implementation and everyday work of the SSC, such as IT, finance, 
accounting and legal support.  
Finally, the anonymised work mentioned above indicated a factor that was 
“definitely decisive: (…) the fact that IndCo’s Centre of Decisions was in [city C]-
Portugal: with the SSC, the information supporting the decision-making process would 
be centralised (…) and, therefore, should be situated as close as possible to those who 
need it the most”. “The very location promotes a greater control by the Corporate 
Centre of the administrative and financial processes carried out by the SSC”. This 
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motivation should be emphasised. Central actors’ objectives went beyond better quality, 
centralised accounting information. It was also desired that its centralised production 
was carried out in the proximity of the central actors, both for decision-making and 
control purposes.  
Therefore, location emerges – again – as a factor with relevant repercussions in 
power issues – as was the case as regards the location of SAP FI databases (see first 
section) and the location of the CC (see second section).29 Central actors’ concern with 
location is better understood by examining their limitations before the SSC. These 
previous limitations are now examined, separating the limitations on the circuits of 
system and social integration. 
6.3.1.3 Limitations of central actors due to a decentralised organisational 
structure in accounting: the circuit of system integration 
A decentralised and autonomous accounting function, in particular as regards 
the transactional component, was a part of the existing organisational arrangements at 
IndCo. In other words, a decentralised accounting function was part of the material 
conditions which, alongside the technical aspect of autonomous accounting information 
                                                 
29 A CC manager analysed how the location of structures affected power in the case of the Retailer 
Business Unit of IndCo’s group. Because of the theoretical importance of the analysis, the interview 
extract is included next (although in a footnote, given that it concerns an empirical setting beyond the 
scope of the case study).  
Respondent: “At the time, [the group unit] was initiating the centralisation process, which 
included withdrawing from the local sites some responsibilities, such as issuing payments, etc. 
(…) It started by withdrawing some responsibilities and powers from the shops. (…) [Later] it 
accelerated enormously with an [industry-specific management change project], which 
obviously radically changes the approach, the logic and the centre of power. 
Researcher: You mentioned the issue of power being associated with the location of certain 
structures and activities. So, when you are referring to these transfers and centralisations, we 
are not just talking about activities, we are also talking about transfers of power. 
Respondent: If nothing else, of decision power. Actual [decision power]. 
Researcher: Could you elaborate on that dimension of ‘actual’?”  
The respondent then returned to IndCo’s case in the 1990’s, confronting the formal decision power of Mr. 
A with his limited effective decision power. See quotation in subsection 5.4.1, in page 329. 
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systems, affected power relations across IndCo’s actors, through the circuit of system 
integration. Decentralisation made central analysis of organisation-wide information 
mode difficult and therefore limited central actors’ power, as already amply illustrated.  
Since many accounting activities were included in local organisational structures 
with high autonomy, local actors had a high degree of flexibility and discretion in 
managing accounting processes and production. This flexibility and discretion allowed 
local actors to adopt locally specific, tailor-made accounting criteria and reports. It also 
allowed local managers to adopt less strict control processes. Two SSC members 
recalled examples of lack of control at a local level, before the SSC: 
Respondent #1: “At the time [the SSC was created], people felt they lost the 
autonomy to decide and do the things with the freedom they were used to. 
However, in our opinion, and it was a generalised opinion, even with that 
autonomy and doing whatever they wanted, in many situations things were 
not correctly done. We realised, when [the accounting processes of] the 
companies were moved to the SSC (…), that there were countless situations 
which were not properly controlled. Respondent #2: Circularisation maps, 
they didn’t use them… Fixed assets were not inventoried… Respondent #1: 
It was all ‘wonderful’. There was a ‘laisser-passer’ [approach].” 
These insights not only reinforce the view of the low priority given to 
accounting and control issues at some local sites, but they also reveal that local actors 
indeed had the capacity to implement the control mechanisms they preferred (and, in 
particular, not implementing others). Therefore, this discretionary capacity not to 
implement strict controls, associated with the capacity to adopt tailor-made accounting 
criteria and reports, does reveal a significant power of local actors at the level of the 
circuit of system integration. 
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Contrastingly, this capacity (i.e., power) of local actors implied a loss of power 
of central actors, who felt the difficulty to obtain global visibility based on comparable 
and reliable information.30 Global decision making processes involving actors from 
different geographical areas were typically compromised by divergent assumptions 
underlying the figures presented by each actor. Indeed, several respondents mentioned 
the frequent discussions at such meetings about whose figures were correct.  
The SAP FI technological innovation had unified ISs and had already started to 
emerge as an OPP in the circuit of system integration, with a potential to address the 
interests of central actors. However, its actual effectiveness was diminished by another 
feature of the circuit of system integration: the decentralised organisational 
configuration of accounting activities. In addition, the limitations experienced by central 
actors did not derive only from technical and organisational limitations, i.e., from the 
circuit of system integration. Their limitations also derived from factors at the level of 
the circuit of social integration. This is analysed next. 
6.3.1.4 Limitations of central actors due to local rules and focus, in the accounting 
area: the circuit of social integration 
As argued in the previous chapter, prevailing rules and priorities at a local level 
privileged the objectives of local actors (individual or collective), and neglected central 
                                                 
30 Interestingly, several central actors admitted that they only became fully aware of the local processes 
after the SSC was created (e.g., check the previous quotation: “We realised, when [the accounting 
processes of] the companies were moved to the SSC…”; and the limited knowledge about the 
decentralised processes in the Spanish subsidiary (see subsection 5.4.4 and, in particular, the quotation in 
page 353). More generally, this awareness increased as the centralisation and integration process 
advanced and more organisational and technological devices were introduced. Their initial limited 
visibility over local processes implied that, before the SSC, they were not fully aware of, for example, a 
potential lack of control over particular aspects. However, the perception that central actors did have, 
incomplete as it might have been, about their limitations was enough to motivate them to propose the 
creation of the SSC. 
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ones. Subsection 5.3.3 included a number of insightful quotes; given its relevance, one 
of them, from a CC manager, is here reproduced again: 
“The great driver in the implementation of the SSC was the perception that 
we didn’t have capacity to have consistent information for decision-making, 
because each one had a different method. Not that there was bad-will or 
whatever. Simply, each one did as he/she knew and was used to doing, 
giving total and absolute priority to the country’s reporting, and not the 
internal group reporting.” 
Unwritten rules, yet recurrently enacted by local actors of the accounting area in 
their daily practices, considered that the priority was addressing local needs, rather than 
global or central needs. Rule following was a perceived problem. The CC manager 
stressed their difficulty to…  
“…guarantee that [centrally decided] rules are actually carried out. Many 
times, we a posteriori find that that doesn’t happen. The rules are 
established, the norms are established, and the practice then… [shows that 
they are not followed].” 
The rules at stake did not become a part of actors’ internal structures, orienting 
their behaviour, and hence were not recurrently enacted by local actors (see section 2.3). 
These rules concerned mostly the reporting timings and the criteria to classify business 
transactions. While the first type of rules (about reporting timings) concerned rules of 
membership, the second type of rules (about criteria to classify business transaction) 
combine both rules of meaning and membership. The lack of enactment of these rules 
affected, respectively, information timeliness and information reliability and 
comparability. Ultimately, the lack of information quality caused by this lack of rule 
following by local actors affected central actors’ capacity to use that information to gain 
knowledge and intervene. 
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Additionally, the lack of adoption of elementary control mechanisms in some 
sites suggests that accounting and control issues were not considered important - 
characterised as the “laisser-faire” attitude in the quote above. This is consistent with 
the traditional characteristic of IndCo, discussed and illustrated with a broad brush in 
the previous chapter: a company focused on production and sales, and neglecting 
support activities as accounting and finance. The traditional rules privileging sales and 
production above all other concerns were emphasised by an IT interviewee, when 
discussing the role of ISs-imposed controls: 
Respondent: “You tell me: ‘OK, this is very urgent, so let’s plan and 
produce it [straight away]…’ [Researcher: And then we’ll see]. 
Respondent: In the past, that was the philosophy. ‘Hey, I’m not going to 
stay around waiting for the order. Produce it [immediately]’. ‘Hey, I’m 
going to ship…’ [dramatised voice, suggesting the objective of ‘getting 
by/implementing a quick fix, expedite solution, outside defined procedures’]. 
Fundamentally, it’s always the rule: ‘What I want is to please the 
customer’. And why? Because he only sees that and doesn’t care a thing 
about the costs or any management implications, or whatsoever.” 
This interviewee added that central actors had been, for a very long time, using 
IndCo’s ISs to try to limit the possibilities of enacting these historical “rules” and 
“philosophy” (sic). However, similar comments about these historical “rules” and 
“philosophy” were made by other respondents. Overall, this suggests that, although 
recently at a minor level, these rules were indeed deeply embedded as actors’ internal 
structures and were consistently enacted. These rules of membership consisted of 
orientations about appropriate behaviour, in situations where tensions existed between 
two alternatives. The first alternative was enacting the rules associated with the 
“traditional philosophy”, by adopting an immediate, quick-fix, one-off solution to that 
particular, idiosyncratic problem (e.g., a pressure to response to an urgent customer 
request). The second alternative was enacting the rules and objectives as depicted in 
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prescribed procedures, which attempted to orient actors in their daily practices, 
promoting consistent behaviours throughout the organisation and bearing in mind 
management needs, in particular in financial terms and at a higher hierarchical level. 
From the insights gathered, the first alternative of enacting historical and deeply 
embedded rules of (local) membership tended to prevail. 
As a summary, centrally decided formal rules about how local actors should 
carry out their accounting activities and processes were not always followed, i.e., did 
not become accepted and enacted as rules of practice Moreover, accepted and enacted 
rules promoted some lack of control, even at a local level. Therefore, local accounting 
information sent from local to central actors was often not timely, not reliable and not 
comparable, hence affecting the control and decision-making of central actors 
depending on consolidated information. 
Hence, due to limitations in the power of central actors in the circuit of social 
integration, their capacity to know, intervene and produce desired outcomes was 
reduced. In turn, these weaknesses in the circuit of social integration compromised the 
effectiveness of the innovations central actors had introduced in the circuit of system 
integration: the SAP FI and the new CC. In other words, the centrally decided rules had 
failed to become Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs), and the rules which were indeed 
OPPs at a local level did not support a tight control and a global, organisation-wide 
perspective.  
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6.3.2 THE PROCESS OF CREATING AND OPTIMISING THE SSC 
This subsection provides an overview of the four main stages involved in the 
creation and optimisation of the SSC. Such an overview retrieves insights from the 
current section, regarding the motivation of the actors involved, and it advances topics 
analysed later in this section. During the analysis of the design stage, it also provides a 
brief description of a workflow of a typical accounting process, clarifying the 
organisational actors involved and how activities are divided and linked between them. 
6.3.2.1 The main stages of the SSC project 
Four main stages may be identified. The first stage, to assess the feasibility and 
make the business case of creating a SSC, started in December 2000. The project was 
approved in February 2001. The second stage, project design, took only a couple of 
months. The third stage, implementation, spanned between May 2001 and February 
2002, during which the transactional accounting tasks of nearly all countries where 
IndCo was located were migrated to the SSC. Finally, a fourth stage, optimisation, 
started as the operations at the SSC gradually became more stabilised; this stage was 
considered to still be on-going at the time the fieldwork was conducted, and in a process 
perceived as never ending. 
An in-depth description of each stage was carried out in the anonymised work 
mentioned at the start of this section. Therefore, this subsection only includes the most 
relevant aspects to briefly characterise this project and support theoretical discussions. 
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6.3.2.2 The first and second stages: evaluation and approval; key decisions in the 
design  
The first and second stages (evaluation and design, as well as the third stage, 
implementation) were heavily supported by a large consulting firm, which IndCo 
considered to have the largest expertise in the area of Shared Services Centres.31 During 
the first stage of the project (evaluation and approval), the various motivations of the 
actors involved – as described in the first part of this subsection - played a key role. 
Without a total consensus around the project among IndCo’s actors, even at a top 
management level, the support of Mr. A proved to be decisive.  
As regards the second stage of the project, project design, some key decisions 
should be examined. A structural decision was to adopt a low-risk, conservative strategy 
for the SSC implementation. It was defined that, during an initial period, the SSC would 
precisely replicate existing processes and practices at every local site, including the 
same number of staff. No improvements or optimisations would be sought during this 
stage, in order not to increase the risk of what was already considered to be an 
extremely complex project. Optimisation would only be pursued at a later stage (the 
fourth stage), after the transferred processes became better known by SSC members and 
became reasonably stabilised and consolidated. 
This strategy of initially merely replicating extant practices therefore intended to 
allow each one of the newly hired actors of the SSC (see below in this section) to learn 
the ‘rules of practice’ as interpreted and enacted by the particular local actor he/she 
would replace, and later precisely enact those ‘rules of practice’ at a central level. 
                                                 
31 The researcher did not establish any contact with this consultancy firm – which, for ethical issues, is 
kept anonymous. 
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Initially, there would be no attempt to address or eliminate any potential gaps between 
centrally defined formal rules and locally enacted rules, or introduce any new rules 
(apart from those strictly related with location). 
Another key decision concerned the project scope, i.e., the definition of the 
processes to be migrated and the countries involved (the “eligible” processes and 
countries). The processes considered to be a first priority, and therefore included from 
the start, were Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, Closing the books, Cash and 
Banking, Fixed Assets and Consolidation; over time, some of these processes were 
merged and additional processes were added. Only two distant countries were excluded, 
due to important local specificities (as regards one case, its non-SAP ERP, Ross; as 
regards the other country, its complex taxation system), combined with their distance to 
the other company locations and their relatively autonomous operations. 
Another crucial decision concerned the constitution of the project teams. The 
project relied on mixed teams of IndCo’s employees and consultants. There were two 
types of teams. A central team based in Portugal coordinated the project and included 
various competencies, such as information systems, business processes, human 
resources, change management and infra-structures. The second type of teams (mixed 
teams of IndCo’s employees and consultants) implemented the changes in each country 
and each site. Additionally, members of the SSC accompanied each implementation 
team to each site, in order to locally learn the tasks they would soon be taking over. 
During a first stage, the SSC members just observed the local members performing their 
tasks; at a second stage, they started performing the tasks themselves, with the 
supervision of the local members. This learning strategy (observing, learning and 
reproducing existing local practices, and then migrating them, unchanged, to the SSC) 
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was an essential part of the overall low-risk, conservative strategy of implementing the 
SSC, as outlined above. 
One of the key deliverables of this second stage was the design of the processes 
after migration, under the new organisational structure32. A very brief description of a 
typical accounting process, split between the local teams and the SSC, may be useful at 
this point to provide a better feeling of the SSC activities and role within organisation-
wide processes. Figure 6.3 below, copied from the anonymised work mentioned at the 
start of this section, describes the workflow for receiving and posting supplier invoices 
and depicts the clear separation of activities between the local business unit and the SSC 
(and the cost owner, should approval or correction be required). It also reveals the 
central role of the two information systems, SAP FI and IXOS, to allow the execution of 
all the accounting procedures without the physical presence of the document and with a 
minimal intervention from the local accounting team – which merely scans and archives 
the document upon arrival.  
                                                 
32 By adopting the consulting jargon of a “gap analysis” (e.g., Johnson et al., 2005), this deliverable 
corresponds to the “To be” scenario. Other typical, related deliverables are the “As is” deliverable, where 
current processes are described, and the “Gap” deliverable, where the differences between the “As is” and 
the “To be” designs are highlighted. 
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Figure 6.3: Workflow for receiving and posting supplier invoices (Source: Anonymised 
work, p. 79; authorisation obtained) 
As depicted in the figure, when a document (e.g., a supplier invoice) is received 
at a local unit, a member of the local team must scan it into IXOS, a document 
management solution linked with SAP. A member of the SSC then accesses the scanned 
image of that document, and a defined workflow carries the scanned image through the 
various steps of the accounting process (e.g., invoice approval, posting in the 
appropriate account and payment) and through the various actors involved, both at a 
central level and at a local level. At the end, the invoice is ready for payment33. 
                                                 
33 In the early stages of the SSC, some processes did not function in such a streamlined way, for a number 
of reasons. In particular, at the time, a significant number of processes was still based on the legacy 
solution SOIC, rather than SAP. The use of the legacy solution implied a detour from the described 
workflow as regards a number of operations, and it required using work-around techniques (mostly, 
parallel, temporary software developments) to overcome the limitations. However, the initial processes 
workflows already contained the essential traits of the current ones; therefore, analysing a current 
workflow is an acceptable proxy of analysing a workflow without a fully integrated SAP system. 
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6.3.2.3 The third stage: implementation (and implementation difficulties) 
The third stage, implementation, was unanimously considered as having faced 
considerable difficulties. In particular, implementation at the subsidiary in country C – 
the large competitor acquired not long before, in 1998 – may be considered the most 
difficult case for a number of reasons. The most significant and recurrent difficulties are 
now analysed, with a special focus on country C. 
Country C was the second country whose operations were migrated to the SSC - 
only 15 days after the migration of the Portuguese operations. Migrating country C at 
such an early stage derived exclusively from an organisational urgency: after rejecting 
various changes proposed by IndCo’s central actors (including relocation to another part 
of the country), local members quickly started leaving the company. This endangered 
the normal execution of the required daily activities, in particular in the accounting, 
finance and administrative areas. So, migrating country C’s processes to the still 
emerging SSC became extremely urgent. 
Two main sources of difficulty were highlighted: people-related and technical 
difficulties. These difficulties typically existed in the implementation in all countries. 
However, they were particularly serious in the case of country C, particularly due to the 
short time available, the still early stage of the emerging SSC and the lack of knowledge 
of its members. Each source of difficulty (people-related and technical difficulties) are 
analysed separately, although their effects are frequently combined. 
As regards people-related problems, resistance from local actors to the SSC 
project was common in most countries, and country C was by no means an exception. 
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Local managers strongly resisted, since they perceived that the elimination of the local 
teams would reduce their power, as highlighted by two CC and SSC respondents: 
Respondent #1: “[The SSC project] was extremely complicated indeed. (…) 
The project was not ‘bought’ by [local] managers… Respondent #2: They 
were forced. In plain Portuguese. Respondent #1: And they had to support, 
because they had to. Respondent #2: Supported… [not agreeing] They 
[merely] accepted. Respondent #1: Exactly, they were [merely physically] 
present at the meetings. Respondent #2: There was no cooperation. It was 
clearly perceived as a loss of power. Respondent #1: I was precisely going 
to say that.” 
Lower level actors, to be made redundant due to the drastic reduction of local 
teams’ size, offered an extremely high resistance – although they were indispensable to 
allow the SSC members to learn the local work practices. The following quote from a 
SSC member illustrates the kind of resistance encountered: 
“Cooperation was many times close to zero. In [country C], people [from 
the SSC] were simply locked in a room, during a first stage. (…) They were 
simply given a computer. (…) The local person simply wouldn’t cooperate 
or didn’t even let you sit beside him to see how he performed his work.”  
This resistance typically declined as the days passed, informal relations started 
being established and local actors started accepting that there was little point in not 
cooperating and the change was inevitable. But the initial resistance was a serious 
obstacle. The SSC members had a short time available for learning existing practices 
and underlying ‘rules of practice’.  
To make things worse, many people sent in this first implementation were very 
junior at IndCo and had a scarce knowledge of local accounting rules and a scarce 
knowledge of SAP – all additional liabilities in the learning process (indeed, in later 
implementations, SSC members were given more SAP training before being sent out to 
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the countries). Lack of knowledge about country C’s rules, especially about taxation, 
was acknowledged to still persist at the time some SSC members were interviewed, in 
2007.  
“As regards taxation, as we don’t have sufficient know-how, not even a little 
bit, we have to do everything they (local people) want, full stop.”  
The (still existing) knowledge asymmetry in favour of the (remaining) local 
actors was acknowledged to have an impact in their power relationships with central 
actors, granting local actors the capacity to lead central actors to accede to their requests 
to implement local specificities. That this still occurred several years after processing 
country C’s operations, allows imagining the scale of knowledge (and, in that regard, 
power) asymmetry at the time of the roll-out. 
Technical difficulties involved two information systems (the SAP system and the 
document management solution IXOS) and the underlying technical infrastructure. The 
migration of country C’s operations to the SSC was a unique case. Country C’s 
subsidiary already had a fully integrated SAP system, including SAP operational 
modules - while Portugal only had SAP FI, at the time. However, the SAP FI version of 
country C’s subsidiary was older than IndCo’s and had a completely different structure. 
This difference required that, during an initial period, the SSC members had to use 
country C’s chart of accounts, even without a detailed knowledge about it (in addition to 
the lack of knowledge of local accounting and taxation rules and of SAP, as mentioned 
above). The following quote from a SSC member highlights the precarious way the SSC 
initially operated, due to the difference between the two SAP systems and the lack of 
knowledge of the SSC members. 
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Respondent: “We had an extremely complicated problem at the SSC. No 
one [from the SSC] understood the SAP system [of country C]. They only 
knew that they had to press that key, then press that key, and that thing 
(SAP) would get things done, and that’s it. But no one understood the 
system well. It’s a good example that having SAP or any other system may 
not mean anything, because it [SAP] can be so different, that no one 
understands anything. Even the IT team had tremendous difficulties in 
understanding that system. [Researcher: So, the SSC managed to work and 
post the transactions in a more or less mechanical away.] Respondent: In 
[country C]? Yes, of course. We got there, we learned ‘he presses that 
button, and that one, and that one’. SAP provides a huge advantage – which 
can be a liability in the future: performing accounting activities, without 
understanding anything at all. We even had Law graduates here. Who didn’t 
know what a credit or a debit was. And they did it. ‘Select option 24, or 
whatever, and it [SAP] will do everything correctly.’” 
In addition, performing accounting tasks in Portugal was further complicated by 
communication difficulties. SAP and IXOS servers containing country C’s information 
were located in Germany, and communication delays threatened to paralyse operations 
at the SSC – even while working seven days a week. 
These (and other) difficulties were eventually overcome, at varied paces. As 
regards technical difficulties, the Global IT team developed interfaces and work-around, 
temporary solutions34. Soon, SAP FI servers still located outside Portugal were 
eliminated. The centralisation of all SAP and IXOS data in a server in Portugal, near the 
SSC, allowed overcoming the severe communication limitations. Finally, the roll-out of 
IndCo’s model of SAP’s financial and logistic modules to the various countries (a 
gradual process which started in 2001) was another important and structural step, by 
providing an integrated system encompassing various functional processes and 
geographical areas.  
                                                 
34 An example of such temporary solutions was the temporary use of Lotus Notes to overcome workflow 
problems derived from the existence on the legacy logistic solution SOIC, described in footnote 33 in this 
chapter. This and other expedite solutions were described as not being ideal, but allowed to quickly 
overcome the problems at hand. 
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As regards people-related difficulties, there were important changes in the SSC 
and at local level. As regards the SSC, knowledge of SSC members gradually developed 
and, collectively, the SSC was increasingly able to provide a better service to the 
business units. At a local level, the people whose activities were migrated to the SSC 
and who were not reassigned to other functions – and who were, understandably, 
against the project – actually left the company. Additionally, there were also exercises 
of force upon certain local members whose resistance was, according to the 
interpretation of interviewed central actors, unjustified. A CC manager thus justified the 
episodic exercise of (formal) power and even force (with sanctions being enacted) upon 
local actors: 
“The idea [of the SSC] can be ‘sold’ if there are people willing to buy it. If 
there is resistance purely just because that implies change, if the people 
[wish to] remain in the status quo, no ‘sale’ is possible, no matter how hard 
you try. It was inevitable, it was necessary to do some… At a certain time, 
there was no ‘sale’; it was implemented, because otherwise… [there would 
be sanctions]. Those not willing to adapt, left, either immediately or later. 
Because it is not possible to keep negotiating compromises for two years. 
Also because, if errors are detected, they are corrected; however, if it seems 
reasonably clear that there are no errors and what does exist is resistance 
to change because it is going to affect a certain [personal] position, there 
can be no compromise. Otherwise, we get to the end of the project, money 
was spent and everything stays the same, the information [quality] still 
doesn’t meet your objectives.” 
The reduction in the resistance of remaining local team members and managers 
had multiple sources. This reduction of resistance of local actors was not only based on 
episodic exercises of power, and even force, namely by excluding those actors from the 
organisation. Reduction of resistance also goes beyond the end of the influence of the 
actors excluded from the network, when they left the organisation. Some interviewees, 
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such as a SSC member, provided an explanation of the change in actors’ dispositions 
based on the passage on time. 
“As time passed, people started accepting this idea [of a SSC].” 
However, an explanation that adaptation to new rules, work practices and, even 
more importantly, acceptance of a new concept like the SSC, occurred “naturally”, 
simply as a consequence of the passage of time, seemed to be limited and unsatisfactory 
for this case. Although the change did take its time to unfold, relying on the passage of 
time as the main explanatory factor emerged as clearly simplistic – in line with 
Quattrone and Hopper (2006)’s more general argument, when they stressed the non-
linearity of time and its effects. The explanation resides in cumulative, reinforcing 
repercussions of the various changes introduced, including other innovations in the 
circuit of system integration, as described in the remainder of this section and, in 
particular, in the next chapter.  
Significantly, this unfolding process of acceptance was neither unidirectional nor 
completed. Tensions and resistance at a local level remained a persistent feature at the 
time the fieldwork was conducted, although certainly at a lower level than during the 
implementation stage (see several quotes from subsection 5.4.1 “Main actors, their 
power and its source - an introduction”). These persisting tensions and resistance are in 
line with the argument of Clegg and Actor-Network theorists, that permanent tensions 
within the actor-network are an inevitable feature of actor-networks. As such, any 
comprehensive explanation must consider both phenomena: of adaptation and of 
resistance. 
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The explanation can, and should, be even broadened more. Resistance to the 
SSC was found to be a particular case of a broader phenomenon at IndCo: the 
traditional misalignment between local and central actors, and consequences of such 
misalignment. Likewise, the reduction of resistance to the SSC was found to be a 
particular case of a general trend towards the promotion and enactment of rules 
favouring central actors. This discussion is developed in the next chapters. 
6.3.2.4 The fourth stage: optimisation 
After the migration of the processes from the local sites to the SSC and their 
stabilisation under the new structure, the fourth stage of the strategy started: 
optimisation. This optimisation stage was not related with solving the acute problems 
(IT and people- related) that emerged during the implementation stage. Rather, the 
optimisation stage consisted of the progressive detection of possible improvements to 
the various processes, in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  
As regards total costs, staff numbers, both at the SSC and at a local level, 
suffered a very significant and progressive reduction, throughout the years (actual 
figures omitted for confidentiality reasons). Additionally, the lower labour costs in 
Portugal also contributed to the reduction of total costs. 
As regards the SSC output, at an initial stage, it was typically criticised by local 
actors. Whether these initial criticisms were the consequence of local actors’ previous 
opposition to the project, the consequence of a possible poor performance of the SSC 
due to the initial difficulties, or to a combination of both, is something which the 
interviews did not allow to clarify. However, a SSC interviewee mentioned a regular 
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internal satisfaction survey to the SSC’s clients (the local actors), indicating that 
satisfaction has gradually increased. Interviews with local actors did not reveal major 
concerns with the SSC’s work. However, interviews did provide relevant insights as 
regards control issues deriving from the existence and the activities of the SSC; these 
are explored in the next chapter. 
In striking contrast with the first three stages, the optimisation stage has no 
defined time boundaries. Even during the years of the field study, interviewees 
considered that there was still room for further improvements, and that optimisation was 
essentially a continuous task. 
6.3.2.5 IndCo’s conservative implementation strategy and structural control: a 
comparison  
It should be noted that the underlying motives for this low-risk SSC 
implementation strategy are different from a very similar strategy depicted by Seal and 
Herbert (2005). The SSC analysed in Seal and Herbert’s study also initially picked up 
“exactly what was going on at the time and just move[d] it”; only later did it start “to 
look at making sure that (…) processes were as standardised (…) and as streamlined as 
they could be” (p. 11). However, the identified reason for postponing the optimisation 
stage was that the new SSC “had to demonstrate that we could do exactly what they 
[local business units] were used to having at the time which gave them the confidence to 
actually let go and say well ‘OK go and do it then’” (p. 12; all quotations from 
interviewees). 
In IndCo’s case, however, the reasons for a very similar strategy were less 
related with the ‘buying-in’ of local actors. The overwhelming insight was that efforts 
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to ‘sell’ the innovation to local actors, to ‘buy them in’ from the start, tended to be 
unsuccessful in most locations outside Portugal, and the key objective of the lower-risk 
strategy was not to gain the locals’ “confidence to actually let go” (see above). The 
approach was rather targeted at securing structural central control of (previously) local 
accounting processes through the introduced innovations. In particular, it was 
ambitioned that the SSC (initially strongly staffed, as explained) could quickly acquire 
the capacity to perform local accounting processes, strongly drawing from the non-
human actor SAP FI. 
Securing such control was essential due to planned reduction of the local 
accounting teams - but, importantly, it was also essential because the level of conflict 
was significant. Comparing again with Seal and Herbert’s case, the “conflict-charge[]” 
of the “changes that were forced through” (2005, p. 31) in that organisation seems to be 
lower than in IndCo. The high level of conflict in IndCo can be understood given the 
configuration of IndCo’s circuits of power and the limitations perceived by central 
actors, as already discussed. A similar picture is found when analysing the expected 
changes in IndCo’s circuits of power arising from the SSC – an analysis carried out 
next. 
6.3.3 CONSEQUENCES OF THE SSC ON INDCO’S ACTOR-NETWORK – AND 
EXPECTED CHANGES IN INDCO’S CIRCUITS OF POWER 
In line with the previous section analysis about the CC, this subsection analyses 
how the creation of a new organisational structure – the SSC – affected IndCo’s actor-
network, and how it could be expected to affect IndCo’s circuits of power. The creation 
of the SSC, as a new organisational structure, represented the appearance, within 
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IndCo’s actor-network, of a new collective actor and a large number of new individual 
actors – a similar event as the creation of the CC. Additionally, the emergence of the 
SSC model also led to the elimination from the actor-network of a large number of local 
actors. 
Important similarities, proximities and connections can be identified between the 
two organisational structures - the CC and the SSC. Furthermore, the links between 
these two (organisational) innovations and the (technological) innovation of SAP FI are 
introduced next, although the discussion is further developed in the next chapter. 
First, the creation of the CC and the SSC occurred with only around two years of 
difference (although the gradual emergence of the CC makes difficult the definition of a 
precise date for the start of its operations). In addition, the design and roll-out of SAP FI 
also occurred during the same years, and this information system was crucial for both 
organisational structures. Without the aim of precisely indicating the date of each event, 
the following figure 6.4 allows the visualisation of the partly concurrent development of 
these three innovations: SAP FI, the CC and the SSC. 
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Figure 6.4: Chronology of the SAP FI project and of the CC and SSC creation. (Source: 
developed by the author) 
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with financial responsibilities and interests; and the information quality motivation also 
reflected limitations of central actors, who considered that their capacity to have 
visibility and intervene across the organisation were limited. The location of the SSC, as 
described in this section, was crucially influenced by the location of CC and IndCo’s 
top management (in particular, Mr. A), both to facilitate decision-making and for the 
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CC to control the processes carried out by the SSC. Finally, as regards the links between 
the SSC and SAP FI, the SSC was considered a necessary complement to improve the 
financial information quality produced by the common financial accounting solution 
being rolled-out throughout the organisation. At the same time, and vice-versa, SAP FI 
was considered essential to implement an organisation-wide structure like the SSC.  
Third, and on a more general tone, the objectives and activities of both structures 
had an organisation-wide scope35. This broad geographical scope strikingly contrasts 
with the geographically specific focus of the business units (see figure 6.2, in page 440, 
representing IndCo’s new corporate model). 
Fourth, both structures were located at the same site of IndCo’s holding and 
where the group chairman and majority shareholder, Mr. A, was based. As argued 
above, this proximity to the group centre and Mr. A had been a crucial factor when 
deciding the location of these structures.  
Fifth, the staffing of the SSC had some similarities with the recruitment and 
selection process of the CC, as analysed in subsection 6.2.3. People for top positions of 
the SSC were typically brought from other central units of IndCo’s group, who had 
already been immersed in a context promoting a central perspective. For the large 
number of positions for clerks initially required, external recruitment and selection 
processes were privileged. As concerns these newly-hired people, and similarly to what 
was argued about the CC, they had not been previously exposed to the local level focus 
                                                 
35 The SSC’s global scope had some geographic and functional exceptions. As indicated in the previous 
subsection, the SSC did not initially encompass the activities of two countries. As regards the processes 
and activities to be migrated to the SSC, determining the eligible ones almost inevitably implies that some 
would eventually be excluded, for one reason or the other. These geographic and functional exceptions to 
a truly global scope do not prevent the consideration of the SSC as having, both as an underlying 
philosophy and as a de facto structure, an organisation-wide perspective. 
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traditionally prevalent in IndCo. Moreover, IndCo’s selection processes (e.g., Ouchi, 
1979), the candidates’ own self-selection mechanisms (e.g., Merchant et al., 2005 and 
Oliveira, 2001) and the pressure of the newly-hired to conduct membership work 
(Munro, 1999) towards Portuguese central actors promoted a closer alignment with a 
centrally-oriented perspective. 
Therefore, not only was IndCo’s actor-network expanded with a new collective 
actor (the SSC), but also with a large number of new individual actors (SSC workers) - 
both created under conditions which promoted an alignment with the perspectives of 
other central actors (Mr. A and the recently created CC). The following figure 6.5 
depicts the factors at work promoting this alignment with a central perspective of the 
individual actors who constitute the new collective actors. 
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Figure 6.5: Factors promoting the alignment of (new) CC and SSC actors with central 
actors. (Source: developed by the author) 
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The objectives and activities of the SSC have some similarities with the ones of 
the CC. Drawing on Hofstede’s (1998) characterisation of organisational subcultures as 
a rough, comparative indicator (as done when analysing the CC, and subject to the same 
important limitations and caveats emphasised at the time), the routine nature of most 
SSC activities may suggest that the SSC may typify the administrative culture. Given 
that the CC was characterised as having activities typical of both the “professional” and 
“administrative” categories, and that Hofstede suggested that the subcultures of both 
categories are not highly distinct, there may be similarities between the prevailing main 
cultural traits of both organisational structures. Additionally, and alike the CC, the SSC 
may also diverge significantly from the local sites, where a “customer orientation” 
subculture tends to prevail. 
As argued about the CC, these new actors (with their objectives, tasks and 
perspectives) could be expected to bring changes to rules of practice in IndCo’s actor-
network, either organisation-wide or merely in parts of IndCo. I.e., these changes can 
(contingently) cause a shift of powers flowing through the circuit of social integration 
across the actor-network – in line with the perspective of ‘power and its cause’ (section 
3.2). 
In addition, shifts in the circuit of system integration could also be expected. The 
combination of SAP FI, the CC and the SSC may be considered as new material 
conditions which may shift the powers flowing through the circuit of system integration. 
Each innovation has the potential to become an Obligatory Passage Point (OPP). 
Additionally, this text has already pointed that a given OPP may reinforce the centrality, 
unavoidability and effectiveness of other OPPs. Brief and preliminary examples may be 
the SSC and the CC reinforcing the centrality of SAP FI, and the SSC reinforcing the 
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effectiveness of the CC activities. Consistently with the option taken in the previous 
section focusing on the CC, a fuller exploration of the empirical insights about the 
power consequences of the introduced innovations are left for the next chapter. 
6.3.4 SUMMARY 
This section analysed the creation of a SSC in Portugal. The motivations 
underlying the decisions about the SSC creation and location were examined, 
particularly in terms of the motivations of the various actors involved. Then, the process 
of the creation and optimisation of the SSC was analysed. The last subsection analysed 
the consequences of the creation of the SSC for IndCo’s actor-network, and suggested 
possible consequences regarding IndCo’s prevalent rules of practice and the power 
flowing in the circuits of system and social integration. 
6.4 SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS 
This chapter analysed key innovations introduced in IndCo between the late 
1990’s and the early years of the new millennium as regards the underlying motivations 
and their implementation processes. Motivations were particularly related with 
limitations experienced by some central actors as regards key aspects of IndCo’s circuits 
of power. Finally, this chapter also suggested some expected changes on IndCo’s 
circuits of power, upon the introduction of these innovations. As a continuation of such 
analysis, the next chapter starts by exploring the empirical insights regarding the actual 
consequences of these innovations on IndCo’s circuits of power – the third element of 
the case study narrative (Czarniawska, 1998). 
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CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyses how the innovations introduced in IndCo’s circuit of 
system integration (SAP FI, the Corporate Centre and the Shared Services Centre) 
reconfigured IndCo’s circuits of power (Clegg, 1989). It analyses actual repercussions 
(rather than expected repercussions, as in the last chapter) of the innovations, as regards 
the emergence and consolidation of Obligatory Passage Points – i.e., structural features 
in the circuit of social integration or in the circuit of system integration.  
The first section focuses on the repercussions of the innovations on the circuit of 
system integration (attempting, for analytical purposes, not to include repercussions on 
the circuit of social integration, as discussed below in this introduction). It starts by 
analysing the repercussions of the SAP FI innovation. Then, since the repercussions of 
the CC and the SSC cannot be isolated from SAP FI, the section analyses the combined 
repercussions of the three innovations. The section concludes with several theoretical 
contributions – still restricted to repercussions on the circuit of system integration. 
The second section focuses on the repercussions of the innovations on the circuit 
of social integration. After an initial subsection discussing the issue of direction of 
causality between circuits of power, the second and third subsections analyse the 
repercussions of SAP FI and the SSC. The fourth subsection analyses the repercussions 
of the organised network of innovations, in their interrelated totality. The fifth 
subsection presents several theoretical contributions. 
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This separation between the repercussions on the circuits of social and system 
integration is done merely for analytical purposes, since the circuits are highly 
interrelated, as already noted in the last section in chapter 5. In fact, the choice of the 
word ‘repercussion’ (rather than alternatives such as ‘impacts’ or ‘effects’) intended 
precisely to convey the idea that the ‘effects’ were typically not direct. Instead, they 
emerged from a process of “reverberation”, a ‘reverberation’ in which the innovations 
had “continuing serious effects” (both definitions from Concise Oxford Dictionary) and 
often had an indirect, diffuse, non-linear, uncertain and contingent nature. Furthermore, 
typically these repercussions did not derive from an initial single event (e.g., the 
introduction of one single innovation). Instead, the repercussions typically derived from 
a set of interrelated, reinforcing events, sometimes separated in time and even only 
gradually emerging, in terms of their scope and/or capacity (e.g., the gradual roll-out of 
SAP FI or the SSC to the various countries, and the increasing capacity of the SSC to 
process and ensure control of the subsidiaries’ accounting tasks). 
Acknowledging other innovations 
As noted in the previous chapter, other innovations became intertwined with 
these three innovations (SAP FI, the CC and the SSC), but were not selected as major 
foci of analysis. Two major types of innovations are at stake: other technological and 
organisational innovations; and rules.  
As regards other technological innovations, a first example is the accounting 
consolidation solution Hyperion. Hyperion had been introduced at group level shortly 
before SAP FI was adopted in IndCo and it played an important role in the process of 
SAP FI mobilisation. Other SAP modules (SAP SD, MM, PP and CO-PC) and the 
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IXOS and IDAR solutions were also relevant technological actors in the ongoing 
organisational change. Therefore, although this chapter focuses on SAP FI, it may also, 
occasionally and when relevant, analyse other technological innovations  
As regards other organisational innovations, the industrial benchmarking 
department (INDBEST) and the Business Processes and Organisation department 
(BPO) also played a role in the wide organisational change towards the reinforcement of 
central actors’ interests, far beyond the boundaries of the accounting area. The role of 
other organisational structures, such as centralised logistic structures, also emerged 
during the study. However, exploring the role of these innovations is left for further 
research (see section 9.4) 
As regards the second type of innovations - rules - new formal rules were 
introduced, in the accounting area and beyond. This chapter only analyses formal rules 
related with, and within the context of, the three above innovations. I.e., this chapter 
does not analyse the introduction of particular formal rules per se as a particular kind of 
innovation. This chapter and the next ones give particular prominence to the concept of 
rules as components of the circuit of social integration, as internal structures orienting 
actors’ behaviours, as accepted rules. I.e., the concern is analysing how rules became 
accepted and enacted, in the context of the three above innovations.  
Therefore, the chapter focuses on the repercussions of the three innovations 
(SAP FI, the CC and the SSC), and does not include an autonomous analysis on the 
introduction of other technological and organisational innovations and formal rules. 
These are only mentioned when relevant for the main analysis. 
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The following Figure 7.1 outlines the overall flow and key message of the 
chapter. It is acknowledged that the figure does not depict every single aspect analysed 
in this chapter, let alone in the entire case study. Moreover, the integrative nature of the 
adopted model, as well as the non-linear, contingent interrelations and ‘repercussions’ 
(instead of linear, unidirectional causality relations) characterising organisations, imply 
that any graphic representation will be incomplete. At the same time, the figure already 
contains a high number of elements and relations and may be considered as excessively 
complex. However, the figure depicts the main features of a rather large chapter, and the 
complexity of the representation merely mirrors the complexity of the represented 
processes (Clegg, 1989) (actually, only a part of that complexity). The figure is not 
explained at this stage; instead, it is intended to provide a useful chapter overview and a 
‘readers’ guide’, to be referred to as the reader progresses through the more detailed 
analyses in this chapter.  
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Figure 7.1: Repercussions of innovations introduced by central actors: an overview (Source: Developed by the author) 
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7.1 THE RECONFIGURED CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
This first section analyses how the circuit of system integration was reconfigured 
after the introduction of the three technological and organisational changes analysed in 
the previous chapter (SAP FI, the CC and the SSC), and also considering other 
technological and organisational innovations. These innovations were introduced in the 
realm of the circuit of system integration, potentially affecting the power that flows 
through this circuit and producing repercussions at an episodic level. 
The following figure 7.2 is an adapted extract from Clegg’s framework (figure 
3.3, depicting the main components and relations discussed in the current section, in 
order to enhance the empirical and theoretical foci and outcomes.  
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Figure 7.2: Technological and organisational innovations and the reconfiguration of the 
circuit of system integration in IndCo (Source: adapted extract from Clegg’s 
framework) 
In line with the adopted research focus, explained above, this section analyses 
how the three innovations became Obligatory Passage Points, structurally reconfiguring 
the circuit of system integration and, in turn, producing some ‘direct’ effects in the 
realm of action, in the episodic circuit. The fieldwork highlighted that, after the 
innovations were introduced, important power shifts eventuated, involving several 
actors’ relational power. However, these shifts were neither immediate, nor linear, nor 
independent, even if the analysis is restricted to the circuit of system integration alone. 
Hence, the expression ‘repercussions’ is typically more adequate than ‘effects’, as 
suggested above. 
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7.1.1 Repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration 
 
The first subsection analyses the repercussions of SAP FI (and of other 
technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration. The second subsection 
then focuses on the repercussions of the CC and the SSC, while also considering the 
intertwined influence of SAP FI and other organisational and technical innovations. The 
third subsection presents key contributions, as regards repercussions within the circuit 
of system integration. 
7.1.1 REPERCUSSIONS OF SAP FI (AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATIONS) IN THE CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The first subsection analyses the repercussions of SAP FI in the circuit of system 
integration; when appropriate, other technological innovations are also considered (see 
below). This subsection first analyses repercussions of SAP FI towards achieving 
central actors’ objectives which may be considered relatively ‘direct’. Then, it 
highlights the perception that SAP FI alone was limited in bringing about changes, 
hence promoting among central actors the perception for the need of additional 
innovations in the circuit of system integration. The subsection finishes by analysing 
how developments of other innovations depended on the presence of SAP FI – and, in 
particular, how the presence or absence of SAP FI influenced the SSC implementation.  
The following Figure 7.3 systematises these points: 
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Figure 7.3: Repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) in the 
circuit of system integration 
7.1.1.1 ‘Direct’ repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) 
promoting central actors’ objectives 
A preliminary characterisation of ‘direct’ repercussions and benefits for central actors 
As analysed in the previous chapter, SAP FI was reconfigured soon after its 
original implementation. After the remobilisation, SAP FI adopted a parallel accounts 
solution, based on one common chart of accounts linked with parallel, country-level 
charts of accounts, based on one single server in Portugal and which could only be 
changed by a very restricted number of central actors, in Portugal.  
SAP FI, and in particular in its remobilised configuration, greatly benefited 
central actors. A CC manager summarised the achieved “productive” benefits for central 
actors, mostly from the central vision based on increased information comparability, 
quality and availability1, as extracted from the following quote: 
[SAP FI] standardised, correctly or incorrectly, but it standardises, it forces 
to do things in a certain way and to use the systems structures (in this case, 
the chart of accounts, cost centres, etc.) in a certain way, so that the 
                                                 
1 Increased information comparability, quality and availability contributed to a greater visibility of central 
actors over the local sites and the company as a whole. The important benefit of central actors’ visibility 
is tightly linked with SAP FI. E.g., SAP FI linked other technological solutions, as explained by a 
consultant: “SAP allowed ‘mapping’ the information between the [consolidated] management component 
[Hyperion for management] and the operational component of SOIC, through traceability. Showing how 
the [information] flows passed through SAP. The roads that traversed SAP.” (quote included in section 
6.1, p. 377). However, the visibility obtained by central actors also depended on other innovations. As 
such, the visibility benefit is further analysed in the next subsection. 
SAP FI 
(and other technological 
innovations) 
Central actors’ objectives 
Other innovations in the circuit of system integration 
(in particular, the SSC development) 
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resulting information has an extraordinarily high degree of comparability. 
(…) Additionally, consolidation is much clearer, much faster and much 
more reliable. Intra-group conciliation, which is a consolidation sub-
activity, is another nightmare when there are countless fluxes (materials, 
services…) across the various companies. IndCo has many juridical 
companies and in the past it had many more. So, to have all this juridical 
complexity reflected in a system is extremely useful. (…) The system allows 
(…) to have a central vision, (…) which addresses local needs related to 
local legal purposes, but that also corresponds to the group needs (…) of 
consolidated information, quality, available, on-line information. (…) 
Basically, this was it.” 
 
“Producing” these benefits for central actors required imposing key and 
structural constraints on local actors. Amongst these constraints, IT-driven and centrally 
defined impositions were used by central actors to define the scope of human agency, in 
the dual perspective of defining boundaries of potential agency and, conversely, 
defining boundaries of excluded agency.  
In particular, the scope of human agency was crucially and directly affected by 
two major areas of SAP mobilisation: 1) IS fundamental architectural alternatives and 
the definition of user profiles; and 2) the automated enactment of rules, embedded 
within SAP. These structural constraints became set, and fixed, in the circuit of system 
integration, with a relatively ‘direct’ effect on organisational processes and practices. 
These constraints are now analysed2. 
IS architectural alternatives and the definition of user profiles 
Two examples of IS architectural shifts can be provided. The first, more obvious 
and fundamental example, occurred when SAP FI was adopted as the single financial 
                                                 
2 This section does not examine repercussions of these structural and imperative constraints at the level of 
actors’ dispositions, based on accepted and enacted rules of meaning and membership. This latter aspect 
of rules, when not automatically imposed by a technological device, is a component of the circuit of 
social integration, and it is analysed in the next section.  
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accounting solution for various countries. At that time, SAP FI became the only 
available tool for local actors to perform transactional financial accounting activities, in 
the countries where it had been implemented. 
The second example is the (later) adoption of the parallel accounts approach of 
SAP FI, based on a single database in a single server, in Portugal. It concerns the way 
the SAP FI package was (re)mobilised and is a less obvious, but more interesting, 
example. After such change, the only accounts available to local accounting actors to 
post the transactions were the centrally created ones. This restriction derived from local 
actors ceasing to have the possibility of changing the structure of local accounts. 
Contrastingly, such possibility was attributed to central actors (and only a few), under 
the general policy of trying to reduce accounts creation to a minimum. The following 
quote from a senior SSC respondent is insightful: 
“Should SAP allow for some kind of flexibility in this area (the connection 
between the common and the local charts of accounts), I guarantee to you 
that there would be a great confusion in the charts of accounts, because 
everyone would be changing [their local accounts]… For example, if I 
changed an account of the local chart of accounts in the middle of the year, 
the history would be lost… It would be a complete confusion. In addition, 
even with that lack of flexibility (which for us is a guarantee in that regard), 
there are only five or six people who can create accounts. No one at country 
level can create accounts, for example. (…) To ensure consistency [between 
the various charts of accounts], the system [SAP FI] is not enough, we 
really had to set restrictions as regards [user] profiles.” 
 
This quote highlighted the intersection of IT structural issues (such as the type of 
adopted solution) and IT parameterisation issues (which include the definition of user 
profiles). In the previously adopted SAP FI solution (with different databases in each 
country), it was not feasible to restrict local accounts creation to central actors (see 
subsection 6.1.4). Therefore, the possibility of creating accounts was attributed to local 
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actors, granting them a greater scope of human agency. Under the new parallel accounts 
solution, it was still technologically feasible to maintain the policy of attributing that 
possibility to local actors. However, that possibility was undesired by central actors. 
Therefore, during the remobilisation of SAP FI, central actors resorted to the definition 
of user profiles to ensure consistency between the various charts of accounts. The 
definition of user profiles centrally defined the few (central) actors who could create 
accounts - and, in particular, the near totality of actors (including all local actors) who 
could not create accounts. 
In addition, the definition of user profiles was also applied, e.g., to define who 
could perform accounting postings in SAP FI. When the responsibility of processing 
most financial accounting transactions by posting them in SAP FI was attributed to the 
SSC actors, the actors who remained in the local accounting teams ceased to have such 
responsibility. The local actors’ profile was then changed and such possibility was 
excluded from their profiles, which were restricted to profiles of analysis. 
The definition of user profiles pervades the entire SAP system. It is a key aspect 
of how SAP is mobilised through its parameterisation. As stated in SAP training 
material, “[w]hen assigned a role, users are assigned not only the menu, but also the 
authorizations they require to access the information” (and therefore change the 
information), “ensuring that the business data is always secure. Authorization profiles 
are generated according to the activities contained in the role, thus restricting the 
authorizations of each user in the SAP system to only those activities.” (SAP 2005a, p. 
53) 
485 
7.1 The reconfigured circuit of system integration 
7.1.1 Repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration 
 
The definition of user profiles were a crucial manifestation of human agency by 
central actors (through the SAP design and implementation team), by crucially defining 
boundaries of agency of local actors. As the above discussion made clear, this definition 
has both a positive perspective (by defining what each actor can do in the system) and a 
negative perspective (by defining what each actor cannot do in the system). It defines 
his/her interaction with the information system and his/her relations with the entire 
actor-network, when mediated by the information system. 
Automated enactment of rules by SAP 
SAP allows the automatic application of rules, according to the way SAP is 
mobilised. Such mobilisation of SAP and the posterior automatic enactment of rules by 
the SAP actor make these rules virtually unchallengeable by users in their daily 
operations, whenever certain events (those defined as triggering rules enactment by 
SAP) do occur. 
There are numerous types of possible automations in SAP, but some may have 
little or no relevance for this analysis. As an example, provided by an IT respondent, 
before SAP FI implementation, accountants of some units posted intra-group 
acquisitions of an entire month in one single transaction, adding up the values of all 
acquisitions, in order to save time. After SAP FI was implemented, new SAP rules were 
developed to allow the automatic posting of intra-group invoices. Although such 
development allowed an improved control of invoice posting, the main benefits were 
characterised as economic, given the time savings and hence higher efficiency (even 
when compared to the previous expedite solutions). Also not relevant for this research, 
and for similar reasons, is the type of rules used as a basis to define product costing 
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parameters for large numbers of products, in an automated way (as described in the 
quote in p. 493). Hence, although it is clear that central actors were benefited, these 
types of rules and automation are not the most relevant for this analysis. 
From the various types of rules and automations in SAP, the most relevant ones 
for the present analysis are those which impinge on human agency and on control by 
central actors. When rules promoting central actors’ objectives become embedded in 
technology and are automatically enacted, the achievement of those objectives does not 
depend on actions from human actors, but only from the non-human actor SAP - which 
in IndCo’s case had been configured (mobilised) by central actors.  
An IT respondent described how SAP operational modules were parameterised 
with rules to ensure the following of certain sequences of actions. 
“We started imposing rules in many (…) areas. We cannot ship, if we don’t 
have an order. In most IS, even in SAP, it’s possible to ship without having 
an order; it’s just a matter of parameterisation. I can [theoretically] create 
an invoice without a shipping order; then, it’s just a matter of defining a 
rule such as ‘that invoice will reduce stock’. Even in SAP, all that is 
possible, it’s just a matter of setting the parameters to make it like that.  
But we, from the start – so, it is already a culture-, say ‘no order, no 
production’. ‘No order, you cannot ship’. ‘No shipping order, you cannot 
invoice’. We have all those blockages… (…) We brought [into SAP] the 
rules we had in [the legacy logistic solution] SOIC, so that there is, in fact, 
discipline. I cannot produce something which doesn’t have a defined 
product code. You cannot. If you do produce, it is completely beyond 
procedures and you cannot perform any administrative task on that.  
So, likewise, we applied the same method to the costing [module]; 
otherwise, there will be leaks all over the place. (…) [The definition of] 
costing is as important as the product itself. If there is no costing rule, then 
it won’t be produced. The system doesn’t even accept the order. (…) All this 
is based on rules.” 
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Two central actors, in the context of the CC and SSC’s on-going efforts to 
standardise processes, both in the financial and non-financial areas, also commented 
about the implementation and operation of SAP Product Costing (SAP CO-PC) module 
(but which could also be applicable to SAP FI and SAP in general): 
Respondent #1: “SAP will help us, because it is going to parameterise 
things which, from then onwards, it will not be possible to change. (…) [It 
will ensure that] rules about the transfer of raw materials or products, 
between group companies or plants, are fully complied. (…) When things 
are automated, no one has to manually apply a rule. The rule is established, 
it is in the system, there is no need of interfaces, the information flows 
naturally. 
Respondent #2: We try to have the systems are parameterised and 
automated as much as possible, so that there is not much deviation from 
what we (…) think that should be done. And that is an essential factor 
towards which we must always work, because as we implement SAP (the 
logistic modules are still being rolled-out to various countries), we realise 
that in each country, and even within each country, there are different 
requests from one plant to another (…). Even as regards accounting, we 
have the experience that, e.g., in Spain, the way to post transactions in one 
plant was not the same as in another. And that happens, not only in 
financial accounting, but also as regards stocks, products transfers, etc.. 
Therefore, we try to automate whatever we can, not only to try to ensure 
consistency, but also, logically, to avoid having people doing more manual 
activities.” 
 
Obviously, respondent #1’s comment that automation eliminates the need to 
manually enact a rule, also means that no human actor has the possibility to enact a 
certain rule. Moreover, and importantly, no human actor has the possibility not to enact 
a certain rule, or enact it according to an interpretation diverging from the interpretation 
intended by the actors mobilising SAP. This has theoretical consequences, since, in such 
a context of full automation, such as the automatic application of given transfer prices, 
SAP FI becomes a device (actually, a non-human actor) disciplining the process, rather 
than a device disciplining human actors. In fact, the issue of actors’ discipline only 
emerges when the possibility of non-compliance exists – a possibility which, prima 
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facie, arguably does not exist in the parts of the processes which are fully automated 
and in which users do not intervene. In this case, by the disappearance of human agency 
at the time of the usage of the system during ordinary business operation, the possibility 
of non-compliance is eliminated. This is another extreme example of fixity in the circuit 
of system integration. 
The lack of the possibility of non-compliance through the elimination of human 
agency at the time of the usage of the system can be considered to be a case of extreme 
force, rather than power, as described by Bachrach and Baratz (1963) (see footnote 14 
in subsection 3.2.3). These authors illustrated their concept of force with, e.g., the 
killing of a person to obtain a wallet. In this case, SAP’s automation eliminated the 
human actor (the user) from a particular part of the process, i.e., it eliminated the human 
actor from the network of intervening actors. A potentially discretionary intervention of 
the human actor (the user) was replaced by automatic rule enactment by the non-human 
actor (SAP). 
Other constrains on human agency during the daily usage of the system, imposed 
by definitions of automatic controls in IT-supported process, are more nuanced. For 
example, should certain pre-defined conditions occur, SAP’s automatic enactment of 
embedded rules may automatically remove the possibility of human agency to certain 
actors, and attribute it to other actors. The following example concerns the enactment of 
a rule about the control of the outstanding debt of each client, based on various SAP 
modules (the control rule is defined in SAP SD sales and distribution module and draws 
information from SAP FI). A senior manager contrasted the greater, ex-ante control of 
credit limits through automatic, systems-triggered blockages of workflows, with the 
previous ad hoc and ex-post controls: 
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Respondent: “If the credit limit of that client (…) [has been taken], the 
order is halted right when it is entered [in SAP]. There are some control 
mechanisms which can be established in an automatic way. The commercial 
area is always one of those which worry us the most. (…) We define a 
certain credit limit to the clients and it should not be exceeded. How can we 
do it? In the old days, before we had the system, it was ad hoc. So, only the 
internal audit could, every now and then, say ‘Hey!…’. 
Researcher: A posteriori. 
Respondent: A posteriori. After the risk had been taken. (…) While now… 
of course that is still possible [to exceed the limit]… 
Researcher: But someone has to authorise it. 
Respondent: Someone has to take that responsibility. It’s not the person 
entering the order who, unknowingly, can create conditions for customer 
risk to be taken. 
Researcher: Without knowing, or opting not to follow what had been 
defined 
Respondent: Yes [laughter]. (…) We don’t stop the operations. [Now], 
there is a person who took that responsibility, and not… [sigh, in an 
excusing way] ‘It was the system [that allowed it]!’” [laughter] 
 
Rules may therefore become embedded in IT-supported processes. This is tightly 
related with the conceptualisation of routines technological embeddedness, as proposed 
by critical realism theorists such as Volkoff et al. (2007), introduced in section 2.2. This 
perspective is now recalled and further discussed. 
Embedding rules in technology: the material dimension of rules 
Technological embeddedness3 was focused on Volkoff et al.’s (2007) study on 
intra-organisational change, drawing from Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) dimensions 
                                                 
3 The term ‘embeddedness’ has several meanings. Within institutional theory perspective, 
‘embeddedness’ may refer to how individuals may be deeply influenced by their institutional 
environment, in which they are ‘embedded’ (see section 2.4 for a brief mention). Granovetter (1985 and 
1992) adopted the term to refer to individuals’ relations and positioning within social networks and how 
their ‘embeddedness’ affects their behaviour. This chapter uses ‘embeddedness’ in two alternative senses. 
The term is now used to convey the ‘embedding’ of rules in technology. Later in this section (p. 523), 
‘embeddedness’ is used in the ANT perspective of how an actor is ‘embedded’ in a wider actor-network 
and wider processes of control (approaching Granovetter’s sense, although in an ANT framework). 
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of ostensive and performative routines and adding the material dimension (see section 
2.2). In particular, they focused on how the organisational elements of routines, roles 
and data may be structurally embedded in IT devices and hence achieve a material 
dimension. Spillane (2005) argued that Feldman and Pentland’s (2003) ostensive and 
performative dimensions can be applied beyond routines, and so can the material 
dimension (e.g., Volkoff et al. applied them to routines, roles and data). This work now 
applies those dimensions, and in particular the material dimension, to rules. 
As already argued, Volkoff et al.’s discussion on routines is actually about 
organisational rules – even though they do not use the word ‘rule’. They noted (as 
already quoted) that “[o]rganizational routines are embedded in the ES [Enterprise 
System] in the form of system-executed transactions - sets of explicitly defined steps 
that require specific data inputs to automatically generate specific outcomes” (p. 839). 
This quote clarifies that they are referring to rules intended to define transactions and 
their sequence – i.e., transactional rules.  
In addition to routines, Volkoff et al. also analysed roles. Roles may be 
considered as particular types of rules: the definition of what each actor is expected to 
do (and not to do) may be considered as a particular type of rule, concerning actors’ 
expected behaviour and contribution – behavioural rules. Therefore, the ensuing 
analysis encapsulates Volkoff et al.’s concepts of ‘routines’ (as transactional rules) and 
roles (as behavioural rules) in a wide conception of rules4. The separate concepts of 
transactional rules or behavioural rules are used when appropriate. 
                                                 
4 Data, the third organisational element identified by Volkoff et al., is not explored here, since data are 
not closely related with rules. Nevertheless, their insights about the embeddedness of data in IS are also 
substantially endorsed by this case study. 
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Volkoff et al.’s concept of technological embeddedness (e.g., in ERPs) is 
particularly insightful to conceptualise the above case discussion. Following their 
discussion, coding a (transactional) rule in the ERP changes the way that rule can be 
enacted, and defining the roles associated with a particular user profile changes what the 
actors with such profile can do, their scope of human agency.  
In the above case discussion, embedding rules (including the definition of user 
profiles) in SAP represented the “materialisation” of organisational rules in IndCo. 
Since in daily interactions SAP automatically applied the (transactional) rules and 
enforced the restrictions implicit to user profiles, “there are no choices to be made” by 
human actors (Volkoff et al., p. 840). These effects, which represent the enactment of 
rules by the non-human actor SAP, are considered as “‘direct’ repercussions” or, 
adopting Volkoff et al.’s terminology, “first-order effects”.5 
Technological embeddedness: a structural extension (and restriction) of human agency 
in time and space 
Even though the above discussion highlighted restrictions or elimination of 
human agency, it should be noted that human agency is still very much present in those 
constraints. In some cases, human agency may have been removed (or, in less extreme 
cases, restricted) from the ‘live’ stage, in which SAP automatically bars access to 
accounts creation or applies rules and performs operations. However, human agency is 
still present during SAP’s implementation stage. In fact, the definition of user profiles 
                                                 
5 As mentioned above, this section only examines rules (including those associated with user profiles) 
embedded in, and automatically enacted by, the non-human actor SAP; it does not examine repercussions 
at the level of actors’ dispositions, based on accepted rules of meaning and membership. In Volkoff et 
al.’s framework, repercussions on organisational elements such as control and mindset are “second-order 
effects”; in Clegg’s framework, they are a component of the circuit of social integration, and they are 
analysed in the next section. 
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and the actual extent and scope of automation of the implemented system largely 
derives from the decisions and actions of human actors who mobilised the SAP package 
at its implementation stage.  
This is in line with Volkoff et al.’s proposed three cycles of social change, based 
on Critical Realism (Archer, 1995). Decisions and definitions during the design and 
implementation stage (human agency by central actors) created a structural 
conditioning (the first cycle) to how local actors were able to use the system, during 
current, post go-live social interactions (the second cycle). The third cycle, of structural 
elaboration / reproduction, occurred when central actors, at certain instances, 
remobilised the system in order to change or reinforce previously defined features (e.g., 
shifting to a parallel accounting solution or defining user profiles), and whenever they 
kept those features unchanged, hence prolonging their effects on social interactions. 
Therefore, the embeddedness of rules in the system is not purely technological, 
and has a time dimension. This technological embeddedness reflects prior human 
agency by central actors, at the previous design stage of SAP. Human agency of central 
actors was extended in time (and space) through the way they mobilised, remobilised 
and preserved the system structural definitions, hence shaping the technological 
embeddedness that would later constrain local actors’ agency in their interactions with 
the system and other actors. 
Still based on Archer (1998b), Vokoff et al. argued that “[w]hile social 
interaction is continuous, at any moment the emergent structure depends on past 
activities, not on the actions of current agents. Agents in turn are shaped and reshaped 
as they engage with the structures they confront, but did not create” (p. 835). However, 
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this argument is now nuanced by two additional insights: 1) as regards the identification 
of actors shaping those structures; and 2) as regards the time dimension of these cycles 
of social change. 
The first insight, about the identification of actors shaping the structures, is 
introduced by the following quotation of an IT manager: 
“The project [of implementing the costing module] was fundamentally to 
define the BOMs, the Bills of Materials6. Of dozens of thousands of 
products; in each plant, many thousands. Define the rules of the BOMs - 
which, when we try to know precisely, no one knows. The plant controller 
knows a few things, but then, e.g., as regards the efficiency of [raw material 
X], the person who knows is the machine operator; and as regards another 
raw material, another person [knows it]. (…) In addition, there are special, 
customised products, (…) and we are not going to have a separate sheet for 
each order; (…) there is a huge number of rules, but it’s not easy to define 
those BOMs.  
There is not one single person who knows everything. There may be a 
person centralising this, ensuring that the BOMs are correct (…) and 
defining the BOMs rules of valuation. The plant controller should be the 
pivot to define all those BOMs – even if he doesn’t know everything (…). He 
should be; we want them to be. (…) Those are our difficulties. Who feeds 
and updates that information? The production planner doesn’t care at all 
about this, (…) about costs. (…) His task is to plan. The machine operator 
doesn’t care about this, either. So, theoretically, it should be the plant 
controller. (…) 
We have a rather agile system, but we need to define rules. And then we 
enter another problematic. On one side, it is far more sophisticated, it’s 
based on rules [so, it avoids the work of manually defining a BOM for each 
new or customised product]. [But] defining such BOMs is not accessible to 
anyone, they are already mathematical rules.”7 
                                                 
6 “A bill of material (BOM) is a list of the components used in an assembly or product” (SAP 2006, p. 
151). “When the complete master data (BOMs and routings) is available in the system, you can create a 
Material Cost Estimate with Quantity Structure, which automatically calculate the cost of goods 
manufactured and cost of goods sold from data existing in logistics applications” (SAP 2005c, p. 5). In 
IndCo, after the implementation of the Product Costing module, the BOMs of all products had to be 
revised, not only to include cost information, but also to include materials which were previously missing 
because they were not relevant for production planning. 
7 As mentioned above, this type of rules, and the type of automation they support (automated costing of 
products), is different from those rules and automations which are of most interest for this research, since 
it does not have theoretically significant repercussions in terms of human agency. Given the huge number 
of BOMs to be defined, the usage of this type of rules is largely an inevitability, to ensure a reasonably 
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The first insight nuances the overriding image conveyed so far, that described 
the central actors as those with the possibility to structurally shape the material aspect 
by configuring the system - hence attributing them exclusive agency at the 
configuration stage. On the contrary, the above quote shows that such parameterisation 
also depends on the input (knowledge and action) from local actors. In addition, local 
actors (in particular, plant controllers) may also be those who check whether the extant 
parameterisation still remains valid, and, if not, trigger the reconfiguration process of 
the system.  
It should be acknowledged that such agency of local actors is constrained, since 
they do not have complete freedom to change BOMs. In fact, this agency of local actors 
is framed into a wider aspect of the very existence of the BOMs and the SAP product 
costing module - which was introduced by central actors and was expected to bring 
significant benefits to them. Significantly, one of those benefits was a greater central 
visibility and control of cost accounting practices at a plant level, attempting to 
overcome possible distortions at this level.  
However, it can be concluded that the human agency which structurally 
conditions organisational life is not, in fact, an exclusive of central actors. Moreover, it 
introduces the first nuance to Volkoff et al.’s characterisation that “at any moment the 
emergent structure depends on past activities, not on the actions of current agents. 
Agents in turn are shaped and reshaped as they engage with the structures they confront, 
but did not create” (p. 835). Human agency structurally conditioning organisational life 
                                                                                                                                               
accurate costing and to avoid the inordinate costs of manual, product-by-product costing (which is, 
anyway, virtually impracticable, given the huge number of products and the daily creation of new 
products). It should be noted, however, that human agency is still present, e.g., at the stage of defining 
those rules and, importantly, in the more fundamental decision to adopt a reasonably accurate product 
costing system. 
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may be dispersed across various actors; therefore, some actors may be both constrained 
actors and change agents as regards a given structure. 
The second insight concerns the temporal dimension of Volkoff et al.’s 
argument (a crucial aspect in Volkoff et al.’s critical realist framework), and nuances 
the clear and absolute separation of the three cycles of social change described above. 
The same actor [e.g., the plant controller] who, during his continuous social 
interactions, is constrained by the structures to which he himself contributed, can also 
monitor in a continuous way the adequacy of such structures and, if adequate, can 
trigger the process of changing the parameters.  
The empirical insights do not challenge the fundamental notion that “[w]hile 
social interaction is continuous, at any moment the emergent structure depends on past 
activities” (Volkoff et al., p. 835). It is also true that Volkoff et al. did not claim the 
infrequency (let alone rarity) of the cycle of structural elaboration/reproduction, “the 
modification of previous structural properties and the introduction of new ones or the 
reinforcing of existing structures” (p. 835). Indeed, they noted that temporal cycles may 
differ across different elements: for example, the temporal cycles of roles (behavioural 
rules) may be shorter, since they are embedded in technology merely through the 
parameterisation of authorisations. In the empirical examples above, what was at stake 
was the parameterisation of SAP, and in particularly at a low level. 
However, the empirical insights suggest that this cycle of structural 
elaboration/reproduction may be much less episodic and intermittent than it might be 
anticipated, as regards certain actors (in situations similar to the plant controllers in 
IndCo) and as regards certain technological aspects (not major changes in structures, 
496 
7.1 The reconfigured circuit of system integration 
7.1.1 Repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration 
 
but typically minor adjustments)8. As regards such actors, the first cycle, structural 
conditioning, may be considered almost continuous - even approaching the structuralist 
conception of technology being “interpretive flexible” (Orlikowski 1992, p. 405), 
although not to the extent of being only “enacted and defined at the moment of use” 
(Volkoff et al., p. 834). And even the third cycle, structural elaboration / reproduction, 
may be best conceived (again, as regards certain actors) as a potentially frequent event. 
Therefore, the last sentence analysing the first insight (that “some actors may be 
both constrained actors and change agents as regards a given structure”, in page 495 
above) can be complemented by the inclusion of a time dimension: some actors may be 
both change agents (in the present or in the future) and constrained actors (in the past or 
in the present) as regards a given structure. 
The remaining chapter discusses additional ways in which human agency is 
influenced by SAP and other technological and organisational innovations, in more 
direct or indirect ways, and directly upon the episodic circuit or through the circuit of 
social integration. For now, it can be concluded that SAP increasingly became an 
Obligatory Passage Point, within the circuit of system integration, by becoming the sole 
solution for local actors to perform financial activities and by automatically enacting 
embedded rules, directly affecting the scope of agency of human actors. 
                                                 
8 Even within a particular technology, such as an ERP from the SAP vendor, there is a need to be specific 
about which aspects of that technology are at stake. This extends Volkoff et al.’s call to avoid treating 
“technology (…) as a unitary object, ignoring each technology’s distinctive characteristics” (p. 832), 
bringing this concern to an intra-technological level. Not all structures of a given technology are alike. 
Different structural features of a given technology (e.g., SAP) have hugely different degrees of flexibility 
(Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005), as empirical insights (beyond the scope of this thesis) also documented. 
In addition, higher level configurations may dictate that some actors may change some lower level 
configurations, but not others. 
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7.1.1.2 SAP FI achievements and limitations, and other innovations in the circuit 
of system integration 
The implementation of SAP FI did not, by itself, imply fundamental additional 
changes in organisational processes or structures (such as, for example, a centralisation 
in an SSC). In fact, as already described, the SAP FI project had a narrow, technical 
scope (implementing the SAP FI package), and excluded broad organisational changes. 
The absence of a technological imperative of organisational changes, potentially derived 
from SAP FI as a non-human actor, was made clear by an IT respondent9: 
“We could [implement SAP FI and] keep [the organisational processes and 
structures] unchanged: the invoices [could] continue to go [physically to 
the local sites], continue to [physically] go to the management of each 
countries [for approval], etc., etc.. And, I say it again, that’s what we 
[initially] did.” 
 
However, although there was no technological imperative emerging from SAP 
FI, there were two important links within the circuit of system integration.  
First, SAP FI alone, as a technological device, even after being remobilised, was 
still perceived to be insufficient to provide timely and fully comparable information 
across the companies, as argued in the previous chapter (and further below) when 
analysing the reasons for the creation of the SSC. This insufficiency of SAP also 
derived from the circuit of social integration. SAP FI had become an Obligatory 
Passage Point for actors involved with financial accounting, but, from the perspective of 
key central actors, it was not totally effective, or “productive”, in the two senses of 
“productive” discussed in section 3.3. In the mainstream sense, SAP FI did not produce 
                                                 
9 See a related quote on subsection 6.1.6, in page 416, in which a consultant argued how SAP, as a 
‘modern’ technical device, may be used as a justification for particular actors to promote organisational 
changes. 
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the information with the ideal standards supporting the desired central vision. And, in 
the Foucauldian sense (reflected in the circuit of social integration analysed in the next 
section), SAP FI did not produce sufficient changes in local actors’ rules and therefore 
did not ‘produce’ actors with dispositions aligned with the objectives and needs of some 
central actors. SAP FI did not subject the local actors to all the requirements of central 
actors, and therefore did not ‘produce’ the subjects that those central actors desired. 
This perception by key central actors was an important driver to the creation of an SSC, 
a new collective actor and an organisational innovation in the circuit of system 
integration. As a senior manager summarised, 
“The SSC was an additional step, because we concluded that SAP FI was 
not enough, we had to go further than that.” 
 
Therefore, purposeful decisions of human actors based on perceptions of 
limitations of SAP FI as a technological tool, rather than technological imperatives 
derived from SAP FI itself, were the basis for the introduction of an additional 
innovation in the circuit of system integration: the SSC. 
The second link of SAP FI within the circuit of system integration was that, in 
spite of the limitations described above, SAP FI was a crucial support to the CC and the 
SSC, in two areas. First, the clearest and most straightforward area concerned the 
provision of financial information which those two actors (as collective actors) and 
various key central actors needed for their day-to-day functioning. Second, SAP FI was 
important in a less obvious way, which raises relevant theoretical issues: SAP FI was 
important regarding the creation, implementation and development of those collective 
actors, in particular the SSC. This SAP FI crucial role is analysed next. 
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7.1.1.3 Dependencies of development: the presence (or absence) of SAP FI 
influencing the SSC and CC implementation 
The fieldwork highlighted how the implementation of both the SSC and the CC 
significantly depended on SAP FI. The analysis of the CC relocation, in the previous 
chapter, already revealed that CC development was also dependent on SAP FI, and this 
chapter adds reinforcing insights10. However, the fieldwork did not deepen such line of 
research, since the SSC emerged as a more theoretically interesting domain of analysis. 
Therefore, the analysis below focuses on the SSC, rather than the CC. 
A CC manager thus described the importance of SAP FI to the SSC: 
“Obviously, the SSC was only possible given the financial project in the 
accounting area, which is homogeneous, it’s all inside the same machine 
[server], it’s all centrally accessible.” 
 
It is significant to further explore the importance of SAP FI as regards the SSC’s 
implementation stage (more than the SSC’s current operations stage, an importance 
related with the production of information, which is a more obvious aspect and does not 
require further analysis). The SSC implementation was highly dependent on the 
underlying and supporting information system. It is significant, for example, that the 
country where greenfield operations started in mid-1990’s was the only one not 
included within the SSC scope, until the time of the fieldwork: not only that country 
was geographically isolated from other units and far from the SSC location (Portugal), 
but, fundamentally, it was the only country which had not adopted SAP.  
                                                 
10 CC dependency on SAP FI is also suggested by an a contrario reasoning of a quote on page 527, about 
the great difficulties encountered by the emerging CC before SAP FI was implemented. This quote is here 
summarised: “[the recently created] corporate centre (…) finds things [solutions] scattered all over the 
place. It has no tools, so it is urgent to have tools.”. This suggests that should a common financial 
accounting system (SAP FI, or a similar system) continue not to exist, the CC contribution and 
development would be reduced. 
500 
7.1 The reconfigured circuit of system integration 
7.1.1 Repercussions of SAP FI (and other technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration 
 
The dependency of the SSC on SAP FI was not only technical, but it was also 
related with organisational and control issues. An IT respondent reflected on IndCo’s 
positive and negative experiences in the migration of accounting activities of the various 
countries to the SSC. He clearly related those experiences with the previous existence 
(or absence) of SAP FI, as a common information system. The particular case of 
country C migration to the SSC has already been analysed in subsection 6.3.2 (see the 
third stage of the process). This respondent thus commented migration processes, both 
in general and regarding this country: 
“We started feeling that it was impossible to set up an SSC and consolidate 
and actually control the operations, without having a common information 
system. (…) From the information systems point of view, we already had 
that strategy, regardless of the SSC. (…)  
[But] the SSC started by [country C], precisely the country which was not 
integrated yet [in SAP FI]. And it was a disaster! (…) [In country C,] we 
had to make a rushed integration. Because the SSC had timings. It was the 
first company to be migrated. Why? (…) Because [local] people started 
feeling that there was the SSC project and started quitting. (…) The SSC 
had to start by [country C] because it had no more people there [in the 
accounting area]; [almost only] the managers remained. (…) 
Those [organisational] integrations are extremely complicated. Either we 
have instruments to support things… [or it’s very difficult]. In my view, [the 
migration to the SSC in country C] had to be by ‘making blood’. Had to be 
by ‘making blood’.”  
 
In country C, local people massively left the organisation, in about a month. This 
organisational urgency pushed the organisational change (the migration of the 
accounting activities) to precede the technological change (the implementation of the 
common information system). This lack of a technological infrastructure was a 
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weakness in the circuit of system integration, which had to be compensated by massive, 
episodic efforts11.  
In another country, the local team also quickly left the organisation, requiring an 
earlier than planned migration to the SSC. However, since SAP FI had already been 
implemented (this country was among the first three adopting SAP FI), the migration 
process was less problematic. The same respondent thus commented, at a more general 
level:  
“In the other countries, it was easier. Why? Because they already had the 
same system. Should [local] people leave, we already have the same 
accounting system, (…) there are [other] resources [at the centre] which 
remain. We still manage the processes, because there are people [at the 
centre, at least from an IT point of view] who know something, the 
information system is the same, etc., etc.. (…)12  
If those problems [of local people leaving] had occurred [in all the 
countries] and each country had its own accounting system, (…) it would 
have been a disaster. I think we would have completely lost control.” 
 
The particular, reiterated expression of this interviewee (“had to be by making 
blood, had to be by making blood”) invokes Foucault’s (1975/1977) description of the 
disciplinary mechanisms used in Europe until the eighteenth century, relying on 
excessive usage of violent means to punish in name of the sovereign power (see the 
literally bloody episodes described at the start of Foucault, 1975/1977). However, the 
circumstances and the objectives (and means!) in IndCo were totally different. In the 
                                                 
11 Additional factors either aggravated or lessened the effects of this technical weakness. Various 
interviewees indicated that the lack of accounting and SAP knowledge of the actors who implemented 
this first migration aggravated the problems created by the lack of a common solution (see subsection 
6.3.2, as regards the third stage of the migration process). However, the accumulated experience of the 
CC helped to compensate, as argued below, in providing an additional supporting structure. Overall, the 
fieldwork insights suggest that the existence of additional factors does not challenge the relevance of the 
described technical weakness (the lack of a common IS). 
12 Another IT interviewee corroborated that “[i]n the back-office, system know-how [already] existed. 
Then, you only needed to fine-tune some particularities of each country, but you always had a support”. 
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eighteenth-century Europe, the violent punishment was also a ritual to re-establish 
power and hence a basic condition of the system to keep the sovereign power (Legrand, 
2005). Quite in contrast, in IndCo, the metaphor of a “bloody” migration represented 
not only the high resistance encountered, but also the high efforts which had to be made, 
in an episodic way, to compensate the structural weaknesses at that particular space and 
time. In IndCo, it was an ad hoc measure of last resort for that particular problem - quite 
unlike the basic and structural way of exercising and keeping sovereign power in the 
eighteenth-century. 
Based on IndCo’s experience, the same respondent then generalised how 
implementing a new, common IS, previous to a centralisation process, can be crucial to 
support that process due to a lower resistance. In fact, should a new IS be at stake, it can 
be perceived as ‘more advanced and modern’ than the previous one, and therefore actors 
may perceive that change as ‘natural’, as ‘progress’. The new, common IS may be 
considered as “something one cannot be against (Hansen and Mouritsen, 1999) for they 
present an appeal which is difficult to resist and thus they do seem ‘imperatives’ no one 
can oppose” (Busco et al., 2007, p. 130; also Quattrone and Hopper, 2006). The 
implementation of a new information system is far more likely to face less resistance 
than an organisational change such as the migration to the SSC, which profoundly 
affects local actors, to the extent of drastically reducing the local teams. 
Respondent: “I’d say that in a [profound] transformation process like this, 
the IS must be installed first, and then those organisational change 
processes can be made. (…) It’s a controversial topic. (…) To uniformise IS, 
there are obviously reengineering processes (…) – although accounting is 
almost the same in all the countries, with [just] some specificities (…). I 
need to have a single model, and then I need to have an alternative chart of 
accounts, more detail in the accounts [structure]… for all the countries. But 
I do it with the help of the [local] people from each country. With the 
participation and the know-how of the accounting area of each country. A 
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process which people easily accept. Their job is not at stake. “Here is a 
good solution, better than the previous one”. It’s a natural process. “Yes, 
we are going to consolidate and place the information system in a [single] 
server”. That’s what we did. 
Researcher: Without the traumatic charge of creating an SSC 
simultaneously. 
Respondent: Exactly. And then, afterwards, comes the optimisation of 
processes [through the migration to an SSC]” 
 
A final quotation of the same respondent reinforces the importance of securing 
the control of the organisational change process, in a structural way.  
“Very often, the problem is not about spending money. If it were a problem 
of spending money, I could say ‘I’m going to invest, in the first year I will 
even double the teams. That’s part of the plan: I will spend more money in 
the first ‘x’ years, but I’ll recover it later on’. As any investment. The 
problem is whether I can, in fact, control [the migration process]. [Ensure] 
that the know-how does not disappear.” 
 
Therefore, the previous allocation of resources to implement SAP FI (financial, 
human, technical resources) provided a structural device, an additional resource 
structurally promoting the introduction of the SSC and the objectives of central actors. 
It increased the control of the process by central actors, to a level which would most 
likely not be achieved if central actors could only resort to episodic exercises of power, 
but without the structural support of SAP FI.  
These insights highlighted the limitations of the mere control of resources and 
their episodic allocation and deployment to attempt to overcome, on a one-off basis and 
in particular instances of social interactions, the problems and resistance which could 
emerge (and did emerge) across the countries – as stressed by Ribeiro (2003), in line 
with Clegg (1989) and Clegg et al. (2006).  
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Reframing these alternative mechanisms in the original Foucaldian thoughts, the 
main problem was not so much about an excessive and inefficient use of resources, but 
rather its lack of effectiveness. Therefore, the previous allocation of resources to 
implement SAP FI attributed to central actors a power which was “more regular, 
effective, more constant and more detailed in its effects; in short, (…) increase its 
effects while diminishing its economic costs (…) and its political costs” (Foucault 
1975/1977, p. 80) (quote already included in section 3.3). 
This subsection analysed how SAP FI influenced the circuit of system 
integration and, in a direct or indirect way, the relational power of actors. It exemplified 
and discussed the importance of technological embeddedness, drawing on Volkoff et al. 
(2007). Rules acquired a material dimension when embedded in SAP FI by human 
actors, creating a structural conditioning. Then, during social interactions, SAP FI 
automatically enacted those rules, hence structurally extending the influence of certain 
human agencies, while constraining or even limiting other human agencies. And 
subsequent structural elaboration/reproduction followed. This conceptualisation is 
further developed later in this chapter. This subsection analysed some achievements of 
SAP FI, but also some of its limitations, even after being remobilised, to fully achieve 
some objectives of key central actors. Finally, this subsection analysed how SAP FI 
influenced the CC and the SSC organisational innovations. The next subsection now 
focuses on the repercussions of the CC and the SSC (as well as SAP FI) in the circuit of 
system integration. 
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7.1.2 REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CC AND THE SSC (AND SAP FI) IN THE 
CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The ensuing analysis focuses on the repercussions of the CC and the SSC 
towards achieving central actors’ objectives. Such analysis must also include SAP FI 
(and other technological innovations, to be consistent with the option taken in this 
section), given the intertwined creation, development, operation and repercussions of 
these innovations. It also analyses the repercussions of these innovations, introduced in 
the circuit of system integration, on this very same circuit. It argues that these 
innovations became complementary obligatory passage points, and it explores how the 
CC and the SSC contributed to the development of SAP FI. The following Figure 7.4 
broadly systematises the main issues. For simplicity, the figure includes only SAP FI as 
a technological innovation, although others are also mentioned during the analysis. 
 
Figure 7.4: Repercussions of the CC and the SSC (and SAP FI, as well as other 
technological innovations) in the circuit of system integration 
7.1.2.1 ‘Direct’ repercussions of the CC and the SSC (and SAP FI) in the circuit 
of system integration, promoting central actors’ objectives 
A preliminary characterisation of ‘direct’ repercussions 
Similar to the above analysis of the repercussions of SAP FI, there are 
repercussions of the CC and the SSC which are relatively linear and straightforward – 
although always highly related with technological innovations, among which SAP FI is 
CC and SSC 
(and SAP FI) 
Central actors’ objectives 
Circuit of system integration 
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paramount. For this reason, the analyses in the previous subsection about technological 
innovations are also pertinent for the ensuing analysis of the network constituted by the 
various innovations. 
The most linear and straightforward analysis is that the CC and the SSC both 
represented new organisational structures, new collective actors with explicitly group-
wide concerns, achieving group-wide cost efficiencies and producing information and 
insights (including for control purposes) which are crucial for central actors - including 
key actor Mr. A.  
In a preliminary note, it should be noted that there is an obvious recurrence in 
the previous analysis, since each of these collective actors are among the central actors 
which greatly benefited from the produced information and insights. As mere examples, 
the CC receives from the SSC more timely and better quality financial information for 
consolidation analyses; and at times the SSC resorts to the CC’s formal authority to 
solve specific conflicts with local teams about accounting issues. Indeed, this recurrence 
is not at all a contradiction. On the contrary, this recurrence adds to, and strengthens, 
other insights about the mutual complementarity between the various elements of the 
circuit of system integration – an insight further explored in this chapter. 
The label of ‘direct’ repercussions does not mean that they are insignificant. On 
the contrary, not only they are empirically relevant, but also two significant theoretical 
contributions can be derived from the introduction of these innovations in the circuit of 
system integration: the constitutive role of the organisational fabric by these 
innovations; and the various potential effects of ‘visibility’, even only considering the 
circuit of system integration. Each one is separately analysed next. 
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The constitutive role of the organisational fabric by these innovations 
The first significant contribution is that innovations in the circuit of system 
integration may have a constitutive role in terms of the social, legal and technological 
fabric of organisations. The creation of the SSC represented the emergence of new 
central actors (the collective actor of the SSC and the individual actors working there) 
and was accompanied by a drastic reduction of the size (almost elimination) of the local 
teams of the accounting area. In fact, this emergence of new central actors and almost 
elimination of local actors of the accounting area means that the circuit of system 
integration may also define and constitute the very social, legal and technological fabric 
across which power flows and tensions potentially emerge, develop and are solved.  
This has important consequences, not only for the analysis of power, but also for 
analyses on institutional theory topics. The empirical setting is not a given. We do not 
simply have “diverse actors who enact, inhabit and reproduce [a given] social 
arrangement” (Seo and Creed, 2002, p. 229). The very fabric of the organisation, the set 
of actors (human and non-human, individual and collective) and their relative position 
within the actor-network (including their physical location) is itself under permanent 
revision, in particular through innovations in the circuit of system integration. 
‘Visibility’ effects in the circuit of system integration 
The second significant contribution concerns the greater visibility that these 
innovations (in particular, SAP FI in its intertwined relation with the CC and the SSC) 
granted to central actors, generally. Again, although relatively ‘direct’, this repercussion 
also allows theoretical developments. Central actors’ increased visibility had two main 
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effects in the circuit of system integration: disciplinary effects derived from monitoring 
(analysed next); and improved decision making (analysed below in p. 511). 
Disciplinary effects through visibility, conceiving discipline as a system of 
control and correction (Foucault, 1980; Legge, 2002), is analysed in two stages. In fact, 
it is suggested that different ‘disciplinary effects’ of visibility should be included in 
different circuits of power – even though (or, instead, precisely because) both aspects 
are often related in practice and theory, in line with the “intertwining of 
knowledge/power” (Legge, 2002, p. 86).  
The disciplinary effects considered in this section are the enactment of rules 
deriving solely from the “post facto” monitoring (and eventual correction) by central 
actors. These more ‘direct’ effects and enactment of rules based on ex-post control and 
detection by central actors should be included in the circuit of system integration. On 
the contrary, this section does not examine (self-) disciplinary repercussions deriving 
from a greater visibility, since these repercussions are related with local actors’ 
dispositions and their acceptance and enactment of rules of membership – a component 
of the circuit of social integration, to be analysed in the next section. Therefore, the 
more ‘indirect’, potential repercussions of visibility in creating self-disciplinary 
dispositions among the local (controlled) actors should be included in the circuit of 
social integration (in the next section) 
As regards disciplinary effects derived from visibility and monitoring, typically 
by central actors, the adoption of a parallel accounts solution in the second stage of SAP 
FI mobilisation is an illuminating example. As described in the previous chapter, a 
parallel accounts solution enables to obtain, simultaneously, a tailored solution to each 
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country, and a common, uniform basis for all the companies. Some disciplinary effects 
were quite direct. As an integrated solution using a single, central database, SAP 
granted to central actors a great visibility over local figures and reduced the possibility 
of data manipulation. The following comment from an IT respondent highlights the role 
of SAP FI and, regarding stocks, SAP operational modules MM and PP: 
Respondent: “I want to know ‘How much do you spend in IT on your 
country?’. [Before SAP FI,] one country uses a certain account, another 
country uses another account. As you don’t know the accounts, you’ll ask 
that information to each country and they will give you the figures 
according to what is in their system, or they are going to ‘prepare’ them 
[voice with an ironic tone]. [But] if you already know the account where IT 
costs are… 
Researcher: I don’t have to ask information to anyone. 
Respondent: You may even ask, but then you’ll check if it is true. The same 
happened, e.g., as regards stocks, lately. Before, you asked ‘I need to know 
the stock figures’. Everyone prepared and sent the information. And you 
only saw the figures, nothing else. When you checked the system, you didn’t 
know how it was [the figures were produced] (…). They would need to 
access ‘n’ systems, all different… [and that was complicated or impossible]. 
Now, the people from corporate management control already have access to 
SAP. One thing which facilitated it was precisely that those people… [can 
access one single system].” 
 
Both examples, from two different functional areas, illuminate the greater 
visibility of central actors potentiated by SAP, through the various modules gradually 
implemented and in the ways the modules were mobilised by the actors involved.  
In addition to SAP FI (and other adopted modules), other technological 
innovations were described as creators of disciplinary visibility by central actors. The 
financial control of purchasing processes (relying on both SAP and non-SAP systems, 
such as the IDAR solution, further analysed below in this subsection on page 519) was a 
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recurrent topic raised by respondents; the following perspective of a senior manager is 
representative: 
“If I don’t have that technology [supporting purchasing procedures], it’s 
almost impossible to control, to guarantee that the orders are placed 
correctly, with all the information, and that when the materials are received 
that order is selected and the quantities and prices are conferred, etc., and 
that the payment is done in the correct way. If there is no technology, or the 
information system, to allow that to happen, it is difficult to control. [An 
hypothetical rule:] ‘For acquisitions above ‘x’ Euros of non current items, 2 
or 3 budgets must be obtained’. Well, if I don’t have visibility over that, [the 
rule] is useless to me, right? (…)  
Investment projects are where this [verification] is needed the most. (…) All 
the required information for an investment project has to be there: the 
budgets, etc., the justification (…). It is a process which starts in a plant, 
then it is approved at a country level… it depends on the amounts.”  
 
In both examples, this ‘Panopticon’ gaze allowed by the technological 
innovations created a disciplinary effect. In the first example, this disciplinary effect 
derived from the possibility that the central actors could directly access the various SAP 
modules and verify the details behind the final figures (rather than merely receiving the 
final figures sent by the local actors, with limited possibilities to verify their reliability). 
In the second example, the disciplinary effect derived from the visibility over each step 
of the purchasing process through the IDAR solution.13 
The second effect of visibility (as introduced in p. 508) concerns benefits for 
central actors’ decision making. As amply described, technological innovations, 
combined with organisational innovations, enabled central actors to have visibility over 
the detailed information and the calculative processes underlying the final figures. 
                                                 
13 In addition, central actors were able to identify and make sense of local information, given increasingly 
shared rules of meaning. However, this aspect is related with the circuit of social integration, to be 
analysed in the next section (alongside the promotion of self-discipline through rules of membership). 
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The benefits of visibility of central actors, therefore, exceeded the merely 
technical activity of financial consolidation. The benchmarking (and resulting 
knowledge) facilitated by the visibility over company-wide (more) comparable figures 
allowed a greater intervention by central, higher level actors, as the following dialogue 
with an IT member makes explicit: 
Respondent: “A foundational work was done to attempt to make key 
financial concepts uniform, to allow an analysis at higher levels of the 
process which would only be possible, both for benchmarking and 
consolidation, if the origin [of the information] has a degree of uniform 
alignment of all plants (and hence of all countries). Otherwise, we’d be 
working with erroneous figures.” 
Researcher: So, the idea of uniformity to simplify consolidation is only half 
of the story. Actually, the need, the desire to benchmark is the other side of 
the story. So, the technical issue of consolidation alone might not justify… 
[interrupted] 
Respondent: … [Consolidation] is not the full reason.” 
A CC member described the limitations of actors located in Portugal to follow-
up on the implementation of defined strategies, and he separated formal decision power 
(of Mr. A and other Portuguese central actors) and “de facto” decision power (of top 
management located in Madrid) (see quote in subsection 5.4.1, page 329). The CC 
member then highlighted how the greater visibility improved central decision making 
processes and hence increased the power of central actors in Portugal, including Mr. A. 
“Researcher: [The non-Portuguese] CEO was in Spain until 2000/2001. 
But, in the meantime, the CC was already in Portugal, so a transfer had 
already started… [interrupted] 
Respondent: That’s where the big difference lies. When the shareholder 
starts feeling a minimum comfort as regards the information systems, in a 
final analysis, it becomes a bit irrelevant whether the CEO is Portuguese, 
French, English, Chinese or Russian. But he has to trust the information 
systems. (…) I don’t believe in ISs which are based on a trust relationship, 
too dependent on people. (…) I don’t believe in ISs which are based on 
procedures, rules and alternatives which depend on person A, B, C or D 
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being in a certain location. The ISs must be autonomous from people. So 
there must be clear rules and procedures, as simple as possible. (…) 
People must know that a part of the obligations of being in a group (…) is a 
timely and quality report towards the corporate centre. And those things 
have to work independently from the presence of particular people in 
particular positions.  
Researcher: So, the CEO remained in Spain for some more time but with an 
increasingly smaller structure. So, in practical terms, power was gradually 
being transferred to Portugal. 
Respondent: Yes, power from that point of view, no doubt. I.e., power in the 
sense of an increasing visibility over the entire decision process, over the 
information that was available, and so that [Portuguese central actors] 
could also make any necessary decisions.”  
 
This account describes how the innovations in the circuit of system integration 
increased the trust in information reliability. This increase in trust was based on greater 
“trust-in-systems” and on overcoming the problem of lack of “trust-in-persons” by 
diminishing the dependency of the new system as regards people (Giddens, 1990; 
Moilanen, 2008; see characterisation of previous situation in subsection 6.2.1)14. In turn, 
the greater knowledge derived from this visibility improved central decision making 
processes and enabled greater action and intervention by central actors. In addition, this 
account also highlights the interwoven nature of, and repercussions between, technical 
and organisational innovations, analysed later in this section. 
Innovations did not just open up lines of visibility to guide immediate, direct 
action, on matters already under evaluation. In fact, the fieldwork highlighted how the 
new lines of visibility enabled by the various innovations contributed towards actors 
starting to question existing practices and arrangements, and to consider alternative 
arrangements, as stated by a senior manager: 
                                                 
14 The next section discusses how changes in the circuit of social integration further contributed to a 
greater ‘trust-in-persons’. 
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“Having access to information and being able to compare information, 
allows us to identify (…) activities which were made more efficiently in one 
place rather than in others. And then it allows us to confront: ‘Why does the 
back-office of [a particular country] only need ‘x’ people per million of 
sales, and [country C] needs ‘y’?’. At least, it allows us to question. 
Question and understand the reasons why things are done in a certain way. 
If we didn’t have the access to information, and the visibility over that 
information, we, as a corporate centre, would never question ourselves, we 
would never question people about that, unless they themselves took that 
initiative and tried to do some benchmarking.” 
 
Therefore, these innovations had ‘productive’ effects (in the mainstream, non-
Foucauldian sense of ‘productive’, analysed in section 3.3). These productive effects 
included current decision making and, importantly, fundamental unveiling of (until 
then) unnoticed issues, questioning of existing arrangements and considering ways to 
change them. 
Significantly, the ‘uniformising’ way SAP FI was (re)designed and 
(re)mobilised had a two ways relation with praxis, with strategic political action (Seo 
and Creed, 2002). The uniform mobilisation of SAP was both a consequence of praxis 
(as the previous chapter made clear) and a condition for further praxis. Had SAP FI not 
been further remobilised to promote uniformity and the initially designed models 
continued to diverge across the countries, the comparability of information from the 
various locations would be reduced. The reduced comparability would reduce 
knowledge about the company as a whole and the ‘productive’ effects for central actors, 
both on current and fundamental issues. Developing these insights may be a 
contribution to the ‘embeddedness paradox’ of institutional theory (see brief mention in 
section 2.4; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Holm, 1995; 
Seo and Creed, 2002), since these innovations were facilitative to question existing 
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arrangements. However, such theoretical development is left for future research (see 
sections 9.2 and 9.3). 
Finally, a note is required to avoid interpretations which overstate the potential 
contributions of these innovations. SAP FI deals with financial accounting and the CC 
and the SSC, collectively, have a strong financial, administrative and control 
orientation. The importance of the insights and knowledge provided by these 
innovations to key central actors has been shown, but it should not be overstated, either. 
A senior manager thus commented: 
“[Consolidation of financial information] required hard work, but it wasn’t 
something [extraordinary]. (…) That was not the problem.  
The problem was the capacity to leverage on information to improve global 
management, to improve investment decision making, to optimise, to 
benchmark… And work on that with the constraints of information 
originated in a multinational company. The company could not continue to 
operate only in the contexts it knew well, in the national contexts. 
And it’s true that many of the experienced problems were related with a 
minor ease in these [foreign] contexts. E.g., the labour market in [a 
particular country] has particularities and a context totally different from 
Portugal or [two other countries]. This caused many of the ‘overcosts’ and 
the incapacity to quickly find solutions for the assets in [that particular 
country]. We didn’t have the knowledge, we were not sufficiently well… 
comforted, supported in critical areas, to make appropriate decisions. (…) I 
think that happened a lot. It is as important to reconcile the information 
which is reconcilable, as well as to identify that information which is not 
reconcilable. [E.g.,] the regulatory frameworks of the various countries 
cannot be consolidated.” 
 
This insight does not contradict the previous analysis on the importance of the 
examined innovations. But it is important to acknowledge the contribution of other 
factors beyond those being examined, to avoid biased conclusions and hence contribute 
towards to the balance and internal validity of the case study (Yin, 2009). 
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Another issue required close empirical examination and careful reflection, in 
order to improve the internal validity of the case study: the repercussions of the SSC. As 
the interviewees’ perceptions about the relevance of the SSC were triangulated, it 
became apparent that they were quite diversified. This diversity of perceptions was 
basically related with the mere consideration of direct and linear ‘effects’ of the SSC, or 
the consideration of more complex and integrated repercussions. This diversity of 
perceptions is analysed next. 
7.1.2.2 The contested importance of the SSC 
The SSC as a mere ‘plant of transactions’? 
Some interviewees downplayed the relevance of the SSC in terms of attributing 
a greater power to (other) central actors, especially when compared to the relevance of 
the CC. The following quote from an IT interviewee is representative. This interviewee 
started by describing the context in which the location of some corporate functions 
became more relevant for Mr. A: 
“When [the company in country C] is acquired, there is in fact a cleavage. 
(…) Because the acquiring company was [the Spanish subsidiary], (…) it 
owned the assets of [most types of product lines], in [several countries] and 
even in Portugal. The Spanish subsidiary swelled… I’d say that even central 
power [increased] in Madrid: ‘Now, we are going to be the kings of IndCo, 
because we were the ones who bought’. (…) And then maybe something 
emerged which started having some relevance: the weight of the corporate 
power and corporate functions – only in the financial area and in 
management control, financial control [as opposed to operational control]. 
(…) 
[Mr. A] wanted to have things nearer… He is the shareholder, the 
Chairman, and wants to have the people here; when he has doubts, it’s a lot 
easier talking to them. (…) Then, the idea of an SSC, of a centre, is born. 
And then, there is clearly the decision to locate things (…) here. Both the 
SSC… [and the CC].” 
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However, the interviewee then downplayed the role of the SSC, when compared 
to the CC’s: 
“But the SSC, I’d say, is not very meaningful. The SSC, sincerely, I’d say 
it’s more a matter of form, than of substance. The SSC is a plant (…) 
posting invoices and controlling (…). It’s really only a plant of transactions. 
Nothing else. It doesn’t decide anything, (…) it does not control anything, it 
does not manage anything… It’s a very mechanical plant. It could be soles 
for shoes. In this case, it enters data in the system. And I’d say that 
[activity] could be done anywhere. 
And I’d say it was here, perhaps because costs were lower. If it were to be 
located in Europe, it’d be here. The only [other] option would be ‘not to 
locate it here, but in India, or in any of those called emergent countries’ – 
that was already discussed at the time. There were companies like HP or 
IBM doing accounting in India. But it was considered that it was very 
dangerous to set up such a thing without making things uniform, without 
transforming the information systems.” 
 
This view of the limited influence of the SSC to achieve the objectives of central 
actors is mainly derived from the consideration that the SSC mostly performs 
mechanical financial accounting activities, and accounting postings in particular. Within 
this view (in line with the view of SSCs as “the new service factories” with a “factory-
like appearance” (Seal and Herbert, 2009, p. 18), both this respondent and a consultant 
considered that outsourcing the SSC activities to an external company, located in typical 
outsourcing destinations (e.g., India; see Nicholson et al., 2006) was perfectly viable, 
had it not been for IS diversity at the time.  
Additionally, the SSC lacks formal power over subsidiaries – indeed, the 
subsidiaries are the SSC’s (internal) clients. Indeed, the nature of a client-supplier 
relationship between the SSC and the local subsidiaries precludes the possibility of the 
SSC imposing its views upon the subsidiaries on contentious issues. In those cases, the 
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SSC has to resort to the CC to settle the divergence and, if needed, to impose a solution 
based on formal power. 
However, the researcher’s interpretation of the case study suggested a more 
detailed, fine grained and subtle influence of the SSC – yet crucially important - to 
achieve the objectives of central actors. This interpretation is analysed next. 
The SSC subtle but decisive influence as an Obligatory Passage Point 
Although the SSC had (and has) no formal power over subsidiaries, the SSC 
structurally gained power (in turn, benefiting central actors) by becoming another 
Obligatory Passage Point. This more subtle influence of the SSC resides in 
encompassing activities beyond its core, typical activities – posting financial accounting 
transactions. Many accounting and finance processes were transferred to the SSC, 
supported by a web of mechanisms in a way that many aspects of organisational life 
(i.e., processes and events, in particular at a local level) would almost inevitably be 
conducted through the SSC and desired check-points. Through this routing of 
organisational life, the SSC became solidly established as an Obligatory Passage Points 
(Latour, 1997), contributing towards the objectives of central actors. 
From the numerous examples found, two are now mentioned. The first example 
concerns the adoption of certain control mechanisms previously absent from some local 
sites. Being an OPP, the SSC allowed the implementation of such control mechanisms. 
The examples in subsection 6.3.1 of absence of circularisation maps and inventory of 
fixed assets in some local sites are revealing. 
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The second example concerns the SSC’s central role in the control of purchasing 
processes. Two mechanisms can be mentioned, conveying how such control is carried 
out by the SSC, through IT-based processes. The first mechanism relies on an IT-based 
process supporting the accounting workflow, including the central posting of documents 
(a process briefly described in section 6.3). Documents received in the local sites have 
to be digitalised immediately as they are received, and their digital image and record 
becomes the support of the entire accounting process, through the IT solution IXOS. 
This supports the central verification, by the SSC, of the adequate authorisation of all 
transactions, through a number of check points. Indeed, the control process starts before 
the supplier’s invoice is received: purchasing authorisation by the appropriate (local or 
central) actor must be obtained before the order is placed. The workflow stipulates that 
when a supplier’s invoice arrives at a local site (and is immediately digitalised), it is 
confronted with the previously authorised order and any divergences have to be clarified 
or rectified by the appropriate actors. 
This IT-based process was only possible due to the existence of two previously 
introduced elements of the circuit of system integration: the IT solutions SAP FI and 
IXOS. IXOS took a central role and became another non-human actor, tightly linked 
with other actors (such as the SSC and SAP FI) and tightly woven with the 
organisational processes it supported. Clearly, the IXOS innovation became another 
Obligatory Passage Point.  
IXOS allows an instantaneous transmission of the (scanned) document from the 
local sites to the SSC, an integrated, paperless workflow, and an overall greater 
efficiency in the accounting processes, among other economic benefits. In addition, it 
also allowed increased central control, as documents immediately become centrally 
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accessible and visible – and controllable. An SSC senior member described the greater 
control derived from IXOS and related organisational rules. 
“We defined that invoices have to be sent to a certain location and scanned 
immediately. Why? Because we think that everything has to be in the 
system, the invoices cannot be left ‘wandering around’. Otherwise, people 
can shove them in a drawer – because they forgot, or for any other reason. 
And we avoid end-of-year surprises, like the ones we had. We had 
unpleasant surprises.”  
 
The second mechanism of control of purchasing processes by the SSC, through 
IT-based processes, is particularly interesting and relates to the purchase of fixed assets. 
An IT solution, named IDAR, aims to ensure the prior authorisation of fixed assets 
purchases15. A backwards description of the process elucidates the control logic. 
Payment of a fixed asset purchase invoice requires a prior posting of the invoice, which 
in turn requires a prior creation of a record for the future fixed asset in IDAR, which in 
turn requires a prior authorisation by the actor with the required formal power. Since the 
start of the process (the creation of the future fixed asset record in IDAR) is attributed to 
the SSC, eventual deviations from the centrally prescribed process (e.g., the request of 
payment of a non-authorised invoice) are detected, as all steps of the process are carried 
out by the SSC. The IT solution IDAR became another Obligatory Passage Point, 
another non-human actor, tightly linked with other actors (such as the SSC and the CC) 
and tightly woven with organisational processes.  
                                                 
15 IDAR might have been analysed in the previous subsection, when the repercussions of SAP FI (and 
other technological innovations) were discussed. However, since the repercussions of IDAR are very 
closely related with the role of the SSC, their discussion was only included now, within the analysis of the 
collective effect of both technological and organisational innovations. As already mentioned, the tightly 
intertwined nature of the innovations and their repercussions promotes the existence of various plausible 
structures for analysis. 
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A local actor, among others, clearly identified IDAR as a control tool to 
overcome the lack of timeliness of a control based on the accounting posting stage, as 
he commented:  
“IDAR became a control tool, to put some order in the house. I imagine 
that, if there was no rule, all plant directors would approve any kind of 
investment; I’m just imagining, I don’t know. (…) “We cannot be dependent 
on accounting [posting] to perform that control, (…) it’s already too late. 
(…) The control resides in a systematisation of authorisations. No one sets 
up an ‘Investment Authorisation Request’ without the required approvals, 
going through all those steps of IDAR. A request over [amount concealed] 
Euros must have around 15 approvals (…). So, everyone gets aligned.” 
 
This local actor was clearly aware of the crucial importance of control 
mechanisms being points through which processes obligatorily had to go through – or, 
if avoidance of control was desired, points which would have to be circumvented. This 
local actor argued that the SSC, as a transaction-oriented unit and physically distant 
from the local sites and actual activities, could not detect some types of manipulation, 
should local actors perform them (significantly, respondents from the SSC and the CC 
also mentioned these particular types of possible manipulation).  
Importantly, the effectiveness of the SSC as a control OPP relied on IDAR being 
actually an obligatory passage point, on its obligatory nature. Should it be possible to 
circumvent IDAR – i.e., denying its ‘obligatory’ nature-, the control effectiveness of the 
SSC would wane and ultimate control would then depend on the effectiveness of other 
complementary and supplementary OPPs in the network (namely, the CC), as discussed 
in the remainder of this subsection. Later, the next section analyses local actors’ 
comments about limitations of innovations to produce a disciplinary effect as regards 
the circuit of social integration. 
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At a time when this interpretation of the empirical insights was emerging, the 
researcher took a lead from an IT interviewee to crosscheck the interpretation. The 
dialogue is now transcribed, for it allows for a number of important observations. 
Respondent: “The SSC also [controls the compliance with defined 
procedures by the units], as well. ‘I don’t check this invoice, because it 
didn’t follow the normal process’. And someone will have to explain why it 
didn’t follow that process. 
Researcher: Just a quick comment. That’s where the SSC may have a much 
more important role than… 
[interruption to change card in recorder] 
Respondent: The SSC is a plant of transactions. 
Researcher: Yes. But it is embedded in processes which ensure control 
because the SSC exists. (…) For example, the case of IDAR. Should the SSC 
not exist and should the local teams be the ones who continued to process 
the invoices… [interruption] 
Respondent: They wouldn’t create the fixed asset file. 
Researcher: They might not create it, or might not enter in IDAR16. And so 
the SSC becomes relevant because… [interruption] 
Respondent: … there is a rule. First, you have to do this, and then that… 
And you only post the invoice, if this exists. In order for this to exist, that 
has to exist.  
Researcher: Exactly. 
Respondent: If the invoice gets there, and doesn’t have [the required 
previous steps], the SSC returns the invoice. If it returns, it doesn’t pay. And 
all things are confirmed there. 
Researcher: That control mechanism would not exist, if there weren’t that 
‘plant of transactions’. 
Respondent: Right. (…) It’s like the auditors, who check if the people use 
certain transactions or not.” 
 
                                                 
16 According to procedures (formal rules), an entry in IDAR must precede the creation of a fixed asset 
file. 
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Subject to an important methodological justification17, this dialogue was 
important in several ways. The researcher’s initial suggestion immediately elicited the 
same, somewhat derogative consideration that the SSC was a mere plant, totally in line 
with another IT interviewee quoted above in this subsection. However, when the 
interviewee’s own previous sentence about the SSC’s control role was developed, the 
interviewee provided insights further confirming the SSC’s importance to ensure certain 
procedural controls – formal rules which otherwise local actors might not enact. 
A more accurate perspective of the contribution of the SSC (and actually of all 
the innovations) should go beyond an analysis of the repercussions of the innovation in 
itself, as if it were isolated from other technological or organisational conditions. The 
analysis now therefore considers how the various elements of the circuit of system 
integration became Obligatory Points of Passage, embedded within an organised 
network of complementary and reinforcing elements. 
                                                 
17 A methodological note is required. It is acknowledged that the researcher’s questions were not as 
neutral as typically recommended for conducting semi-structured interviews and might be criticised for 
being leading questions (Silverman, 2005; Yin, 2009). The potential justification based on the objective 
of testing a research hypothesis is also not sufficient in itself. Ribeiro’s (2003) reflections on the last stage 
of his fieldwork, directed to crosscheck and confirm his interpretations and reading of the case, are 
applicable. “I had to avoid questions of the type ‘do you agree with this interpretation’? Probably, the 
interviewee would be influenced by the interpretation suggested, and by her/his ‘membership work’ 
towards me.” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 167).  
However, in the circumstances of this particular moment of this particular interview, a more direct 
approach was considered more appropriate, for three reasons. First, the topic was introduced by a logical 
consequence of the interviewee’s reasoning (who had just stated that the SSC had a control role), and 
researcher did not fully justify his rationale, because the interviewee developed and justified his own 
rationale (which was in line with the researcher’s hypothesis). Second, this question derived from an 
interpretation just starting to emerge and was elicited by an analysis made by the interviewee; it had not 
been included in the interview planned topics, let alone the exact set of questions, so it did not benefit 
from prior reflection. Third, a pragmatic reason: this interview was approaching three hours, its end was 
eminent and it was virtually certain that there would be no more interviews with this respondent; 
therefore, the researcher could not afford to adopt a more open approach, which might take longer to 
reach a conclusive point and hence fail to crosscheck the research interpretation and hypothesis. Finally, 
regardless of the original reasons, what is crucial, in pragmatic terms, is the extent to which the 
interviewee’s reply may have been biased by the researcher’s approach; in this regard, the researcher has 
no doubts that the interviewee’s insights were not at all influenced, de facto, by the questioning approach, 
since they were basically a development of the first quoted sentence. 
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7.1.2.3 OPP’s embeddedness and complementarity 
The previous analysis highlighted how the capacity of the SSC to control relied 
on having become embedded in wider processes of control. By having become 
embedded, encroached in wider processes of control, the SSC became a key nodal point 
which is difficult to circumvent. By having established and structurally secured that key 
position within the actor-network and its organisational processes, i.e., by having 
become an Obligatory Passage Point in the circuit of system integration, the SSC has 
achieved a higher relational power as regards the local actors. And, given the SSC’s 
alignment with the interests of key central actors, the SSC also increased the relational 
power of those central actors as regards the local actors. The central actors secured a 
higher relational power indirectly, through the actor they had introduced in IndCo’s 
circuit of system integration.  
However, the SSC was integrated in a wider organised network of control 
devices which complement each other – in particular, the SSC and the CC. In fact, these 
actors do not only complement each other, but they also supplement each other, with 
one actor potentially replacing the other, should the previous one fail to adequately 
exercise control. Resuming the insights provided by the local actor quoted above in 
page 520, this actor was aware of the existence of such a network of complementary 
(and supplementary) control devices. In this case, the management control area of the 
CC (rather than the SSC) would be the organisational structure which might detect a 
potential manipulation. In fact, in spite of having recognised the SSC’s control role, he 
shared the perspective of the other interviewees who downplayed that control role - in 
particular when compared with the CC management control area and with the formerly 
existent control and administrative structures at a local level, before the SSC creation).  
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“A person from the SSC obviously will not do that [such a close control as if 
he/she was in a plant]. That can be done, eventually, by the [CC] 
management control.” 
 
Therefore, the IT-based control devices (OPPs) might provide information to the 
CC - another OPP - which, due to the more analytical (rather than transactional) nature 
of its objectives and activities, might detect the manipulation which the SSC did not 
notice. 
In addition to this subtle (yet effective) complementarity of organisational 
structures, complementariness can also be very ostensive. This is particularly the case 
mentioned above in this subsection of the CC intervening when the SSC and local 
subsidiaries do not reach consensus on a particular issue. The SSC sometimes asks the 
CC, as an actor with formal power over local subsidiaries, to intervene, in an episodic 
way.  
In fact, and in line with the diversified perceptions of the SSC as a control 
device, the SSC relation with local subsidiaries may be considered ambiguous. On one 
hand, the client-supplier relationship does not attribute any formal power to the SSC. 
On the other hand, substantial de facto power derives from the structural power 
relationally gained through the mechanisms analysed above and from the possibility to 
resort to the CC to solve unsettled divergences with local subsidiaries. This ambiguity is 
captured in the following dialogue between the researcher and an SSC member: 
Respondent: “People were used to managing their own things, to do as they 
thought it was best. Now, they are given directives… [correcting the prior 
reasoning] We do not impose them anything… [correcting the reasoning 
again] Well, in the limit, we end up by imposing… 
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Researcher: To impose, it has to be done always through the corporate 
centre, right? 
Respondent: Yes, yes…” 
 
It is important to highlight that the effectiveness of these networks only 
gradually improved. Interviewees mentioned several contemporary or recent examples 
of tensions between central and local actors, even referring to the period during which 
the fieldwork was conducted (2005-2008, i.e., several years after these innovations were 
introduced). E.g., a CC member indicated that only very recently the objectives that led 
to implementing IDAR started being attained. 
Respondent: “The ultimate objective of IDAR is being attained, in this last 
year: that local teams previously create a list of investments to make 
throughout the year; and that throughout the year all the investments 
carried out are matched against the initial list; and that all variances are 
better understood and explained. 
Researcher: That is pure budgeting. [suggesting that it was not a major 
innovation] 
Respondent: Yes, but in the previous years, it easily happened that the lists 
of budgeted investments did not even minimally correspond to the reality 
throughout the year. And that process allowed management control 
[department] to start becoming aware of that reality, to compare the 
approved and budgeted figures and try to make those corrections.” 
 
Complementarity and reinforcement between organisational and technological 
innovations, between human and non-human actors strategically situated and designed 
to be Obligatory Points of Passage, go beyond their daily operation. Various 
interviewees also stressed development dependencies, complementarities and 
reinforcements between the SSC, the CC and SAP FI. This section has already analysed 
the influence of SAP FI on the CC and SSC development. The focus now turns to how 
the SSC and the CC influenced SAP FI development. 
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7.1.2.4 Dependencies of development: the SSC and the CC influencing SAP FI 
development 
While the previous subsection analysed how SAP FI influenced the development 
of the SSC and the CC, the ensuing text analyses the reverse phenomenon: how SSC 
and the CC influenced SAP FI development. The following quote of a senior SSC 
member (in line with other interviewees) reflects both phenomena, recalling the 
importance for SAP FI development of the SSC as a single, central organisational 
structure dealing with financial accounting: 
“It works both ways. Without a system and a technological platform, etc., 
an SSC would never exist. But the SSC also facilitates uniformity in 
technological platforms and implementations [i.e., developments]. 
Everything is a lot easier, because there is a global [organisational] 
platform here [the SSC].” 
 
Therefore, the development and implementation of innovations in SAP FI were 
facilitated by the single location of the “organisational platform” (the SSC) where most 
financial accounting activities were carried out – a location which was, in addition, the 
same where the Global IT team was situated18. 
As regards the CC, one of its managers commented on its need of a common 
system, when the CC was created.  
“The start of SAP (…) coincides with (…) the creation of a corporate 
centre, (…) with finance, management control, etc.. And that corporate 
centre needs tools and finds things [solutions] scattered all over the place. 
It has no tools, so it is urgent to have tools. On the other hand, when doing 
                                                 
18 Some interviewees also mentioned that the existence of the SSC also facilitated the roll-out of the SAP 
logistic modules – and that, inversely, those logistic modules have also facilitated the activities of the 
SSC. However, this bidirectional influence is beyond the scope of this research. 
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[the SAP implementation], [it is aimed that] we get something that solves 
many other things which are needed.”  
 
Another CC manager highlighted the CC initial limitations due to its small size, 
in a quote already included in the previous chapter: 
“We need to ponder, the desirable and the feasible. And when we are at the 
stage of creating a corporate team, it was at least excessively ambitious… 
(…) With a team like this, with so little experience, with so little business 
knowledge, implementing a completely distinct logic would be impossible. 
So, the option was basically ‘For now, let’s introduce a single system; and 
then, when things start to…’ (…) There were no conditions for such a type 
of strategy [implying ruptures].” 
 
However, this respondent further developed a dynamic perspective on the 
changing capacities – and relationships – between SAP FI, the CC and the SSC: 
Respondent: “When we created the SSC, the CC already had other 
conditions. Because although a huge effort was needed, we already had a 
[corporate] team here which minimally ensured that effort, recruited people 
to the SSC with some anticipation and, as far as possible, trained them. So, 
as we migrated each country, there were already people minimally 
available and capable, so that if a rupture occurred – as it happened, e.g., 
in country C, where the local team disappeared in fifteen days - we 
managed to sustain that [situation] with people hired here two months 
before… 
Researcher: So, there were already a number of material conditions (let’s 
call them like this), systems, human resources… 
Respondent: [correcting a part of the researcher’s sentence] The systems, 
we were [only then] implementing them… There was, above all, another 
stability in terms of management control, as regards the teams here. 
Although they were not large teams, they already had a lot more experience 
and we had set up a specific team for that project [with consultants].”  
As regards the SSC, it should be recalled that it was created in 2001, when most 
countries had already adopted SAP FI (in its remobilised form). Therefore, the SSC 
direct influence on the implementation of SAP FI could only have happened as regards 
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country C’s nearly simultaneous processes of SAP adoption and SSC migration (about 
which the previous quotes also provide some indication). But the theoretical relevance 
of this factor can be concluded by the following quote of an IT senior interviewee:  
“If I have a person typing orders in Spain, and another person (…) in 
Portugal, I don’t need common screens. But I’ll have that need when the 
same person types orders for both Portugal and Spain. That person will 
start making demands. ‘Different screens? I want a single screen. Why can’t 
we uniformise it?’. In the SSC, it was exactly the same thing. [Initially,] 
since there wasn’t [one person posting transactions for all countries], that 
need [to have the same system, same screens…] did not exist”.19 
 
Additionally, the existence of the CC and the SSC as additional collective actors 
and their increasing development, in terms of size and scope of activities, also promoted 
an increased development of information systems through increased requests of 
functionalities. And the existence of the organisational capacity to potentially use new 
functionalities was an important motivator for those new functionalities to be included 
in the IS. In fact, although exceptions may potentially exist, developing functionalities 
when there are no potential users is hardly justifiable. An SSC member thus 
commented: 
“Where to get information? That’s one of the problems from the start and 
that with time has gradually improved, and it has impact on the issue you 
mention, the ERPs. In fact, we have a lot of information, and many times the 
appropriate reports to get that information are missing. Many times, only as 
time goes by people start realising that, or new needs emerge. As these 
needs emerge, we contact our IT team (…) to get that information. (…) We 
have all the information, it’s all inside SAP, but it’s not ‘F9’ [i.e., not 
immediately obtainable]. Many times, it’s almost impracticable. And many 
times, it is based on those requests [from IndCo’s decision makers] that 
needs of new reports, new parametrisations arise; and then we present 
those requests [to the IT team].” 
                                                 
19 Likewise, an IT member thus commented a distinct episode regarding the centralisation of functions: 
“Provided that you have the notion of how an accounting team works… Having the same people working 
with various accounting models in various countries, would make work very complicated. (…) ‘Now, 
change the plug, because you’ll now work with a different company’. It makes no sense.”  
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A particularly interesting driver for IS development concerned a recent initiative 
set up within the SSC to foster the emergence, development and implementation of 
innovative ideas. Although there was no limit defining the scope of acceptable ideas, the 
ones most proposed concerned changes to the information system and, according to two 
SSC members, this initiative had been generating a large number of change requests – 
in particular, because each SSC member was required to present at least one idea per 
month.  
Therefore, making an organisational structure such as the SSC a driver of IS 
change was promoted by formal initiatives intentionally directed towards such end – 
adding to the role of users’ requests arising from emerging information needs, within 
their ordinary organisational activities. 
7.1.3 THE CIRCUIT OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION: KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
This subsection now synthesises the key contributions concerning exclusively 
the repercussions on the circuit of system integration (as clarified, contributions on 
repercussions on the circuit of social integration are discussed in the next one). The 
order of the contributions does not reflect their relative importance, but rather intends to 
produce a structure as conceptually logical as possible. 
7.1.3.1 Innovations as new actors and the redefinition of the organisational fabric  
The first contribution has ontological and methodological dimensions. From an 
ontological perspective, the analysed innovations introduced new actors in IndCo: non-
human and human, individual and collective. Moreover, the SSC innovation was 
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associated with the almost disappearance of the local actors of the accounting area. 
Innovations redefined the organisational fabric. Therefore, the organisational referent 
and the set of actors are themselves a result of political moves in the circuit of system 
integration. The empirical setting is not a given. It is not an ex-ante structure and a mere 
part of the contextual or explanatory factors; rather, it is both an explanatory factor and 
a factor which needs explanation. 
From a methodological perspective, the notion that the empirical setting is also a 
result of the processes which the researcher is investigating (and did not a priori know) 
suggests that the empirical setting defined at the research outset may probably have to 
be adjusted, as argued in chapter 4. This recommends flexibility during the conduction 
of the fieldwork, in order to include organisational areas which the on-going 
interpretation of the empirics suggests to be theoretically relevant.  
 
7.1.3.2 Innovations as promoters of visibility to challenge unquestioned 
arrangements 
The second contribution is to highlight the potential of innovations to grant a 
greater visibility to central actors, not only favouring decision making in current, 
established issues, but also favouring questioning existing arrangements, at a more 
fundamental level. It was argued that the way SAP FI was mobilised (along with other 
innovations) was both a consequence of praxis by human actors and a condition for 
further praxis to unfold, potentiating further fundamental changes. As already 
suggested, this insight may be usefully explored to address the institutional paradox of 
embedded agency (Seo and Creed, 2002; see section 9.4). 
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7.1.3.3 An emphasis on organisational structures as key innovations in the circuit 
of system integration 
The third contribution is emphasising the importance of one particular type of 
innovation in the circuit of system integration: organisational innovations (in addition 
to technological innovations), through the creation of new organisational structures as 
new collective actors. 
This contribution is particularly relevant considering the emphasis on 
technological (rather than organisational) innovations in the very scarce case-based 
literature based on Clegg’s framework and focusing on intra-organisational issues. 
Indeed, only Ribeiro (2003) adopted theoretical lenses and an empirical focus similar to 
this research20, and he strongly focused on a technological innovation (an ERP system). 
Although he did not ignore the issue of organisational structures, they were only very 
briefly mentioned and were not reflected in the research conclusions. On the contrary, 
IndCo’s case is compelling in highlighting new organisational structures as a crucial 
type of innovation in the circuit of system integration, and an essential part of a wide 
(intra-organisational) change process.  
7.1.3.4 An emphasis on organised networks: connections, complementarities and 
actors’ embeddedness 
The fourth contribution of this case is to highlight the importance of the 
collective, of the concept of network and, in particular, of an organised network – 
empirically, theoretically and methodologically. 
                                                 
20 Analysing the literature referenced at the start of subsection 3.5.1, only two out of over a dozen case 
studies drawing on Clegg’s framework analysed single-organisations. Within those two, Davenport and 
Leitch (2005) had a very strong inter-organisational focus. Therefore, Ribeiro (2003) was the only 
research based on a single organisation case study with a clear intra-organisational focus. 
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The introduction of one single innovation, individually, produced only limited 
repercussions in IndCo. Even restricting the investigation scope (temporarily, for 
analytical purposes) to the circuit of system integration, it was clear that the combined, 
reciprocal and cumulative repercussions of various innovations were both empirically 
and theoretically crucial. Indeed, while the research focused on three particular 
innovations (SAP FI, the SSC and the CC), several additional innovations were noted 
throughout the fieldwork. Some examples are other technological innovations (other 
SAP modules and other technological solutions like IXOS and IDAR) and 
organisational innovations (e.g., an industrial benchmarking department, a Business 
Processes and Organisation department, and centralised – at a country level - logistic 
structures). The collective origin of the repercussions, rather than one particular origin 
from one particular innovation, was an outstanding insight. 
The feasibility and effectiveness of the implementation, operation and further 
development of the various innovations, as well as their organisational impact, are 
highly interwoven and interdependent. There are important complementarities and 
reinforcements between these elements of the circuit of system integration. Each node, 
in particular when it becomes an Obligatory Passage Point, has the potential to develop 
and strengthen the relational position and power of other OPPs – as well as to challenge 
and even replace other OPPs. 
In line with Foucault and ANT, the power repercussions of the strategies of the 
central actors that introduced and promoted these innovations, are dependent on the 
collective effect of these innovations, which constitute a network of human and non-
human actors. The power effects of each innovation (and of the collective network) are 
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dependent on their capacity to become established, embedded and fixed as Obligatory 
Passage Points within the actor-network.  
For this collective effect to emerge, organisation is critical (Clegg, 1989). It is 
not enough to assemble resources, or to implement information systems, or to create 
organisational structures. As emphasised by ANT, the links between these actors are 
crucial – among which, the processes routed through these actors, as illuminated by the 
empirical insights. The linkages, the routings, the complementarities and 
reinforcements, the overall organisation of the actors, end up by being as important, or 
even more important, than the actors themselves. 
Therefore, it is not merely the existence of the actors (innovations) that matters. 
Additional characteristics related with the network concept are extremely important. 
The first characteristic is how these actors (innovations) are connected, the socio-
technical relations between them, how they complement and supplement each other. 
And the second is how the actors (innovations) are embedded in organisational 
processes, how they become a necessarily intervening part in those processes, in a way 
that they become Obligatory Passage Points. 
The emphasis on networks also has research implications at a methodological 
level (in addition to the empirical and theoretical aspects already discussed). 
Researchers who (too) quickly settle in investigating the ‘effects’ of a particular 
innovation, without being persistently inquisitive in trying to unveil additional related 
innovations, risk missing important empirical and theoretical insights.  
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7.1.3.5 Embeddedness in organisational processes: beyond technological 
embeddedness 
The fifth contribution concerns extending the focus of research about 
embeddedness of rules, going beyond technology (Volkoff et al., 2007) to include 
organisational aspects as well. 
Volkoff et al. (2007) identified “embeddedness as central to the process of 
change” (p. 832). The discussion of this case study fully supports such view, and 
suggests the extension of embeddedness beyond technology. In fact, an identified 
crucial characteristic is how rules are structurally defined and embedded in one, or both, 
types of actors (the technological innovations and the organisational innovations). An 
example of a technological actor is SAP, which during social interactions automatically 
enacts the previously embedded rules. An example of an organisational actor is the 
SSC. The SSC organisation and ordinary, day-to-day functioning is structurally based 
on the enactment of certain rules by all actors, including (and in particular) those 
subject to control; and, through various mechanisms analysed in this chapter, the SSC 
strongly promotes the enactment of those rules21. 
Therefore, going beyond only technological embeddedness, a more adequate, 
wider focus should be the embeddedness of rules in organisational processes – which, 
in turn, depend on both technological and organisational aspects and innovations. Two 
CC respondents converged in indicating processes as the crucial aspect. One of the 
respondents stated he was increasingly concerned about processes, and less concerned 
                                                 
21 Repercussions of innovations on actors’ dispositions are a part of the circuit of social integration, 
discussed in the next section. 
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about systems. The other respondent also emphasised processes, by thus commenting 
that the department focused in business processes and organisation is…  
“structuring, reinforcing the component of change, leveraging a lot on IS, 
but not exclusively… In organisation models… The processes themselves.”  
“We should not equate information with the technologies providing that 
information. (…) We analyse the processes which provide and manage 
information. The support tools are a constraint, which we respect, but we 
are not going to analyse the tool and whether [solution X] is good or not. 
We are going to analyse if the reporting [process] is satisfying or not. If not 
and the reason is the tool, then we can question the tool.”  
 
Therefore, the crucial aspect is the process itself and users’ perceptions about it. 
And these ‘outcomes’ depend not only on the technological tools, but also on 
“organisational models”. As a conclusion, research on embeddedness should widen its 
scope beyond technology. It should focus on embeddedness in organisational processes, 
including both technological and organisational aspects and innovations. 
7.1.3.6 Innovations structurally extending (and restricting) agencies 
The sixth contribution highlights how technological and organisational 
innovations structurally extended the influence of certain human agencies, as well as 
structurally restricted other human agencies.  
For example, SAP FI was introduced in the actor-network and underwent several 
stages of mobilisation by central actors. In its current configuration, SAP FI sets a 
number of restrictions to human agencies, in particular to local actors, by automatically 
enacting rules which were embedded in technology during its mobilisation stage. This 
changes the scope of human agencies in various ways. It eliminates some possibilities 
of agency for local level actors, by transferring it either to SAP FI itself (when SAP FI 
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automatically enacts certain rules) or to other actors (e.g., when SAP FI restricts posting 
transactions to SSC actors). On the other hand, this redefinition of possibilities of 
agency also promotes the structural extension of human agency of central actors. The 
interests and objectives of the central actors who influenced the processes of 
introduction, mobilisation and embedding of innovations are now better supported, in a 
structural way, because the way those innovations are configured to operate within the 
network promote those interests and objectives. The capacity of those central human 
agencies to produce effects (or repercussions) was extended, in time and organisational 
scope. The innovations took over their place in the everyday relations they establish 
with the other elements of the network. Those central human agencies may cease to be 
involved in everyday relations and exercises of power, because innovations took over 
that role. 
It should be clear that the innovations at stake are not only technological, but 
also organisational. Indeed, even the above example, focusing on the SAP FI 
technological innovation, highlighted the role of the SSC organisational innovation, 
taking over some responsibilities from the local actors and hence contributing to the 
overall redefinition of the scope of agencies throughout IndCo.  
As noted in the first contribution, technological and organisational innovations 
become new actors in the network. The innovations relationally gain power by 
becoming Obligatory Passage Points in the network. In other words, the agency of these 
innovations becomes structurally indispensable and unavoidable within the network, 
including for other actors whose agency may be restricted. And, in turn, this may also 
structurally benefit the relational power of the actors whose interests and objectives 
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influenced the new circuit of system integration and the structurally redefined scope of 
agencies.  
7.1.3.7 Mutual dependencies of development among innovations in the circuit of 
system integration 
The seventh contribution highlights how the various innovations in the circuit of 
system integration were mutually dependent not only in daily operations, but also in 
their overall development – in terms of their introduction, design and implementation 
and continuous development. This contribution is a particular consequence of the 
network concept, and the dependencies were both technological and organisational, 
reflecting the relations between the technological and organisational components of the 
actor-network. For example, SAP FI initial design depended, among other factors, from 
IndCo’s group and its consolidation solution (see the start of subsection 6.1.3). And 
subsections 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 7.1.1 and the fourth contribution in 7.1.2 highlighted how 
various stages of the development of SAP FI, the CC and the SSC exhibited 
multifarious mutual dependencies. 
7.1.4 SUMMARY 
This section discussed how various innovations in the circuit of system 
integration had repercussions in that same circuit of system integration and, in a 
relatively ‘direct’ way, in the episodic circuit through rules enacted by various actors 
and through some relatively ‘direct’ benefits. Based on such discussion, some 
contributions were proposed. Figure 7.1, offering an overview of this entire chapter, 
depicted the major salient insights and contributions of this section mostly in its upper, 
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lower and right areas (the insights concerning the next section are concentrated in the 
middle, left area). 
The contributions highlighted how innovations become new actors in the 
organisation actor-network and hence redefine the organisational fabric. Innovations 
may become promoters of visibility to challenge previously unquestioned arrangements. 
The importance of organisational innovations was emphasised, in parallel with 
technological innovations, with both types of innovations being closely intertwined. In 
fact, the importance of the collective was emphasised, as an organised network of 
connected and complementary elements. It was suggested going beyond only 
technological embeddedness, and also focusing embeddedness in organisational 
processes, encompassing both technological and organisational aspects. It was argued 
that innovations may structurally extend and restrict the scope of agencies throughout 
the actor-network. Finally, it was highlighted that the various innovations were mutually 
dependent both as regards their current operations and the various stages of their 
development. 
It should be noted that this section did not analyse all the insights regarding the 
circuit of system integration. In fact, this section mentioned at its outset that it attempted 
to restrict its scope to this particular circuit of power, excluding as much as possible the 
intertwined aspects related with the other circuits of power – in particular the circuit of 
social integration. However, the intertwining of circuits of power entails that other 
insights about the circuit of system integration acquire a particular relevance when the 
circuit of social integration is also considered. And the repercussions of these 
innovations in this second circuit, encompassing the prevailing rules of meaning and 
membership, are the focus of the next section. 
539 
7.2 The reconfigured circuit of social integration 
7.2.1 An introduction and a note on directions of causality between circuits of power in IndCo 
 
7.2 THE RECONFIGURED CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
7.2.1 AN INTRODUCTION AND A NOTE ON DIRECTIONS OF CAUSALITY 
BETWEEN CIRCUITS OF POWER IN INDCO 
This section analyses how SAP FI (and other IT tools), the CC and the SSC (as 
innovations in the circuit of system integration) contributed towards changes in the 
prevailing rules of meaning and membership (in the circuit of social integration) (Clegg, 
1989). The emphasis is on understanding how the innovations promoted the 
introduction and, in particular, the acceptance of rules by actors, in becoming a part of 
their “internal structures” (see subsection 2.3.1), promoting new dispositions towards 
rules enactment. These repercussions are part of the “second-order effects”, including 
“mindset and organizational culture” (p. 833), that Volkoff et al. (2007) suggested could 
eventuate from technological embeddedness, but which are not embedded in technology 
(see page 489 and following, in subsection 7.1.1). 
An alternative direction of “causality” would be to research the potential 
introduction of new rules at the level of the circuit of social integration, creating new 
dispositions among actors, and its eventual repercussions on the overall circuits of 
power. This direction of causality (of how accepted rules and associated dispositions 
affect the circuits of power) is theoretically plausible (Clegg, 1989; Ribeiro, 2003) and 
in the previous chapter this type of influence was considered important to explain 
IndCo’s circuits of power during the 1990’s. Such alternative direction of causality was, 
in fact, not absent in IndCo; however, it is argued that this was not the most salient 
direction of change. 
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The introduction of innovations was accompanied by communications, 
presentations and training. For example, as regards the SSC implementation, there was 
an initial presentation at IndCo’s Corporate Centre to all the “eligible” countries, 
targeted to the country managers and to the leaders of the administrative area. This was 
followed by tailored and shorter presentations, in each country, to all local actors. A 
senior manager thus described the need to promote dispositions among actors which are 
supportive of the technological and organisational innovations, rather than relying 
merely on the innovations themselves or on episodic exercises of power: 
“We try, as much as possible, to avoid to command, because normally we 
prefer to involve the people in the processes [of change]. (…) Suppose that I 
want to standardise a purchasing activity, to define the information flow of 
the purchasing activity. I know what I want. But I’m not going to get there, 
have the process designed, and ‘Now, go!’. No, I will create an entire 
project, involving people. In which (…) we will show and convince people 
about the benefits of following a certain standard procedure to place an 
order, receive materials, all that stuff. A change that in a small company 
should be no problem - I would tell the person of the purchasing area 
“From now on, it’s like this”, and on the following day it would be 
functioning… here, it can take months, until the process has been ‘bought’ 
[by actors], implemented and is [finally] functioning.” 
A senior SSC respondent conveyed a similar idea of ‘buying-in’ local actors 
towards making them accept the new rules. However, the same respondent also 
acknowledged the potential necessity to resort to episodic deployments of power to 
impose the change. This respondent was quoted in chapter 5, p. 328, describing the 
acute difficulty in introducing in some local sites a particular work procedure related 
with document digitalisation using the IXOS solution. In order to try to solve this 
problem, the respondent explained the planned course of action: 
“What are we going to do? We’ll talk to the people, show that this works. It 
works in Portugal, it works in [another country]… [elongated speech, in a 
relatively patronising way…] It’s more efficient, they won’t need as many 
people. It provides better control... (…) I’ll talk to them, and have my boss 
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talking to the local manager… Etc., etc.. And as a last resource, the CC will 
have to determine: “No, you will have to centralise”. We are going to try to 
achieve consensus. Trying to convince, ‘buy-in’ the people. ‘Buy-in’, in the 
good sense. And then, if it is not possible, it will have to be… [by hierarchic 
force].”  
 
From the previous quote, it should be highlighted that all the technological and 
organisational structures supporting the new work procedure were already in place – 
i.e., they had already been introduced and structurally secured in the circuit of system 
integration. However, the circuit of social integration was preventing the actual 
enactment of rules regarding the document digitalisation process. This circuit of social 
integration was going to be (re)addressed now, but with the backup of the circuit of 
system integration and eventually with the resort to episodic exercises of power. 
Several central actors admitted, and many more provided insights indicating so, 
that IndCo tended to privilege ‘hard’ approaches to organisational change, relying 
mostly on technological innovations and explicit, formal directives to bring about 
behavioural changes. For example, as an IT member acknowledged,  
“Communication and change management have always been areas where 
the IT Department has been weak. In fact, it still is.” 
 
The same respondent argued that consultants contributed to improvements in 
these areas, even beyond the periods of the consultants’ presence. But the perceptions of 
consultants themselves were particularly insightful to characterise IndCo’s traditional 
minor emphasis on the ‘softer’ side of organisational change: 
“[In IndCo], they don’t ‘buy’ consultants for organisational change, and 
they don’t value someone who proposes such approach. They say: ‘We take 
care of that, we’ve always done that’. Nowadays, they may think differently, 
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they’ve been through many experiences, they may consider that I’m not 
being fair. ‘We’re not that bad, we’ve already been through some 
experiences and we think that [change management] is very important, so 
that [neglect] doesn’t exist [any more]’. But, at the start, we felt, as 
consultants, that whenever we tried to include an additional profile, to 
improve certain components, it was seen as ‘Hey, you’re basically trying to 
swell the project with additional hours…”. Even the component of project 
management, at the start, had to be done by a project manager who had a 
very ‘hands-on’ vision; so, he wasn’t just a project manager, but also had to 
be ‘hands-on’.” 
 
In particular, numerous interviewees, both IndCo’s internal actors and external 
consultants, suggested that the IT Department and IT solutions often led the way in 
implementing wider organisational changes. An IT respondent presented the 
implementation of IndCo’s IS as a crucial condition to achieve and secure power in 
acquired companies: 
“We always had the culture that, first, to dominate, to exercise power over 
the acquired company, we had to dominate the ISs very well, otherwise we 
didn’t know what we were doing. I think that operation has succeeded in 
[the Spanish subsidiary], but it was totally unsuccessful in [a particular 
country]. Two years passed and nothing was done. Zero. Nobody bothered 
about implementing IS. (…) And we suffered a lot, in my opinion.”  
 
Indeed, the typical approach to change IndCo’s circuits of power and to drive 
organisational change was introducing technological and organisational innovations, in 
the circuit of system integration, rather than intervening directly and mostly in the 
circuit of social integration, i.e., addressing dispositions and rules acceptance directly. 
Instead, as argued in this section, an important vehicle for the introduction of new rules 
(and new dispositions) in IndCo were technological and organisational innovations. In 
line with the above discussion on embeddedness (see previous section), rules were 
embedded in innovations and in organisational processes. In other words, the attempts 
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to change the circuit of social integration were mostly done through innovations in the 
circuit of system integration. 
In fact, IndCo’s approach is in line with Clegg’s (1989) diagnosis of the 
propensity of the various circuits of power to promote change. In fact, Clegg argued that 
rules were mostly related with stability. On the contrary, changes (in the circuits of 
power in general, and hence also in rules) were most likely to be originated from 
innovations in the circuit of system integration.  
The following Figure 7.5 expands Figure 7.2 (an extract of Clegg’s framework). 
When compared with Figure 7.2, it additionally exhibits the components and relations 
of Clegg’s framework discussed in the current section.  
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Figure 7.5: Technological and organisational innovations and the reconfiguration of the 
circuit of social integration in IndCo (Source: adapted extract from Clegg’s framework) 
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Figure 7.5 depicts how the organised network of technological and 
organisational innovations which become Obligatory Passage Points in the circuit of 
system integration may promote changes in the circuit of social integration. These 
changes in the circuit of social integration may consist in the replacement of accepted 
rules, by making some rules stop being OPPs, and fixing new rules as OPPs – ‘social’ 
OPPs. In turn, the network of technological, organisational and ‘social’ OPPs creates 
repercussions in the episodic circuit. 
7.2.2 REPERCUSSIONS OF SAP FI (AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATIONS) IN THE CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
7.2.2.1 SAP FI achievements and limitations in changing the circuit of social 
integration 
The previous chapter indicated ways in which SAP FI promoted a greater 
consistency of rules of meaning within the accounting area across IndCo. However, the 
path towards such greater consistency was not linear: although the original starting 
point (the original chart of accounts) was the same for the three countries initially 
involved, the technological and organisational options allowed divergence to occur. 
Local actors started changing their local charts of accounts, in an uncoordinated way. 
However, an additional mobilisation of the package introduced a parallel accounts 
solution and the concept of a common chart of accounts, in a central database in a 
central server (in Portugal). 
Therefore, although local actors could still find locally relevant meaning in their 
local, country-level charts of accounts, there was an attempt to achieve a globally 
relevant meaning by the existence of the common chart of accounts and its 
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correspondence with each of the local charts of accounts. It was therefore a case of SAP 
FI becoming a ‘heteromogeneous’ object (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006). SAP FI 
“possess[ed] diversity and heterogeneity whilst being a homogeneous and operative 
technology”, and therefore “appear[ed] homogeneous for it attract[ed] and generate[d] 
heterogeneous uses” (p. 212). Diversity was not merely epistemological (how different 
actors perceived SAP FI), but also ontological (what SAP FI was, how it could be used 
and what for, differed for the various actors). 
However, while SAP FI allowed imperative local needs to be met, the diversity 
in SAP FI usage at local levels was still significantly constrained by central actors, by 
also strictly limiting the variety of outputs (i.e., SAP reports) made available to local 
actors. IT and SSC respondents (mentioned in subsection 6.1.5) clarified that SAP 
standard reports were used as much as possible and that addressing specific preferences 
of final clients was highly restricted. Indeed, the development of customised reports was 
not only restricted to central actors, but was even restricted to IT central actors, as 
highlighted by a senior SSC member. Centrally imposing a restricted number of 
common reports (indeed, typically restricted to SAP standard reports, since the 
development of customised reports was limited) limited the possibilities for divergent 
and inconsistent rules of meaning to develop.  
Reflecting at the wider level of the entire SAP system, an IT respondent 
suggested that the endorsement of appropriate rules of membership by local actors could 
be inferred from their acceptance of, and even desire for, the greater consistency of rules 
of meaning reflected on SAP information. 
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“The former CEO (…) mentioned that now, at the meetings with the various 
country leaders, this system allows not to waste endless time any more, 
discussing the contents of each account: ‘This figure is lower, because we 
don’t consider XPTO, and the other countries do, etc.’. Now, there is 
uniformity of contents, making comparison easier and fairer – and, later, 
evaluation, since evaluation is based on those figures. And that greater 
fairness must be good to those being evaluated.” 
 
Underlying this comment was the suggestion that it did not make sense that 
someone acting on good faith and having done a good job – and inherently obtained 
good results – had something against a more comparable, more transparent and fairer 
system that would presumably reveal those good results. Conversely, it was implicitly 
suggested that only someone who was not acting on good faith or had not done a good 
job could be opposed to it. 
Therefore, the uniform SAP system was perceived as “something one cannot be 
against (Hansen and Mouritsen, 1999)” (Busco et al., 2007, p. 130; also Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006). Here, the basis for creating the imperativeness and incontestable status 
of a uniform system was not the modernity appeal (as described in the previous section, 
page 502). Here, the basis consisted in the endorsement of appropriate rules of 
membership, including arguably universal characteristics such as ‘good faith’ and ‘do a 
good job’ (regardless of the precise ways those characteristics were perceived and 
evaluated). 
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, key central actors still perceived 
that SAP FI, in itself, even after being reconfigured to a parallel accounts solution, was 
insufficient to ensure the desired results (timely and comparable information). Some 
persisting rules of membership emphasising local issues and a local focus, rather than 
global and central ones, were not significantly affected by the implementation of SAP 
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FI22. A particular aspect was the persistence of distinct rules of meaning, in spite of 
some convergence. Such diversity was not manifested in the technological and 
accounting structures – which were the same in all the countries. Rather, such diversity 
manifested itself in the local actors’ actual, everyday usage of such structures. The 
actual usage of the structures reflected local actors’ accepted and enacted rules of 
meaning – and, in addition, usage reflected the ways local actors interpreted the rules 
which were embedded in the structures, and the ways local actors interpreted the 
business events to be posted in SAP FI23. This perception by key central actors was an 
important motivator to create the SSC, as well as additional technological innovations. 
In fact, a similar case concerned the introduction of the product costing module, SAP 
CO-PC, in 2005, to address diversity in cost and management accounting across plants, 
as mentioned in the chronological account of SAP adoption in IndCo, at the start of the 
previous chapter. 
7.2.2.2 A reflection on repercussions of technological innovations in the circuit of 
social integration 
Several insights were obtained about how other technological innovations had 
repercussions on the circuit of social integration. In line with the introductory discussion 
of this section, a consultant thus commented on IndCo’s use of IT solutions as a whole: 
                                                 
22 Excerpts of particularly insightful quotes from a CC manager, included in subsection 5.3.3, are repeated 
here: “We already had SAP [FI] (…) [But] we didn’t have capacity to have consistent information for 
decision-making, because each one [at a local level] had a different method. Not that there was bad-will 
or whatever. Simply, each one did as he/she knew and was used to doing, giving total and absolute 
priority to the country’s reporting, and not the internal group reporting”.  
23 The CC manager mentioned in footnote 22 clarified (also quoted in the same subsection): “Some 
[countries] posted external personnel expenses in the personnel account, others in overheads, in 
commercial costs…”. As regards the (partially related) controlling area, the following quotations included 
in the same subsection reflected the perceptions of some central actors in 2005 (i.e., around five years 
after SAP FI was implemented): “There was a procedure manual for management control. But not all 
[plant controllers] did in the same way”; and “We are sure that, in some cases, criteria are different 
across controllers.”  
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“For someone who is looking from outside, I think it is quite visible: 
information systems act a lot like a striker, in terms of acculturation to 
IndCo’s methodologies.” 
 
The consultant related ‘acculturation’ with the adoption of new work rules and 
supporting new concepts, embedded in SAP operational modules. An example was the 
introduction, in a recently acquired plant, of the concept of ‘delivery date’ to the client. 
As analysed below in this section (see 7.2.4.2), there were also crucial non-
technological (organisational) contributions for the change to occur and for local actors 
to start enacting the rule. But the embedding of rules in SAP and its enabling and 
disciplinary role had, indeed, a central contribution. In a similar vein, other respondents 
(both central and local) highlighted that the legacy solution, SOIC, had a similar role 
when implemented in acquired companies (before SAP operational modules were rolled 
out). 
The fieldwork provided insights about various ways in which the SSC (actually, 
more than the CC, in itself) affected the circuit of social integration. The most direct 
influences of the SSC are now analysed in the next subsection. After that, the following 
subsection focus broadens the analysis and researches the most subtle influences of the 
entire network of innovations. 
7.2.3 DIRECT REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SHARED SERVICES CENTRE IN THE 
CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
As argued in the previous section, the creation of the SSC had two, almost 
immediate effects in the network of actors, at a local and at a central level: it drastically, 
and swiftly, changed the composition of the local network of actors, by the almost 
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elimination of the local members of the accounting area; and it introduced a new central 
collective actor (the SSC) and the central individual actors who worked there. 
The elimination of some actors from the local networks and the emergence of a 
new central collective actor (and its individual members), in itself, had clear and direct 
consequences as regards power issues and institutional characteristics. The first 
contribution of the previous section, highlighting the reconstitution of the actor-
network, is the basis for additional analysis. In fact, some local actors endorsing the 
local rules of membership described above (e.g., an emphasis on local issues) simply 
ceased to exist in the remaining network of local actors. Second, a new central 
collective actor, with centre-oriented rules of meaning and membership, emerged.  
In addition, considering that often the same individual actor at the SSC 
processed similar types of transactions for various countries, the previous inconsistency 
of practices deriving from different rules of meaning across the various sites was 
virtually eliminated. Importantly, the interpretation of the rules by that particular 
individual at the SSC became the prevailing interpretation in the recording of 
accounting transactions. Centralising the execution of certain accounting activities 
across all subsidiaries in a particular individual was crucial in overcoming the 
previously perceived situation of distinct interpretations of rules across individual 
actors, scattered across the various local sites. This centralisation eliminated one of the 
sources of rules indexicality, i.e., of diversity of rules derived from diverse contexts 
where the rules were applied (see subsections 2.3.1.2 and 3.5.6). 
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A CC manager clearly considered that the SSC was more important than SAP FI 
in improving consistency in rules interpretation and enactment, although making clear 
their combined effect: 
“I think it is much more relevant that we have moved to a single structure 
[the SSC], rather than having SAP (…). The fundamental feature is that it is 
a single software (SAP or another), there is central data processing and the 
possibility for variations on how to interpret and introduce data in the 
system is increasingly restricted.” 
 
The very direct consequences of the elimination and creation of actors within the 
actor-network are significant, and their theoretical and practical relevance should be 
noted. However, an even more promising area of analysis, from both theoretical and 
practical perspectives, is to understand the more subtle effects of this migration, and in 
particular as regards the local actors that remained in the local teams, after the 
migration. Furthermore, at an organisation-wide level, the “post-innovations” network 
of actors (including the new central actors and, in particular, the remaining local actors) 
is the empirical referent about which power and institutional issues may be raised.  
The interpretation of the fieldwork insights suggested that these more subtle 
effects in the circuits of power and, in particular, in the circuit of social integration must 
be understood by the consideration of the entire network of technological and 
organisational innovations. As a merely illustrative example related with the last 
analysed insight, the SSC repercussion on greater uniformity in interpretations cannot 
be disassociated from the contribution of IXOS in immediately transporting the image 
of the original document for the SSC actors to analyse and interpret – and post in SAP 
FI. As such, the ensuing subsection focuses on the entire network of technological and 
organisational innovations (SAP FI, CC and the SSC, and also other innovations 
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mentioned throughout the analysis). And it investigates how that entire network of 
innovations influenced the circuit of social integration, i.e., the power operating through 
the prevailing rules of meaning and membership. 
7.2.4 REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NETWORK OF INNOVATIONS IN THE CIRCUIT 
OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION - PRELIMINARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
7.2.4.1 The role of increasing requests by new actors 
As argued, the creation of the SSC and the CC constituted the emergence of new 
central actors with specific information needs, encompassing the organisation as a 
whole. An IT interviewee suggested that these additional information requirements had 
an influence beyond the central level, also affecting local actors and their beliefs about 
the most appropriate approach to produce financial information: 
Researcher: “[Drawing from the interviewee’s depiction of an increasing 
tighter control and information access:] So, there was an objective to 
perform a more detailed control, rather than merely based on the bottom-
line – although the official strategy is being a multi-regional company, 
typically associated with a less tight control at a detailed level, and more 
based on the bottom line. 
Respondent: OK, you have various regional locations and managers. But 
you start having centralised corporate functions, the management control 
[department at the CC], the SSC. That obliges to start having centralised 
information, and so you [at the centre] stop having exclusively a bottom-
line concern and start needing another type of information. By tightening 
the control, you start obliging that, even at a regional level, people accept a 
more centre-oriented concern than before, when [the prevailing perspective 
was] ‘OK, this [information] is for my own use, I don’t care about the 
others!’. ‘Now, this is for me and it is for them. So, I’ll prepare the 
information already in line with what they want, so that I avoid further 
work, later on.’”  
 
However, the mere existence of requests from central actors may not be 
sufficient, in itself, to consistently produce organisational outcomes (in this case, 
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changing rules and practices to produce information according to central actors’ 
requirements). This thesis has already amply described examples of such insufficiency 
in IndCo. As Clegg (1989) and Ribeiro (2003) argued, episodic exercises of power, 
through mere episodic pressure and mere episodic allocation of resources, may not be 
sufficient to produce intended outcomes, in particular in a consistent and recurrent way.  
Therefore, from a perspective of theoretical development, an account limited to 
the emergence of additional central collective actors, with added formal power (in 
particular, the CC), making more requests and more pressure on local actors, contributes 
to a possible explanation, but has a limited explanatory reach, in itself. 
High level actors also appeared to be aware of the insufficiency – and 
undesirability – of relying exclusively on episodic exercises of power. Applying the 
concepts adopted in this thesis, it can be said that these actors considered that there was 
virtually no alternative to relying on structural mechanisms of power, on creating a web 
of obligatory passage points, on the circuits of system and social integration. As a senior 
manager stated (see quote at the start of this section, p. 540), this was particularly the 
case of a large company such as IndCo, where episodic exercises of power are unable to 
create a coordinated acceptance and enactment of desired rules. 
One of the limitations of central actors was clearly related with local rules of 
membership, which prioritised local interests and a local focus. As highlighted above, 
the implementation of SAP FI alone promoted greater uniformity of rules of meaning 
across subsidiaries, but there were no significant repercussions as regards rules of 
membership.  
553 
7.2 The reconfigured circuit of social integration 
7.2.4 Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of social integration - preliminary contributions 
 
So, why and how did eventually the rules change? Ribeiro’s (2003) work 
suggested two main explanations addressing the limitations of episodic exercises of 
power: the role of innovations as creators of disciplinary visibility and enablers of 
enactment of desired rules. These explanations are now confronted with the insights 
from IndCo’s case. 
7.2.4.2 A first contribution: an empirical validation of Ribeiro’s (2003) 
hypotheses 
Ribeiro (2003), based on his case study, provided two lines of explanation of 
practices based on innovations in the circuit of system integration, and which were also 
present in IndCo. First, Ribeiro proposed that new information technology (an ERP 
system) and techniques (management accounting) could create new lines of visibility, a 
‘gaze’ over activities and performance; therefore, they could become “disciplinary 
devices capable of promoting and enforcing the very enactment of the rules being 
carried” (p. 215). Second, he proposed that those devices could also “enable the 
following of rules” (p. 215, emphasis in the original), “if the measures and figures 
produced were capable of driving decisions and actions” (p. 271). 
Innovations creating disciplinary visibility and enabling the enactment of rules 
Both Ribeiro’s (2003) insights, that innovations could be creators of disciplinary 
visibility and enablers of enactment of desired rules, were also found in IndCo’s case.  
As regards disciplinary visibility, this section focuses on the self-disciplinary 
repercussions of visibility, based on enactment of rules of membership by local actors. 
The more ‘direct’ disciplinary repercussions based of central actors’ visibility and 
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control of local actors was analysed in the previous section and it is not considered 
again, as much as the intertwined nature of the various effects allows. The explanation 
of self-disciplinary repercussions is substantially more complex, and its building blocks 
are laid down throughout this entire section, as the various contributions are presented. 
The accounts of several interviewees mentioned disciplinary and enabling 
repercussions. E.g., the adoption of a parallel accounts solution in the second stage of 
mobilisation of SAP FI (as synthesised in the previous section) had both enabling and 
disciplinary effects. As regards SAP FI as an enabler of the enactment of certain rules, 
the combination of a common structure and local, specific detailed accounts was crucial, 
as commented by a CC manager.  
“They could have 500.000 detailed accounts, if needed, as many as they 
wanted, that would be used only by them. But those accounts would fit in the 
places [in the accounts structure] that we wanted.” 
 
As a direct enabling effect for local actors, this tailored solution provided locally 
needed reports (such as tax reports) and the possibility to create local accounts - 
although a constrained possibility, since only (very few) central actors could create 
accounts. At the same time, it also enabled central actors to produce aggregated reports 
accessing directly to the local information, which fitted a common global structure.  
While SAP FI contributed to increase consistency in rules of meaning across the 
various sites, it was unable by itself to achieve the degree of consistency that central 
actors ambitioned. Organisational structures, such as the SSC, were crucial to promote 
such consistency. In particular, the SSC was crucial in two, highly related ways. First, 
the SSC disseminated knowledge about the global accounting structures among local 
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actors. And second, because the SSC became an OPP through which any attempt to 
materialise deviations from centrally defined rules of meaning had to go through. By 
being such an OPP (in particular, because it was the only actor that could create new 
accounts), the SSC was able to be informed about, evaluate and approve (or, by general 
policy, tend not to approve) local actors’ ambitions to create new accounts – ambitions 
which, if centrally unconstrained, could have the potential to (re)create diversity of rules 
of meaning.  
An IT interviewee thus described this role of the SSC (and of the IT Department, 
in particular during the period prior to the existence of the SSC): 
Respondent: “(…) [The IT area] and the SSC opposed to that [‘creative 
freedom’ to create specific local accounts]. If that plant doesn’t need, why 
should the other one need? It’s creative freedom, wanting to be different. 
Researcher: And from the moment that accounts creation becomes 
[interrupted]… 
Respondent: Central 
Researcher: …an exclusive of the SSC, that situation becomes 
automatically solved. 
Respondent: People [from the SSC] will ask: ‘What is this for?’. In 
addition, sometimes there are difficulties because people in other countries 
don’t really know what certain accounts of the common chart are for. [Then 
the SSC member will reply:] ‘So that is what the request is for? Then you’ll 
use this account, which suits this purpose’. Otherwise, we’d have a situation 
in which each person creates an account, thinking that the account in the 
common chart was not appropriate; but maybe it also suits the purpose.”  
 
Additionally, SAP FI’s enabling role also promoted, albeit in an indirect way, 
the enactment of new rules of membership which took the centre into consideration. 
Since one single operation of data entry originated information which satisfied both 
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central and local interests, local actors had more incentives to adopt rules of 
membership aligned with the interests of central actors.24 
In addition to SAP FI, other technological innovations, along with organisational 
innovations, also illustrate the two effects proposed by Ribeiro (disciplinary visibility 
and enabling the enactment of rules). The financial control of purchasing processes was 
already mentioned in the previous section. The rules about purchasing fixed assets 
included, in particular, not exceeding budgeted values and obtaining authorisation prior 
to ordering. These are two rules of membership, describing what each actor should do 
considering his membership of IndCo, rather than membership of a putative 
independent company (a common situation before IndCo’s acquisition). As a senior 
member of the SSC stated, “we still don’t own the place”. This respondent perceived the 
IDAR solution (see subsection 7.1.2, p. 519) to be, through the monitoring role of the 
SSC, a provider of visibility and an enabler of the enactment of these two rules of 
membership: 
“In IDAR, [the SSC] controls budgets [for fixed assets purchasing] (…). 
When [local] people estimate that something is going to cost 1000, (…) it 
must not cost 1500; otherwise, (…) the [SSC] Accounts Payable team will 
not post [the invoice] and will ask why there was a variance, so that people 
start becoming more conscious when they are doing things [budgets, or 
purchases]. And also to make them used to the idea that you shouldn’t buy 
things without an authorisation. Otherwise, it’s like ‘putting the wagon in 
front of the horses’. It’s not only when the supplier’s invoice appears, or 
when the supplier is already yelling for the money, that the authorisation is 
obtained. It makes no sense. It has not been easy to instil this part [this 
rule], because when people need something, they are used to grab the phone 
and immediately make a purchasing order, and maybe they are not used to 
this bureaucratic side, but they will have to get used to it. And I will be 
increasingly… [demanding]. I always try, when it’s a new thing [rule], to 
give a period for people to get used to the idea (…). ‘Exceptionally, I’ll do 
                                                 
24 The importance of simultaneously satisfying both central and local concerns is a contribution proposed 
in the next subsection, in 7.2.5.6 “Minimise additional work for local actors’ compliance – and increase 
work for non-compliance”. 
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this, but it’s an exception...”. But after sufficient time has passed, 
[exceptions] are no longer justifiable and people must start acting 
[according to the new rules]. If it is not the easy way, it will have to be the 
hard way. (…)  
In principle, [local] people have autonomy to purchase. Another thing is 
people being conscious when purchasing [and keep within the budget] (…). 
Otherwise, each one does as he/she pleases. It’s a matter of discipline, so 
that people start realising that one thing is autonomy, but we still don’t own 
the place, right? (…) No one told me this, but we perceive that this is it [this 
is the purpose of IDAR]. That [local] people feel that ‘Attention, pay 
attention. I am here’. At the end of the day, it’s a demarcation of terrain. No 
one told me, but… ‘Pay attention, if you do everything correctly, no one will 
bother you; but look out, because someone is paying attention’. I think that 
this is the main purpose: to make people feel that there is someone paying 
attention.”  
 
This excerpt is insightful as regards the perception that the creation of a line of 
visibility, of a ‘gaze’ over local actors’ activities, had both a disciplinary effect (and 
purpose) and an enabling effect. In fact, this excerpt encapsulates both the ‘direct’ effect 
of creating disciplinary visibility derived from the control by central actors and the more 
indirect repercussion of creating self-discipline among local actors. 
In a similar line, a CC respondent, after agreeing that IDAR was an obligatory 
passage point25, argued that the ‘consequences’ of the detection of a failure to enact 
prescribed rules had longer term disciplinary repercussions: the creation of appropriate 
dispositions of self-discipline, conducing to the enactment of prescribed rules in future 
situations. The discipline derived from a post-facto control and detection by central 
actors translated to a discipline based on ex-ante dispositions of local actors. 
Researcher: “Occasionally, should there be a greater need for speed in a 
certain [acquisition] process, something may be classified as a cost [rather 
than a fixed asset]… 
                                                 
25 This interview was held towards the end of the fieldwork and previous empirical findings and research 
hypotheses and concepts were discussed. 
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Respondent: There were cases like that. 
Researcher: It is actually a way to circumvent the obligatory passage point, 
right? 
Respondent: Exactly. 
Researcher: But sooner or later, the thing [manipulation] is detected 
Respondent: Exactly. Sooner or later. And those cases tend to become less 
frequent, given the ‘consequences’ (between commas) deriving from that 
act.”  
Researcher: (…) Even if, physically, there’s a way to circumvent that, the 
process will be blocked later, right? 
Respondent: [Yes, it will be] [b]locked. 
Researcher: When the invoice payment time is reached… 
Respondent: It will be noticed. (…) Exactly, that’s true.” 
 
A final example, related with non-financial SAP modules, concludes the analysis 
of Ribeiro’s hypotheses. It also reveals how the various circuits are intertwined and how 
difficult their analytical separation is. 
A consultant provided empirical support to Markus and Bjorn-Andersen’s (1986, 
p. 501) argument that IS “embody ideas and theories about the desired nature and 
organization of work”. He exemplified how SAP, given the way it was implemented in 
a recently acquired plant, facilitated the adoption in that plant of work practices and 
ideas prevalent in IndCo. This shift occurred since SAP granted visibility and 
knowledge about the plant production process, to a commercial unit which closely 
interacts with the plant (see quotation #3 in the Appendix).  
This description of “acculturation”, of instilling work methods common to the 
entire company, suggests the mere reliance on consent, on actors’ lack of alternative 
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unless to comply, under the pressure of other structural conditioning elements. In this 
case, the structural conditioning elements were fundamentally technological (Volkoff et 
al., 2007), but there is an organisational aspect which cannot be overlooked. Rules of 
meaning were technologically embedded in SAP in a structural way, imposing that the 
plant actors indicate a delivery date and start using the new concepts ‘production cycle’ 
and ‘block planning’. However, the strong pressure from the commercial organisation 
(empowered by the visibility allowed by SAP) was crucial to convert the initial, 
technologically enforced introduction in SAP of a delivery date, into the actual 
enactment of the rule at a physical level – i.e., by having the order produced in the 
indicated date. The organisational pressure cannot be considered as an absolute 
imperative (as the technological aspects were), but its influence cannot be overlooked in 
creating the appropriate “mindset” (Volkoff et al., 2007).  
With these empirical insights alone, it is not possible to explore whether that 
consent also created positive dispositions among plant actors towards the work 
methods; it is also not possible to evaluate how previously existing rules and 
dispositions influenced the interpretation and application of the proposed innovation, 
and the rules it brought along – even an ‘implacable’ implementation strategy, as the 
one described, cannot ignore the existence of previously existing rules, and how they 
shape actors’ understanding and reaction.  
In spite of the research limitations, some conclusions can be still drawn. SAP 
became an Obligatory Passage Point for the plant actors. Even assuming that this 
implementation process relied on sheer imposition and actors’ consent, rather than 
persuasion and buy-in, new rules were introduced and accepted in the circuit of social 
integration. New rules of meaning (the definition of the concepts of ‘production cycle’, 
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‘block planning’) were actually introduced via embedding them in SAP, in the way it 
was configured by the IT team and reinforced by other organisational supporting 
structures. And the subsequent enactment of certain rules of membership (which define 
the appropriateness of the actors’ conducts and hence their membership status) through 
the following of these work procedures was closely monitored by another organisational 
structure, the Spanish commercial, via the visibility allowed by SAP. Therefore, 
diversified elements of the circuit of system integration fixed, structurally rather than 
episodically, new rules of meaning and membership and their consistent enactment 
(self-discipline) by the plant actors. 
As a concluding remark, this empirical example allows reinforcing some 
previous contributions regarding repercussions on the circuit of system integration (see 
previous section) and extending them to the circuit of social integration. Such is the case 
of the importance of visibility and organisational structures. In addition, the importance 
of the collective also emerges, and in particular of an organised network. This insights 
are analysed as the next contribution in this subsection. 
These insights on visibility, control and self-discipline are quite similar to 
Bentham’s (1995/1843) and Foucault’s (1975/1977) description of the control in the 
Panopticon (see subsection 3.3.1). In particular, technology creates the conditions for a 
permanent, pervading control by another entity (“someone”; “pay attention. I am here”, 
as in the above quote, in page 558), a possibility clearly perceived by controlled actors’. 
In turn, the controlled actors’ awareness of this gaze (“people feel that there is someone 
paying attention”) and the perceived inevitability of later detection of potential 
deviations, creates self-disciplinary dispositions, promoting the enactment of rules 
(analysed as an autonomous contribution, in 7.2.5.8 “Perception of inevitability”. 
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Interestingly, the two first interviewees reflecting on IDAR repercussions (p. 
557 and following) provided two different perspectives on why those self-disciplinary 
dispositions emerge. The first respondent highlighted the latent threat (or the even 
actual exercise) of sanctions (“if you do everything correctly, no one will bother you”; 
“If it is not the easy way, it will have to be the hard way”) – i.e., direct disciplinary 
actions by central actors. However, ‘the consequences’ mentioned by the second 
interviewee related to the processual blockages that are created in the event of non-
compliance, rather than (actual or potential) disciplinary actions26. This second 
perspective is one of the foundations for an additional contribution, presented in 7.2.5.3 
“OPPs to produce and the promotion of dispositions to desire OPPs and accept 
embedded controls”. 
Local perspectives: downplaying, but acknowledging, the disciplinary effects of 
visibility 
Local actors were fully aware of the control role of these innovations, based on 
increased visibility. However, some downplayed the disciplinary effect of these 
innovations, in two main perspectives. One of the perspectives was downplaying the 
disciplinary effect in their particular case. One local actor thus commented:  
“Indeed, there is more control, we are more ‘controlled’ (between commas) 
in our activity, but that doesn’t create any problem. It doesn’t bother me 
that someone is looking at what I do. Because I don’t do any more, or any 
less, because of that. It’s natural that such a large company, with so many 
plants, has a control system. It’s normal, logical. (…) It seems reasonable to 
me.”  
                                                 
26 The interpretation that the expression “‘consequences’ (between commas)” was related to processual 
blockages (rather than disciplinary consequences) derived from a careful analysis of the oral expression 
of the interviewee, rather than from the topics of the ensuing dialogue. It should be noted that the ensuing 
dialogue (which could be considered to also support this interpretation) could not be used as a criterion to 
interpret the expression, since the discussion was mostly led by the researcher, not the interviewee.  
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Naturally, this is one of the cases where respondents’ accounts must be 
interpreted with caution. In fact, should local actors attribute a great disciplinary effect 
of the control devices, the researcher could interpret that as acknowledging that, in the 
absence of such controls, their dispositions and practices would be different – i.e., 
undisciplined and opposed to the interests of central actors. Respondents’ accounts are 
always potentially biased by their ‘membership work’ towards the researcher (Ribeiro, 
2003), an actor allowed by central actors to be querying organisational members – and 
in this topic the potential of bias is particularly important. 
Therefore, local respondents’ insights about other local actors (rather than about 
themselves) are likely to be less influenced by a potential ‘membership work’ towards 
the researcher (although such risk is merely potentially diminished, but never 
eliminated). Therefore, the following comment of the same local actor is particularly 
meaningful: 
“They are simply watching what you are doing. Nothing else. (…) Our 
activity is as always. At least, in my case. There are colleagues [other local 
actors] who feel differently.” 
 
Therefore, although excluding his particular case, this local actor argued that a 
tighter control indeed impacted on dispositions of other local actors. 
The second perspective of local actors downplaying the disciplinary effects of 
the innovations (and which may also be subject to the above caveat) was arguing that a 
remote control by central actors and based on IDAR failed to be timely and hence 
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effective in preventing variances. The suggested alternative was a control performed by 
local actors, with a direct, first-hand knowledge about the plant: 
“Although it [the control through IDAR and the SSC] has a dissuasive 
effect, in some cases it does not work. ‘In fact, we miscalculated, or we 
weren’t counting on this unpredictable event, and we are going to have that 
variance’. The dissuasive effect still exists. But the difference [between a 
local level control and a remote, central control] is between a dissuasive 
effect when it is still possible to do something [to avoid the variance, should 
the control be made at a plant level], and the dissuasive effect that will do 
nothing. (…) It is very difficult to centrally control a plant. You don’t stand 
a chance. (…) It is too late. If you don’t have a person controlling in the 
field, you are not going to control anything. It’s just an idea [a false idea] 
that you are controlling. You are not! When the invoice gets there [to the 
SSC], what is the SSC going to do? Will the SSC refuse to pay the supplier? 
Is he guilty of that [lack of enactment of internal rules]? (…) What has been 
done, has been done. (…) There is only one solution, and it must be based at 
a plant level. It’s not someone from the SSC who is going to say: ‘Look, you 
have this alternative equipment to set up this line [of production]’.” 
 
Several aspects potentially limit IDAR’s effectiveness as a control tool. IDAR 
does not prevent, impede local actors from disrespecting the rules (as confirmed by 
quotes from other interviewees, e.g., in p. 580). In this regard, the effectiveness of 
IDAR is not comparable to SAP’s automatic enactment of rules embedded in the 
system, as analysed in the previous section. Human agency is retained by local actors, 
and local actors’ dispositions are relevant in guiding action. Even more important, not 
enacting the rules gives rise to material consequences (“the work has been done”) and 
legal obligations (“Will the SSC refuse to pay the supplier? Is he guilty of that [lack of 
enactment of internal rules]?”); this may promote among local actors a sense of a de 
facto capacity not to enact formal rules.  
Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of a dissuasive effect (i.e. disciplinary 
effect), based on IDAR and operated through the SSC, still emerges from the previous 
564 
7.2 The reconfigured circuit of social integration 
7.2.4 Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of social integration - preliminary contributions 
 
quote. In fact, local actors are aware that such disrespect will not pass unnoticed by the 
network of control devices, potentially putting at stake the actors’ ‘membership work’ 
towards IndCo.27 Therefore, the disciplinary effect is indeed present, even if nuanced by 
other factors as the ones discussed.  
Indeed, this self-disciplinary effect is visible in a quote from a different local 
actor. This local actor recognised a de facto capacity not to enact formal rules and order 
without an approval through IDAR. However, the same actor also recognised that the 
SSC would identify such deviation due to its embeddedness within the integrated 
purchasing processes and would then halt the process, by not paying the supplier’s 
invoice: 
“Once [a purchase is] approved in IDAR, they [SSC] have to create that in 
SAP. Therefore, any order to a supplier has to include a given number, 
based on the system. If you don’t have a number, you cannot order. And 
let’s imagine that you made a non-official order. You cannot pay the 
invoice. [Silence, meaning: ‘there’s nothing you can do’]”  
 
Finally, IndCo’s case study suggested an additional perspective to Ribeiro’s 
insights. Consequences regarding rules enactment may not derive from new formal rules 
introduced by, and embedded in, the innovations, as clarified by a senior SSC member: 
“There has always been [the rule defining that there should be] people 
approving [investments]. But not in such a rigid way.” 
 
Therefore, the contribution of the IDAR technological solution was mostly 
bringing actual effectiveness to the control process, to the actual enactment of already 
                                                 
27 An autonomous contribution in 7.2.5.8 “Perception of inevitability” develops this perspective. 
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previously existing rules, through the increased visibility and enabling effect – rather 
than the introduction of new rules. 
7.2.4.3 A revisited emphasis on organised networks 
As argued above, empirical insights (both already presented and to be presented) 
highlight the need of going beyond limited interventions relying on single, unarticulated 
innovations. The importance of the collective, of an organised network, was a 
contribution already proposed in the previous section, regarding the circuit of system 
integration. This proposal is now extended to the circuit of social integration. 
The repercussions on the circuit of social integration depend on the combined, 
reciprocal and cumulative repercussions of various innovations. This included a large 
number of dispersed actors, ranging from technological actors (like SAP with its various 
modules, IXOS and IDAR), ‘typically central’ organisational actors (like the SSC, the 
CC, the industrial benchmarking department and the Business Processes and 
Organisation department) to less visible and ‘less central’ actors. The above example, 
about the acceptance and enactment of rules by members in a recently-acquired plant 
(see p. 559 and following), the influence of SAP (as a technical actor with embedded 
rules that are later automatically enacted) cannot be disassociated from the influence of 
organisational actors that are not ‘central’ actors. Instead, they are local actors, from a 
different functional area (the commercial area), but which become another member of a 
wide network of actors contributing to the enactment of centrally defined global rules 
due to their embeddedness in organisational processes. Likewise, in an example 
presented below in p. 588, logistic departments at a country-level (i.e., at an 
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intermediate level between plants and ‘central’ actors at headquarters) are described as 
crucial in rule acceptance and enactment.  
Therefore, organisational actors contributing to the attainment of centrally 
defined, global objectives (such as the adoption of rules of meaning and membership) 
were widely distributed. This highlights the collective origin of the repercussions, rather 
than one particular origin from one particular innovation. It also extends the 
contributions in the previous section emphasising the concepts of networks and 
embeddedness, proposing their relevance also to repercussions on the circuit of social 
integration. And it further supports Dechow and Mouritsen’s (2005) view that 
“management control in an ERP-environment is not a property of the accounting 
function but a collective affair where local control issues in different parts of the 
organisation are used to create notions of global management” (p. 691).  
7.2.4.4 A summary of preliminary contributions 
This subsection initiates the analysis (to be continued below) of the 
repercussions of the innovations network in the circuit of social integration. The first 
identified repercussion derives from increased requests by new central actors. This 
insight is not unimportant, both empirically and theoretically, but is not here considered 
as a contribution. Then, the subsection analysed the hypotheses suggested by Ribeiro 
(2003), that innovations could be creators of disciplinary visibility (i.e., influencing the 
circuit of social integration) and enablers of the enactment of desired rules. This second 
role of innovations is more directly related with actors’ behaviours in particular 
episodes of action, but, as further argued in the remainder of the section, it can also 
influence the circuit of social integration. Finally, it revisited last section highlights 
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about the importance of collective, dispersed and organised actors, by proposing that 
this concept of an organised network was also relevant to understand repercussions on 
the circuit of social integration. 
In addition, more fundamental and innovative contributions were developed 
based on this case study. They are now presented in the next subsection. 
7.2.5 REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NETWORK OF INNOVATIONS IN THE 
CIRCUIT OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION – MAIN THEORETICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
7.2.5.1 Application and confirmation of literature hypotheses in very different 
empirical settings 
This case contributes to theory in a way also related with Ribeiro’s hypotheses 
(as above), but not in a ‘narrow’ confirmatory perspective. The contribution is related 
with the empirical setting. In fact, this case study showed that Ribeiro’s hypotheses 
were also valid in a very different empirical setting.  
What is at stake is not merely researching a different organisation; in such 
perspective, every case study on a different organisation would have this contribution. 
What is at stake is that this study focused on a very distinct functional area and on a 
very different type of activity. Ribeiro analysed the influence of material conditions in 
the enactment of rules in the production area; this case study focused on that influence 
in the financial area and, in particular, in the production of financial information and 
control - while occasionally drawing on examples from other functional areas and 
activities to highlight that similar repercussions could be also found at a wider level. In 
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spite of obvious and important differences between the two functional areas and 
activities (the production of industrial goods and the production of financial information 
and control), Ribeiro’s hypotheses also had explanatory power in this case.  
Therefore, and also considering the validation presented in the previous 
subsection, this case study contributed to strengthen the external validity of Ribeiro’s 
hypotheses and to the analytical generalisation recommended to promote theory 
development based on qualitative research (Modell, 2005; Yin, 2009). 
7.2.5.2 Innovations shaping actors’ scope of agency and rules related with actors’ 
roles 
The effectiveness of the network of OPPs relies on organisation (Clegg, 1989). 
A key aspect of such organisation is concerned with the role and contribution of each 
actor within the wider network, the way each actor perceives his/her role (what each 
actor perceives to be expected to do and not to do) and his/her scope of agency (i.e., 
what each actor perceives he/she can do).  
Subsection 7.1.1 has already analysed how, during the implementation stage, 
central actors structurally embedded in SAP: 1) transactional rules and 2) the definition 
of roles through user profiles. This structural conditioning (in Volkoff et al.’s, 2007 
terms) defined boundaries of agency for all actors. The previous section has already 
analysed how SAP automatically: 1) enacts those rules regardless of any direct human 
agency and 2) enables or restrains the scope of human agency, during users’ ordinary 
use of the system (the social interaction cycle, according to Volkoff et al.). As argued in 
that subsection, such automatic enactment of rules and human agency conditioning by 
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SAP cannot be considered an aspect of the circuit of social integration, since it is not 
related with the creation of dispositions among (human) actors. 
Nonetheless, material conditioning also has consequences as regards the circuit 
of social integration. Indeed, the IT-driven and centrally defined boundaries of agency 
can be considered to be a manifestation of the enactment of particular rules of meaning. 
These boundaries of agency shape the meaning attributed to each particular 
organisational actor, occupying a particular organisational position, with a particular 
role, in a particular organisational structure. These are rules of meaning which impinge 
on the actors’ sense of identity (‘Am I an administrative actor entering information in 
the system? Or am I an analyst?’) and are strongly and structurally embedded in the 
system. In turn, these particular rules of meaning are tightly related with rules of 
membership - what each actor should do as a member of the network, in terms of the 
expectations of third parties to whom the actor aims to conduct membership work 
(Munro, 1999) and in terms of his own perceptions of rules of membership. The 
following quote of a senior SSC actor is representative: 
“[With the SSC,] there had to be a click in the way to face the day-to-day 
and the way of working (…) At the time [before the SSC], the local people, 
even the leader of those local teams, could post transactions, etc.. We 
changed the profiles. They can no longer do it. They have profiles of 
analysis, full stop.”  
 
These repercussions are patent in the empirics already discussed. But one of the 
clearest examples referred to the project of implementing the Product Costing SAP 
module, SAP CO-PC (as mentioned, this project is beyond the scope of this thesis; 
therefore, it is only briefly mentioned). Numerous interviewees pointed out the 
expectation that the role of the plant controller would undergo a significant change, 
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from a calculative emphasis to an analytical emphasis and to the creation and 
maintenance of cost accounting rules. This would involve rules of meaning and 
membership of the plant controllers themselves, as regards their sense of identify within 
the company, and also rules of meaning and membership of other actors, such as their 
hierarchical superiors, the plant directors. As a CC manager and an IT member stated, 
respectively:  
“This will also require training the plant directors, to understand that the 
controller (…) is not his personal assistant to make the ‘little reports’ A, B, 
C or C which provide exactly the same information of those which are in the 
system, but someone who is there to help him with qualitative analysis, to 
help him correct problems which may occur. This will be an aspect to be 
changed a bit in most plant directors, because that is still the perspective. 
[The plant controller] is the personal assistant who is there to make the 
reports and the presentations.”  
“Plant controllers like drawing maps, working with Excel, in the offices (…) 
But sometimes they do not go physically see and become aware of the plant 
reality. (…) And that is a very large cultural change.” 
 
What is at stake are the prevailing rules of meaning regarding the plant 
controller function and related rules of membership, and in particular his contribution 
towards control at a local level – in addition to control at a central level, as other parts 
of the latter interview and various others made very clear. 
Although these comments merely reflected an expectation regarding a change in 
rules of meaning and membership (rather than an evaluation of past events), they can 
still be considered as an additional corroborating insight (although with the caveat that it 
does not refer to actual, past events). In fact, there was an extremely high convergence 
among central actors on the above diagnosis and expectation regarding the rules 
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concerning the plant controllers’ function, in particular as regards their new analytical 
role.  
7.2.5.3 OPPs to produce and the promotion of dispositions to desire OPPs and 
accept embedded controls 
The various innovations, collectively, became an organised network of 
Obligatory Passage Points, embedded in organisational processes. In particular, some 
innovations became OPPs for local actors to carry out their activities and hence be 
recognised as ‘good’ organisational members. Therefore, working in cooperation or in 
an aligned way with some innovations-turned-OPPs became a condition to successful 
“membership work” (Munro, 1999). The obligatory nature of OPPs for actors to 
produce, combined with the embedding of control rules in those OPPs, strongly 
promotes dispositions to desire the OPPs and accept their embedded controls. 
Several examples illustrate this insight. SAP FI became the only available tool in 
almost all countries where IndCo had industrial facilities. Therefore, the core of the 
work of local people involved with financial accounting activities became tightly linked 
to this tool, to which there was no alternative. When a new module or functionality (and 
not only as regards SAP FI), becomes the new, single available tool, local actors’ 
membership work becomes strongly dependent on the actual adoption of the tool in 
their daily tasks. As an IT respondent argued, 
“People stick themselves to the IS; they stick themselves because they need 
to carry on with their day-to-day operations.” 
As a second example, plant managers have an interest in paying suppliers, in 
order to continue to receive their goods. Since almost all stages of payments became 
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centralised in the SSC, plant managers have an interest that all the processes preceding 
payment are executed correctly. Eventual non-compliances or other problems are 
increasingly detected by the network of OPPs involved in the payment process, leading 
to blockages of the normal administrative workflow. At an operational level, these 
blockages endanger the regular supply of goods to the plants, hence penalising the plant 
manager’s production activities. This applies to the cases (already described) of 
procedures of fixed assets purchasing processes, embedded in IDAR and monitored by 
central actors, as well as other purchasing processes.28  
A third example relates to the rule embedded in SAP that the Bill of Materials 
(BOM) of any product must valuated, so that a production order can be introduced in 
SAP (see quotation and explanation in p. 493). The activity of production actors is 
halted if the financial perspective is not reflected in SAP. As CC respondent stated: 
“Before, plants didn’t care about the issue of value. What they wanted was 
to produce, to deliver to the client. Now, people from production and 
logistics are more sensitive to issues of value – also due to the entropy 
introduced.” (approximate quotation)29 
 
The second example (regarding the interest of plant managers in the compliance 
of purchase processes requirements) highlights a wide range of influence of the OPPs. 
                                                 
28 As an SSC member described, “You have to post the invoices, because if you don’t post [the invoices], 
you don’t pay. If you don’t pay the suppliers, (…) they stop delivering and the plant stops.” The 
respondent was commenting on SAP FI initial technical problems, but the description of the disruption in 
the relations with the suppliers is equally applicable to problems arising from non-compliance with 
prescribed procedures. Other respondents (e.g., those quoted in the previous subsection) contributed to 
this insight, highlighting how processual controls and blockages by the SSC created a dissuasion and self-
disciplinary effect and contributed to reduce non-compliance. 
29 The control role of local actors should not be underestimated, either. For example, the same interviewee 
mentioned the importance of successive instances of control at a local level, as performed by the shift 
manager, then by the production manager, and then by the plant controller. “If the shift manager and the 
production manager [correctly] validate the information, the plant controller won’t have so many errors 
to identify – and ‘annoy’ the operational people…” (approximate quotation). This entropy at a local level 
does not derive from the network of OPPs that has been examined; however, this example does illuminate 
that the network of control actors is even wider than the (already wide) network of OPPs examined so far. 
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The OPPs may focus areas other than actors’ core production area, and still affect the 
actors’ capacity to produce – and hence their dispositions to accept, and even desire, the 
OPPs. The plant managers’ core activity is mainly to produce industrial goods. 
However, they may be strongly affected by blockages introduced in the administrative 
processes by the SSC, through the use of technological solutions (e.g., SAP FI, IDAR). 
Therefore, that creates an incentive that plant managers promote, among the local actors 
directly involved with purchasing processes, compliance with defined rules.  
Therefore, the OPPs, due to their pervasive embeddedness in organisational 
processes, had the power to affect dispositions of key actors beyond those whose 
activities were directly controlled by the OPPs (such as the local actors responsible for 
purchasing or, in the first example, the local actors of the accounting area). The OPPs 
fostered the acceptance of the rules of meaning and membership which central actors 
structurally embedded in the innovations and in the organisational processes upon 
which local actors depended to carry out their activities and “membership work” 
(Munro, 1999). 
It should be noted that the scope of analysis considered in this contribution (as 
well as in the next two contributions) has necessarily to be narrow. The evaluation of 
the benefits (or losses) of the various actors from a given characteristic of an OPP only 
considers a narrow range of factors – those more closely related with the characteristic 
being analysed. In addition, no attempt is done to ‘quantify’ the ‘benefits and losses’ 
related to each characteristic and then evaluate ‘which is the greatest’. Neither the 
underlying phenomena nor the adopted research approach are amenable to such 
evaluation. The approach taken is to identify factors which promote certain 
repercussions, in a qualitative way. The ambition to holistically encompass all the 
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repercussions of all the features of an OPP (or, at an even wider scale, of the entire 
network of OPPs) is not to be tackled as a particular contribution. Instead, such 
ambitious objective of a holistic – and qualitative - evaluation is reflected in the overall 
characterisation of the case study, as a whole. 
This contribution focused on the compulsory, unavoidable nature of OPPs for 
local actors to produce. Therefore, although it drew on actors’ self-interests and 
dispositions (rather than impositions), it was still about a negative motivation 
(unavoidability) to obtain a positive outcome (production and successful membership 
work). The next contribution takes a more positive perspective. 
7.2.5.4 OPPs direct benefits for local actors and the promotion of dispositions to 
desire OPPs and accept embedded controls 
OPPs may also provide direct benefits for local actors – those actors who are 
also, simultaneously, controlled by the OPPs. Therefore, this contribution takes a more 
positive perspective, although still in the perspective of a balance between OPPs’ 
positive and negative repercussions. 
Various examples illustrate this insight. SAP FI was mostly introduced in 
already existing units, which previously used other financial accounting solutions. 
However, existing solutions were typically less sophisticated than SAP FI. Therefore, 
local actors had some direct benefits from using the new proposed (actually, imposed) 
solution.30  
                                                 
30 The appeal for new solutions should not be assumed to be universal – and it certainly was not universal 
within IndCo. The introduction of SAP logistic modules in IndCo implied the abandonment of the legacy 
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Although the SSC initially caused a huge shock and disruption in local units (in 
particular, due to the drastic reduction in the sise of local accounting teams), the 
remaining actors gradually started experiencing benefits of having the SSC. According 
to the evaluation of a senior SSC member, 
“Today, those local teams can realise the benefits, as regards reporting 
timings, the very quality of information and the relief they had in the 
transactional and reporting activities. We are the ones who report [to the 
Corporate Centre] for consolidation purposes. The moment they close their 
books, they have almost nothing to worry about, unless some fine tuning of 
the accounts.” 
 
Naturally, such a positive evaluation made by an SSC member might always be 
suspect of potential bias. Another SSC member mentioned a regular internal satisfaction 
survey to the SSC clients (the local actors), focusing on aspects like posting timings and 
quality, quality of the replies and contacts established by the SSC. The SSC member 
informed that the survey results indicate an increasing satisfaction of local actors, 
indicating the benefits for local actors as critical in overcoming the initial great 
resistance to the SSC. 
“There was a great resistance in an initial phase. In this initial phase, there 
were always criticisms about the quality of the SSC’s work (…). After some 
time, people recognise that things do operate well, and they even may be 
better than before. After all this time, you can tell perfectly that that 
[resistance] are gone-by waters.”  
 
To triangulate the perceptions of central actors, interviews with local actors were 
therefore important. During the fieldwork, the local actors also conveyed a positive 
                                                                                                                                               
solution (SOIC), developed in-house to fit exactly organisational processes and local needs. There was 
unanimity among respondents that the initial reaction of local actors to the replacement was precisely the 
opposite: strong dispositions to reject the new OPP. As an IT respondent recalled, the change was 
“complicated! They didn’t understand the reason for the change. From their perspective, they had a 
system that worked well and they saw neither the need nor gains of changing” (approximate quotation). 
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general idea about the SSC and some stated that they were also benefited by its 
existence. Notwithstanding, they could also be critical about some issues31. The 
empirical insights below express this variety of perspectives.  
For example, a local actor argued that the SSC drew attention to important 
aspects from a financial perspective but which might be unnoticed by local actors due to 
daily pressures and urgencies. The respondent described the SSC as an “independent 
entity” and a “control mechanism” which “helps a lot”. The SSC was even described as 
bringing to plant level actors some “tranquillity” because the respondent knew someone 
else verified the correction of the work. The same respondent also expressed satisfaction 
about several benefits from another OPP, IDAR. However, simultaneously, the 
respondent criticised the lack of sensitivity of SSC members to “how we work around 
here” and some delays in approval processes. 
Another local actor commented on the visibility made possible by SAP 
production modules. While he acknowledged that hierarchical superiors had a greater 
control about plant events, he added that the same applied to plant actors themselves, 
who also benefited from the visibility based on near on-line information. 
As a final example (more could be provided, including additional examples 
below in this subsection), the implementation of the product costing module of SAP 
(SAP CO-PC) also brought some benefits to local operational actors. Local operational 
actors, a priori, would have scarce or no benefits from SAP CO-PC; indeed, various 
respondents argued that actors related with the operational area initially opposed, or at 
                                                 
31 This critical attitude increases the researcher’s confidence that those respondents were not trying to 
convey a false image of perfect compliance to, and acceptance of, central actors, as a precaution given the 
researcher’s presence through top management approval – always a potential risk, as already 
acknowledged. 
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least were not supportive, to the implementation of the module32. However, a CC actor 
stated they later benefited from the implementation of the module. In fact, local actors 
did not trust production times initially introduced in SAP production modules. The 
implementation of the CO-PC module (in those locations where the SAP production 
roll-out had already occurred, prior to the CO-PC roll-out) made such error become 
evident, in a financial perspective. This detection led to the revision of the production 
times, which in turn benefited local operational actors, leading to a more favourable 
attitude towards the financial module. 
Therefore, as a conclusion, there was overwhelming evidence that the OPPs 
frequently produced benefits for local actors, not only for central actors. As such, local 
actors’ benefits from the OPPs contributed to compensate the repercussions which 
negatively affected them. Therefore, direct benefits (beyond the mere need of the OPPs 
to produce, as focused in the previous contribution) were important promoters of local 
actors’ dispositions to desire the OPPs and accept the rules embedded in those OPPs.  
The last two contributions considered that OPPs’ positive repercussions for local 
actors contributed to compensate the negative repercussions and hence promote 
appropriate dispositions towards those OPPs. The next contribution highlights a 
positive, or at least neutral, perspective: how certain OPPs enabled the simultaneous 
attainment of the objectives of both central and local actors. 
                                                 
32 The reasons for the opposition of local operational actors to the SAP CO-PC project are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Very briefly, this opposition was considered to derive from two reasons. First, the 
project implied additional workload due to the massive revision of the Bills of Materials, which until then 
only reflected production planning needs (as analysed above in this subsection and in p. 493). Second, 
and importantly, the implementation of the CO-PC module became a part of the wide, recently started 
project of implementing the SAP production modules in the vast majority of plants. The association of 
both projects increased the complexity and risks of the SAP production modules roll-out. 
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7.2.5.5 Mobilisation of OPPs making central and local objectives compatible  
The mobilisation of certain OPPs succeeded in creating a ‘win-win’ situation (or 
at least a ‘win-indifference’ situation), by implementing features which promoted the 
simultaneous achievement of both central and local objectives. The perspective at stake 
here is, therefore, positive (unlike in the previous insights about a trade-off between 
positive and negative aspects). 
For example, certain features of the SAP FI parallel accounting solution 
promoted such compatibility of objectives. As already discussed, this remobilisation of 
the original SAP FI solution allowed the production of company-wide information, 
drawing from the common chart of accounts – hence creating a new benefit for central 
actors. Simultaneously, it continued to allow the production of information in locally 
relevant formats, drawing from the country-level, local charts of accounts – hence not 
implying the loss of the previous features. This ‘heteromogeneity’ (Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006) of SAP FI is a clear expression of a win-indifference situation.33 
Other respondents provided insights suggesting that while some OPPs benefit 
central actors, there are mechanisms which enable that such benefits are not ultimately 
detrimental to local actors. A local actor thus explained his perception about the 
existence, location and rules of the SSC, relating them with the coexistence of formal or 
informal alternative mechanisms which prevent negative repercussions on crucial 
                                                 
33 In line with the above acknowledgement of the narrow evaluation perspective adopted when analysing 
these contribution, this ‘comparison’ only considered the directly related perspective of the various actors 
obtaining financial information reports. This ‘comparison’ ignored other less direct effects (analysed in 
other parts of the discussion) which are not such as direct. An example of a negative repercussion over 
local actors which is being ignored is an increased control by central actors over the accounts structure, 
and hence ensuring that the models of the various countries would not diverge, as it had previously 
happened. 
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activities of local actors. This local actor started by arguing his indifference about the 
location of the SSC and his satisfaction about its day-to-day performance: 
“The administrative part of each plant doesn’t bother us (…). The location 
where it is done, is irrelevant (…). The location of the invoices doesn’t add 
value to me. What matters is that the invoices are well controlled, and that 
the ones which should be paid actually get paid. (…) And that works fine, 
because we had to validate them in the system. (…) So, the centralisation of 
administrative activities has to be analysed from an efficiency point of view 
(…). From a plant point of view, a more centralised [administrative] 
management doesn’t create any problems to our work. It never bothered me. 
Assuming that in the plant we have to be rigorous and serious, and that we 
don’t do ‘strange’ things, the distance from the administrative activity 
shouldn’t bother us.” 
 
The local actor went on to argue how informal mechanisms may prevent 
negative operational repercussions: 
Respondent: “What is really important is the industrial activity, and we 
didn’t lose any autonomy. The important thing is that we can easily make a 
request to buy something. And we are submitted to a discipline that 
sometimes can be seen as a constraint to deal with an urgent situation. But 
that doesn’t happen, because if something needs to be bought, we buy it 
anyway, with or without SAP, with or without authorisation. We have to do 
it, and we’ll be accountable later. [laughter] No problem. When something 
is urgent, no one sets administrative limits. We buy it, and that’s it. 
Researcher: If you buy a fixed asset, you need to enter it in IDAR. But if it’s 
urgent… 
Respondent: [Making the gesture of picking up the phone] “‘Boss, I need to 
buy this now. And while we wait for the approval, I’ll buy it’. And he’ll tell 
you: ‘As you wish’. He can’t say ‘yes’, because the procedures must be 
followed; but you have to do it. (…) There are mechanisms which allow 
dealing with abnormal situations.” 
 
These quotes highlighted, in addition to insights analysed in other contributions 
(see, e.g., the quotes in pages 562 and 583), the perception that plant level actors’ 
operational effectiveness was not diminished due to the control mechanisms – in a 
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scenario in which local actors’ decisions were aligned with the interests of central 
actors, and in which this respondent situated himself34. 
As a conclusion, some features of the innovations introduced by central actors 
facilitated the simultaneous achievement of both central and local objectives. This 
enabling role as regards local actors’ objectives fostered positive dispositions among 
local actors towards accepting those innovations and the rules they embedded. 
7.2.5.6 Minimise additional work for local actors’ compliance – and increase 
work for non-compliance 
Several central respondents stated their concerns about minimising, or 
eliminating altogether, additional workload for local actors to comply with central rules. 
There was awareness that compliance with centrally defined rules might imply an 
additional workload to local actors. Indeed, additional workload was one of the typical 
criticisms and reasons provided for local actors having negative dispositions towards 
OPPs 
However, several central respondents stated their concerns about minimising, or 
eliminating altogether, additional workload for compliance to central rules. For 
example, the SAP FI parallel accounting solution had features addressing such 
concerns. As discussed in the previous subsection, one single operation of data entry 
originated information both in the common and in the local charts of accounts, 
satisfying both central and local interests. Therefore, and leaving aside restrictions such 
                                                 
34 The analysis could also be expanded to explore the (alternative) scenario in which local actors “do 
‘strange’ things”, i.e., contrary to the main interests of central actors. In such alternative scenario, should 
the network of OPPs achieve effective control, such ‘strange’ actions would be detected, hence clearly 
benefiting central actors. The potential of biased descriptions, acknowledged above, is clearly present in 
this particular quote. However, the crucial aspect is the theoretical outcome of this empirical scenario, 
more than the precise assessment of whether this particular respondent actually did “‘strange’ things”. 
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as opening accounts and adaptation efforts to the new solution, local actors did not 
experience an additional transactional workload during daily operations. 
An IT actor thus described this concern, at a more general level: 
“At a financial level, from a centralised perspective, it wasn’t required any 
more [information] than the one that was required when there was 
decentralisation. Because the information requested to the plants is still the 
same. (…) Before, the plants already had to have that information, to report 
to the corporate centre or to the centralising structure – otherwise, they 
wouldn’t be able to report. [The difference is that] we [at the centre] now 
have the details that the plants previously had – only they might not have 
them in SAP, and obtain them through other ways. 
We have always tried to avoid (…) duplicating tasks [of local actors] or 
increasing the number of tasks to report to the centre. That was always 
taken into account. If it was possible to obtain detailed information without 
an added workload for the user… [we did it]. Hence the ‘user-exits’, which 
the system performed and the user didn’t even realise (…) and didn’t have 
additional work”. 
 
This concern in not increasing the workload does not mean that local work 
practices were not affect, as it has been abundantly shown, e.g., as regards their timing 
or their sequence. In fact, some central actors (typically from the IT department or the 
SSC) argued that local actors’ perception of additional workload was sometimes 
erroneous. The same IT interviewee commented the increasingly residual, yet still 
persistent, creation of debit notes without adopting prescribed procedures. The rule 
which the local actors were supposed to enact was creating the debit notes in SAP’s 
Sales and Distribution (SAP SD) module. The alternative practice was either using a 
temporary solution developed in SAP FI or using Excel (a practice even more ‘outside’ 
the system and procedures) and then email the debit note for the SSC to post. The IT 
interviewee thus commented: 
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“[Some people] still think it’s easier (…) doing it this way [outside the 
system], than doing it through the system. If those people, one day, start 
doing it through the system, they will reach the conclusion: ‘Why did I do it, 
after all? I’m going to do it here [in the system]. I neither gain nor loose 
anything. (…) If I do it directly [in SAP and in the right module], the SSC 
won’t need to post it, I won’t need to send it and it is [immediately] 
integrated. I had to do it anyway’. So, there are no major gains or losses [to 
local actors]. It’s rather an issue of being uniform and doing everything in 
the same place. (…)  
It’s like purchasing processes. If I do an order over the phone, and then, 
when the invoice comes, I enter the purchasing order in SAP… I didn’t have 
less work. I just didn’t do it at the right time. 
Anyway, those [still remaining problems] are already insignificant. The 
major work has been done. Now, only small details are missing.” 35  
 
Therefore, whenever compliance with the rule embedded in the OPPs and the 
OPPs network did not require additional effort from the local actors, a disincentive for 
rule non-acceptance and non-compliance was avoided. 
The opposite incentive was also found: non-compliance by local actors entailed 
additional work for them. Non-compliance did not just imply entropy on organisational 
processes which were crucial for local actors, as discussed above in page 571. Non-
compliance, when detected, also implied substantial rework from the local actors.  
Several respondents analysed this, in particular as regards the various modules 
of SAP. An interview with an IT respondent was particularly vivid and illuminating (see 
an extended transcript in the Appendix as quotation #4): “[Operational] people, 
because they know the trouble of retrieving all the information a posteriori, think twice 
before they do such a thing [failure to enact a rule]”. 
                                                 
35 This interviewee seemed to assume that only the amount of time was important for local actors. 
However, the timing and the order in which actions are performed are sometimes crucial for local actors 
when they perceive that a particular operational problem requires an immediate purchasing order, as 
discussed above. 
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This insight is in line with Volkoff et al.’s (2007) case study analysis: “the ES 
[Enterprise System] served to embed sanctions for poor work performance and for any 
performance of routines that was inconsistent with ES-embedded work practices. As a 
consequence of these implicitly embedded sanctions, a culture of disciplined work 
emerged as workers came to recognise that the ES only worked smoothly when they 
performed their work routines with strict discipline. (…) ‘if you try to do the end-
around, it just adds more time to your process, so do it right the first time.’” (p. 842) 
It is acknowledged that such these two insights are likely to be universal. As 
regards the first one (trying that compliance does not require an additional effort from 
local actors and hence avoiding a disincentive for non-compliance), it is unlikely that 
any actor wishes to have an additional workload, especially if this workload is due to 
requests and interests of other actors, rather than self-interests. The second insight 
reflects a trade-off: the benefits from non-compliance (e.g., quickly shipping to the 
client) vs. the resulting high additional workload. However, as the additional workload 
and required efforts increase, the trade-off will increasingly tend towards compliance 
and self-discipline. 
Since these insights are likely to be universal, the inherent theoretical 
contribution is reduced. However, the contribution is still valid, for two reasons. First, it 
highlights two pragmatic aspects that designers of control systems (including 
management control systems) should consider. Second, the contribution is more 
pertinent considering a structural organisational change after the creation of the SSC: 
the significant reduction of the local teams. This is now analysed. 
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7.2.5.7 Scarcity of local resources 
Scarcity of local resources was found to promote the acceptance of some OPPs 
and rules, and abandoning others – in particular, rules reflecting exclusively local 
concerns and therefore requiring the allocation of resources to satisfy exclusively local 
concerns. 
In fact, after the creation of the SSC, local accounting teams were drastically 
reduced. Although this reduction of resources was accompanied by a reduction of the 
activities attributed to the local teams, a potential previous organisational slack at a local 
level was likely to have been reduced. As an IT actor argued, such reduction was an 
incentive for local actors to start, right from the start, producing information compliant 
with the information requirements of the centre: 
“Additionally, as you start creating those central functions, you start 
reducing those same functions at a local level. People start not having time. 
So, they have to find solutions to avoid work duplication.” 
 
A limited prior allocation of resources, associated with increased compulsory 
requirements by increasingly powerful central actors (as discussed above in this 
subsection), functions as an incentive for local actors to be selective as regards their 
allocation of time and other resources. Confronted with limited resources to carry out 
several tasks, local actors had incentives to only produce the information which they 
compulsorily had to present to central actors – hence ceasing the enactment of some 
rules with an exclusively local perspective.  
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Therefore, solutions allowing to simultaneously satisfy the needs of several 
actors (as discussed above) become particularly appealing. Such was the case of 
integrated solutions, such as SAP, based on one single point of data entry in a common 
structure and which then made information available in multiple formats, according to 
the differentiated needs of the various actors. The SAP FI parallel accounting solution is 
a particularly adequate example, but the same rationale was present in other 
innovations. 
As already mentioned, these repercussions are neither deterministic nor absolute. 
A clear opposing example was obtained at a local site. The respondent argued that SAP 
CO-PC reports do not include a particular indicator used for many years in that site and 
which local actors continued to require. Therefore, they had to calculate this particular 
indicator using non-SAP tools, in addition to the standard SAP reports. In this case, 
scarcity of resources was clearly not impeditive for the continuation of enactment of 
local rules of meaning (concerning the concept of this indicator) and membership 
(concerning the usage of non-SAP calculations). However, this opposing example does 
not invalidate this contribution - which merely argues that scarcity of resources at a 
local level promotes a greater selectiveness on the information to be produced and that, 
confronted with increasing and compulsory requests from central actors, local actors 
have incentives to focus on these, rather than on site-specific ones. 
7.2.5.8 Perception of inevitability 
Several respondents acknowledged the perception that the enactment of rules of 
membership misaligned with central actors’ objectives would inevitably be detected and 
countered. Such perception of inevitability was an important promoter of self-discipline. 
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Perceptions of inevitability have already been discussed, but usually in the 
context of the analysis of other perspectives (e.g., automatic enactment by IS; visibility; 
necessity to accomplish current activities, etc.). This contribution provides an 
autonomous emphasis to the perception of inevitability as a promoter of the enactment 
of desired rules and as dissuasive of the enactment of undesired rules. 
The perception of inevitability gives rise to the application of a “rule of 
anticipated outcome”36. A local actor vividly illustrated this rule, focusing on the 
dissuasive effect of emergent organisational structures in enacting rules of membership 
not aligned with the interests of central actors. The issue at stake was the redistribution 
of orders across plants, to equilibrate activity levels at a global level. However, there 
was resistance from some directors whose orders were withdrawn, as the respondent 
described: 
“Recently, the company [i.e., centrally] ordered a redistribution of orders 
among plants, to equilibrate activity levels. Depending of the plant, that 
redistribution is easier or more difficult. There are plants which resist that 
orders are taken away from them. And should it be an activity that requires 
the support of the plant which will lose the orders – due to raw materials, 
e.g.-, the plant will resist or not according to the attitude of the plant 
director, as regards facilitating the transfer of that order to another plant. 
That happens. There are all sorts of situations. In general, I think there is a 
                                                 
36 The expression “rule of anticipated outcome” was inspired by Bachrach and Baratz’s (1963) “rule of 
anticipated reaction” (p. 635). However, these authors used it within a more complex, and partly inverse, 
perspective. Bachrach and Baratz (1963) described a scenario in which “though B regularly accedes to 
A’s preferred courses of action, A in fact lacks power over B because A just as regularly tailors his 
demands upon B to dimensions he thinks B will accept. As an illustration, if the President submits to the 
Congress only those bills likely to be palatable to a majority of lawmakers, he can hardly be said to have 
power over the Congress simply because all his proposals are enacted into law.” (p. 635) Bachrach and 
Baratz used the expression to illustrate how the “powerful” side may anticipate the reaction of the “less 
powerful” actors and in anticipation adjust his demands within the latter’s preferences. This thesis uses 
the expression to refer to how the “less powerful” and controlled side may anticipate that the outcome of 
a potential deviation from established rules will be its detection by the “more powerful actors” or by the 
network of control OPPs they established. Such detection will trigger a reaction from the “more 
powerful” actors, directly or through other actors of the network, which will be detrimental to the “less 
powerful side”. Therefore, anticipating such outcome, the “less powerful side” is likely to adjust its 
demands accordingly. 
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positive disposition towards thinking about the group. But there are very 
‘localistic’ situations.” (slightly edited transcript)  
 
However, the creation of centralised organisational structures, with formal 
power over plants, has been countering that approach, challenging the rule of defending 
the interests of the individual plant against the interests of the group. The same 
respondent continued: 
“[As regards structures to overcome a traditional ‘localistic’ focus, there is 
an introduction of a] centralised culture… Eg., the centralised logistic 
structure intervenes, if required, to achieve such adjustment [transfer of 
orders across plants]. But it’s a struggle. So, sometimes it intervenes. ‘Why 
should you be struggling about that topic, if it’s not a topic to struggle 
about? (…)’ But we understand each other increasingly better, because 
there are sufficient structures. (…) You can say ‘I’m going to resist, but 
what for? If later I am going to be ‘squeezed’ through that mechanism, and 
I’ll have to accept?’. People gradually realise that, by devotion or 
obligation, we have to cooperate towards the group.” 
 
Therefore, an organisational innovation in the circuit of system integration (the 
centralised logistic structure) become another Obligatory Passage Point and has 
increasingly fixed, structurally rather than episodically, new rules of membership. The 
plant directors’ increasing awareness that any resistance will eventually be overcome by 
an episodic exercise of power by the organisational structure has been creating consent, 
even among those who tended to resist to globally-oriented decisions. So, either “by 
devotion or obligation” (consent), plant directors have started to adopt and enact more 
globally-oriented rules. 
The same self-disciplinary effect of this “rule of anticipated outcome” can be 
detected in many empirical situations already described, related to innovations 
introduced in the circuit of system integration. When the innovations attain an OPP 
588 
7.2 The reconfigured circuit of social integration 
7.2.5 Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of social integration – main theoretical contributions 
 
status, perceived by controlled actors as such (i.e., obligatory, unavoidable), the 
controlled actors are more likely to enact the “rule of anticipated outcome”. This 
promotes that local actors pre-emptively enact rules not attracting upon them the 
negative consequences perceived to follow a (perceived as) inevitable detection of 
deviations. 
The chosen example to introduce and illustrate the “rule of anticipated outcome” 
is also a very clear case of removing certain topics from the political agenda. “‘Why 
should you be struggling about that topic, if it’s not a topic to struggle about?’”. The 
perception of a structural fixing of material conditions promoting central control, 
detection and potentially disciplinary actions has achieved an important power effect: 
controlling the political agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963).  
Indeed, the depicted situation (taken in isolation from the wider effects related to 
the networks of OPPs) corresponds to Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962, 1963) ‘elitist’ 
perspective, what Lukes considered the second dimension of power (see 3.1.2 “The two 
dimensional framework – extending beyond the visible”). Disputes were avoided by 
removing those local objectives (derived from underlying rules of membership) from 
the political agenda. Local actors were confronted with power structures perceived to 
make any resistance futile. Therefore, potentially resistant local actors become aware, 
through the “rule of anticipated outcome”, that it was better not to bring that topic to the 
political agenda, because they would not be able to win the ensuing dispute. 
589 
7.2 The reconfigured circuit of social integration 
7.2.5 Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of social integration – main theoretical contributions 
 
Aggregating the last six contributions 
The last six contributions (7.2.5.3 to 7.2.5.8) made a number of propositions. It 
was proposed: that some OPPs became indispensable for local actors to produce; that 
some features of OPPs provided direct benefits for local actors; that some features of 
OPPs made central and local actors’ objectives compatible; that mobilisation of OPPs 
tried to make compliance not to imply additional work from local actors and, on the 
contrary, made non-compliance imply substantial additional work; that, related to the 
previous contribution, some OPPs addressed the constraint of scarcity of local 
resources; and that some OPPs created the perception of inevitability of compliance 
among local actors.  
The six contributions have different emphases on positive or negative 
perspectives. However, the first five of them reflect one common insight: that they 
produced a situation which was “both non-zero sum and served the self-interest of the 
players” (van Marrewijk et al., 2008, p. 599, emphasis added). Even when some 
misaligned interests still prevailed, the mobilisation of OPPs contributed to also satisfy, 
entirely or at least partially, the self-interest of the actors subjected and controlled by the 
OPPs network. The ways OPPs were mobilised created either advantages or the 
absence of disadvantages to local actors. And these advantages (or absence of 
disadvantages) contributed towards making them willingly accept the embedded rules 
and the higher visibility and tighter control by the various central actors – a visibility 
and control which the local actors indeed acknowledged. This way, rather than mere 
consent through imposition, there was also a positive disposition towards the network of 
OPPs and the rules embedded in it. 
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Even the strong negative perspective of the seventh contribution, regarding the 
perception that potential non-compliance would inevitability be detected and countered, 
had an underlying pursuit of self-interests. The enactment of the “rule of anticipated 
outcome” by local actors is, actually, the option which “best” serves their self-interest, 
considering their perception of the impossibility to avoid the organised network of 
control OPPs. 
The next, and last, two contributions reflect a different perspective, of more 
subtle and deeper perceptions and embedding of control. They analyse actors’ 
perception that OPPs were natural and they analyse how control also became more 
discretely pervasive through its embedding in organisational normalcy. 
7.2.5.9 Perception of the naturalness of control 
Both central and local actors mentioned the perception that it was “natural” that 
control OPPs existed, entailing the acceptance and enactment of some devices and rules 
related with central control37. Such perceptions of ‘naturalness’ correspond to an 
unquestioned acceptance of the existence of control devices and rules - in an abstract 
way, regardless of particular control devices and rules. 
The contribution does not reside in identifying such perception of ‘naturalness’ – 
a perception basically in line with generalised organisational characteristics and extant 
literature. The contribution lies in highlighting that the perception of ‘naturalness’ is 
related with the perception of ‘inevitability’ and entails the perception that control, or at 
least some control, is “something one cannot be against”; therefore, control OPPs may 
                                                 
37 As an example, a local actor accepted that “[i]t’s natural that such a large company, with so many 
plants, has a control system. It’s normal, logical. (…) It seems reasonable to me” (quoted above in this 
section). 
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“seem ‘imperatives’ no one can oppose” (Busco et al., 2007, p. 130; also Quattrone and 
Hopper, 2006). In other words, this perception affects attitudes and reactions towards 
those innovations and promotes a lower level of resistance. 
Perceptions of inevitability have already been discussed and related with lower 
potential resistance, in relatively specific matters, as reviewed in the previous 
contribution (as a result of automatic enactment of rules by non-human actors, as a 
requirement for local actors to produce, as a constraint driven by scarce resources or as 
the triggering factor for the enactment of the “rule of anticipated outcome”). 
However, the ‘inevitability’ perception is now identified at the wider level of 
control. Moreover, it corresponds to a more fundamental type of imperative, when 
compared with the perceptions of “inevitability” of OPPs and rules analysed above. In 
fact, this perception of the naturalness of the existence of control and rules creates an 
imperative based on the institutional realm, of the taken-for-granted ways perceived as 
supposed to be present in organisational life.  
The abstract, generalised level of this perception (since it refers to the mere 
concept of the existence of control and rules) is limited in ensuring the acceptance of 
particular control devices and rules. However, it is a fundamental pre-requisite upon 
which additional perceptions and dispositions may develop. It is a broad institution, 
providing a basilar support at the level of the circuit of social integration to the 
implementation of concrete innovations in the circuit of system integration to increase 
the control and relational power of central actors. And, by providing this basilar support 
to these innovations, this broad institution also provides a basilar support to the 
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repercussions that these innovations are expected to promote in the circuit of social 
integration. 
7.2.5.10 Innovations and control within organisational normalcy 
The various innovations, collectively, became a organised network of Obligatory 
Passage Points, embedded in organisational processes. This embeddedness allowed 
that the control functions of the innovations became also embedded in organisational 
processes. Furthermore, control became a pervading feature of organisational processes, 
rather than merely, and exclusively exercised by a given, identifiable entity to which 
control functions had been attributed. As argued above, it became a “collective affair” 
(Dechow and Mouritsen, 2005, p. 691).  
Organisational processes are organisational life. Without processes (with more, 
less or no formalisation and structuration), there is no organisation – at least, an 
operative one. So, organisational processes constitute the normalcy of organisational 
life. The (commonsensical) recognition of the normalcy of organisational processes 
takes a particular importance considering that the innovations introduced in the circuit 
of system integration, that the OPPs promoting the interests of central actors, became 
embedded in organisational processes. Control OPPs, as techniques of discipline and 
production and embedding and promoting rules of meaning and membership, became 
an integral part of many organisational processes, of the daily workflow. One of the 
clearest examples of such achievement concerns the SSC. Like stated by an interviewee 
of the SSC researched by Seal and Herbert (2005, p. 16), the SSC in IndCo “‘has very 
much been cemented in as being part of business as usual’”. 
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Clegg et al. (2006, p. 293) noted that “[n]aturalness is necessary for social life to 
proceed (…), but it effectively hides the processes of social construction that underlie 
everyday social reality”. In IndCo’s case, important aspects of control became a part of 
organisational normalcy, and it became less visible. In a Foucauldian perspective, 
normalcy is where power becomes most effective. And normalcy is where researchers 
should look for power – even if, or precisely because, it is less visible. 
7.2.6 SUMMARY OF SECTION AND CHAPTER 
This section, along with the previous one, proposed and discussed a number of 
contributions emerging from the interpretation of the case study, regarding the 
repercussions of innovations introduced in the circuit of system integration. The 
technological and organisational innovations emphasised were SAP FI, the SSC and the 
CC. In addition, other innovations were also mentioned, such as other SAP modules, the 
IXOS and IDAR solutions, the INDBEST and BPO departments and other 
organisational structures.  
The overall objective of this section was to identify and explore the multiple and 
intertwined ways in which these innovations contributed towards attaining the interests 
of central actors, by promoting the acceptance and enactment of rules of meaning and 
membership. The main empirical insights and contributions were depicted in the 
middle, left area of Figure 7.1 - hence completing the overall argument of the chapter, 
started in the previous section. 
This section first contributed towards development of knowledge by empirically 
testing hypotheses proposed in the literature (Ribeiro, 2003, as suggested by Modell, 
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2005; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009; see section 4.1), although this was not a primary aim 
of the research. This case study supported the hypotheses suggested by Ribeiro (2003). 
This confirmatory perspective is a contribution towards wider research programmes of 
“studying intra-organisational change in a processual manner” (Ribeiro and Scapens, 
2006, p. 95) and in particular adopting a Foucauldian and ANT perspective of power, in 
line with the “successful and progressive research programme” triggered by Foucault 
(as recognised by Lukes, 2005, p. 98). Then, this section reinforced the emphasis on the 
innovations collective, as organised networks of diversified and dispersed elements, 
producing cumulative, reinforcing or compensating repercussions. This emphasis had 
already been introduced in the previous section, regarding the repercussions on the 
circuit of system integration; this section reinforced this emphasis and expanded it to the 
repercussions on the circuit of social integration. 
This section also proposed more innovative contributions. This section 
highlighted that Ribeiro’s (2003) hypotheses were also valid in a very different 
empirical setting. This different empirical setting concerned a very distinct functional 
area (accounting and finance) and a very different type of activity (the production of 
financial information and control), while also drawing on examples from other 
functional areas and activities. This section also highlighted that innovations defining 
the scope of agency of various actors impinged on rules of meaning and membership 
regarding the role of actors – especially as regards local actors whose boundaries of 
potential (and excluded) agency were particularly targeted by the innovations.  
This section also discussed several factors promoting favourable dispositions to 
desire or at least accept OPPs, and to accept and enact embedded rules - even if they 
were conducive to an increased control. It was highlighted that some OPPs involved in 
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control were also crucial for local actors to produce and carry out ‘membership work’ 
related to their core organisational activities; some OPPs also provided direct benefits to 
local actors, who would also be subject to an enhanced control by those OPPs. OPPs 
were also sometimes mobilised in ways promoting central and local objectives 
compatible and simultaneously achieved. In addition, actors mobilising the innovations 
attempted to minimise the additional work required for local actors to comply and enact 
desired rules; on the contrary, non-compliance might imply an increased workload. A 
greater scarcity of local resources and the perception of inevitability were also 
discussed. Finally, the section concluded analysing wider repercussions, concerning the 
perception of a central control being ‘natural’ and how innovations and control became 
a part of organisational normalcy, of ‘business as usual’.  
All these factors promoted favourable dispositions to desire or at least accept 
OPPs, and to accept and enact embedded rules – in cumulative, reinforcing or 
compensating ways. This overall repercussion on the circuit of social integration was 
relevant to reduce one of the initial problems of central actors, as highlighted in the 
previous chapters (subsections 5.4.5 and 6.2.1): central actors’ low ‘trust-in-(local)-
persons’ (Giddens, 1990; Moilanen, 2008). As discussed, this low trust-in-persons was 
related to the enactment of rules of meaning and membership which privileged the local 
level. Therefore, the innovations also promoted the interests of the actors that had 
introduced the innovations, by affecting the circuit of social integration and, through it, 
the realm of action, in actual, episodic relations between actors during everyday 
organisational life.  
However, it should be noted that innovations and their repercussions did not 
produce total homogeneity, consensus and compliance. The example provided when 
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inevitability was discussed (see above, p. 586) highlights the persistence of misaligned 
interests among the various actors (central vs. locals, and locals among them) – even 
when overt conflicts diminished. Therefore, although the political agenda became 
constrained, by an increasing perception that particular issues should not be discussed or 
argued against, the actors were not “alienated”, as in Lukes’ (1974 / 2005) third 
dimension. Therefore, the existence of “sufficient structures” was important to solve 
disputes which emerged (i.e., related with overt conflicts) and to avoid disputes 
removing local objectives from the political agenda (agenda control). Ultimately, these 
“sufficient structures” promoted the acceptance and enactment of the rule of 
membership (in the circuit of social integration) that there should be cooperation 
between plants. However, it was apparent that such effects did not alienate the actors 
(Lukes’ third dimension of power) or, in institutional theory terms, the rule did not 
become unconsciously taken for granted, or institutionalised (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Local interests still remain diverse and potentially opposite, both between themselves 
and as regards the interests of central actors, reflected in what the respondent described 
as “‘localist’ situations”. And diversity of interests is a powerful source of instability 
within circuits of power, whose effects may only be contained, but are unlikely to be 
eliminated, by formal rules or material conditions. 
The next chapter builds on the insights and contributions discussed so far, to 
propose more generalised theoretical developments to the literature in power and 
institutional theory. To do that, the next chapter attempts to contribute to the 
development of the theoretical frameworks which inspired this research: Clegg (1989) 
and Burns and Scapens (2000). 
 8.0 Introduction and outline 
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8.0 INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE 
This chapter proposes developments to the theoretical fields drawn upon in this work: 
power and OIE. The first proposed development, in the first section, is a refinement of 
Clegg’s (1989) framework of ‘Circuits of Power’, comprising changes in its graphical 
layout, linkages and even concepts. It should be noted that these proposals add to the 
various contributions proposed in the previous chapter, also strongly based on Clegg’s 
framework. 
In the second section, an ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-based action is proposed. It 
draws on Burns and Scapens’ (2000) ‘macro’ structure of the realms of institutions and 
actions, and on some key concepts. However, beyond that, it is actually a totally 
different model. Some salient distinctive features can be preliminarily highlighted. The 
model depicts intra-organisational diversity in institutions, interests and capacities. It 
focuses on the processes of introduction, interpretation, acceptance and enactment of 
rules, relating them with material conditions. The model distinctively considers non-
human actors (in this case, technological actors) and how rules may become 
technologically embedded (as well as embedded in organisational processes). The final 
distinctive characteristic is the concept that technologically embedded rules may be 
directly enacted by the non-human actors and may also influence processes of 
interpretation, acceptance and enactment of rules by human actors, at the realm of 
episodic action.  
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8.1 REFINING CLEGG’S FRAMEWORK OF ‘CIRCUITS OF 
POWER’ 
8.1.1 THE REVISED MODEL AND CONTRIBUTIONS: INTRODUCTION AND 
PRESENTATION  
This section suggests some developments to the framework of ‘Circuits of Power’, 
proposed by Clegg (1989). These developments were based on case study insights and 
on theoretical reflection, which in turn was based not only on the literature in general 
but also drew from Clegg’s own work. It should be emphasised that this theoretical 
reflection would have been extremely unlikely to be achieved had it not been the 
systematic, intensive and extensive deployment of Clegg’s framework as theoretical 
lenses to explore the case study empirical material. Therefore, the case study provided 
more than empirical insights: it promoted an in-depth understanding of the model which 
was invaluable for the identification of suggestions for theoretical development. 
Clegg’s framework, both in terms of its graphic representation and in its interpretation 
and terminology, has already been adapted by some authors (Ribeiro, 2003; Taylor, 
1995). Other authors adapted the interpretation and terminology, while reproducing the 
same figure (or not showing it) (Davenport and Leitch, 2005; Lagendijk and Cornford, 
2000). However, these adaptations were mostly simplifications or mere modifications of 
the original framework, especially in graphical terms, with no substantive suggestions 
for improvements or overcoming of eventual shortcomings.  
This section aims at making a more substantive (though not claiming to be 
revolutionary) contribution, ranging from changes or additions to the graphical 
depiction of the framework, to conceptual modifications and new linkages. The revised 
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model of ‘Circuits of Power’ is presented next (Figure 8.1). Changed concepts are 
written in red and changed linkages are depicted in thicker, red arrows. 
Rules 
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Techniques of 
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Figure 8.1: Revised model of ‘Circuits of Power’  
(Source: Developed by the author, based on Clegg, 1989, p. 214; also Ribeiro, 2003, p. 73) 
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The figure reflects six areas of improvement, and each one is discussed in the following 
subsections. The first suggestion is the vertical expansion of the Obligatory Passage 
Points (OPPs) element and the clarification of their relationship with rules and 
techniques. This suggestion is, above all, a reconciliation between Clegg’s textual 
analysis and the framework. In addition, it is also a required foundation to the ensuing 
suggestions. 
The second, third and fourth suggestions are arguably the most significant contributions. 
The proposed changes are: the inclusion of a bidirectional, curve arrow linking rules and 
techniques, passing through extant OPPs; the conceptualisation of ‘socio-technical’ 
relations, instead of ‘social relations’; the conceptualisation of rules and techniques 
fixing socio-technical relations and empowering agencies (as discussed below, this third 
suggestion actually includes two related suggestions). 
The fifth suggestion concerns the endogenous reproduction and transformation of both 
rules and techniques, and it represents another reconciliation between Clegg’s textual 
analysis and the framework. The sixth suggestion is the inclusion of a link between 
exogenous environmental contingencies and the episodic circuit. Although less 
significant, the three fine-grained suggestions (the first one and the last two) may 
prevent misleading interpretations of the framework and, hence, are believed to be 
valid. Each suggestion is discussed next, in a separate subsection. 
 8.1 Refining Clegg’s framework of ‘Circuits of Power’ 
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8.1.2 VERTICAL EXPANSION OF THE OBLIGATORY PASSAGE POINTS 
(OPPS) ELEMENT AND CLARIFICATION OF OPPS RELATION WITH 
RULES AND TECHNIQUES 
The Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs) element was vertically expanded, to encompass 
both circuits of social and systems integration. This graphical change intends to make 
visually clear that the OPPs do not involve only fixed rules (as it could, in a more hasten 
interpretation, be suggested by the original position of the OPPs element, at the same 
horizontal level as the rules). This clarification is important to clarify that OPPs may be 
not only fixed rules, but also fixed techniques.  
This rationale is, indeed, present in Clegg’s own thoughts: “each of the circuits of social 
and system integration will have to (…) fix [] obligatory passage points” (Clegg, 1989, 
p. 225). In addition, and so that no doubts remain, he referred to the “‘obligatory 
passage points’ that system (and social) integration circuits potentiate” (Clegg, 1989, p. 
236). Furthermore, the original figure was, in this regard, correct, since the OPPs 
element was also crossed by the arrow departing from “Techniques”. However, the 
position of the OPPs element only at the level of the rules may have misled authors like 
Taylor (1995) - who, both textually and graphically, incorrectly only associated the 
creation of OPPs to the circuit of social integration, and not to the circuit of systems 
integration. Hence, this (merely graphical) suggestion. 
As a logical derivation from the above, since not only rules but also techniques 
constitute OPPs, the ‘fix/re-fix’ indication was included in both links from rules and 
techniques to the OPPs. Since the original model only linked rules to OPPs, the ‘fix-re-
fix’ indication was only restricted to this relation - a representation which may have 
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further contributed to the misinterpretation noted in the previous paragraph. (This 
‘fix/re-fix’ effect is further analysed below). 
The case study also provided ample evidence that not only the circuit of social 
integration, but also the circuit of system integration, are involved in the constitution 
and preservation of OPPs. Techniques introduced in the circuit of system integration 
may became themselves OPPs. One example is the technological innovation SAP FI 
becoming the sole tool to carry out financial accounting operations. Another example is 
the organisational innovation of the SSC becoming embedded in the organisational 
processes and therefore becoming virtually unavoidable, even if indirectly, in the 
accomplishment of many of the actors’ objectives and tasks. 
In fact, if it were not for the inclusion of yet more content in what is already a rather 
complex framework, the expression ‘constitute / replace’ would be added to the ‘fix/re-
fix’ expression, to convey the potential of rules and techniques to become structural and 
obligatory points of passage, eventually replacing extant ones. 
Each circuit of power does not operate independently; on the contrary, this fixing of 
OPPs results from the simultaneous and interactive influences of both circuits. This is 
analysed in the next suggestion. 
8.1.3 A BIDIRECTIONAL, CURVE ARROW LINKING RULES AND 
TECHNIQUES, PASSING THROUGH EXTANT OPPS. 
This suggestion complements Clegg’s emphasis that prevailing rules can facilitate or 
restrict the actual adoption and acceptance of new technologies – a capacity graphically 
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depicted in the original framework by the downward arrow from ‘rules’ to ‘techniques’. 
It is now suggested a similar, though reverse, potential influence of techniques over 
rules; therefore, the first part of this suggestion entails adopting a bidirectional arrow 
between rules and techniques. In addition, it is suggested that such mutually constitutive 
potential of both rules and techniques is intermediated through the entire network of 
extant OPPs; therefore, the second part of this suggestion is that the directional arrow 
should be curve, passing through extant OPPs. The two parts of the suggestion are 
analysed next, separately. 
8.1.3.1 A directional arrow between rules and techniques 
Clegg argued that the circuit of system integration (i.e., techniques) “is the major 
conduit of variation [i.e., change] in the circuits of power” (p. 233), inducing potential 
instability and transformation through the creation of new OPPs. Furthermore, 
considering exclusively Clegg’s text (rather than the graphical framework), the potential 
of techniques (circuit of system integration) to influence rules (social integration) is 
present, always in a contingent perspective.1 However, the potential of new techniques 
to change or fix rules was not depicted in the graphical representation of the framework. 
Clegg’s strong objection to technological determinism may have led him to avoid 
graphically emphasising such potential influence. However, such potential influence is 
relevant, and improvements in this area are now proposed, based both on the literature 
and on empirical insights. 
                                                 
1 The following extract from the conclusion of Clegg’s chapter on ‘Circuits of Power’ is representative: 
“Whatever sources of system disintegration or contradiction actually lead to transformation and a new 
practice of rules will depend upon the network of power and passage points that are achieved through 
episodic power’s configuration of the organizational field at the level of social organization” (Clegg, p. 
239). 
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Literature deploying Clegg’s framework has suggested that the introduction of new 
techniques may have an impact on rules. Ribeiro (2003) made a particularly strong case 
for this and, consistently, his graphic adaptation of the framework included a link from 
‘techniques’ to ‘rules’2. Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) also emphasised the capacity of 
technology to change rules and, as a more extreme case, Taylor (1995) had a highly 
technologically deterministic discourse3.  
Beyond the circle of authors who have applied – and adapted - Clegg’s framework, one 
of the main inspiring sources for Clegg himself, Foucault, can be cited. “[W]ithout any 
physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, [the Panopticon] acts directly 
on individuals; it gives ‘power of mind over mind’” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 206), i.e., 
affecting the rules of individuals’ behaviour. Analysing the technique of incarceration 
through prisons as described by Foucault (1975/1977), Clegg concluded that 
“[i]ncarceration along traditional lines serves only to tighten the webs of criminal 
membership and meaning for most inmates” (Clegg, 1989, p. 235) – again, techniques 
influencing rules of meaning and membership (although clearly in an unintended 
direction!). 
The empirical insights obtained during the case study also provide ample evidence to 
suggest that innovations introduced in the circuit of system integration can influence 
rule acceptance and enactment in the circuit of social integration (although in non-
linear ways, hence supporting Clegg’s rejection of determinism). The examples above 
and, in particular, the in-depth discussion in section 7.2 provide an extensive support to 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that Ribeiro (2003) was well aware of the importance of rules, in their “indexicality” 
and in the way they affect the introduction of new techniques. However, the original link from “rules” to 
“techniques” was missing in his work – a mere mismatch between the graphical depiction and of his own 
understanding of the framework, as a personal communication with the author came to confirm. 
3 See chapter 3, page 165, footnote 32 for criticisms to Taylor’s (1995) excessive technological 
determinism and the inconsistency and incorrectness in his graphical representation of the framework. 
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this point, which is not repeated here. Technologies may influence the way rules are 
established and fixed, the way they are operationalised and enacted in organisational 
practices. The interdependence, the mutual influence, of the circuits of social and 
system integration is a main consequence of the integrated nature of the framework. 
Together, they are involved (actually, co-involved, as discussed below) in the creation 
of OPPs, either rules-based or technology-based.  
Therefore, in the new, proposed framework, the original unidirectional downward arrow 
from rules to techniques is replaced by a bidirectional arrow. The option for a single 
bidirectional arrow (rather than the alternative of opposite two arrows) intends to 
convey a notion of interdependence, far more adequate than a hypothetical opposition 
between them (social integration strictly as a stabiliser, versus system integration 
strictly as a destabiliser). 
8.1.3.2 A curved bidirectional arrow between rules and techniques 
The second part of the suggestion entails depicting a curved arrow, passing through 
extant OPPs. The mutual influence between rules and techniques goes beyond simple, 
direct effects such as ‘rule A affects the adoption of technique B’. This mutual influence 
between rules and techniques is shaped by the whole array of extant OPPs, constituted 
by all the rules and techniques which have become (previously or concomitantly) fixed.  
Given the multiple origins of the OPPs (multiple rules and techniques, introduced by 
various actors with distinct objectives), OPPs may potentially (even most likely) enter 
into conflict. They constitute different conduits of power, and they may enter into 
conflict to become the prevalent passage point(s), while making competing ones 
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become ‘less obligatory’, easier to be circumvented. Therefore, any actor attempting to 
establish a new OPP through a new rule or technique is faced with a maze of competing 
OPPs, i.e., with other competing rules and techniques. In other words, it involves far 
more than only ‘rule A’ and ‘technique B’.  
Therefore, the (now bidirectional) arrow linking rules and techniques has been made 
curve, in order to pass through the OPPs element.  
8.1.4 INDICATION OF ‘SOCIO-TECHNICAL’ RELATIONS, INSTEAD OF 
‘SOCIAL RELATIONS’ 
8.1.4.1 ‘Socio-technical’ relations: an ANT perspective 
Clegg’s framework depicted ‘social relations’ occurring among agencies, in the episodic 
circuit. By using the term ‘social’, Clegg seemed to be encompassing exclusively 
human actors - which, in ANT terms, can be either individual or collective. However, 
one of ANT’s distinctive traits is that actors can be not only human but also non-human 
- ‘material’ entities, like machines or ERP software4 (e.g., Callon, 1986; Hyvönen et al., 
2008; Lodh and Gaffikin, 2003). As cited in section 3.4, Andon et al. (2007, p. 276) 
summarised that “ANT explores processes and relational effects within socio-technical 
networks of elements”.  
At this point, Law’s (1997) discussion about heterogeneity and materiality is 
appropriate: “social relations aren’t simply social. Instead they are inserted into other 
materials. Or (let’s make this symmetrical) the relations of other materials are inserted 
into what we sometimes call ‘the social’. (…) For relations are, yes, materially 
                                                 
4 As argued in section 3.4, non-human living entities (e.g., germs) are likely less relevant in organisational 
issues and are not considered within the concept of non-human actors in the ensuing discussion. 
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heterogeneous. They take the forms that they do, if they do (and they do so only 
contingently and often enough precariously) because they are performed, held in place, 
in a variety of different media: words; bodies; texts; machines; buildings. All mixed up. 
Materially heterogeneous.” (Law, 1997, p. 4). I.e., social relations are, actually, socio-
technical relations, combining heterogeneous actors, human (social) or technological. 
Hence, this section suggests replacing in the framework the original element ‘social 
relations’ by ‘socio-technical relations’. 
Some authors suggested that the importance of socio-technical relations supports the 
ontological suggestion of conceiving an ERP as a socio-technical actor (i.e., 
considering a ‘social’ aspect in the ERP actor). E.g., Wagner et al. (2006) discussed the 
agency of a technological actor such as an ERP and its power over human actors (in the 
sense of power as a capacity; see chapter 3): “Once a standard is reified as a best 
practice and becomes inscribed into the material infrastructure of an organization 
through information systems like ERP it gains technological agency. As a socio-
technical actor it then acquires the capacity to configure users, condition organizational 
options, and shape industry imagination” (p. 260, emphasis added)5. However, such 
conceptualisation of the ERP as a socio-technical actor does not underlie the endorsed 
ANT framework and is not pursued here. It raises a number of challenges related with a 
clear conflation between the material and the social, as Volkoff et al., 2007 argued 
against, based on the critical realism approach deployed in the previous chapter (see 
section 9.3 on future research avenues). The focus here is retained on the socio-
technical nature of relations between heterogeneous actors, including technological 
actors deeply influenced by (and also influencing) individual and collective human (i.e., 
                                                 
5 This excerpt of Wagner et al. (2006) does not represent an overall deterministic position. In fact, these 
authors’ case study highlighted how most (potential and initial) effects were indeed provisional, contested 
and ultimately overturned. 
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social) actors during the course of socio-technical relations. Consequences of adopting 
this new concept are discussed next. 
8.1.4.2 ‘Socio-technical relations’: structural technology (and rules) brought into 
episodic exercise 
The suggested consideration of socio-technical relations between human and non-
human actors  
ANT’s consideration of both human and non-human actors is particularly relevant since 
the resultant explicit consideration of socio-technical relations between human and non-
human actors is believed to enhance the understanding of the overall framework of 
circuits of power. Moreover, this insight led to the wider and important consideration of 
how the structural features of fixed techniques (as well as rules) operate in a 
recurrently episodic and potentially unavoidable way; as such, they may potentially 
make episodic, direct exercises of power by some agents unnecessary. This suggestion 
is discussed next. 
As noted above, on one hand, Clegg’s original framework suggests that what takes 
place at an episodic level are exclusively social relations, i.e. relations among 
individuals and “some collective loci of decision-making and actions” (p. 215). Clegg 
endorsed ANT’s view of agencies as more than human beings (including, e.g., an 
organisational entity), but he did not encompass technological devices, such as 
machines or software. On the other hand, Clegg argued that “[t]echniques of production 
and discipline generate pathways (…) which can (…) become a new set of standing 
conditions redefining both social relations and agencies’ causal powers” (Clegg, p. 
236). Since both organisational and technological devices are included within the 
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facilitative ‘techniques’ included in the circuit of system integration, it can be argued 
that technological, non-human actors are also involved in the episodic circuit. There 
seems to be room to improve the framework consistency.  
But what distinguishes the episodic circuit and the two structural circuits of social and 
system integration? In Clegg’s own words, “episodic instances of agency power” are 
“the most apparent, the most easily accessible and the most visible circuit of power” (p. 
211), in which agencies attempt to secure outcomes in particular instances of 
interactions. In this episodic circuit, control of resources at those instances is crucial; an 
agency may draw on the resources it controls (e.g., by attributing a reward) to exercise 
power over another agency in order to obtain something out of that particular 
interaction, through an episodic exercise of power. The two other circuits, of social 
integration and system integration, are structural and “constitute the field of force in 
which episodic agency conceptions of power are articulated” (pp. 211-212). As regards 
the circuit of system integration, described, it is constituted by the “material conditions 
in a social system – that is, prior distributions of resources and available technologies of 
discipline and production” (Ribeiro, 2003, p. 58). Here, controlled resources have been 
deployed in advance to introduce - and fix - those structures of fixity (“e.g., financial 
resources may be available [and deployed] to introduce disciplinary technologies”, 
Ribeiro, 2003, p. 75). 
Some empirical insights highlight such a perspective of agencies drawing on structural 
standing conditions (including the technological innovations they had previously 
introduced) to obtain, e.g., information on other (third) parties, so that they could then 
use that information within their social relations with those (third) parties. An example 
was when a commercial unit obtained, through SAP, greater visibility over industrial 
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processes and therefore was able to be more demanding in its social relations with the 
plant. However, this setting is still much the one depicted in Clegg’s framework and his 
notion of standing conditions providing agencies with resources to be drawn upon 
during social relations.  
The main suggestions are now proposed over the two following paragraphs, 
concerning: 1) the concept of socio-technical relations; and 2) how technological 
innovations may allow human agents not to get recurrently involved in episodic 
exercises of power, since the technological innovation may replace those human agents 
in a recurrent and permanent episodic way.  
Previously introduced technologies (e.g., the ERP) neither solely structurally reside in 
the circuit of system integration, nor merely remain ‘as if’ in the background to social 
relations established by human actors (individual or collective). Those previously 
introduced technologies – which, in an ANT approach, are considered actors – have a 
direct relation with the agencies (individual or collective) within the episodic circuit. 
Socio-technical relations are therefore at stake, in the episodic circuit of power – rather 
than merely social relations, as depicted in the original framework. These relations are 
‘socio-technical’ in two ways. First, ‘socio-technical’ relations encompass the relations 
between individual or collective actors and non-human (so called ‘technological’) 
actors. And second, ‘socio-technical’ relations also encompass the conventionally 
labelled “social relations” between human (social) agencies, but which are ineluctably 
immersed within ‘technologies’ - and hence inevitably become ‘socio-technical’ 
relations. 
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The second suggestion, and most importantly, is that agents who succeeded in 
previously introducing those technological innovations (in the circuit of system 
integration) may not need to be further involved in episodic exercises of power with 
other agencies (in the episodic circuit). They may not need that, because the 
technological innovations may take over that role, in a recurrent and permanent 
episodic way.6 
The case study provided abundant insights on how the outcomes at an episodic level 
were achieved as a result of particular socio-technical relations between agencies and 
the ERP system, in ‘one-to-one’ socio-technical relations, between one individual and 
the configured software – i.e., beyond those situations where technical actors are merely 
drawn upon by (human) agencies within social relations with other (human) agencies. A 
first example concerns SAP FI becoming established as the only software for most 
financial accounting activities, and configured with a single chart of accounts; a second 
example concerns the change of user profiles to prevent local actors to post transactions 
(after the migration of such activities to the SSC). In the two examples, a crucial aspect 
at the episodic level were the socio-technical relations between the local level 
individuals (and their organisational units) and the ERP.7 Indeed, the second example 
also highlights that the episodic (yet recurrent and permanent) influence upon the local 
individuals was indeed not only derived with his/her relation with the software, but was 
                                                 
6 The initial understanding of this issue by the author was developed during a discussion with João 
Ribeiro, who actually proposed the replacement of ‘social relations’ with ‘socio-technical relations’. The 
acknowledgment and gratefulness is here expressed, as well as a full assumption of responsibility for any 
potential error. 
7 The reader is reminded of the previous stages of software selection and design, in which additional 
actors were involved. Therefore, the ‘one-to-one relation’ mentioned in the above paragraph is actually 
only a visible, episodic instantiation of a particular socio-technical relation but which actually reflects a 
far more plural relation. 
 8.1 Refining Clegg’s framework of ‘Circuits of Power’ 
8.1.4 Indication of ‘socio-technical’ relations, instead of ‘social relations’ 
613
also tightly related with the relations which that individual established with the SSC, the 
new ‘collective agency’ also recently introduced by central actors.8 
It should be noted that the deployment of Volkoff et al.’s (2007) framework in section 
7.1 (see page 489 and following) had already highlighted this insight - that 
technological innovations might replace and actually extend, in space and in time, the 
influence of human actors upon a wide network of other actors. Underneath the 
technological embeddedness of rules, constraining local actors’ agency in their 
interactions with the system and other actors, underlay prior human agency by central 
actors, at the previous design stage of SAP. After SAP FI ‘went live’, the interests and 
objectives of central actors then started being promoted by the mobilised non-human 
actor, in a continuous way during socio-technical interactions.  
This important insight is, in fact, an extension of another which can be accommodated 
within the original framework and its reference to (only) ‘social relations’. 
Organisational innovations, such as the SSC, are collective actors, introduced in the 
network by other central actors (e.g., Mr. A). In the same section 7.1, on page 523, it 
was argued that central actors had indirectly secured a higher relational power, through 
the innovation (the SSC actor) they had introduced in IndCo’s circuit of system 
                                                 
8 Another similar rationale can be found in the original writings of Foucault about the Panopticon (in spite 
of some differences as regards the above discussion, particularly since Foucault’s text is centred only on 
surveillance and visibility). “Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things 
that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection 
of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be 
a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in 
short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. 
To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an 
inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has 
no need in fact of being so. (…) It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes 
power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, 
surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which 
individuals are caught up” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 201, emphases added). 
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integration. The above ‘replacement’ mechanism is also present here, now applied to the 
SSC collective, social actor (i.e., not a technological actor), whose relations with other 
(social) actors were already encompassed in the original element of ‘social relations’. 
Therefore, this particular configuration was not within the scope of the above 
suggestions, but it is also a novel perspective into the original framework. 
The above rationale (how episodic repercussions of elements of the structural circuit of 
system integration may substitute episodic exercises of power by some agencies) can be 
further extended to another structural circuit: the circuit of social integration. When a 
senior manager was discussing the “utmost importance” of the acceptance by local 
actors of ideas and rules proposed by central actors, he added: “… as it is evident. We 
are not there, and we are not going to have one person doing and another one ensuring 
that the first one actually did it”. So, through the incorporation of the proposed rules 
within local actors’ ‘internal structures’ (see chapters 2 and 7), episodic exercises of 
power of central actors upon local actors would be less needed, being replaced by the 
appropriate dispositions emerging from the accepted rules. This example does not 
concern the suggested replacement of ‘social relations’ by ‘socio-technical relations’. 
However, it does show that the OPPs at both structural circuits may actually replace 
episodic exercises of power by agents - another novel perspective into the framework. 
As a conclusion, the suggested adoption in the revised framework of the expression 
‘socio-technical relations’, instead of ‘social relations’, has two advantages. First, it 
allows strengthening consistency with ANT’s ontological notion of actors (by including 
the relations involving non-human actors). Second, it contributes to a better 
understanding of how structural material conditions (techniques), in the circuit of 
system integration, have a direct impact at an episodic level through particular and 
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episodic socio-technical relations established with human and collective agencies. 
Importantly, although this impact is episodic, it is recurrently episodic and potentially 
unavoidable, as a consequence of the underlying structural nature of the material 
conditions. This recurrent and potentially unavoidable impact makes it potentially 
unnecessary for human agents to episodically engage in direct exercises of power – 
because the structural features may be, in a recurrently episodic and potentially 
unavoidable way, influencing (human) agencies towards the interests of the actors who 
introduced those material conditions. Finally, and in addition, a similar reasoning can be 
developed to argue that the fixing of rules (in the structural circuit of social integration) 
has a similar effect, potentially making episodic exercises of power by agents 
unnecessary. 
8.1.5 RULES AND TECHNIQUES FIXING SOCIO-TECHNICAL RELATIONS AND 
EMPOWERING AGENCIES 
The proposed framework clarifies the links between: 1) rules and techniques; 2) OPPs; 
and 3) social/socio-technical relations and agencies. In Clegg’s framework, it was not 
clear if the rules ‘fixed’ the OPPs, or the social relations, or both. Likewise, there might 
be doubts about what the techniques ‘empowered’9.  
As suggested above, the indication of ‘fix/refix’ has been applied to the links from rules 
and techniques to OPPs. These links are situated in the realm of the structural circuits of 
social and system integration. The next step is to clarify what ‘fix’ and ‘empower’ may 
refer to, at the episodic circuit of power. It is now proposed that socio-technical 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, this discussion only mentions the possibility to “fix” or “empower”, and not the 
alternatives of “re-fix” or “disempower”. However, the reasoning is equally applicable to those 
alternatives. 
 8.1 Refining Clegg’s framework of ‘Circuits of Power’ 
8.1.5 Rules and techniques fixing socio-technical relations and empowering agencies 
616
relations may be fixed, while agencies may be relationally empowered. It is also 
proposed that both rules and techniques can do both effects: fixing socio-technical 
relations and empowering agencies. These proposals are now justified, in two separate 
analyses.  
8.1.5.1 Linkages between rules and techniques fixing socio-technical relations 
(through OPPs);  
The first proposal concerns what factors may fix socio-technical relations. Clegg 
proposed that social relations may be fixed through rules. The networks within which 
social relations are established are shifting and unstable. Therefore, shared rules, 
through the OPPs, may contribute to fix or stabilise such relations.  
However, suggestions that techniques can fix social relations are scarce in Clegg. As 
already quoted above, Clegg argued that “[t]echniques (…) generate pathways (…) 
which can (…) become a new set of standing conditions redefining both social relations 
and agencies’ causal powers” (p. 236), i.e., basically an indirect effect of techniques 
over social relations. But the main effect of techniques that Clegg suggested does not 
concern fixing social relations, but rather empowering agencies (this is analysed below). 
And, as already noted, the original framework does not depict techniques fixing social 
relations, either. 
A return to the literature may be helpful. When Foucault (1975/1977) discussed the life 
of the inmates in prisons, is not there a clear signal that the disciplinary techniques 
influence which kind of social relations can be established? “[t]hose separate cells [of 
the inmates], imply a lateral invisibility [to the other inmates]. (…) [I]f the inmates are 
convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of 
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new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences. (…) The crowd, a compact mass, a 
locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is 
abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities” (Foucault, 
1975/1977, p. 200-201). When Clegg mentioned Crozier’s (1964) study of the factory 
“in which the techniques of production were fully rationalized around the moving 
conveyor belt” (p. 236), can we avoid seeing potential impacts on the social relations 
which were possible (and impossible) in such a context? When an organisation 
restructures and creates new departments, at least some changes in social / socio-
technical relations are expected: new relations may be created, existing ones may 
change or disappear. When processes embedded in a new information system require 
new interactions to occur if business processes are to be executed, social / socio-
technical relations cannot remain totally unaffected.10  
The case study revealed how technological and organisational innovations introduced in 
the circuit of system integration had a deep impact in social / socio-technical relations. 
The repercussions at stake go far beyond firing the local actors made redundant in the 
plants due to the SSC creation. The SSC introduced new actors in the network, both 
individual and collective, that inevitably establish new relations, both among new actors 
and among new and old actors alike, both among human and various technological 
actors. The SSC had a constitutive effect over the organisational fabric, including the 
social / socio-technical relations which contribute to define the actor-network, the 
complex ties between the actors. The SSC established new work procedures and 
workflows between parties which until then were not related, and removed other 
workflows, promoting the disconnection of other parties. 
                                                 
10 Naturally, the effects of these techniques on relations are mediated by existing rules and other 
techniques, constituted as OPPs. 
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Therefore, the new, proposed framework suggests that socio-technical relations may 
also be fixed by techniques of production and discipline (and not only by rules, as 
depicted in the original framework) – while recalling, like Clegg, that such fixation is 
conditioned by extant OPPs. 
8.1.5.2 Linkages between rules and techniques empowering agencies (through 
OPPs and socio-technical relations). 
The second proposal concerns what can produce empowerment and what can be 
empowered. The arrows in Clegg’s original framework suggested that only techniques 
can provide empowerment and disempowerment. However, rules can also empower and 
disempower. After discussing how techniques may empower agencies, Clegg drew on 
Child (1985) to note that “the probability of disempowerment of an agency depends 
greatly on the position that that agency has constructed in the existing network 
configuration of episodic power as well as in the circuit of social integration” (Clegg, 
1989, p. 233, emphasis added). In addition, the previous chapters discussing the case 
study demonstrated how actors can try to achieve power by introducing and promoting 
the acceptance and enactment of rules of meaning and membership which support their 
interests.  
Therefore, the proposed framework considers that both techniques and rules can allow 
empowerment – empowerment of actors, as suggested next. 
As noted in sections 3.2 and 3.3, power can be seen as relationally attributed to actors 
(or agents, Clegg’s preferred term). Although “[i]t is not a thing nor is it something that 
people have in a proprietorial sense”, people “‘possess’ power only in so far as they are 
relationally constituted as doing so. To the extent that the relational conditions which 
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constitute power are reproduced through fixing their obligatory passage points, then 
possession may be fixed and ‘reified’ in form” (Clegg 1989, p. 207). Later on, he refers 
to “empowerment and disempowerment of agencies in a relational field” (p. 232, 
emphases added). In a similar message, “relations of power (…) may be (…) 
empowering (…) members, stakeholders and others”, Clegg et al., 2006, p. 246). 
Therefore, agents are the entities which can be empowered through the socio-technical 
relations they establish within the network (rather than relations themselves being 
empowered, as it might be suggested by the original framework). 
Therefore, it may be argued that Clegg’s original figure was inaccurate in two ways. 
First, it did not indicate that rules (only techniques) may create empowerment; however, 
rules do may create empowerment, like techniques. Second, it related empowerment 
with ‘social relations’; however, the entities being empowered are agencies, through 
social relations (or socio-technical, in the revised framework). 
As such, in the revised framework, the arrows representing empowerment flow from 
rules and techniques to the agents, not only going through the OPPs, but also through 
the socio-technical relations in which those agents are involved. The endpoint of this 
link are the agencies (who relationally ‘possess’ power), and socio-technical relations 
are the context, the relational field in which those agencies are empowered. 
8.1.6 ENDOGENOUS REPRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION OF BOTH 
RULES AND TECHNIQUES 
The fifth area for improvement concerns endogenous stability or change of both social 
and system integration circuits, and includes two related proposed changes. The first 
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suggestion consists of including, in the graphical representation of the model, a link 
representing the pressures emerging from episodic level outcomes towards the 
reproduction or transformation of techniques - in addition to the reproduction or 
transformation of rules, which was the only suggested link in the original depiction. The 
second suggestion is adding the adjectives “extant / new” to both rules and techniques 
(while removing the term “innovation” from “innovation in techniques”).  
It is believed that these suggestions – amply illustrated throughout the case study - do 
not add anything substantial to Clegg’s own understanding of these circuits. As regards 
the first proposal, regarding the addition of a link to the circuit of system integration, 
Clegg himself writes that endogenous changes “occur as a result of episodic power 
outcomes achieving either transformations in the rules that fix relations of meaning and 
membership or enhancement in the process of innovation of techniques of production 
and discipline” (Clegg, 1989, p. 224, emphasis added). In addition, the original 
framework did depict that agencies may control and contest extant OPPs – which 
encompass both rules and techniques.  
The reason why the link to techniques was not included in the original figure is unclear 
to the author. It may be speculated to have been an attempt to simplify the (already 
complex) graphical representation of (also complex) phenomena (Clegg, 1989, p. 215). 
In fact, including another line might imply lines crossing each other (although the 
revised framework managed to avoid that). However, a potential attempt to 
(over)simplify may also mislead, and this may have been such a case. 
As regards the addition of the “extant / new” qualifiers and the removal of “innovation” 
from the term “innovation in techniques”, the novelty concerns mostly in the inclusion 
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of extant techniques (in addition to ‘new’ ones). While the model was accommodative 
(by omission) of both extant and new rules, the mention of “innovation in techniques” 
restricted the scope to new techniques only. This restriction reflected Clegg’s suggestion 
that the circuit of system integration is the main source of innovation in the circuits11. 
However, extant techniques should also be considered. For example, section 5.5, 
regarding the 1990’s, highlighted how characteristics of extant techniques (e.g., Excel 
spreadsheets, SOIC’s limited financial functionalities and the lack of strong central 
organisational structures) reinforced the OPP status of the rules underlying Excel 
spreadsheets adoption and of the Excel spreadsheets themselves. Furthermore, agencies 
may be involved in efforts to preserve extant techniques. Therefore, the proposed 
framework encompasses both new and extant techniques and expands the explanatory 
power of the model, without compromising its accuracy. 
8.1.7 LINK BETWEEN EXOGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONTINGENCIES AND 
THE EPISODIC CIRCUIT 
Clegg’s original framework only depicted the effects of exogenous environmental 
contingencies over rules and techniques (circuits of social and system integration, 
respectively). These environmental contingencies explained exogenous change as they 
“interrupt and disturb the fixed fields of force of the circuit of either social or system 
integration” (Clegg, 1989, p. 224), along the endogenous consequences of outcomes of 
episodic relations (as analysed in the previous suggestion).   
The new framework includes a link from exogenous environmental contingencies to the 
episodic circuit (in addition to the links to the circuit of social and system integration). 
                                                 
11 As proposed in section 8.1.3, but not depicted in the original graphical framework, innovations in 
techniques can also have repercussions on rules. 
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The case study discussion did not provide a particular illustration of this relationship, 
probably because research efforts were not directed to it, for two reasons. First, research 
efforts were mainly focused on the structural circuits of power (rather than the episodic 
circuit), precisely due to their structural, long-term repercussions. Second, research 
efforts attempted to uncover endogenous explanations for events which, superficially, 
might be considered exogenous. Pursuing a holistic analysis of interconnected social 
settings (in line with the purpose and assumptions stated in section 4.1) may reveal that 
apparently idiosyncratic, exogenous events may actually have an endogenous source 
(Seo and Creed, 2002). Beyond this particular case study, it is reasonable to consider 
that exogenous contingencies can also affect the outcomes of episodic power relations, 
based on agents’ causal powers. It can be speculated that such linkage was absent from 
the original framework merely for simplification purposes. 
8.1.8 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL: AN OVERVIEW 
Individually, these proposals do not represent revolutionary changes to Clegg’s original 
framework. Some suggestions add and clarify several linkages which in the original 
framework were either absent or unclear. Even though some of these arguable 
shortcomings may be considered minor, they risked creating misunderstandings of the 
framework. The clarification that rules and techniques fix socio-technical relations and 
empower agencies is believed to remove some ambiguity which arguably existed in the 
original figure.  
Two suggestions were clearly more substantive. First, the consideration of the 
interdependence between rules and techniques, mediated through the extant OPPs, 
concerns a crucial path and direction of influence at the core of the structural circuits of 
 8.2 An ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-based action 
8.2.1 The proposed model at a glance 
623
power. Second, the replacement of ‘social relations’ by ‘socio-technical relations’ 
enhances the consistency with the ANT grounding of the framework. In addition, this 
suggestion promoted the understanding of how techniques, as structural devices, may 
operate at an episodic level, including by replacing episodic exercises of power by 
agencies. Finally, this last insight was also extended to include not only techniques, but 
also rules. These two suggestions are believed to be the most fundamental developments 
to the original model, with significant repercussions on how power strategies can be 
conceived and carried out by organisational actors.  
Clegg’s framework, now revised in this section, has proved useful to make sense of the 
case study. ANT, underlying the framework, contributed to a useful fine-grained, micro-
level perspective of organisational life, combining insights on dynamism and fluidity 
with insights on stability and fixity. In particular, these theoretical lenses supported 
insights on the creation of mechanisms to structurally orient practices, within a complex 
and heterogeneous network of diversified elements. These insights are now deployed, in 
the next section, to construct a model loosely inspired in the OIE framework adopted at 
the start of this work, Burns and Scapens (2000), paying greater attention to the 
organisational micro-level and diversity and to a broad concept of rules, as important 
orientations for organisational action. 
8.2 AN ANT-INSPIRED, OIE MODEL OF RULE-BASED ACTION 
8.2.1 THE PROPOSED MODEL AT A GLANCE 
This section builds on insights developed throughout the thesis to propose an ANT-
inspired, OIE model of rule-based action. This model does not purport to be an all-
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encompassing model, encapsulating all the insights developed throughout the work and 
eventually becoming some kind of ‘meta-model’ representative of a ‘meta-theory’. Its 
ambitions are more modest and are centred on the particular determinant of practices 
which was most focused on this thesis: rules. 
The general structure of the model (Figure 8.2) is loosely inspired by Burns and 
Scapens (2000) (henceforth, Burns and Scapens), with an institutional realm and a 
realm of action. But the resemblances stop virtually there. The model defines the 
institutional realm as a deep, structural psychological structure and it depicts two 
additional structural realms: one of a material nature; and another of a psychological 
nature - at a more superficial level than the deeper institutional realm. Like in Burns and 
Scapens’ framework, the model includes rules; however, it adopts the conceptualisation 
proposed in this thesis; i.e., conceptualising rules as more than formal rules, external to 
the individual, and emphasising rules as actors’ internal structures. Unlike Burns and 
Scapens’ model, this model does not reflect the existence of routines, in order to allow 
for a greater focus on rules, in line with the argument and approach in the previous 
chapters. Also unlike Burns and Scapens’ model and as a reflection of the ANT 
perspective, this model also considers collective actors and non-human actors. Finally, 
this model explicitly considers the interpretive work on rules that human actors have to 
conduct in various instances. These distinctive options, inclusions and exclusions, are 
justified below. 
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Figure 8.2: An ANT-inspired, OIE model of rules-based action 
(Source: Developed by the author, loosely inspired in Burns and Scapens, 2000) 
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In brief, this model acknowledges both the existence of organisational-wide institutions 
(in line with Burns and Scapens’ framework) and the existence of lower level entities 
(ranging from sub-units to individuals) with differing traits, all influencing interests. 
These entities may develop strategic efforts to achieve their interests by influencing 
actions, via mobilising organisational rules and resources. Resources are located in a 
structural, material realm. Rules, on the other hand, are also conceptualised as located in 
the structural realm, but they may have a material dimension (as formal rules) or a 
psychological dimension (informal rules and rules as actors’ internal structures). Rules 
and resources may become intertwined across the two structural realms and rules may 
become technologically and organisationally embedded. The acceptance of rules by 
actors, making them orientating internal cognitive structures, results from those actors’ 
institutions and interests and from whether and how the rules are technologically and 
organisationally embedded. Ultimately, actions unfold at the episodic action realm, as 
enactments of rules by human and non-human actors. Across the previous stages of 
rules embedding, acceptance and enactment, interpretive work is also involved. 
Therefore, the proposed model is very different from the one in Burns and Scapens. It is 
actually a new model altogether, inheriting from the original model only its macro 
structure and most of its key fundamental concepts, but then developing them in 
significantly different ways. 
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8.2.2 THE PROPOSED MODEL, IN DETAIL 
8.2.2.1 Institutional realm as deep psychological structure: institutions and 
interests in a micro-level view of organisations 
From an organisation-wide view… 
In line with Burns and Scapens, the upper part of the proposed framework depicts the 
institutional realm, including shared meanings and beliefs across the institutional unit – 
which, in the most typical scenario of OIE studies, is associated with the organisational 
level (see section 2.4.3). This institutional realm encompasses “the shared taken-for-
granted assumptions”, the beliefs about “the way things are” (Burns and Scapens, p. 8), 
in a relatively “unquestioned and unquestionable way” (p. 11). In a Parsonian view, 
organisation-wide institutions are therefore an element contributing to organisational 
‘truce’ (alongside other elements of the framework, such as routines) (Becker, 1998 and 
2004; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Scapens, 1994). 
Institutionalised, shared beliefs translate into shared interests (arrow ‘A’). This 
association between institutions and interests is solidly established in the literature12. 
The argument that interests are shared among actors is actually an important supporter 
of the organisational ‘truce’. E.g., the widely researched paradox in institutional theory 
of embedded transformational agency has, as one of its fundamental premises, the 
assumption that participants’ perceptions and interests are shaped by their institutional 
context (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Seo and Creed, 2002; see also chapter 2). 
                                                 
12 The literature also associates institutions and preferences. However, interests establish a stronger 
linkage to theoretical approaches analysing intra-organisational power, the major focus of this work and 
of this model in particular. 
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… to a micro-level view of organisations 
However, organisations are not homogeneous entities. In a call to avoid the typical 
association between institutions and the organisational level, Burns (2000a, p. 591) 
noted that “institutionalisation (…) cannot be assumed to be uniform throughout an 
organisation”. Various factors have been identified in the literature promoting intra-
organisational diversity. ‘Incomplete institutionalisation’ (DiMaggio, 1988 and Powell, 
1991) may emerge in “nested systems”, i.e., “interconnected, multilevel systems” 
(Holm, 1995, p. 398), which because they are only ‘loosely coupled’ (Powell, 1991) 
may exhibit diverging characteristics.  
The notion of totality reminds that on-going activities of actors of an institutional unit 
imply keeping relations within and beyond that unit (Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 
2002; from outside the institutional literature, Granovetter, 1973 and 1983). Relations 
beyond the actor’s institutional unit promotes exposure to alternative arrangements and 
promotes diversity. Moreover, there are additional sources of influences not related with 
interactions with humans (e.g., the media). In addition, Whittington (1992) drew on 
Giddens to identify structural diversity in four sources of influences (professional, 
political, ethnic and domestic) which affect different actors in different ways. Given the 
focus on organisational issues, previous chapters discussed divergences associated with 
professional influences, such as those associated with different types of organisational 
functions and which may even give rise to different organisational subcultures 
(Hofstede, 1998; see sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3). 
Taken together, the totality of the professional and non professional domains for 
individual and collective actors inevitably create exposure to a wide range of 
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institutional arrangements, at multiple levels and in “unregulated ways”, in a 
“nonrationalized sphere of organizational action” (Benson, 1977, p. 12). Whittington 
(1992), inspired by Giddens (1991), noted the “diversity of social milieux in which we 
(…) are involved, both through direct participation and through media exposure” (p. 
696). “This diversity of contacts with other institutional arrangements promotes “a 
plurality of choices which confronts individuals of high modernity” (Giddens, 1991, p. 
82) and creates the potential for institutional diversity among organisational actors. 
And, as noted above, diversity of institutions and other characteristics within an 
organisation promotes the emergence of intra-organisational diversity of interests. 
In this framework, interests are conceived as the “representations of interest which 
agencies make” (Clegg, p. 212). Interests may therefore be the “result of a process of 
‘translation’”, reflecting various influences including the one depicted in the 
framework: institutionalised shared beliefs. Therefore, the above conception of 
‘representations of interests which agencies make’ is consistent with institutional 
theory, although it accommodates other sources of influence over those representations, 
in addition to prevalent institutions. At stake may be a more calculative and less 
Parsonian view of agencies, and the potential role of strategies of power conducted by 
other actors, as this case study demonstrated and Ribeiro (2003) had suggested (see 
subsection 2.3.1). Therefore, a caveat as regards the graphical representation of the 
framework must be expressed: were it not for the concern of not increasing the 
complexity of the framework, various arrows would be pointing to ‘interests’, in 
addition to the depicted one originated in ‘institutions’.  
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Three categories of actors 
As argued during the case study analysis, there was substantial heterogeneity across 
IndCo. Without intending to promote reification, three broad abstract categories of 
actors are now identified. These categories are defined according to actors’ relational 
and contingent capacity, exercised at particular points in time, to attempt to influence 
the elements of the two structural circuits of power proposed by Clegg: rules and 
material conditions. The categories refer to: 1) those actors influencing the definition or 
proposal of rules (formal or informal); 2) actors influencing the definition or proposal of 
material conditions (technological and organisational); and 3) all actors in general, 
beyond their eventual influence on the definition or proposal of rules and material 
conditions.  
These abstract categories of actors are, above all, analytical categories. The graphic 
representation cannot do justice, of course, to the overlapping of such categories, in 
particular considering the various levels and types of rules and material conditions 
potentially involved. In practice, an ambiguous and exclusive classification of any 
particular actor within any of those categories is unlikely to exist. E.g., a particular actor 
may be in a relational position to attempt to influence the definition of particular rules, 
while, at the same time, being unable to do the same as regards other rules.  
In addition, there is no necessary, strict association between any particular actor, a 
specific organisational area and related characteristics. Nevertheless, from the case 
study interpretation did emerge beliefs and concerns considered to characterise certain 
organisational domains in particular temporal contexts. E.g., among subsidiaries, local 
level issues were the main foci and priority, above central level priorities; in turn, this 
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translated into specific issues such as accounting criteria, reporting timings and adopted 
tools. An identical focus and priority did not characterise interviewees broadly 
associated with the organisational centre.  
In a related way, these broad categories of actors should not be conceptualised as 
monolithic groups of homogeneous actors, or as corresponding to particular, defined, 
recognisable sub-groups. These categories of actors merely reflect those actors’ 
particular attempts (or absence of attempts) to influence the structural realms. Each 
category is likely to be heterogeneous in its institutionalised beliefs and interests, while 
sharing some commonalities. In particular, the third category intends to encompass all 
actors, whenever they are not attempting to influence rules and/or material conditions. 
In fact, no actor actively attempts (let alone succeeds) to influence rules and material 
conditions in all areas, at all times. There are at least some occasions and times in 
which actors (all actors) are not involved in such active attempts. The third category is 
therefore likely to be the most widely diversified one. 
Considering the above description of the categories of actors, four aspects underlie the 
graphical representation of the framework: relational capacity; contingent capacity; 
exercised capacity; the time dimension. First, the capacity of an actor is not absolute, as 
if intrinsically his/hers, but rather derives from the particular relational position that 
that actor occupies at a certain moment within the relevant actor-network. Second, there 
is no determinism or guarantee as regards the capacity of any actor to obtain success in 
any particular attempt. Third, although power is seen as a capacity, what is relevant in 
this particular framework is the actual exercise of that capacity to try to influence the 
structural circuits of power. Fourth, (and this complements the third aspect) this 
classification is temporally specific and also dynamic and processual. In a nutshell, the 
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relational, contingent capacity is exercised in particular, temporally specific instances of 
wider processes. 
Finally, two clarifications are required. The first clarification concerns the adoption of 
ANT’s ontological assumptions. In addition to individuals, both collective and non-
human actors are depicted in the framework. Collective actors are the “collective loci of 
decision-making and actions” (Clegg, p. 215) mentioned in section 8.1. In turn, this 
requires conceptualising rules not only as the orientations accepted by individual human 
actors, at an atomised level, but also as the orientations accepted at a collective level. In 
addition, it also requires considering that there is ‘collective interpretive work’. The 
second clarification is related to rules. In line with section 2.3, rules, in this collective 
sense, still remain different from institutions (which are taken-for-granted and 
disassociated from historical origins, etc.) and from routines (which are crucially related 
with recurrence, repetition, and tend to be associated with some degree of automaticity).  
Diversified actors, institutions and interests 
Condensing the above argument about diversity of actors, institutions and interests, this 
framework brings such diversity to the forefront, as depicted by the three arrows ‘B’. 
Institutional diversity across diverse actors contributed, concomitantly with additional 
factors, towards different interests across actors (these additional factors are not 
graphically expressed to simplify the framework). These diverse interests across the 
organisations and their actors promote the emergence of diversified strategies to attain 
those interests, acting on the other structural realms. This is analysed next.  
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8.2.2.2 Structural material and (surface) psychological realms: defining rules and 
material conditions 
According to their diversified and potential opposing interests, actors attempt to 
structurally shape the conduits through which power circulates within organisations. 
This requires addressing the two other structural realms: the structural material realm 
(including material conditions and formal rules) and the structural, yet superficial 
psychological realm (more superficial than the deep level of the institutional realm, and 
which include rules of meaning and membership).13 These attempts are represented by 
the three arrows ‘C’.14 
The structural, material realm is conceived as comprising material conditions and 
formal rules. As defined during the discussion of Clegg’s framework in Chapter 3, 
material conditions include machinery, information systems, software, organisational 
structures, etc. and were labelled under the wide concept of techniques of production 
and discipline. In addition, the criterion of materiality leads to the inclusion of formal 
rules in this realm, given their codified, ‘objective’ nature - regardless of being 
inscribed in a strictly material form (e.g., in a book) or in a virtual form (e.g., in an 
electronic database). Strategic moves by agencies to shape these two areas are 
represented by the two arrows ‘C’ which link the institutional realm and the material 
realm. 
                                                 
13 As already discussed, these structures are in line with Giddens’ structures of signification, legitimation 
and domination, respectively. However, Giddens establishes a narrow relation between the structure of 
domination (based on resources) and power, while in Clegg’s vision power flows, emerges and is 
constrained through the various circuits, and not only through material conditions. 
14 Since each category of actors is heterogeneous and has various interests, and since such diversity 
promotes diverse, potentially opposite strategies to influence the structural realms, it would be plausible 
to draw multiple downward arrows ‘C’ coming out of each (heterogeneous) category of actors. Multiple 
arrows would correspond to multiple (and potentially opposed) proposed and defined rules and material 
conditions (Ribeiro, 2003). This plausible, and even more complete and accurate, representation was not 
adopted for simplification purposes. 
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Formal rules may be materially confined to their underlying original support in which 
they were legislated. In such case, actors are confronted with those formal rules, the 
eventual rewards and sanctions included in the legislation, and actors’ internal 
“questions of value” also underlying those issues (Hodgson, 2006, p. 5). However, rules 
may also be translated and embedded in material devices, granting an additional 
influence to these rules; this is analysed further below, when arrow ‘G’ is discussed. 
In addition to formal rules, actors may also promote the adoption of rules with an 
informal nature (the third arrow ‘C’), not codified in a ‘material’ way (in the above latu 
sensu). It is acknowledged that informal rules may also emerge through an alternative 
process of “‘accretion, a passive process not under anyone’s control, just happening’”15. 
However, it would be naïf to reject the possibility that actors may also actively propose 
and promote informal rules. Like in the above analysis of the initial stage of formal 
rules, the influence of informal rules is largely shaped by the rewards and sanctions 
perceived to be associated with them – and whose enforcement mechanisms, as argued 
in subsection 2.3.1 based on Hodgson (2006), share some important commonalities. 
A brief clarification regarding the relative positioning of the structural realms is 
required. Positioning the material realm next to the institutional realm and above the 
surface level psychological realm (in the upper area of the figure) is not intended to 
suggest greater closeness or similarity between the first two realms, when compared to 
relation between the institutional realm and the surface level psychological realm. 
Similarly (as regards the bottom area of the figure), it is also not intended to suggest that 
the surface level psychological realm is closer to the realm of action, when compared 
                                                 
15  Full quote already included in chapter 2, from Seal and Herbert (2005, p. 30), citing Czarniawska 
(1997, p. 192, emphasis removed). 
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with the material realm. Their relative position is merely intended to facilitate the flow 
of the proposed ‘causality’ account and it has no further theoretical foundations or 
implications.  
8.2.2.3 Structural realms in interaction – part 1: rules, interpretive work, 
material conditions and the embedding of rules 
As argued in section 2.3, all rules, formal and informal rules alike, require 
interpretation. ‘Interpretive work’ on rules indeed takes place at various moments and is 
responsible for rules indexicality – i.e., for rules meaning being dependent upon the 
interpreters and upon the context of interpretation. The framework signals several 
instances where interpretive work occurs, identified with letter ‘D’ (‘D-1’, ‘D-2’ and 
‘D-3’) (other possible instances are not depicted in the framework)16. 
Interpretive work associated with letter ‘D-1’ actually refers to two instances. The first 
instance when interpretive work must be carried out is when formal rules affect 
informal rules, and vice-versa (arrow ‘E’, a bidirectional curve touching the 
‘interpretive work’ figure). Formal rules provide orientations (signals) about acceptable 
and non-acceptable behaviours, and, through interpretive work, formal rules can extend 
their influence to areas not initially reflected in them (the concept of analogy is 
applicable here). Likewise, informal rules can also affect the production of formal rules, 
according to the particular interpretations that the ‘legislators’ may carry out of those 
informal rules; in this case, the relevant ‘interpretive act’ (Boland, 1996) is carried out 
                                                 
16 Interpretive work operates within human actors’ ‘internal structure’ and is obviously a psychological 
activity, rather than a material aspect. However, the instance of interpretive work identified as ‘D-1’ is 
graphically depicted across not only the psychological realm but also the material realm. Such 
representation merely intends to emphasise, without additional confusing graphic elements, that 
interpretive work mediates the various processes within the structural realm, including those within the 
material structural realm (arrows ‘F’ and ‘G’, explained below). 
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by the actors involved in the ‘legislative act’.17 It should also be noted that the processes 
through which formal rules influence informal rules are likely to be more gradual and 
emergent, while the inverse processes of informal rules influencing formal rules are 
inherently more episodic. 
The second instance of interpretive work encompassed by letter ‘D-1’ is when rules 
have an influence in ‘conditions of possibility’18 as regards the definition of material 
conditions (arrow ‘F’). Although this instance of interpretive work is also represented 
by letter ‘D-1’ for the sake of graphical economy, it may be carried out by different 
actors. As mentioned, material conditions are techniques of production and discipline. 
For example, rules concerning investments can significantly influence the material 
conditions which can potentially be implemented. These rules can be codified and 
formal (e.g., as expressed in the annual budget, or in the procedure manual about the 
required steps of an investment process, regarding its conception, justification, 
authorisation and physical and financial execution). However, the rules can also be 
informal (e.g., a general informal rule considering that investments in enhanced 
financial software are not a priority).19  
As discussed in the previous chapter, rules may be translated from their formal or 
informal ontology to become embedded in structural devices, gaining multiform 
materiality. As discussed in the previous chapter, rules may become technologically 
                                                 
17 Naturally, the expressions ‘legislators’ and ‘the legislative process’ are used here in a broad sense and 
certainly beyond the realm of laws (e.g., State laws) and include, e.g., a director defining stricter 
organisational rules for purchasing approval processes. 
18 This is a narrow, but plausible, application of the concept of ‘conditions of possibility’ (see footnote 17 
in page 404, in chapter 6). 
19 Such process of defining material conditions (arrow ‘F’) itself entails the enactment of rules, in a 
recursive application (arrow ‘L’) of what is presented below as the ‘final’ stage of the framework, at the 
episodic realm of action. For the sake of presentation simplicity, the recursive nature of the process is 
temporarily ignored, and is resumed below, towards the end of the discussion of the framework. 
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(Volkoff et al., 2007) and / or organisationally embedded. Each type of embeddedness 
is described separately, but for the sake of economy the same arrow ‘G’ is used to refer 
to both. In addition, it is likely that informal rules, in order to become embedded, must 
become somehow formally recognised beforehand (the upward direction of arrow ‘E’). 
Hence, arrow ‘G’ departs solely from formal rules, rather than informal rules. 
Through mobilisation of technology, rules become inscribed within technological 
devices (arrow ‘G’), which have a material nature. As argued in section 8.1, 
technological devices (in IndCo’s case, SAP FI) are non-human actors, but they are 
involved in socio-technical relations. The present discussion on inscribing rules within 
technological devices highlights the constitutive effects of such socio-technical relations 
on the non-human actor’s ontology. In this case study, embedding rules implied 
mobilising SAP (and SAP FI in particular) by configuring various aspects of this 
technology. One example was embedding rules within the adopted parallel accounts 
solution, with the inherent relational ontology of the common and local charts of 
accounts20. Rules also became embedded through wider aspects of SAP mobilisation, 
such as the definition of user profiles - and, inherently, the rules that defined users’ 
capacities and scope of agency for interaction with the system (e.g., as regards the 
various charts of accounts), as well as with other users, through the system. 
The case study also suggested that rules may achieve a particularly structural nature 
when they become embedded within integrated organisational processes, carried out by 
organisational structures. As mentioned, the arrow ‘G’ is also used to refer to this type 
of embeddedness. The type of embeddedness, and materiality, achieved by rules 
                                                 
20 Local charts of accounts exist in relation to the common chart of the accounts, and vice-versa. In 
addition, each local chart of accounts is also related with the other local charts of accounts, but only 
indirectly, via the common chart of accounts. 
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through organisational embeddedness is different when compared to technological 
embeddedness. But both embedding mechanisms reinforce the defined or proposed 
rules, by increasing actors’ need to compliance in as much as actors then take part in 
those wider, integrated organisational processes carried out by organisational structures 
and / or interact with those technological devices. 
Finally, it should be recalled that both processes of embedding rules are mediated by 
‘interpretive work’ of the actors involved (a third instance of interpretive work also 
represented by letter ‘D-1’). In fact, actors must make sense of the (organisational) rules 
to be potentially embedded, as well as of the rules of the structures in which the 
(organisational) rules are to be embedded. This is particularly the case of ERP systems, 
such as the case study SAP system, which themselves comprise an inordinate amount of 
rules regulating their own ‘conditions of possibility’. As Volkoff et al., 2007 noted, 
“systems are configurable, but not infinitely malleable” (p. 833), and ERP configuration 
requires an articulation between the interpretation and enactment of ERP rules and the 
interpretation of the proposed organisational rules. 
8.2.2.4 Structural realms in interaction – part 2: the emergence of rules as 
‘internal structures’ of human actors 
The analysis of the structural realm now turns to the holistic repercussions of the 
various structural elements, as encompassed by the vertical curly bracket. At stake is 
how those structural elements, mediated by additional ‘interpretive work’, have 
repercussions on the emergence of the rules accepted by human actors (both individual 
and collective) and which constitute a part of their ‘internal structure’ (see section 2.3). 
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Human actors are confronted with formal and informal rules which have entered the 
organisational realm through various processes of promulgation, definition, proposal or 
suggestion. Some (but certainly not all) of those rules have been embedded in 
technological and/or organisational structures and processes which impinge on actors’ 
organisational life. 
The framework depicts processes of a deliberate and largely guided nature, with 
particular underlying actors and interests. It can be argued that, as regards informal 
rules, there may also be processes resembling simple accretion, although it is doubtful 
whether they do not reflect interests of particular actors. This distinction about the 
degree of guidance (or manipulation) of these processes is, nevertheless, not absolutely 
crucial for the ensuing discussion, because the focus now resides in the generality of 
actors that have not been promoting these processes of definition and promotion of 
rules. These actors (the third category of actors depicted in the model) are the ‘targets’ 
for the rules being promoted, but they do not correspond to a clearly defined, exclusive 
and reified subset of actors, as discussed above in this section. 
At this stage, these ‘targeted’ actors are confronted with a confluence between extant 
material conditions, defined or proposed rules (embedded or not, formal or informal) 
and their particular institutional context and interests (the ‘wider-than-usual’ circle 
around letter ‘H’ intends to represent such confluence among multiple factors). This 
convergence requires additional interpretive work, given rules indexicality (letter ‘D-2’, 
the fourth instance of interpretive work), in a process which is also guided by their 
particular (i.e., diverse) institutional context and interests.21 The diversity of outcomes 
                                                 
21 As noted above, it would be plausible to draw multiple vertical arrows coming out of each category of 
actors. 
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resulting from the consideration of multiple institutional traits and interests across actors 
is compounded by the indexicality of rules interpretation related with the interpreters 
themselves (see chapter 2). Finally, the consideration of material conditions 
(encompassed, alongside rules, by the vertical curly bracket) accommodates a more 
calculative view of individuals, as suggested by Ribeiro (2003), complementing the 
more Parsonian view of individuals as internalising institutionally shared traits. 
Therefore, the ultimate acceptance of rules by actors, making rules orienting structures, 
as a part of actors’ ‘internal structure’, is depicted in the framework as resulting from 
the confluence of four factors. First, from shared institutional traits and interests, as 
emphasised by Scapens and Macintosh (1996). Second, from diversified institutional 
traits and interests, as a consequence of a more micro-level view of organisations. Third, 
from individuals’ interpretive work (which Boland, 1996 depicted as indexical, not 
relying primarily on putatively shared meanings). And fourth, from a more calculative 
attitude of individuals, beyond a Parsonian perspective of values internalisation and 
accommodating more deliberate and calculative strategies, reflecting, e.g., the ways to 
advantageously explore structural material conditions (Ribeiro, 2003). 
8.2.2.5 Episodic realm: enactment of rules by human and non-human actors 
At an episodic realm, human actors draw on their accepted rules, as part of their internal 
structures, to orient their actions; rules may thus become enacted. However, the 
framework highlights that there is still an additional instance of interpretive work and 
indexicality, in particular due to the need to interpret the rule considering the actual 
context of potential enactment. Therefore, additional interpretive work on the rule must 
be carried out (letter ‘D-3’) prior to its enactment.  
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In addition, prevalent material conditions (letter ‘J’) also influence the ultimate 
enactment of the rule. The case study, across chapters 6 and 7, amply demonstrated how 
the material conditions introduced in the organisation (the new information system and 
the new organisational structures) profoundly influenced the actors’ practices. 
Repercussions of material conditions emerged (as discussed in chapter 7) by making 
certain practices easier or more difficult (as techniques of production) or by creating 
lines of visibility (as techniques of discipline) (see also in chapter 7 the identification of 
various types of discipline).  
Therefore, there is a confluence between the prevalent structural material conditions and 
the interpretive work carried out by the actors on the rules they accept as a part of their 
internal structure. It is that confluence that orients, in a contingent and non-deterministic 
way, the actual enactment of rules, in the episodic realm of action. 
The case study also provided insights on the enactment by non-human actors of 
particular rules, previously embedded in technological devices (arrow ‘K’). Various 
kinds of rules were identified which were enacted by the non-human actor SAP. E.g., 
embedded rules allowed SAP to automatically post intra-group invoices and to expedite 
product costing. More significantly, embedded rules impinged on human agency in 
areas such as transfer prices, the requirement of the existence of product costing for any 
given product to be produced, and credit control. This last example, regarding credit 
control, is particularly interesting since it entails an automatic enactment of a rule 
embedded in SAP (by halting the invoicing process), but retaining a room for human 
agency - albeit an oriented one. In fact, SAP enacts other embedded rules to constrain 
and channel the potential for agency to a particular individual, who then has to perform 
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the interpretive work concerning the rules at stake and decide on the course of action, at 
the episodic level. 
8.2.2.6 Recursiveness revisited: enacted rules influencing the structural realms 
Finally, enacted rules at the episodic level, in isolation or repeatedly, have the potential 
to influence the structural realms at all levels (arrows ‘L’). This recursiveness is, of 
course, multi-layered and links together processes concerning various rules. Rules 
enacted in one area may, at one point in time, impinge on rules whose processes of 
definition, proposal, interpretation, embedding and acceptance are still underway. 
Importantly, enacted rules may be repeated across time and space, potentially giving 
rise to routines and even institutions, in processes of routinisation and upward causation 
which have been, and continue to be, extensively researched in the literature (Becker, 
1998, 2004, 2005, 2008a; Burns, 2008; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Hodgson, 2006; 
Quinn, 2010). Indeed, institutionalised rules are accepted rules which have achieved an 
institutionalised status, by having ‘moved upwards’ to the deep psychological level of 
the institutional realm). 
Therefore, there is an inherently dynamic nature in this process, which is hardly made 
justice in the graphical depiction of the framework – conveyed by arrows ‘L’ and the 
large horizontal arrows of each realm pointing towards the right, i.e., towards the future.  
As a final note, it is suggested that this model may provide a preliminary starting point 
to address a paradox of institutional theory. As Seal and Herbert (2005) noted, one of 
the paradoxes of institutional theory concerns the contrast between “the notion of 
institutions that ‘suggests accretion, a passive process not under anyone’s control, just 
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happening’” and the notion that “the ‘construction of institutions implies and demands a 
proactive, performing, vision of human actors, busying themselves with plotting, 
performing, accounting for what they do…’” (Seal and Herbert, 2005, p. 30, citing 
Czarniawska, 1997, p. 192, original author’s emphasis). In the suggested model, actors 
are at the core, promoting and being constrained by strategies about proposed and 
defined rules and material conditions, in turn influencing accepted and enacted rules. 
Ultimately, accepted and enacted rules benefit the actors who have introduced them (see 
the last consequence depicted in figure 7.1, and which was not included in the model for 
simplification purposes). Furthermore, at a wider level, accepted and enacted rules may 
end up by becoming institutionalised, as suggested in the model.  
The model does not explore whether and how accepted rules go beyond the surface 
level of ‘merely accepted’ rules and achieve that ‘taken-for-granted’ status 
characterising institutions. Therefore, the model does not solve the paradox. However, it 
does highlight how active human agency may influence antecedent steps to 
institutionalisation, by influencing accepted and enacted rules. And, by a greater 
understanding of agency, the model may contribute to lessen the neglect of agency 
traditionally charged against institutional theory, as noted in chapter 2. 
8.2.3 CONTRIBUTIONS – AND LIMITATIONS - OF THE PROPOSED MODEL 
8.2.3.1 Contributions – a brief overview 
The proposed model of rule-based action incorporates several innovative concepts and 
linkages which are not only distinctive features as regards extant models, but may also 
make a contribution to OIE. Only a brief overview is provided here, since a more 
detailed analysis is developed in the next chapter. 
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The model explicitly considers diversity within organisations, as regards institutions and 
interests. It also endorses a wider concept of rules than the most usual one in OIE model 
(restricted to formal rules), emphasising rules as (human) actors’ internal structures 
orientating their actions, and hence expanding the explicative power of OIE models (as 
argued in section 2.3). 
The model also depicts three structural realms: an institutional realm (as a deep 
psychological structure); a material realm; and a surface psychological realm. This 
innovative conceptualisation highlights the importance of material conditions – 
techniques of production and discipline-, with multiple repercussions: embedding rules, 
promoting rules acceptance and enactment, and even enacting rules themselves. The 
distinction between two psychological structures as regards their depth is also useful, 
since, among other reasons, it highlights the importance of rules even when they do not 
achieve the greater depth of institutions.  
The model also brings to OIE the concept of technological embeddedness (Volkoff et 
al., 2007), applying it to rules and incorporating the ANT insight that non-human actors 
– and not only human actors – may also enact rules. In addition, it proposes the 
analogous concept of organisational embeddedness. Finally, the endorsement of an 
ANT ontology, conceptualising individual and collective actors, human and non-human 
actors, has important repercussions for OIE (e.g., non-human actors enacting rules, as 
mentioned above), whose further discussion is postponed to the next chapter. 
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8.2.3.2 Limitations 
It is hoped that the components and relations included in this model make a useful 
contribution to the literature, but the model is certainly not exempt from limitations, 
even when compared with models also drawing from Burns and Scapens (e.g., Quinn, 
2010). E.g., these two other models have a characteristic that in the now proposed 
model was sacrificed to avoid information and detail overkill: a more obvious dynamic 
and temporal perspective. As mentioned, such dynamic perspective is only discretely 
conveyed by the right-oriented horizontal arrows of each realm, pointing towards the 
future, in addition to the feedback arrow ‘L’, representing the influence of enacted rules 
on the structural realms. But attempts at introducing both antecedent conditions (on the 
left side of the framework) and posterior changes (on the right side of the framework) 
have resulted in visually unappealing depictions of an inordinate amount of elements 
and arrows. The reader is invited to bear in mind that these processes are dynamic, 
continuous, contingent and precarious, in spite of the attempts to create fixity through 
the structural components. Therefore, the process depicted in the figure is continuously 
repeated, as agencies continuously attempt to secure and deploy their always contingent 
and precarious sources of power. 
In addition, as already acknowledged, it is also accepted that the two other models also 
incorporate a component which is absent from the proposed model: routines. As 
clarified above in this section, this absence does not reflect a suggestion that routines 
may not exist or may be unimportant. Its absence reflects two choices. First, the choice 
for focusing on rules, in order to argue for a greater emphasis on this component, often 
neglected in favour of an overwhelming focus on routines. Indeed, the label of this 
model made explicit its focus on “rule-based action”. Second, the eventual addition of 
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routines would imply an increased complexity in an already complex figure, risking a 
visual (and cognitive) overkill.  
It is nonetheless suggested how routines may be accommodated in this framework. As 
Becker (2004) highlighted, routines necessarily depend on previous, recurrent 
behaviour (see section 2.3). Therefore, it is suggested that an additional arrow to the 
right on the realm of action may convey the routinisation of repeated, recurrent actions 
by human actors (i.e., constituting performative routines).  
In turn, these performative routines may feedback on all the above three levels. First, 
actions and performative routines may affect the surface level of structural 
psychological realm, by creating ostensive routines, which may further reinforce the 
orienting function of rules as internal structures. In turn, ostensive routines (and their 
underlying rules) may also affect the structural material realm, as they become 
embedded in technological devices or translated into formal rules (if such technological 
embeddedness or formal representation did not already exist). Finally, routines may 
affect the deep level of the structural psychological realm, if routines become 
institutionalised, disassociated from the historical circumstances in which they were 
originated (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
Both acknowledged exclusions (of a more obvious dynamic perspective and routines) 
are areas for further development, in particular to conceive of more integrative 
frameworks. The previous paragraph is a first approach on such a future development. 
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
This concluding chapter is divided in three sections. The first section synthesises 
the main research findings by drawing on the adopted research questions: three 
questions related to the specific empirical setting; and two questions directed towards 
theoretical development in the field of institutional theory and power. The second 
section acknowledges some limitations of the study and a final section indicates 
avenues for future research. 
9.1 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
9.1.1 UNDERSTANDING THE EMPIRICAL SETTING – ‘THE ‘WHY’S AND 
‘HOW’S’ 
This first subsection is structured around the three research questions more 
closely linked to the case study organisation ‘IndCo’ and addressed in chapters 5, 6 and 
7. It synthesises the constructed understanding of the particular empirical setting, by 
addressing the ‘why and how’ questions that are crucial in interpretive and processual 
research. The option taken in this section was to include an empirical synthesis, in 
addition to the theoretical analysis, in order to facilitate a quick overview of the rather 
extensive empirical chapters (cf. Silverman, 2005). 
9.1.1.1 Why did central actors have power limitations? 
The first research question aimed to address a puzzle arising from the case study 
and... 
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1) Explain why formally powerful, central actors at the case study 
organisation were confronted with power limitations. 
 
 
Addressing this question in Chapter 5 allowed the author to theoretically 
position and structure the remainder of the case analysis. Numerous insights suggested 
that, by the end of the 1990’s, IndCo’s ‘central actors’, including its Chairman and 
majority shareholder, were confronted with several power limitations. Those limitations 
concerned the lack of capacity of central actors to have consistent, detailed and timely 
information (including financial and accounting information) for decision-making and 
control and the resulting lack of capacity of those actors to effectively intervene at local 
levels. These structural limitations contrasted with their formal hierarchical positions 
which, through episodic exercises of power based on the control of resources, typically 
granted them the capacity to obtain intended outcomes in particular instances.  
Understanding why that structural capacity of central actors was limited, what 
caused that limited power, was the puzzle. Power was therefore conceived as a capacity 
(in this case, a limited capacity), as a ‘power to’. And the cause of this (lack of) power / 
capacity had to be explained (see section 3.2 for these conceptions of power). 
Clegg’s concepts of circuits of social and system integration contributed to make 
sense of the puzzle. The most visible explanation could be attributed to the circuit of 
system integration, regarding extant techniques of discipline and production, both 
technological and organisational (see subsection 5.4.4). Various technological 
conditions supported local actors better than central actors, ranging from production 
technology to information systems of the production, financial accounting and 
management accounting areas. A local perspective also underlay organisational 
 9.1 Research findings 
 9.1.1 Understanding the empirical setting – ‘the ‘why’s and ‘how’s’ 
649
structures and processes – which in turn were tightly intertwined with information 
systems, supporting the socio-technical relations of daily operations (section 8.1). 
Several examples regarding the disintegration, diversity, decentralisation, autonomy and 
local focus in the accounting area were provided.  
This configuration of the circuit of system integration had disciplinary 
consequences and ‘productive’ consequences (in both ‘mainstream’ and ‘Foucauldian’ 
approaches, see subsection 3.3.6), and overall tended to favour the perspectives – and 
interests – of local actors better than the ones of central actors. 
In addition, a less visible explanation of the puzzle also emerged from the in-
depth discussions, concerning the circuit of social integration. Extant local rules of 
meaning and membership did not promote, and sometimes even hampered, the 
attainment of the interests of central actors, since they privileged a local level focus and 
/ or they were diverse across locations, or differently interpreted and enacted (section 
2.3). Some quotes, nearly all from chapter 5, may be useful: “we all had different 
concepts”; “criteria are different across controllers”; “people (…) did not know what 
was behind [the numbers]”; “many times, he [plant controller] calculates using his own 
rules”; “possibility for variations on how to interpret and introduce data in the system”; 
“There was a procedure manual for management control. But not all [plant controllers] 
did in the same way”. These quotations highlight the need of going beyond formal rules 
(e.g., the procedure manual), and research the rules as interpreted, accepted and enacted 
(or not) at a local, micro level, down to the individual level. 
Considering these two circuits, central actors’ limitations could be attributed to 
the lack of “Obligatory Passage Points” guiding actors’ interpretations, dispositions and 
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behaviours towards the attainment of their interests, both as regards extant techniques 
and rules. 
Exploring this first research question also provided relevant insights for 
introducing nuances in more extreme interpretations, both from an OIE-perspective and 
from a politically-focused perspective. OIE theorists tend to emphasise the role of 
institutions and routines and power theorists tend to emphasise organisations as arenas 
of struggles. The following quote from a CC manager reconciles various views, 
explaining central actors’… 
“… perception that we didn’t have capacity to have consistent information 
for decision-making, because each one had a different method. Not that 
there was bad-will or whatever. Simply, each one did as he/she knew and 
was used to doing, giving total and absolute priority to the country’s 
reporting, and not the internal group reporting”. 
 
On one hand, this interviewee rejected the existence of a clear conflict leading to 
“bad-will”. But he also depicted how accepted and enacted rules, as regards their 
content and their diversity, had consequences over the objectives and interests that each 
set of rules favoured, or neglected. This account highlighted the ubiquity of power, even 
when no visible conflict is at stake, and the persistent (albeit sometimes discreet) 
linkage between rules and power. In addition, while this interviewee recognised the 
importance of recurrent patterns of behaviour (an individual habit or collective routine, 
in a behavioural conception of these terms), these patterns cannot be disassociated from 
the underlying rules repeatedly enacted (section 2.3) 
As argued in chapter 2, rules should also be considered, not the least because 
they also underlie routines. This thesis does not deny the importance of routines. 
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However, as previously discussed, OIE would have to benefit from looking into other 
components of the institutional framework in order to increase the explanatory capacity 
of OIE models. 
Three major innovations in the circuit of system integration between the late 
1990’s and the early years of the new millennium were expected to substantially 
overcome these limitations. This issue was explored in the second research question, 
addressing both the motivations and the processes linked to the innovations.  
9.1.1.2 Why and how did central actors introduce and mobilise innovations in the 
circuit of system integration? 
The second research question, explored in Chapter 6, aimed to… 
2) Explain why and how central actors introduced and mobilised 
technological and organisational innovations.  
 
 
The major innovations at stake were the adoption of the financial accounting 
model of SAP (SAP FI), the relocation of the Corporate Centre and the creation of a 
Shared Services Centre. Addressing this question should start by recognising that 
orienting rules was not the exclusive motivation for introducing the innovations. E.g., 
the SAP FI innovation had an important technical motivation (avoiding the ‘Year 2000 
bug’ and adopt a financial accounting solution for new sites in two countries) and the 
SSC had an important economic motivation (cost savings). However, as discussed, the 
technical motivation of SAP FI was deeply intertwined with non-technical issues (e.g., 
the selection of one single solution, rather than various ones; the design of the solution 
by a single team, based in Portugal, rather than in a decentralised way at a country 
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level). And the economic motivation of the SSC cannot be disassociated from the 
interests of key central actors (among which the main shareholder Mr. A), strongly 
affected by IndCo’s financial crisis at the time. Therefore there is no claim of attributing 
exclusive explanatory capacity to the objective of orienting rules; but what is claimed is 
that this objective cannot be ignored in the processes of introduction and mobilisation of 
the innovations.  
A simplistic answer to the ‘why’ component of the research question would 
merely highlight the objective of overcoming previously perceived limitations. 
However, the case study provided a more complex account of the underlying 
motivations, and which must be understood considering the ‘how’ component of the 
research question – i.e., how the innovations were introduced. The three innovations 
(SAP FI, CC and the SSC) will be analysed separately next. 
The introduction and mobilisation of SAP FI 
The introduction and mobilisation of SAP FI represented a very clear case of the 
development of preferences and objectives through action. In addition, ANT insights 
highlighted how such motivations emerged as a result of actions occurring within a 
network of socio-technical relations, rather than ‘strictly social’ (see sections 3.4 8.1). 
As the process of SAP FI mobilisation evolved and as SAP FI itself evolved, the mostly 
IT-focused initial objectives and concerns became enmeshed with objectives and 
concerns of actors from other areas (in particular, central actors of the financial area). 
As the case study argued, these objectives were only gradually developing. SAP FI 
clearly had various stages of mobilisation, characterised by the prevalence of particular 
types of concerns by particular actors. This overall depiction of a gradual, largely 
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unplanned and unpredicted, and certainly non-linear process, supported answering the 
question of ‘why… central actors… introduced… innovations… to orient rules’ in a 
more holistic (albeit less direct) way. It allows going beyond an answer to the ‘why’ 
question only based on ‘overcoming previously perceived limitations’. 
SAP FI was a (non-human) actor introduced, through socio-technical relations, 
within a socio-technical network. The case study highlighted the early, but relatively 
incipient, objective that this new actor promoted uniform rules (across one, then three 
countries). Such an objective relied on the development of one single model, with the 
same processes and accounts structure, developed by a single team in Portugal 
(although the very existence of a global IT team in Portugal was, in itself, important to 
understand why only one model was developed). However, the initial configuration 
included independent, unarticulated charts of accounts, in different servers, across the 
countries, and local level actors were able to change local settings. Such an initial option 
resulted mainly from lower risk IT criteria, considering two factors: the lack of 
requirements by central actors in the financial area towards greater uniformity; and the 
requirements from local level actors, mostly concerned about local level financial 
accounting issues, rather than central level ones. As highlighted, local level actors, in 
particular plant directors, held a particularly strong relational power within IndCo’s 
network at the time. 
This initial decentralised configuration allowed for an unplanned divergence of 
the models. Only when such divergence eventuated, and concomitantly with other 
technical developments (the adoption of logistic SAP modules) and organisational 
developments (the first steps towards the creation of a corporate centre in Portugal), did 
central actors from the finance area raise the uniformity and integration objectives. A 
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new stage of SAP mobilisation started. The shift to a parallel accounts solution, with a 
common chart of accounts articulated with country-level charts of accounts and based 
on a single server in Portugal, was a crucial step towards greater multi-country 
uniformity and integration and, through that, enhanced visibility and intervention 
capacity by central actors. 
The concurrent influence of other (technical and organisational) factors 
mentioned in the previous paragraph is explored next and also when addressing the third 
research question, about the actual repercussions of the innovations. One additional 
aspect, also to be addressed in the third question, is also relevant to understand the 
‘why’ of the second question. SAP FI was expected to influence rules because a number 
of proposed new rules would be technologically embedded in SAP FI, through its 
parametrisation and configuration - i.e., during the processes of SAP FI mobilisation by 
the various actors. As discussed in section 7.1, about technological embeddedness, in 
some cases SAP FI itself would enact the rules, automatically; in other cases, SAP FI 
was expected to promote the acceptance and enactment by human actors (individual and 
collective) of rules more attuned to the objectives of the central actors. As discussed 
below, this latter effect did not fully eventuate. 
Finally, even a summarised account of the ‘why’s and ‘how’s’ must 
acknowledge two additional factors. The first factor is situated at a higher, group level 
analysis (i.e., above the organisational level): the non-human actor of the accounting 
consolidation solution ‘Hyperion’, adopted shortly before for the entire group. As 
discussed, the socio-technical relations around this actor made it an Obligatory Passage 
Point (OPP) in the process of introduction and mobilisation of SAP FI. The second 
factor traversed levels of analysis: the collective actor of consultants. The same 
 9.1 Research findings 
 9.1.1 Understanding the empirical setting – ‘the ‘why’s and ‘how’s’ 
655
consultants were involved in the recent Hyperion project, at the group level and in 
particular at another business unit. Hence, these consultants were crucial OPPs within 
the socio-technical relations around the established OPP, Hyperion, and the emergent, 
potential future OPP, SAP FI. In addition, consultants were also crucial in micro-level 
processes of SAP mobilisation, at the level of local arenas of struggles where alternative 
visions for financial accounting systems were at stake, within IndCo. Consultants’ 
general and group-specific SAP knowledge was crucial in determining the prevalence of 
the vision towards uniformity endorsed by Portuguese actors (even if still in an 
embryonic state), rather than of the alternative decentralised vision of Spanish actors, in 
line with the organisational characteristics of that country’s subsidiary and SAP 
configuration. These two actors (Hyperion and consultants) were crucial OPPs, 
influencing ‘conditions of possibility’ about the rules to be embedded in SAP FI and 
hence about the rules proposed for interpretation, acceptance and enactment by the 
actors throughout IndCo. 
This synthesis focused on the underlying motivations and major steps in the 
introduction and mobilisation of SAP FI by key central actors. As analysed, a key 
motivation was promoting the acceptance and enactment of rules promoting their 
interests and objectives. It was already noted that some initial expectations did not get 
fulfilled, and additional innovations were introduced in the circuit of system integration 
to counter these unexpected results (e.g., the shift to a single database and server 
solution). The synthesis is continued in two ways: next, by analysing the other 
innovations introduced in the circuit of system integration (the Corporate Centre and the 
Shared Services Centre); later, by addressing the third research question, through a more 
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detailed explanation of the multiple repercussions within and across the various circuits 
of power. 
The relocation of the Corporate Centre (CC) 
During the years of the CC (and top managers) location in Madrid, the chairman 
and majority shareholder Mr. A trusted key people to compensate his diminished 
knowledge and involvement in the business. In addition, information systems were not 
adequate to support central visibility. Therefore, in spite of the lack of ‘trust-in-
systems’, Mr. A accepted incompleteness of information due to his longstanding ‘trust-
in-(key)-persons’ (see section 6.1, Johansson and Baldvinsdottir, 2003; Moilanen, 2008; 
Seal and Herbert, 2009). However, the departure of those key people created a lack of 
both types of trust and promoted the objective of increasing business monitoring – an 
objective also promoted by the dramatic increase in IndCo’s size. 
The relocation of the CC (and top management) to IndCo’s headquarters (Mr. 
A’s location) represented an innovation in the circuit of system integration, as a 
relocation of an organisational structure. The broader motivations mainly concerned 
central business control and finance, but rules were also present, alongside broader 
beliefs and principles. As discussed, prevalent local rules mostly addressed local level 
concerns, rather than central level ones; and there was an emergent belief that Spain was 
actually IndCo’s ‘centre’, rather than Portugal. This configuration of the circuit of social 
integration increased the potential misalignment between the interests of Portuguese 
central actors (in particular, Mr. A) and local actors’ enactment of local level rules. As 
the size and capacities of the CC increased, there was an increased attempt to promote 
the standardisation of rules across the sites. In addition, an increased business control 
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also increased the potential to identify occasions of lack of rule compliance and, 
therefore, was a factor promoting rule enactment.  
The creation of the CC from scratch implied that, initially, resources were 
scarce. However, it allowed for the selection and training of individuals whose interests 
became more closely aligned with Portuguese central actors – indeed, individuals who 
became part of a new emergent network and which, in turn, became a new collective 
actor: the CC. In turn, as summarised below, there was significant interdependence in 
the repercussions and in the processes of development of SAP FI, the CC and the SSC, 
with initial negative dependencies and later positive mutual reinforcements. 
An ANT-aware characterisation of the CC highlights the need to relationally 
locate the CC within the actor-network. In this case, the change in CC physical location 
(more than in the CC abstract role as a management control structure) was key in 
defining it as an innovation in the circuit of system integration. The CC proximity to 
Mr. A and the group headquarters contributed towards tighter links between these 
actors, changed its relational position within IndCo’s wider network and influenced the 
effects of this reinforced actor-network. 
The creation of the Shared Services Centre (SSC) 
In addition to strictly economic motivations related to cost reductions, the 
creation of the SSC was motivated by the perception of Portuguese ‘central’ actors that 
SAP FI and CC did not fully succeed in attaining their interests. In particular, SAP FI 
and the relocated CC (the previous innovations in the circuit of system integration) did 
not fully succeed in promoting the enactment of new rules, in a uniform way, 
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compromising the timely production of comparable and integrated information. Even 
though the same formal rules applied in the countries with SAP FI, local actors 
interpreted and enacted them differently (or even failed to enact them). Persistent local 
rules (of meaning and membership), rooted in local interests, were crucial in the 
continuing lack of uniformity in accounting practices. Local ‘rules of practice’, as 
interpreted and enacted by actors in everyday actions, remained diverse and 
compromised the interests of central actors. These were important motivations related to 
the circuit of social integration. Moreover, the motivations for the SSC, and indeed its 
very essence, entailed jolting a notable feature of IndCo’s circuit of system integration: a 
highly decentralised and autonomous organisational structure based on relationally 
powerful local actors, at a plant level. 
The SSC was a radical innovation expected to deeply alter IndCo’s actor-
network and enacted rules. The changes in IndCo’s actor-network involved more than 
changing the relations established between an a priori, given set of actors. Both the 
relations (the usual focus of ANT) and the actors themselves within the network were 
to change, in a fundamental way. The change withdrew multiple local actors involved in 
accounting activities and added a new collective actor (the SSC, constituted by 
multiple, lower level actors). It eliminated, from IndCo’s network, multiple, 
heterogeneous, locally-focused actors, replacing them by a new collective ‘central’ 
actor. With this replacement of actors, it was hoped that rules indexicality related to 
interpreters could be overcome. The transactional activities of local actors within the 
accounting area would largely be restricted to merely scan and email the invoices to the 
SSC - where, in turn, the same human actor (as part of the SSC collective actor) would 
be posting the transactions of all subsidiaries (Clegg, 1975 and 1989; see sections 3.6 
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and 8.4; it should be noted, nonetheless, that rules indexicality still inevitably remains 
as regards the context of interpretation). In addition, the remaining actors in the local 
sites were also expected to accept and enact rules in line with central actors’ interests. 
This latter aspect is analysed below. 
Radical shifts in the relations within the network and in the centrality of the 
actors (eventually becoming OPPs) were expected. And, ultimately, radical shifts in 
actors’ relational power were expected, reinforcing the central actors introducing the 
innovation – and ultimately Mr. A, the key actor behind this innovation. Indeed, like in 
the case of the CC, power considerations were crucial in selecting the physical location 
of the new actor: after ensuring that IndCo’s (and Mr. A’s) headquarters in Portugal 
satisfied economic and technical requirements, the proximity to central actors was a 
crucial criterion, in order to support their decision-making and control processes. 
The introduction and development of the SSC, based on the transfer of most 
accounting transactional activities from the local sites to a central location, was 
crucially dependent on human and non-human actors. As regards human actors, a large 
scale recruitment and selection process led to hiring a large number of actors to the 
SSC. These newly-hired actors were sent to learn from the to-be-dispensed local actors, 
on-site, extant ‘rules of practice’. At a first stage, the objective was to merely replicate, 
in the SSC, the rules previously enacted by local actors, without any ambition to change 
them. Potential (but certainly envisioned) changes to extant rules of practice would only 
be considered at a later stage. Before that, it was required that the new socio-technical 
relations between the human actors (the SSC actors, interpreting and implementing the 
rules in a mimetic way, and the remaining local actors) and non-human actors became 
minimally stabilised and under the control of the central actors.  
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Non-human actors were crucial in an initial stage in securing structural control 
by central actors. This was even more noteworthy because such structural control was 
not strongly supported by human actors - neither central nor local actors. The central 
actors in the SSC had superficial and mostly mimetic knowledge about the rules of 
practice (superficial knowledge of rules of meaning was therefore the main problem); 
and the local actors, overall, resisted (keeping adverse rules of membership was here the 
main problem). Non-human actors, especially SAP FI, provided a structural control, 
through the rules which were technologically embedded and whose enactment by SAP, 
within the established social-relations (of daily, SAP mediated accounting practices) 
allowed to lessen the problems with human actors (see chapters 7 and 8). The following 
account from a senior SSC manager is representative: initially some actors of the SSC 
“didn’t know what a credit or a debit was. And they did it. ‘Select option 24, or 
whatever, and it [SAP] will do everything correctly.’”  
The above highlights how innovations introduced in the circuit of system 
integration were crucially reinforcing in rapidly granting to central actors structural 
control within the actor-network, even in the context of strong opposition and radical 
organisational changes. Similar repercussions eventuated in a longer-term analysis, by 
influencing rule acceptance and enactment across the network, contributing to central 
actors’ structural control of the network, and ultimately towards achieving their 
objectives. This leads to the theme of the third research question. 
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9.1.1.3 How did innovations in the circuit of system integration influence the 
acceptance and enactment of rules and increased the power of central 
actors? 
The third research question aimed to… 
3) Explain how technological and organisational innovations influenced 
rule acceptance and enactment and increased the power of central 
actors.  
 
Addressing this research question was the major concern of Chapter 7 (which 
also developed additional issues, as discussed below). Figure 7.1, as an outline of the 
overall flow and main components of the account in Chapter 7, is also the basis for this 
summarised answer to the research question. 
The ‘initial’ central actors identified as crucial for this process were, depending 
on the innovations, IndCo’s global IT department, IndCo’s chairman and majority 
shareholder Mr. A and IndCo’s top management. These ‘initial’ central actors 
introduced and mobilised three major innovations in the circuit of system integration 
(SAP FI, the CC and the SSC) which became key actors in IndCo’s actor-network, by 
gradually engendering Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs). It should be noted that while 
the emphasis was given to the three above innovations, other innovations were 
introduced, simultaneously and throughout the years. E.g., the Hyperion, IDAR and 
IXOS technological solutions operated within the processes of: accounting 
consolidation; investments; and document management for centralised financial 
accounting, respectively. And centralised organisational structures emerged in areas as: 
logistics; industrial benchmarking; Business Processes and Organisation. The collective 
nature of the origins and fixing of structural changes in IndCo’s circuits of power was a 
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salient trait throughout the case analysis, and will now be explored. Even though the 
three core innovations, related to the accounting and control area, were prominent in the 
depicted processes, the influence of additional innovations should not be ignored, 
making “management control in an ERP environment (…) a collective affair” (Dechow 
and Mouritsen, 2005, p. 691). 
These ‘new’ actors were mutually dependent, both for their everyday operations 
and for their development and even emergence. Although none of the ‘new’ actors 
actually introduced any of the others, the previous presence and operation of certain 
actors in the network was crucial in promoting the introduction, mobilisation and 
development of other actors (a clear example is SAP FI supporting the SSC, and other 
examples were indicated).  
The whole of plural, networked centralities had several repercussions (rather 
than ‘direct effects’, as discussed in the introduction of chapter 7) and was ‘productive’ 
in two senses. Chapter 7 highlighted that the repercussions eventuated mostly from the 
innovations as a network, as an organised set of elements, rather than from individual 
innovations, independent from the others. It was, above all, an organisational 
achievement, and organisation was key (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006). And this 
organised network was ‘productive’ in both senses discussed in Chapter 7, reflecting its 
nature of techniques of discipline and production (see subsection 3.5.5 for the broad 
sense of ‘techniques’). The network was ‘productive’ in a Foucauldian, metaphorical 
sense, by ‘producing’ a subjected subject, i.e., ‘producing’ an actor whose behaviour 
promoted the interests of the actors introducing the innovations. And it was ‘productive’ 
in a mainstream sense (also present in Foucault’s conceptualisation), by, e.g., producing 
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better quality, faster, more detailed information; cost savings; physical manufacturing of 
goods; and so on. 
The introduction of these actors in IndCo’s network was accompanied by the 
attempt to change enacted rules across the organisation. In some cases, the change 
consisted of changing actors’ interpretation, acceptance and enactment of existing rules. 
In other cases, the change consisted of introducing new rules – which, in turn, would 
also have to be interpreted, accepted and enacted by actors, therefore requiring 
additional efforts to influence these later stages. 
In both situations of changes in rules, a key mechanism was embedding the 
(formal) rules within the organisational fabric, embedding the (formal) rules in 
technology and in the organisation. Embedding rules in technology and in IndCo’s 
everyday organisational functioning, across various organisational structures, was a 
crucial mechanism to structurally influence rules acceptance by actors. This embedding 
of rules went beyond the codified substance of rules and beyond the reliance on human 
actors’ internalisation of rules due to moral allegiance and commitment (in a Parsonian 
perspective) or straight fear of sanctions (in a simple conception of power). In addition, 
it should be noted that this embedding of rules also reinforced the influence of the 
innovations, reinforcing their relational position and status as OPPs (hence the 
bidirectional arrow between the innovations’ OPP status and rules embedding). 
The emerging reconstituted and reconfigured network brought about a number 
of repercussions, in various ways, and in which the various innovations had variable 
pertinence and centrality. The ‘new’ network entailed a redefinition of the scope of 
agency among (extant and new) actors, often based on the compulsivity derived from 
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technologically embedded rules (e.g., by restricting local actors’ potential agency). 
Several mechanisms also attempted to orient prevalent interpretations. Moreover, 
although the ‘new’ network was fundamentally intended to benefit central actors, it also 
addressed issues pertinent to local actors. Reflecting the mainstream sense of 
‘productive’ techniques, some innovations contributed for local actors’ ‘productive’ 
activities (vital within their membership work - Munro, 1999) and created direct 
benefits for local actors. Other innovations had particular features which contributed 
towards making the objectives of central and local actors compatible. Some innovations 
introduced incentives for compliance, by making rule enactment favour local actors’ 
activities; and, in the opposite direction, some innovations introduced disincentives for 
non-compliance, since non-compliance would end up by complicating local actors’ 
activities. Importantly, there was an emergent perception that the failure to enact 
proposed rules would inevitability be detected, followed by the likely restore – when 
possible - of the outcome implicit in the rule and, eventually, implying some kind of 
sanction; rule acceptance and enactment then emerged as the best alternative, on a 
calculative (rather than Parsonian) perspective. Another factor (not depicted in the 
figure) was the scarcity of some resources at a local level - in particular, time. This 
scarcity promoted that local actors prioritised activities and enacting rules which were 
imperative for their membership work within the reinforced socio-technical relations 
with central actors, abandoning other more locally-oriented activities and rules.  
Two final repercussions were identified, at a more abstract level. An emergent 
perception that control by central actors was not only inevitable, but also ‘natural’, 
played a foundational role, promoting appropriate dispositions towards rule acceptance 
and enactment. Finally, the diffused, capillary embedding of rules within organisational, 
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everyday processes promoted that control became a part of organisational normalcy. 
And, as chapter 7 concluded, normalcy is where power becomes most effective.  
These various repercussions impinged on local actors’ dispositions towards 
accepting the proposed rules. Accepted rules became Obligatory Passage Points within 
the circuit of social integration. As rules became accepted and a part of the actors’ 
cognitive structures, they promoted oriented, self-disciplined behaviour, based on the 
enactment of those rules. Finally, it should be noted that interpretive work is again 
involved at the stage of enactment of rules; therefore the repercussions of the 
innovations network on actors’ interpretation (at this stage, on actors’ interpretation of 
the situation being interpreted) are again a key issue. 
In addition, some rules were enacted by non-human actors – in particular, SAP. 
The enactment of these rules by non-human actors occurred in a parallel and 
complementary way with the enactment of rules by human actors – in fact, it often 
resulted from the redefinition of the scope of agency alluded above, in particular as 
regards the withdrawal of agency from human actors and its attribution to non-human 
actors. This redistribution was largely supported by the embedding of rules in 
technology, which in turn was framed by the embedding of rules within integrated 
organisational processes across multiple organisational structures. 
As a final remark, it should be recalled that these processes were not introduced 
and did not develop in a vacuum – on the contrary. Previous, extant rules and 
techniques, established as Obligatory Passage Points when these various processes 
started, were constant presences. But extant OPPs were considered and addressed 
differently within these processes: some OPPs were irrelevant; other OPPs were taken 
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into account and preserved; other OPPs were supports of the processes; other OPPs 
were taken into account but the socio-technical relations in which they participated were 
redefined; and, finally, other OPPs were considered precisely as the OPPs whose 
obligatory status and even existence was being contested (e.g., local rules privileging 
local concerns over central concerns, extant techniques addressing exclusively local 
concerns). These processes entailed redefining some extant socio-technical relations, 
and the role and centrality of extant OPPs were differently addressed within these 
processes – ranging from being reinforced to being challenged. Redefining (plural) 
centralities within the actor-network relations was a fundamental objective of these 
processes.  
Overall, the complex and intertwined processes depicted above influenced rules 
acceptance and enactment and ultimately favoured the attainment of the interests of 
central actors – both those that initially introduced the innovations and those that were 
created during this process and became a part of the actor-network. At the realm of 
specific behaviours within specific socio-technical relations, within the episodic circuit, 
the interests of central actors became more likely to be met. The third research question 
has thus been answered. 
As depicted in figure 7.1, the innovations also led to repercussions not directly 
affecting the enactment of rules by the ‘targeted’ actors. The innovations were also 
material conditions facilitating the ‘production’ of organisation-wide integrated, 
detailed, timely and comparable information, enhancing central actors’ visibility across 
the organisation. This enhanced visibility (by the ‘initial’ central actors and by the 
‘new’ central actors, in particular the CC and the SSC) facilitated an external control of 
rule enactment, identifying and correcting situations of lack of rule compliance. 
 9.1 Research findings 
 9.1.2 Theoretical contributions 
667
Therefore, it facilitated an external discipline regarding the outcomes, even in situations 
where self-disciplined behaviour had not been previously achieved. In addition, this 
enhanced visibility also facilitated central actors’ decision-making. As a whole, these 
repercussions complemented the above described process of ex-ante promoting rules 
enactment (in fact, as regards ex-post control, they operated in a supplementary way, 
when ex-ante rule enactment was not achieved as desired). And, overall, all these 
repercussions facilitated central actors’ activities, reinforced their relational position 
within the socio-technical relations and contributed towards the attainment of their 
interests. 
 
9.1.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The second subsection addresses wider theoretical issues, based on 
developments to the theoretical frameworks deployed in this study, as proposed in 
chapter 8 by drawing on all previous chapters. The above answers to the three 
empirical-related research questions already contain theoretical contributions, in 
particular the third question about how the innovations influenced rules, as they depict 
in conceptual terms the organisational change processes in the case study organisation; 
however, in spite of such theorisation, they still remain rather empiric-specific. The 
ensuing contributions, although also guided by the empirical study, are more detached 
from the case details and therefore have a wider (theoretical) applicability and 
generalisability (Scapens, 1990) 
Following the structure of chapter 8, this conclusion starts by addressing the 
second research question, proposing development to Clegg’s (1989) framework. Then, 
it returns to the first research question, to propose an OIE model of rule-based action. 
 9.1 Research findings 
 9.1.2 Theoretical contributions 
668
This model, integrating insights from the adoption of a micro-level OIE perspective, 
from ANT and from the previous deployment and development of Clegg’s model. 
9.1.2.1 A revised model of ‘Circuits of Power’ 
The second research question aimed at developing Clegg’s framework of circuits 
of power. The proposed contributions range from changes or additions to the graphical 
depiction of the framework, to conceptual modifications and new linkages. Six 
contributions are discussed in section 8.1, but only four of them are briefly summarised 
next, given their wider theoretical relevance. 
The first contribution clarifies that the Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs) 
comprise elements from both structural circuits of power, i.e., from the circuits of social 
and system integration. In addition, it clarifies that not only rules but also techniques 
constitute (i.e., ‘fix/re-fix’) OPPs. 
The second contribution highlights the specific potential of techniques (in the 
circuit of system integration) to influence rules (social integration); in addition, it 
highlights that such potential of any given technique is contingent on all extant OPPs. 
As regards the first aspect, the original framework did not depict such potential of 
techniques, eventually as a consequence of Clegg’s (correct) stance against 
technological determinism. In the proposed model, this suggestion is graphically 
depicted by a bidirectional arrow between rules and techniques, conveying a notion of 
mutual influence. In addition, the suggested bidirectional arrow between rules and 
techniques is curved, passing through extant OPPs. This change suggests going beyond 
simple, direct conceptualisations such as “rule A affects the adoption of technique B”, 
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and to consider the whole set of rules and techniques (previously or concomitantly) 
fixed as OPPs. 
The third contribution reflects ANT’s conception of ‘socio-technical’ relations 
and, importantly, it suggests that the structural features of fixed techniques (as well as 
rules) may potentially dispense with episodic, direct exercises of power by agents that 
introduced those techniques and rules. This contribution had its starting point in ANT’s 
remark that ‘social relations’ are, indeed, ‘socio-technical’ relations, within ‘socio-
technical’ networks. As such, in the revised model, (episodic) ‘socio-technical relations’ 
replace the original reference to ‘social relations’. This apparently minor terminological 
change contributes to a further clarification of how the overall framework of circuits 
works. Expanding the scope of analysis from only techniques to both techniques and 
rules, it was noted that the structural features of fixed techniques and rules operate in an 
episodic way, but in a recurrently and potentially unavoidable episodic way. Therefore, 
agents who succeeded in previously fixing rules and techniques may not need to be 
further involved in episodic exercises of power with other agencies (in the episodic 
circuit), because the fixed rules and techniques may take over that role, in a recurrent 
and unavoidable episodic way. 
The fourth contribution clarifies the links between: 1) rules and techniques; 2) 
OPPs; and 3) social/socio-technical relations and agencies. This clarification was 
needed because doubts were raised about these links in Clegg’s framework, in particular 
about what ‘fix/refix’ and ‘empower’ referred to. The first contribution already clarified 
that both rules and techniques ‘fixed/refixed’ OPPs, in the two structural circuits. This 
additional contribution now addresses the linkages to the episodic circuit of power. It 
clarifies that ‘fixing’ refers to socio-technical relations and that ‘empowering’ refers to 
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agencies. As such, socio-technical relations may be fixed by the rules and techniques 
which became fixed as OPPs. In turn, agencies may be relationally empowered by those 
rules and techniques fixed as OPPs. These linkages could not be derived from Clegg’s 
depiction of the framework. 
9.1.2.2 An OIE model of rule-based action: an overview 
The second theoretical contribution emerges from the first research question, 
which aimed at developing Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework, focusing on the 
complex processes of introduction, interpretation, acceptance and enactment of rules, 
and also given particular salience to material conditions. The framework proposed in 
section 8.2 is loosely inspired in Burns and Scapens (2000) and builds on insights 
developed throughout the thesis to propose an ANT-inspired, OIE model of rule-based 
action. This conclusion starts by summarising the main theoretical conceptions of the 
proposed framework. Subsequently, the rest of this subsection highlights the most 
salient and innovative features as regards more traditional OIE models. 
The model general structure extends from the structural, higher level and more 
abstract institutional realm (here defined as a deep psychological structure) to the realm 
of action (in line with Burns and Scapens, 2000). In between these extremes, the model 
depicts two additional structural realms, one with a material nature, and another of a 
psychological nature - at a more superficial level than the deeper institutional level. 
Resources, as material conditions, are located within the structural material realm. Rules 
are located in both structural realms introduced in this model. Formal rules (the 
prevalent conception of ‘rules’ in Burns and Scapens) are located in the structural, 
material realm. In turn, the structural, superficial psychological realm encompasses both 
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proposed informal rules and the rules that end up by being accepted and hence become 
part of human actors’ cognitive structures. 
Like Burns and Scapens (2000), the model accepts the existence of an 
institutional realm of shared taken-for-granted assumptions at an organisational level. 
However, the model emphasises a more micro level perspective, i.e., below the 
organisational level. Considering the analysed topics (rules and material conditions), the 
model includes three abstract, analytical categories of actors when promoting new rules, 
promoting new material conditions, and not promoting either. Shared and diverse 
institutional traits are considered to coexist across the organisation and even within each 
of the categories. 
Importantly, actors’ interests are influenced by prevalent institutions of the 
various institutional fields to which the actors are exposed. Therefore, diverse and even 
opposing interests are considered an intrinsic characteristic of organisational life, 
coexisting with shared, common interests. 
In order to attain their interests, human actors (individual or collective) may 
define or propose rules (formal and informal) and resources (material conditions). Rules 
and resources may become intertwined across the two structural realms. Formal and 
informal rules can mutually influence each other and they can influence the ‘conditions 
of possibility’ as regards the definition of material conditions. Moreover, and 
importantly, rules may become technologically and organisationally embedded. Rules 
can be embedded in technological actors during their mobilisation, as they are 
configured and/or parameterised in a particular organisation (Volkoff et al., 2007). And 
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rules can also be embedded within integrated organisational processes, carried out by 
organisational structures. 
In a confluence between extant material conditions, defined or proposed rules 
(embedded or not, formal and informal) and actors’ particular institutional context and 
interests, some rules may become accepted and become a part of their ‘internal 
structure’, orienting their behaviours. This multiplicity of influences accommodates 
both Parsonian and calculative views of actors, expanding beyond the typical OIE focus 
on the Parsonian mechanism of internalising institutionally shared traits. 
Finally, at an episodic realm, human (individual and collective) actors enact 
accepted rules (as part of their internal structures) and draw on available material 
conditions, in order to conduct their actions. In turn, non-human actors enact the rules 
which were previously technologically embedded in them. 
It should be noted that diversity within the framework is further increased by an 
additional factor not mentioned in the above account, for simplification and 
summarising purposes. This additional potential source of diversity - and 
unpredictability - is actors’ ‘interpretive work’ involving rules (see section 2.3). 
‘Interpretive work’ on rules is responsible for rules indexicality – i.e., for rules being 
contingent on the context of the interpreters and contingent on the context of 
interpretation. Such interpretive work takes place at various steps depicted in the 
framework: in the interdependencies between formal and informal rules; in rules 
influence in ‘conditions of possibility’ concerning material conditions; in processes of 
embedding rules; in the acceptance of rules; and, finally, in the enactment of rules.  
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The model concludes with the introduction of a recursive element, highlighting 
that enacted rules may influence the entire process at all realms. Indeed, enacted rules 
may be repeated across time and space, given rise to routines and even institutions, in 
processes of routinisation and upward causation This recursiveness represents a 
dynamic nature of the framework, in addition to the temporal dynamism conveyed by 
the horizontal arrows pointing towards the right, i.e., towards the future. 
9.1.2.3 An OIE model of rule-based action: distinctive features and contributions 
The proposed model of rule-based action incorporates several innovative 
concepts and linkages which are not only distinctive features as regards extant models, 
but may also make a contribution to OIE. These innovations are now briefly outlined in 
separate parts. 
Exploring institutional and organisational diversity 
First, the model explicitly represents, emphasises and explores institutional and 
organisational diversity. Institutional diversity makes some way to address the tensions 
emerging in the debate between Boland (1996) and Scapens and Macintosh (1996), in 
particular as regards Boland’s charges against the other authors’ alleged ‘monolithic’ 
approach. It is recognised that even institutional diversity is still at odds with Boland’s 
core objections against the concept of ‘shared’ traits and would still be regarded with 
scepticism. Nevertheless, some of Boland’s core objections are incorporated in the 
framework when interpretive work is considered (see below the fifth contribution). 
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A renewed emphasis on a revised conception of rules 
Second, the model focuses and explores processes involving rules, adopting a 
different conception from the prevalent one in the literature. Rather than conceiving 
rules merely as formal, codified rules, a wider conception is adopted, including also 
rules as (human) actors’ internal cognitive structures, influencing their behaviour. This 
expands the explicative power of the model to situations which previous models did not 
address because they were restricted to the concepts of routines and formal rules.  
A brief summary of the arguments developed in chapter 2 is appropriate. First, 
sections 2.2 and 2.3 noted that rules underlie all conceptions of routines - including 
those conceptions depicting routines as orienting behaviour (ostensive routines, in 
Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005 and 2008; Quinn, 2010; Van 
der Steen, 2007; Volkoff et al., 2007); and depicting routines as dispositions (in Burns, 
2008; Hodgson, 2003; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). More significantly, the 
importance of rules is particularly clear when there are no routines regarding a 
particular issue (subsection 2.3.3). A first reason why routines may not exist is related 
to a key requirement of routines: recurrence of behaviours (Becker, 2004). Recurrence 
of behaviours is required both to create a routine and to maintain it. Failing that (e.g., 
that particular issue had never occurred, so actions concerning it had never been 
performed), there are no routines. A second reason why routines may not exist is related 
to recurrent actions not developing into routines – a possibility also acknowledged in 
OIE literature (Burns, 2000; Yazdifar et al., 2008). It is therefore very plausible that 
routines may not exist in a certain organisational context as regards a particular issue. 
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In the absence of routines and their orienting role for behaviour, and considering 
the (reasonable) assumption that organisational actors’ behaviour is not random, then 
behaviour is oriented by the rules accepted by those actors – whatever the form and 
origin of those rules. This situation makes it clear that conceptualising rules merely as 
formal rules limits the explanatory power of extant models – indeed, there is consensus 
in the literature that there may be a wide gap between formal rules and actual behaviour 
In addition, institutions also provide an unsatisfactory account. As recalled in subsection 
2.3.3, OIE theorists have recognised the limits of institutions for providing direct 
orientations for action, relying on rules and routines for that purpose (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). 
Therefore, actors’ accepted rules emerge as crucial explanatory factors. Relevant 
accepted rules may not necessarily have the status of an institution, and they may not 
necessarily underlie a routine - although accepted rules may potentially be present in 
those forms. Indeed, the flexibility of the concept of rule grants it a significant 
explanatory power which may be crucial to address gaps in extant OIE models. Hence, 
the proposal of a renewed emphasis on a revised concept of rules, as stressed both in the 
literature review and in the proposed model. 
Three structural realms 
Third, the model depicts three structural realms: an institutional realm (as a deep 
psychological structure); a material realm; and a surface psychological realm. The 
literature has acknowledged that rules, as cognitive psychological structures orienting 
actors, may have a variable depth in the way they are sedimented and taken-for-granted 
– indeed, that is key for the classification of a given rule as an institutionalised rule. The 
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proposed representation separates a deeper psychological realm (comprising 
institutions) and a more superficial psychological realm (comprising rules without the 
requirement of having achieved such institutionalised status). 
The distinction between the two psychological structures as regards their depth 
is not new in the literature. However, this graphical representation highlights the 
importance of rules even when they do not achieve the greater depth of institutions. 
Furthermore, these potentially more superficial rules are likely to be the crucial link to 
orient everyday, detailed action. And, finally, these more superficial rules may evolve to 
a deeper level if, and when, they become institutionalised.  
In addition, the inclusion of a structural material realm is clearly distinctive as 
regards other models, in particular as regards the component of material conditions 
(techniques of discipline and production). Techniques of production and discipline (as 
conceptualised in the revised model of ‘Circuits of power’) have diversified and 
important repercussions. They make the embedding of rules possible (see next 
contribution); they promote rule acceptance and rule enactment; and they enable the 
enactment of rules by non-human actors (see the final contribution). These are valid 
reasons to give material conditions an important place within OIE models. 
Technological and organisational embeddedness 
Fourth, this model incorporates Volkoff et al.’s (2007) concept of technological 
embeddedness, applying it to rules. Rules are incorporated in technology and may then 
be automatically enacted by technological, non-human actors (see the final 
contribution). This is a first contribution to OIE models. 
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In addition, this model draws on the ‘circuits of power’ framework to identify 
organisational structures as particular techniques and material conditions. This 
theoretical insight and the empirical insights allowed developing the related concept of 
rules becoming organisationally embedded, also depicted in the now proposed model. 
The organisational embeddedness of rules refers to when rules become embedded 
within integrated organisational processes, carried out by organisational structures. This 
extension is not only an important complement to Volkoff et al.’s work, but also to OIE 
models, while reinforcing the consistency between the proposed models. 
Attention on actors’ interpretive work 
Fifth, a particular attention was given to actors’ interpretive work concerning 
rules. Rules are related to their usage and they are indexical – i.e., contingent to the 
context of interpreters and the situation being interpreted. This permanent contextual 
contingency of the repercussions of rules promotes a greater diversity and 
unpredictability within organisations, as mentioned in the first contribution, and makes 
OIE models more realistic and (should criticisms such as Boland’s, 1996 be accepted) 
less ‘monolithic’. 
While Giddens’ concept of rules of interpretation already highlighted the 
importance of interpretation, the specific indication of various instances where 
interpretive work is relevant, as well as a general greater salience to it, is a contribution 
to a more systematic consideration of this factor. 
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Non-human actors and collective agency 
Sixth, and finally, the proposed model incorporates ANT’s stress on collective 
human agency and non-human actors, in addition to individual human agency. These 
two ontological considerations are an important contribution to OIE models.  
Although OIE theorists do analyse collective effects and behaviours (the Burns 
and Scapens’ model is but one example), they typically refrain from granting agency to 
collective entities, or even explicitly object to that. Such objection is patent in 
Hodgson’s (2006) exchanged messages with Nelson Winter about whether 
organisations can be considered players, and Hodgson’s objection to considering 
organisations as “essentially the same as individuals or players” (p. 20). Underneath 
these objections of OIE theorists lies a legitimate objection to the transposition to a 
micro level of unitary, monolithic views about collectives.  
But ANT is antithetical to monolithic conceptions and to viewing any collective 
as a homogeneous, single entity. ANT has a local, even atomistic, concern. ANT 
conceptualises any ‘collective’ as a relational collective of individual components – 
which, in turn, are also seen as relational collectives of other, smaller individual 
components. Such conceptions clearly do not promote monolithic conceptions – on the 
contrary. What ANT, and the ANT-inspired frameworks in this thesis (sections 8.1 and 
8.2), do emphasise is the organised and collective nature of organisations, 
organisational actions and organisational achievements. While ANT was considered as 
‘atomistic’ (above), it can also be considered as ‘holistic’. Organisational achievements 
are not reducible to independent achievements of the individual components. 
Organisational objectives are not linearly reducible to either the objectives of one 
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particular actor or the mere aggregation of independent individual objectives. In 
empirical organisational analysis (and the case study in this thesis illustrates this, e.g., as 
regards the SSC), it is meaningful to conceptualise the achievements, limitations and 
objectives of a particular collective entity. 
The contribution to OIE is even more distinctive as regards the consideration of 
non-human actors. As documented in the case study and reflected in the model, 
techniques as ERPs have a (contingent) capacity to produce effects (see section 3.2) – or 
repercussions, as suggested in chapter 7, to reflect the non-linear, indirect and 
contingent nature of ‘effects’ in organisational life. Therefore, ERPs have power and 
can be considered as actors – indeed, powerful actors, capable of contributing to 
significant organisational achievements within actor-networks. Within this OIE 
framework of rule-based action, non-human actors contribute to rule acceptance. Rule 
acceptance is promoted by the non-human actors carrying embedded rules and by being 
drawn upon by other actors in their activities (i.e., by their function as ‘productive’ 
technologies, in the mainstream sense – see section 3.3); chapter 7 extensively 
discussed and exemplified various mechanisms through which such repercussions may 
eventuate (see, in particular, figure 7.1). The promotion of rule acceptance contributes 
to the Foucauldian sense of ‘productive’, in as much as it contributes to influence the 
other actors of the network and, in particular, to influence human actors. As Foucault 
put it, in a metaphorical way, technologies, as non-human actors, ‘produce’ subjected 
subjects (see section 3.3 and the discussion in subsection 3.3.7 in particular).  
Finally, non-human actors may also directly enact rules themselves. While this 
direct rule enactment by non-human actors is not in line with OIE typical concerns, it 
should nonetheless be considered, for several reasons. First, rule enactment by non-
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human actors often corresponds to a redefinition of agency, in particular through the 
reduction of the scope of potential human agency – an important concern of OIE. 
Second, rule enactment by non-human actors has important power repercussions in the 
organisation – a core topic of OIE (see section 2.4). Third, occurrences at the realm of 
action, in particular as these occurrences are repeated, may end up by influencing 
structures. In particular, routinisation and institutionalisation processes may develop 
among human actors (individual and collective) over the course of socio-technical 
relations established within the actor-network. Indeed, routinisation may directly 
involve non-human actors, as elements involved in the performative and ostensive 
dimensions of routines (e.g., by SAP being a part of accounting routines). In addition, 
institutionalisation may also directly involve non-human actors, as elements to which 
institutions refer (e.g., the presence of SAP may become taken-for-granted by 
organisational actors, because it achieved an Obligatory Passage Point status and 
became inevitable in daily organisational life – see figure 8.1). And processes of 
routinisation and institutionalisation are, beyond doubts, main concerns of OIE. 
However, it should be acknowledged that, in spite of these remarks on points of 
convergence between OIE and ANT, they are only a starting point for further work on 
integrating these theoretical strands, as discussed in section 9.3. 
9.2 LIMITATIONS 
This section aggregates research limitations in three major types. The first 
subsection analyses research design limitations. The second subsection analyses 
theoretical development limitations. The third subsection discusses several limitations 
related to the specific empirical setting of the case study organisation; it identifies 
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potential research avenues based on this organisation which either might have been 
pursued with greater depth, were not pursued or were pursued but not included in this 
final version.  
9.2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN LIMITATIONS 
Several limitations of this work are related to its research design (chapter 4). 
First, the empirical work is a single case study and therefore the analysis and 
conclusions based on the empirical interpretation lack statistical generalisability (Yin, 
2009). However, as discussed in section 4.1, an objective of case study research may be 
‘theoretical generalisability’ (Scapens, 1990, p. 270). This case study had a strong 
theoretical basis, the analysis was theoretically structured and included a comparison 
with another study adopting a similar theoretical approach, and the contributions were 
built on extant theoretical models (as synthesised in chapters 8 and 9). Therefore, it is 
believed that this study has potential theoretical generalisability. 
A further limitation concerns the important retrospective component of this 
research, in addition to the longitudinal component, since the relevant research temporal 
scope reached substantially further back in time than the start of the fieldwork (see 
subsection 4.2.1). This significant temporal gap increases the risk that (past) 
organisational events become ‘black boxed’, whose ex-post understanding is difficulty 
or even impossible. As discussed in subsection 4.2.2, this temporal gap may raise 
doubts about the reliability of interviewees’ accounts, due to selective memory, 
forgetfulness or long-term post-rationalisation (e.g., Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Christensen, 2005; Silverman, 2005). In addition, some sources of information may 
become unavailable. A relevant issue in this study was the disappearance of actors from 
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the network. People who used to work in the ‘before-SSC’ large local accounting teams 
could provide meaningful insights. But most of them have left the organisation actor-
network – and therefore are beyond the researcher’s own actor-network. A hypothetical 
Herculean endeavour of trying to trace those actors, as part of the fieldwork, would also 
be likely confronted with obstacles related to the confidentiality of former employees’ 
personal data. Therefore, the ‘black box’ of ‘before-SSC’ local accounting teams cannot 
be reopened through that potential ‘window’ and through such ‘vistas’. 
While the above limitations must be acknowledged, several measures were taken 
to mitigate them: there was extended and repeated contact with many actors with a long 
company history, and in relevant positions for the research areas of interest; and 
triangulation among interviewees was significant. Key figures of interviews in 
subsection 4.2.2 support this argument. More than one third of the interviewees had 
experience at, or with, IndCo for almost two decades; this percentage approached 50% 
for twelve years of experience and 90% for six years or more. Interviewing respondents 
multiple times supported triangulation among interviewees: interviews to respondents 
who were contacted three or more times (or two or more times) represented 47% (72%) 
of total interviews. In addition, Ribeiro (2003) noted although ANT recommends 
‘following the actors’, the focus should be on “the collection of the ‘traces’ they leave 
behind them” (p. 155), such as “material traces” and “memories about events” (p. 156) - 
in particular, “traces left on others’ memory” (p. 157, emphasis in the original). Both 
research methods were pursed to address these concerns, as discussed at the start of 
subsection 4.2.2. 
Also related to the retrospective component, it must be recognised that some 
events date back to more than a decade ago and might be accused of being 
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technologically and organisationally dated (e.g., the enormous surge in ERP adoption 
around the year 2000; see Fahy, 2001) and hence with little relevance. However, 
institutions, rules, routines, interests, power struggles and attempts to create and 
structurally sustain mechanisms to achieve objectives within organisations as organised 
networks, all are timeless organisational issues which will continue to emerge in 
whatever technical environment. Chapman (2005) made the point that although “ERP 
may now be considered ‘old’ technology”, “to frame it thus is to miss its potential 
contribution” (p. 4). As other papers on past ERPs events (Dechow and Mouritsen, 
2005; Quattrone and Hopper, 2005), this work “based on technical insights” (…) “to 
develop an understanding of their organizational and social significance” (Chapman, 
2005, p. 4). And such type of contribution is not limited to often short-lived particular 
types of technology. 
It is recognised that the fieldwork occurred predominantly at IndCo’s 
headquarters, promoting a greater exposure to (and hence potential bias towards) the 
perspectives of ‘central’ actors, when compared to ‘local’ actors’ perspectives. This 
greater share of time devoted to central actors risks leading to an interpretation written 
from the point of view of the ‘centre’, rather than the ‘locals’. The significant functional 
and hierarchical heterogeneity of central respondents promoted insights diversity, but 
not in terms of the ‘central-local’ balance. However, not only five interviews (and other 
informal interactions) were indeed carried out at a local level, but there were also 25 
interviews with nine ‘now-central’ actors who had previously been ‘local’ actors. In 
spite of the limitations recognised in subsection 4.2.2 about the influence of their 
current central position and membership (Munro, 1999), their accounts were particularly 
useful for the retrospective component of the research, to characterise the ‘local’ level 
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regarding the past periods in which they were located in the local sites. Finally, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents had very close contact with local actors, 
including frequent visits to the various locations (as the researcher witnessed when 
scheduling interviews). Therefore, central respondents did not merely provide an 
account of objectives, strategies and actions of central actors, but also the (centrally-
perceived) repercussions on the local level, based on their many years of experience of 
close interaction – including successes, difficulties and failures. 
9.2.2 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT LIMITATIONS 
Three major limitations are acknowledged as regards the theoretical 
development included in this thesis. Each limitation is discussed next, and each one 
constitutes a future research avenue, as discussed in the next section. 
It is recognised that this work only scratched the surface of psychological 
mechanisms underlying the processes conducive to rule acceptance and enactment. This 
theoretical limitation is not unrelated with above research design limitations. As noted 
in section 7.2, there were limited insights about the process of development of positive 
dispositions towards the acceptance of Obligatory Passage Points and embedded rules 
and controls. This work highlights that institutional theory should also consider rules as 
actors’ cognitive structures, both at an individual and collective level, and the OIE 
framework highlights two psychological levels in which accepted rules may be located. 
Additionally, the proposed frameworks depict how various interrelated factors may be 
conducive to rule acceptance and enactment. However, although this work brings 
forward the importance of psychological aspects, it is recognised that further 
contributions from the psychology field are required. 
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Another limitation concerns the proposed ANT-inspired OIE model of rule-based 
action. As already acknowledged, the model does not fully reflect its underlying 
dynamic and temporal perspective. Moreover, the model does not incorporate the 
important component of routines. As already clarified, this absence does not reflect a 
suggestion that routines may not exist or may be unimportant, but merely reflects the 
focus on rules and an attempt to simplify an already complex model. However, the 
absence of routines limits the adoption of this model as an integrative framework.  
It should also be acknowledged that scarce theoretical work has been developed 
towards reconciling or integrating OIE and ANT. While this work has highlighted the 
potential of combining both theoretical strands, and it already explored several 
intersection areas (e.g., the reflections in section 4.1, and the entire case analysis, 
discussion and theoretical developments), it is recognised that additional theoretical 
work is still required.  
9.2.3 EMPIRICS-BASED RESEARCH NOT DEVELOPED OR NOT INCLUDED IN 
THIS THESIS 
This section concludes by noting that the present work was limited because 
various potential research avenues identified in the empirical setting: 1) might have 
been pursued with greater depth; 2) were not pursued; or 3) were pursued but not 
included in this final version. Each type of limitation is discussed next. 
In any research, there are limitations of the first type, as the research efforts need 
to be prioritised. An acknowledged instance in this research is related to its temporal 
focus, which may have paid a relatively minor attention to the 2003-2008 period, when 
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compared to the 1998-2002 period. Although the core empirical time frame was defined 
between 1998 and 2008 (see subsection 4.2.1), the instance that the three core analysed 
innovations had been introduced roughly between 1998 and 2002 required devoting a 
particular attention to that period, in order to characterise the motivations and 
expectations underlying those innovations and understand the historically situated 
nature of ensuing changes. The ensuing period, between 2003 and 2008, was also 
considered to address the actual repercussions of the innovations, and included the three 
years of the longitudinal research component. However, it is acknowledged that an even 
greater focus on this later period might have produced additional insights about less 
dramatic and disruptive, but more on-going, gradual and incremental changes – and 
resistance. The perceived potential of additional in-depth research on this period is 
analysed in the next section. 
As regards the second type of limitation, of not pursued research avenues, the 
clearest example was (not) studying the implementation of the SAP product costing 
module. The design stage of this project was still ongoing when the fieldwork started 
and its implementation stage extended for the following two years. As explained in 
subsection 4.1.4, authorisation to study this project longitudinally, as it was unfolding, 
was not granted. The ensuing fieldwork focused on other areas, but the topic surfaced at 
times during the interviews. Several potential research avenues were identified, but not 
explored in depth, or at all.  
Other limitations arose from the need to focus research efforts and the final 
output, implying the exclusion of research questions and empirical material which were 
indeed significantly explored during the course of the PhD. Such a research avenue was 
exploring the institutional theory paradox of embedded agency, in particular through the 
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adoption and development of Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework. Considerable work 
was carried out on this topic, including the discussion of existing contradictions and the 
institutional embeddedness of key actors, and culminating in the integration of Seo and 
Creed’s (2002) and Clegg’s (1989) frameworks (the latter of which revised in section 
8.1) within one single framework. Nonetheless, some additional work was still needed, 
and it was decided not to further pursue such research avenue, hence limiting (but 
focusing) the theoretical scope of the research.  
Another research avenue not fully pursued was the role of consultants. In the 
original research question, consultants were, alongside ERP systems, a crucial research 
topic. While the present work already reflects some research efforts in this area, in 
particular as regard their role in the SAP FI project (see subsection 6.1.3), consultants’ 
role as regards other projects and their role on a more on-going basis, beyond particular 
projects, was not very researched. In particular, the SSC project was heavily supported 
by a consultancy firm not contacted during the fieldwork. This is another limitation of 
this research. 
A potentially relevant factor for the explanation of interests and accepted and 
enacted rules was IndCo’s performance measurement system, in particular concerning 
local actors (e.g., Otley, 1999 and 2003). This topic was approached several times with 
several interviewees, both at a central and at a local level, and it was also discussed with 
one of the consultants, beyond the scope of this organisation. Obtained information 
suggested the hypothesis that some features of the performance measurement system 
might affect tensions and divergences between the interests of local actors. These 
included the issues of adopting financial and non-financial measures, and local and 
organisation-wide levels of performance measurement (and related issues, such as 
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compensation). However, the researcher perceived that exploring this (very wide and 
complex) topic would expand the scope of the research even further (and excessively), 
imply significant dispersion of efforts and, in addition, require access to the Human 
Resources department, which had never been approached. Therefore, the potentially 
relevant explanatory factor of performance measurement was not included in this thesis 
- and this may be considered a limitation. 
Not having pursued the above issues may be considered a limitation of the 
current work vis-à-vis the wider research potential of the empirical setting. Therefore, 
some of those issues are included as future research avenues, in the next section. 
9.3 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Many of the avenues for future research identified next derive from the 
limitations acknowledged in the previous section.  
9.3.1 FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT BASED ON THE THESIS 
THEORETICAL ANALYSES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The first research avenue concerns the development of a research programme to 
support and strengthen theoretical generalisation and external validity (Modell, 2005; 
Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 2009). The frameworks developed in 
this thesis constitute both an outcome (of this research) and a starting point. It is hoped 
that additional case studies deploying the proposed frameworks can provide additional 
empirical support and/or theoretical corrections, refinements and complements. 
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Future work may involve strengthening the proposed frameworks with further 
insights from the field of psychology. As acknowledged in the previous section, the 
proposed frameworks highlighted the importance of psychological aspects but only 
scratched the surface of a very complex area. Indeed, a greater contribution from 
psychology may be a useful complement to sociology-based contributions which are 
salient in institutional theory, even within OIE. And by providing a better understanding 
of agency, it may contribute to overcome the charge traditionally directed against 
institutional theory, about its neglect of agency. 
It should be noted that, consistently with the notion of collective actors, typical 
notions from the psychology field may be usefully explored at a collective level. One 
clear example is the recent work of Fiedler and Welpe (2010), studying how dimensions 
of organisational structure (in particular, codification of information) influence 
organisational memory. This research avenue may also contribute to explore how 
codified rules (a particular type of information) may become part of actors’ cognitive 
structures, and hence further explore the discussion on rules addressed in this thesis. 
It is suggested to develop the combination, cross-fertilisation and, potentially, 
integration of ANT and OIE, since the steps taken in this work are still preliminary (see 
previous section). Combination between ANT and another strand of institutional theory, 
NIS, has been suggested (Hopper and Major, 2007; Lounsbury, 2008; Rautiainen, 2009) 
and, significantly, Rautiainen (2009) drew on OIE in reconciling NIS and ANT. 
Rautiainen (2009, p. 1) argued that “the concept of agency – making and re-making the 
rules and routines in an organisation – is the bridge” between ANT and NIS. When 
compared to NIS, OIE’s more micro level focus and greater attention to actors and 
political processes anticipates that the gap to be bridged between ANT and OIE is 
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narrower. It is therefore suggested that, upon consideration of their underlying 
assumptions (Hopper and Major, 2007; see section 4.1), combining, cross-fertilising 
and, potentially, integrating ANT and OIE is a viable and rewarding research path.  
A specific research task ahead is bridging the frameworks proposed in this work. 
This task will reside in theoretically exploring the similarities and complementarities of 
the revised model of ‘Circuits of Power’ and the OIE model of rule-based action, 
eventually producing a more integrative framework. Such efforts are likely to provide 
an important contribution towards the above suggested wider research path of 
integrating OIE and ANT. 
Finally, a number of related topics concern ontological issues about actors and 
structures which may be developed beyond this thesis. Volkoff et al. (2007) argued that 
ANT, by considering technology as a non-human actor, conflated agency and structure 
and therefore does not adequately depict the structural effects of technology and how it 
can mediate change. On the other hand, they claimed that ANT still privileged human 
actors, given its focus on negotiation, and that in ANT “[t]he technology is viewed as a 
receptacle where an actor’s perspective can be inscribed and frozen” (p. 834). Although 
Volkoff et al. expressed greater affinity to ANT when compared to behavioural, 
institutional or structuration theories, they suggested the alternative of critical realism. 
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 drew on Volkoff et al.’s insights, within the wider ANT framework 
structuring the chapter, and suggested developments to their approach. Overall, 
significant compatibility between both approaches emerged from this thesis, but it is 
hypothesised that further work drawing more extensively on critical realism lenses, 
exclusively or in combination with other lenses, may be fruitful.  
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Section 8.1 endorsed the concept of socio-technical relations between mutually 
dependent human and technological actors. It was noted that some ANT authors (e.g., 
Wagner et al., 2006) proposed the notion of socio-technical actors. This alternative 
notion brings the heterogeneity of the network into the ontological conceptualisation of 
the individual components of the networks. It finds some support in the ANT 
consideration that the network is a hybrid, a quasi-object (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006; 
see section 3.4) and that each network is both constituted by other networks and is a part 
of other networks. Therefore, conceiving actors as socio-technical is an alternative 
conceptualisation (not endorsed in this thesis, and opposed to Volkoff et al.’s, 2007 
critical realist perspective deployed in chapter 7) which may considered in future work. 
9.3.2 FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT BASED ON THE EMPIRICAL 
SETTING OF THE THESIS 
A number of future research avenues are directly related to this particular 
empirical setting, although in very different theoretical domains. These research 
avenues may build on the insights generated in the already conducted fieldwork (though 
potentially not present in this thesis) and, in some cases, on additional future fieldwork. 
The previous section identified research areas which: 1) might have been pursued with 
greater depth; 2) were not pursued; or 3) were pursued but not included in this final 
version. Each research area and its potential to generate future contributions are now 
discussed. 
The first acknowledged limitation concerned a relatively minor attention to the 
2003-2008 period, when compared to the 1998-2002 period. A greater focus in the later 
period might have highlighted less dramatic and disruptive, but more on-going, gradual 
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and incremental changes. It would highlight repercussions, not from major innovations 
in techniques, but from fine-tuning those techniques and their usage. Importantly, the 
gradual nature of these changes may have promoted these to have taken a more 
“natural” appearance (see the last contributions in section 7.2). On the other hand, a 
greater focus on the later period might further illuminate more subtle and persistent 
processes of resistance. At the time of fieldwork, divergence, resistance and even 
rebellion still occurred at a local level. Central and local actors alike acknowledged that 
some issues still remained to be addressed, or were only recently solved. Further 
exploring the long term perspective of the original research question would further 
contribute to highlight that organisational work towards greater integration, visibility, 
control and power, including changes in techniques of discipline and production, “is an 
unending process and it is produced concurrently and episodically”, as Dechow and 
Mouritsen (2005, p. 691) argued by focusing on ERPs. 
As regards future work in areas not pursued (see the second type of limitations 
mentioned above), a clear example concerns the implementation of the SAP product 
costing module. The obtained empirical insights suggested that this new SAP module 
could be conceptualised as another innovation introduced in IndCo’s circuits of power, 
with significant similarities to (and some differences from) the SAP FI innovation. 
Further research on this additional innovation may build on and expand the present 
work. In addition, several respondents from different functional areas and hierarchical 
levels expressed very high expectations about an ambitioned change on the role of 
management accountants at a plant level (labelled as ‘plant controllers’ within the 
organisation). It was hoped and expected that plant controllers would start focusing 
mainly on qualitative analysis and business support, instead of transactional activities. 
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Pursuing this research avenue can provide significant contributions in a topic attracting 
recurrent attention in the literature (e.g., Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Granlund and 
Lukka, 1997; Jack and Kholeif, 2008; Järvenpää, 2007; Scapens and Jazayeri, 2003). 
As regards future work on avenues which were pursued but not included in this 
work (the third type of limitations identified above), one area is exploring the puzzle 
depicted in literature of why the introduction of ERP systems seemed to produce only 
“moderate impacts” on management accounting, and whether this was “a lag or 
permanent outcome” (Granlund and Malmi, 2002, p. 299, emphasis added). Early 
fieldwork focused on this issue, when evaluating whether the case organisation was 
actually a suitable empirical setting for the original research question, as discussed in 
section 4.1. Indeed, the initial concern with long-term interactions (between an ERP 
system, the consultants which implemented it and management accounting and control) 
reflected the “moderate impacts” puzzle. The setting was considered to be particularly 
adequate: the initial SAP cost accounting components were introduced in 1999 but 
integrated cost accounting only emerged in 2005 with the SAP product costing module, 
and its implementation only finished around 2007. Until then, there was scarce change 
in cost accounting at plant level. Oliveira (2007b) explored the technical, organisational 
and political interplays underlying (and justifying) the long process towards integrated 
cost accounting. Part of the explanation relied in path-dependency, a recurrent concept 
in institutional theory, which was applied to technical and organisational aspects. In 
addition, it also regarded path-dependency beyond the usual negative connotation of 
lock-ins constraining developments. It added a positive perspective to path-dependency, 
as pointing the ways towards further developments: because ‘something’ happened 
before, ‘something else’ becomes possible. This vision is briefly reflected in this thesis, 
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in the insights about the mutual dependencies of development of innovations: initially 
constraining (at an early stage of development) but later reinforcing (in later stages of 
development) (see section 7.1). Future work entails finalising these research topics. 
Another major research area not included in this thesis concerns the organisation 
performance measurement system, in particular of local actors. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the insights obtained on this topic highlighted its potential relevance. 
Future work may yield very important contributions, but it will also require significant 
additional fieldwork. 
Another major research avenue consists of addressing the institutional theory 
paradox of embedded agency (Seo and Creed, 2002). As mentioned in the previous 
section, this avenue was pursued but not completed for this work – largely due to the 
need to focus and restrict the overall dimension of the thesis. Early work has been 
presented in Oliveira (2007a), but was later substantially developed. One preliminary 
insight was introduced in 7.1.2.1, but its development was left for future work. 
Finishing this research avenue might require only limited additional, focused fieldwork. 
The main task would be to complete extant work-in-progress, which analyses 
contradictions within the organisation and the institutional embeddedness of key actors, 
mechanisms of creating awareness about contradictions and alternatives, and culminates 
in the integration of the frameworks of Seo and Creed (2002) and Clegg (1989) (in its 
revised form, in section 8.1) within one single framework.  
One potential approach to studying the paradox of embedded agency would 
draw on Seal and Mattimoe’s (2007) proposal of routinisation of change. These authors 
drew on Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’ to explain how change can 
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become routine, including at a company-level of analysis. In IndCo, the role of some 
organisation structures and policies supported this view. Some of these organisational 
structures were briefly mentioned in this thesis, such as the industrial benchmarking 
(INDBEST) department and the Business Processes and Organisation (BPO) 
department (see section 7.0). These departments, along with particular initiatives (e.g., 
the SSC initiative to foster the generation of new ideas, as briefly mentioned at the end 
of subsection 7.1.2) and human resources policies not mentioned in this work, 
structurally embedded a permanent focus on change within the organisational fabric. 
These organisational features intend to contribute to a permanent reflexivity, both at an 
individual and at a collective level. I.e., they intended, and apparently achieved, to 
routinise change. 
These organisational structures and processes have high organisational visibility 
and are under close monitoring. As such, the actors involved in them have strong 
incentives to continuously reflect over existing arrangements, promoting an awareness 
which counters the embeddedness advocated by traditional institutional theorists. As 
such, it is possible that these mechanisms, introduced in the circuit of systems 
integration (Clegg, 1989), may play a significant role in explaining the institutional 
paradox of embedded agency, without most mechanisms suggested by Seo and Creed 
(2002).  
This line of reasoning should not be overextended, though. In fact, the 
consideration that these initiatives intended to promote change, including in prevailing 
rules, should not neglect that there are different levels of rules (Clegg, 1975). Some 
rules are surface rules, while others correspond to deeper rules – as those in the ‘deep 
psychological realm’ that corresponds to institutionalised rules (see model in section 
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8.2). Although interviewees suggested that all rules can potentially be questioned, it 
should not be taken for granted that institutionalised rules are actually identified and 
questioned by actors and then potential proposals for change are actually further 
developed. It is likely that institutionalised rules, and in particular the wider premises of 
‘forms of life’, may lie beyond the reach of such embedded mechanisms, and routinised 
change may be restricted to more surface issues, leaving the deeper (and more 
fundamental) issues unchallenged. In addition to institutional literature, various strands 
of the power literature analysed in chapter 3 can contribute to this research avenue (e.g. 
Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963 and 1975 and the ‘community power’ debate; Lukes, 
2005 and the ‘third dimension’ of power; Foucault, 1975/1977, 1980, 1988 and the 
notion of a ‘constituted subject’; Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998 and the ‘fourth 
dimension’ of power; Clegg, 1989 and the integrated circuits of power). Pursuing these 
research avenues and hypotheses is left for future work. 
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APPENDIX 
 
QUOTATIONS REMOVED FROM THE MAIN TEXT 
 
 
Quotation #1, from 5.4.4 “Circuit of social integration” - 5.4.4.2 Organizational 
conditions – processes and structures”, in page 352: 
 
 
“There were different ways to use the systems. It depended a lot from who 
was responsible for the plant planning, because the tools people had were 
exactly the same (…). There was a great discrepancy in the methods of each 
plant. There were those who planned production twice a day, and therefore 
had the delivery dates one or two days later after the order arrival, at the 
most. But there were also other plants which did that sporadically, once a 
week, or a bit randomly, when the person had time. (…) And there was 
another important factor: the type of clients and the type of products of each 
plant. There are plants with (…) few clients and large volumes; those plants 
have a low tradition in that daily planning, because they don’t need it that 
much. But the main [factor] was actually the planner’s will and way of 
working. Regardless of all other considerations, they could all work in the 
same way (…) and confirm orders everyday, but they didn’t do it. 
Meetings were organized with the planners of the various plants, attempting 
to share experiences and uniformise work methods. But they always ended 
up by not producing great results, because planners always kept working 
the way they were used to, the way they knew and they though was best 
adapted to their case. 
There were still a few attempts, mainly due to the commercial units, those 
which put a stronger pressure [towards uniformity]. They had relations with 
7 or 8 plants; and there were those plants they called ‘well behaved’, which 
confirmed in a day, while other plants took 3 or 4 days. And the commercial 
units did not really understand these situations, and it was them who pushed 
the uniformisation attempt. But then, it was always blocked by some reason: 
or ‘because it was not possible, because that plant doesn’t work that way’; 
or ‘because the planner has no time, because in that plant, the planner also 
has additional responsibilities, and so he cannot run the planning 
everyday’… There were always a number of reasons and impediments, and 
it was never achieved that all the plants worked exactly in the same way”. 
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Quotation #2, from 6.1.6 “Re-examining motivations for the design options and the 
role of the accounting and finance area” - 6.1.6.2 “SAP FI initial 
configuration as a result of strategically-phased mobilisation efforts?”, in 
page 412: 
 
 
“Probably, those decisions [which led to preserve previous configurations] 
are not as coordinated as you are suggesting. I don’t know if it is very 
normal that the Executive Committee deeply reflects about the chart of 
accounts [voice suggesting slight irony]. There are people in the company 
who have a greater technical knowledge of those areas; perhaps a 
consultant or a systems integrator may help, make a proposal, justify it, it 
looks good, and we move one. It is not obligatory to reflect about all the 
systems, at all times. As time advances, that will happen. But I would NOT 
[emphasis] say that admitting diverse charts of accounts was a strategic, 
deliberate option, in the sense of advocating autonomy… It was not, 
certainly. Perhaps, at the time, [it was thought] ‘making a common chart of 
accounts today will cause a tremendous mess. So, the best is to leave it, for 
now…’. Isn’t it? (…) 
The issue of resistance to change, sometimes, is expressed through 
arguments which are valid. Maybe the strongest of all is the loss of [past] 
references. People are always afraid to… [interruption] They say they 
accept change, easily, etc… but [they add that] ‘it’s necessary to safeguard 
the references’. And that’s a very strong way to resist to change. It’s not 
easy to argue that ‘No, what is good, is to loose references, rethink 
everything from the start’. So, that leads, many times, to a more cautious 
management, more prudent, more conservative, which does not take so 
vigorous steps towards change, so that some references are maintained. 
I recall that the debates about Information Systems were: ‘What we need is 
that some things are common. After that, what happens in the middle… [it’s 
not important]. [Provided that] sales figures, EBITDA, etc… [are the same, 
that’s enough]. Beyond this, if people have different approaches, it’s not so 
critical. In the sense of, always, trying to provide some space, some 
autonomy, and maintain, not change everything at the same time. I don’t 
know if it’s the best way, but that’s life”. 
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Quotation #3, from 7.2.4 “Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of 
social integration - preliminary contributions - 7.2.4.2 “A first 
contribution: an empirical validation of Ribeiro’s (2003) hypotheses”, in 
page 559: 
 
“For someone who is looking from outside, I think it is quite visible: 
information systems act a lot like a striker, in terms of acculturation to 
ZZZ’s methodologies”. “When I say ‘implementing SAP’, it’s mostly in the 
perspective of implementing processes. ‘Let’s format these people to our 
way of working’. 
If it weren’t for the [SAP] systems [implemented in a recently acquired 
plant], it would have never been possible for the Spanish commercial unit to 
work with that plant the way they work today. The Spanish commercial 
[unit] is very aggressive, (…) it has people focused on analysing what is 
going on in the plant in terms of the [production] process. (…) SAP allows 
them to be constantly calling the plant, asking ‘Where is this product? I see 
in the system that it is still in production (…) You confirmed [the order] to 
day Y and I still don’t have it’. This aggressiveness and this control are only 
possible with this type of implementation. (…). 
Acculturation, in the sense of… For example, in ZZZ, commercial units 
attribute a great deal of importance to the [delivery] date confirmed to the 
client. There is a culture of ‘I place my order, I want to know when it will be 
produced’. This plant did not have that culture. And all ZZZ works this way. 
(…) The system, by itself, by itself, imposes that when someone makes an 
order, there is a confirmed [delivery] date. And that confirmed date is then 
controlled (…) 
In the production area, ZZZ wants the plants to define the production cycle. 
[Details omitted to preserve confidentiality]. One of the things we do – and 
which has nothing to do with the system, but the system allows doing – is 
that the IS team already has that defined strategy. (…) ‘You will have to 
define what we call block planning [details omitted]’ By doing this 
[definition of the production cycle], we are immediately conditioning all the 
plant planning. And they don’t even have the chance to say they don’t want 
it. That is imposed; and it is imposed by the systems [team], which is a 
curious thing. They impose, but then of course there is the support of all the 
structure behind. But the systems [team], by themselves, impose that way of 
working, because it’s the way that all [emphasis] the company works. That 
is a way to acculturate the way of working of the entire company.”  
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Quotation #4, from 7.2.5 “Repercussions of the network of innovations in the circuit of 
social integration – main theoretical contributions” - 7.2.5.6 “Minimise 
additional work for local actors’ compliance – and increase work for 
noncompliance”, in page 583: 
 
 
Respondent: “A new product, which has never been made… First, you have 
to create the code. If there is no code, there is no order. [It can also 
happen] that there is a code but for some reason there is no technical list 
[the BOM], because it is does not fit the rules [that creates the BOMs]. The 
order is recorded, but it has no confirmed date. Full stop. (…) It is not 
planned, it has no confirmed date. (…) 
Researcher: For someone who wants to quickly deliver an order to the 
client, it is certainly a problem… 
Respondent: Someone who wants to quickly deliver the order to the client, 
calls the plant and the [machine] will do what they ask and loads a truck. 
And here goes a [manual] shipping order… 
Researcher: I.e., if the order cannot fit in the system entirely, the order will 
stay completely outside the system… 
Respondent: I never saw a truck not leaving a plant because it didn’t have a 
shipping order created by the system. It may have waited a bit longer, but at 
the end of half an hour ‘Forget it, make the paper and go’. 
Researcher: That is one of those typical situations which will generate 
information inconsistencies… 
Respondent: Of course, and people have indications to avoid all this. 
Because we know that creates a number of problems to retrieve information. 
To retrieve a shipping order, is a real pain. We can’t create an invoice; 
stock control requires turnarounds; we have to keep all the tags and then 
read all the tags… A complete mess! [Operational] people, because they 
know the trouble of retrieving all the information a posteriori, think twice 
before they do such a thing. 
Researcher: But when the pressure and need is high, ‘here it goes’… 
Respondent: I don’t have the faintest doubt! [Laughter].”  
 
